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Synopsis 
The primary aim of this work is to provide a social and a cultural history of British 
soldiers who served in Ireland during the revolutionary period stretching from the 
Easter Rising of 1916 to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921. As such, it 
represents the first concerted attempt to view the period though the eyes of the 
soldiery and both challenge and corroborate `received' views of the military's role in 
the conflict. Previous accounts have tended to cast the military in a peripheral role; 
this study restores troops to the centre ground. In so doing, it will demonstrate that 
soldiers had a crucial role to play in shaping both military policy and (by reaction) the 
nature of the rebel campaign. It will also reveal the military's part in influencing 
Anglo-Irish relations for the worse by contributing to a culture of vigilantism in the 
Crown forces. 
By tapping into a wealth of previously unexploited sources including soldiers' 
memoirs, letters, war diaries and regimental journals, the study will explore soldiers' 
quotidian service life and bring fresh perspectives to the military history of the period. 
It will explore central themes such as isolation, endurance, recrimination and revenge. 
A further chapter (incorporating post-conflict analyses) will uncover how these 
experiences formed the soldiers' assessments of the political and military aspects of 
the period, as well as their opinion of the Irish nation and people. 
Above all, this study will build on approaches which move away from the 
paradigm of (narrative based) military-political studies of the period which have 
tended to obscure the role both of individuals and of non-elites. In so doing, it will 
restore the importance of `fighting' and `front-line' experience as a major determinant 
of the conflict and the period. 
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Introduction 
The rich and flourishing tradition of biographical and scholarly investigation into the 
Irish War of Independence has provided students of the period with a solid foundation 
upon which to develop fresh lines of enquiry. In recent years, a number of eminent 
historians working in the field have stressed the need for new thematic and 
methodological approaches to tackle, amongst other issues, the relationship of Ulster 
to the war, the basis for a violent conflict, the necessity for violence in achieving a 
settlement, and the comparative dimensions linking the Irish War of Independence to 
later conflicts and revolutionary episodes. ' 
There can be little doubt that pioneering studies in these areas would greatly 
enrich our understanding of the period (particularly in relation to the `unfinished' 
aspects of the War). However, it is difficult to imagine how we can strive towards 
new understandings, particularly in relation to comparative studies, when several of 
the key players in the conflict, notably the military, have yet to fully engage the 
attention of scholars. With this in mind, this thesis will seek to restore the regular 
army to the centre-ground of the conflict. In so doing it will demonstrate an approach 
that emphasises the importance of front-line `cultural' and `social' experiences as a 
determining factor in conflict. It will further explore the motivating factors that drove 
soldiers' actions, and establish how these were influenced by core factors such as 
1 Michael Hopkinson has suggested that `partitionist attitudes on both sides of the border' have been an 
obstacle to a more holistic approach that would establish the conflict as more than 'a twenty six county 
affair'. He has also called for further investigation into the relationship between a violent conflict and 
the eventual scope of the Treaty that established the Irish Free State. See The Irish War of 
Independence (Dublin, 2004) pp. xix - xx; 'Negotiation: The Anglo-Irish War and the Revolution' in 
J. Augusteijn (ed. ), The Irish Revolution 1913-23 (Basingstoke, 2002) pp. 123-4; Both Peter Hart and 
Charles Townshend have stressed the need to produce further comparative studies of the conflict. 
Townshend has suggested this as a means by which to assess the extent to which 'revolution' is a 
useful or problematic term when applied to the Irish War of Independence, see `Historiography: 
Telling the Irish Revolution' in Augusteijn, Ibid, pp. 1-2,4,7,13. Peter Hart has asserted that the 
comparative study of other `mass movements, citizens' revolts, and guerrilla wars of liberation' should 
be utilised 'to generate new questions and answers' and restore Ireland to 'the analytical canon' of 
revolution studies, see The I. R. A. at War 1916-23 (Oxford, 2003) pp 6,29. 
2 In terms of published works there have been very few attempts to link the Irish War of Independence 
to other conflicts. One notable exception is T. Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security: The Case of 
Ireland 1916-21 and Palestine 1936-39 (London, 1977) in which the author contrasts the relative 
success of the Irish uprising, based on robust fighting, intelligence, communication, and propaganda 
networks, with the failure of Palestinian rebels to develop a similarly comprehensive organisational 
structure. 
government policy, operational strategy, living conditions, insurgency. community 
relations and political and ethnic identities. 
For example, in the case of military reprisals it is clear that soldiers' motivations 
cannot simply be extrapolated from statements issued by a government and military 
authority that singularly failed to understand or control reprisals throughout the 
period. Rather, it is argued, a whole range of political, cultural, psychological and 
sociological factors need to be invoked. What is needed here is a more holistic 
approach linking policy and front-line experience and establishing the order of action 
and reaction, from top to bottom and vice versa. 
The role of the military has often been demonised in contemporary and 
nationalist accounts or, less forgivably, ignored altogether by more objective 
historians. 3 Even many traditional `sensational fighting narratives' with their pungent 
presentations of revolutionary violence, have often failed to find a place amongst the 
revolutionary crowd for the British ``Tommy". 4 Seemingly outperformed in terms of 
aggression and brutality by their colleagues in the new R. I. C., soldiers have usually 
failed to make the final cut for a role in the nationalist foundation epic and, despite 
some pioneering research, they have never quite engaged the full attention of students 
or scholars of the period. 5 For example, historian Richard English in his engaging 
narrative account Armed Struggle: The History of the I. R. A. failed even to mention 
the British Army in relation to the I. R. A. until the deployment of British troops to 
Northern Ireland in August 1969 following clashes between the police and the 
Catholic community in Derry. For the early period he focused almost exclusively on 
the development of the I. R. A. via an antagonism against the civil authority. 6 
It is hoped that the themes explored in this study will help to restore some 
balance: this study will be the first to provide a dedicated analysis of the British army 
in Ireland during the period in question. The need to understand the motivations of 
3 With reference to the demonisation of the military, see in particular, Tom Barry, Guerrilla Days in 
Ireland (Tralee, 1971) and Sean Moylan, In His Own Words: His Memoir of the Irish War of 
Independence, (Aubane, 2004). Moylan focused his criticism solely on the military, sometimes in part 
exoneration of the R. I. C. 
4 The phrase `sensational fighting narrative' is borrowed from Hopkinson, The Irish War of 
Independence, p. xix. 
5 Alvin Jackson commenting on unionist and republican literature of the 1920's and 30's observed ho\N 
the `Irish Free State was ... supplied with a revolutionary mythology and 
hagiography bý, its scholarly 
and polemical defenders... reaching a literary apex with Ernie O'Malley's, On Another Man's Wound 
(1936)' this process has been variously referred to as the 'creation myth' or `foundation epic' of 
modern Ireland. See 'Irish Unionism' in D. G. Boyce and Alan O'Day, The Making of Modern Irish 
History: Revisionism and the Revisionist Controversy (London, 1996) p. 126. 
6 R. English, Armed Struggle: The History of the I. R. A. (London, 2003) 
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soldiers and how these were determined by their quotidian service life will provide 
the rationale for the research presented in this thesis. By exploring the culture of 
service life in Ireland, this study will engage a methodological and conceptual 
approach that will seek to define culture via categories of enquiry based on issues 
such as `ethnicity', `race', `violence', `power', `relationships' `community', 
`geography', `class', `periodization' and even 'social psychology'. All of which are 
burgeoning elements in the recent historiography of the period. 7 
Sources 
The conflict is remarkable for the volume and the variety of source material that was 
generated. This richness of detail has allowed the likes of Fitzpatrick, Hart, Farry and 
Coleman to produce detailed micro-studies of communities, families and even low- 
profile individuals within specific localities. 8 Indeed, the conflict has proved to be 
especially fertile ground for the meticulous researcher, as Hart has claimed: 
`practically the only limit to enquiry is that created by the historian's imagination. '9 
In the interest of providing an imaginative and analytical approach to the available 
material, this study will bring to light several under-exploited sources, including a 
number of unpublished diaries and memoirs generated by troops during this period. 
Through a diachronic analysis of previously unexplored regimental journals, digests 
of service and war diaries, this study will trace the development of a culture of fear 
and discontent in the Irish garrison. A careful reading of official service records, 
regimental histories and War Office and Cabinet Office files should also lend support 
to this analysis. These sources should also allow further connections to be established 
between official policy, military strategy and front-line experience. By contrasting 
7 Many of these elements have formed lines of enquiry in the work of (amongst others) Coleman, 
Farry, Hart and Fitzpatrick (see footnote 8). In particular, Peter Hart has recently highlighted the 
potential for a `a new revolutionary history' based around these categories of enquiry which would 
make full use of the broad range of source materials originating from the period. See Hart, The I. R. A. 
at War, pp. 3 -29. 
a See D. Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life 1913-1921: Provincial Experience of War and Revolution, 
(Dublin, 1977); Peter Hart, The IRA and Its Enemies, Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-23 
(Oxford, 1998); Michael Farry, Sligo 1914-1921: A Chronicle of Conflict (Trim, 1992); The Aftermath 
of Revolution: Sligo 1921-23 (Dublin, 2000) and Marie Coleman, County Longford and the Irish 
Revolution, 1919-1923 (Dublin, 2003). 
9 Hart, The I. R. A. at War, p. 6. 
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and supplementing sources in this way, this study will espouse the cultural aspects of 
military life in Ireland as a determining factor in shaping the pattern of hostilities. 
This study will also bring fresh perspectives by incorporating contemporary 
investigative journalism as a tool of analysis. By harnessing the most penetrating 
journalistic enquiries from the time it should be possible to establish a counterpoint to 
the wealth of military source material. 10 In addition, a balance of adroit journalistic 
sources should allow for a greater appreciation of background events; in a war driven 
by rumour, mythology, speculation and polished propaganda, it is important to 
examine the background to the lofty claims made by participants on both sides. 
Despite the quantity and the diversity of the sources available for a study of this 
kind, it would be unwise to proceed without considering their limitations. The most 
obvious drawback to the use of diaries and memoirs is the (rather self evident) fact 
that they restrict the researcher to accounts compiled by those who chose to record 
their experiences. Those who did were usually motivated by the exceptional nature of 
their period of service, and consequently any qualitative analysis of diaries and 
memoirs will always exhibit bias towards a sensationalized view of events. This 
factor will also make the study more area specific, with a disproportionate amount of 
recorded material arising from the most active areas such as West Cork or Dublin 
District. Added to this, a sharp escalation in rebel activity in the final year of the 
conflict has tended to detract attention from the formative events of the earlier period. 
It is also important to recognize that many soldiers, especially those recalling an 
earlier period, were likely to have regarded Irish service as an unremarkable interval 
in their military careers and certainly not one that inspired them to record their 
experiences for posterity. Those who did probably had very personal reasons for 
doing so and, we can fairly assume, would be unlikely to make their memoirs 
available in public archives. 
The Anglocentric nature of military sources is another important consideration 
for a study of this kind, especially so given that very few of the many Irish soldiers 
who served in the British army appear to have left written records of the period. It is 
not altogether clear whether this resulted from a conflict of emotions or whether Irish 
ex-servicemen were simply loath to dwell on their service with the British army. 
'o See (in particular) reports, editorials and articles published in The Times, 1919-1921; also H. Martin 
Ireland in Insurrection (London, 1921); H. W. Nevinson, Last Changes, Last Chances (Plymouth. 
1928) and Wilfred Ewart, A Journey in Ireland, 1921 (London, 1922). 
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Certainly, those who remained were an especially conspicuous group in post-Treaty 
l Ireland, and a common target for militant republicans. " 
Many accounts of the period were also compiled several years after the events' 
that they describe which tends to create both constraints and advantages for 
researchers. On the one hand, this phenomenon can contribute towards more 
dispassionate and considered accounts, on the other, a delayed retrospective analysis 
also has the potential to misrepresent a person's true feelings or experiences during 
the period in question. The delay between an event being experienced and being 
recorded tends to increase the fallibility of memory, and reliability is further 
compromised by a condition of memory known as `paramnesia', in which events 
become `distorted, telescoped, transposed or otherwise confused' over time. 12 It is 
hoped that a diligent approach involving a broad range of source materials can help to 
limit the potentially misleading effects of bias and false memory. Furthermore, the 
legacy of previous research, particularly the detailed reconstructions of both major 
and minor events, should allow for an appropriate use of secondary literature as a 
means by which to eliminate some of these inherent problems. 
Historiographical context 
General 
In terms of research and scholarship, the period has been subject to the detailed 
analysis of participants and historians alike. These works (varying greatly in quality) 
have tended to approach the period from a biographical perspective or via a particular 
narrative thread. Therefore, students of the period are first struck by the lack of any 
general narrative text reconciling the political, military, social and, economic aspects 
of the period into a coherent whole. 13 This lack of an interconnected narrative has 
11 See J. Leonard `Getting Them at Last: The I. R. A. and Ex-servicemen' in D. Fitzpatrick (ed) 
Revolution? Ireland 1917-23 (Dublin, 1999), and Hart, The IRA and Its Enemies, pp. 293-315. 
12 In the foreword to his memoir, Dublin Made Me (Dublin, 1979), C. S. Andrews acknowledged that 
his account was written mainly from memory. He therefore disclaimed `any intention of writing a 
historical account of these years', p. 7. 
13 Hopkinson's The Irish War of Independence, J. M. Curran's The Birth of the Irish Free State 1921-23 
(Alabama 1980) and C. Townshend's The British Campaign 1919-1921: The Development of Political 
and Military Policies (Oxford, 1975) are probably the most comprehensive accounts of the period 
currently available. 
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often compelled the student to approach the period largely through a reading of 
specialized monographs, localised studies, biographies and memoirs. " 
The dominant (auto)biographical history of the period looks set to be further 
boosted by the recent release of 1,800 statements made to the [Irish] Bureau of 
Military History between 1947 and 1957. Established by the de Valera government in 
order to capture the everyday experiences of participants in the conflict, this 
collection was, after a number of delays, finally opened by the Taoiseach in March 
2003. In terms of published material, the first fruit of this release was Sean Moylan's 
brilliantly readable account In His Own Words. 15 
In terms of secondary literature, historians, military strategists and social 
geographers have, amongst others, scoured the period for insights and produced an 
abundance of published works. This diverse output has included studies of the 
machinations of irregular conflict, as in Taber's Study of Guerrilla Warfare, or a 
chronicle of governmental failure as in O'Halpin's The Decline of the Union or John 
McColgan's British Policy and the Irish Administration. 16 Other authors have isolated 
disparate groups in the struggle, for example, Buckland's account centred on the 
experiences of unionists, Conlan provided a valuable study of women revolutionaries 
and Bradley focused on the history of farm labourers in the struggle. '7 In contrast, 
Michael Hopkinson has provided the most complete (multi-dimensional) account of 
the conflict in his study The Irish War of Independence. The strength of Hopkinson"s 
14 Particularly useful specialized monographs have included A. D. Harvey, `Who were the Auxiliaries?, 
Historical Journal (Sept, 1992); J. Leonard `Getting Them at Last'; P. Hart, `The Thompson 
Submachine Gun in Ireland revisited', Irish Sword (Summer, 1995). For a list of the most prominent 
regional studies (see footnote 8). Recommended biographical accounts include T. P. Coogan, Michael 
Collins: A Biography, (London, 1990); D. Fitzpatrick, Harry Boland's Irish Revolution (Cork, 2003); 
R. English, Ernie O'Malley, I. R. A. Intellectual (Oxford, 1998); T. Ryle Dwyer, Big Fellow, Long 
Fellow: A Joint Biography of Collins and de Valera (Dublin, 1999); M. G. Valiulis, Portrait of a 
Revolutionary: General Sir Richard Mulcahy and the Founding of the Irish Free State (Dublin, 1992). 
The most famous memoirs to emerge from the period include: General Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of 
an Active Life, Two Volumes (London, 1924); Dan Breen, My Fight for Irish Freedom (Tralee 1964) 
[possibly ghostwritten]; Michael Brennan, The War in Clare 1911-1921: Personal Memoirs of the War 
of Independence (Dublin, 1980); Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland; Andrews, Dublin Made Ale, and 
Ernie O'Malley, On Another Man's Wound, (Dublin, 1979). 
`s Moylan, In His Own Words. Although these contributions were recorded as Witness Statements to 
the Bureau of Military History, they did, in some cases provide lengthy overviews of the period as a 
whole and sometimes ran to several hundred pages. Moylan's account, for example, is 136 pages long 
and covers all the major milestones in his life from childhood to the truce of July 1921. 
16 R. Taber, The War of the Flea. A study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice. See chapter VII 
The Irish Troubles and the Role of the Black and Tans' (New York, 1965); E. O'Halpin, The Decline 
of the Union: British Government in Ireland 1892-1920 (Dublin, 1987); J. McColgan, British Polier 
and the Irish Administration (London, 1983). 
" P. Buckland, The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland 1885-1922, (Dublin, 1972); L. Conlan, Cumann na 
mban and the women of Ireland 1913-25, (Kilkenny, 1969); D. Bradley, Farm Labourers and the Irish 
Struggle 1900-1976, (Belfast, 1988). 
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work lies in his ability to portray the outstanding characters and events of the conflict 
whilst simultaneously highlighting more oblique and specialized themes. 18 Therefore, 
despite the broad ambition of his study, his focus on regional variations in the 
experience of conflict, and his concern for the minutiae of local events, has allied his 
work with the very best regional studies to emerge in recent years. The use of themed 
chapters with relevant chronologies also provides a narrative and thematic strength 
that, combined with an impressive scope of research, should establish the account as a 
general text for students of the period. 
Of particular relevance to this study is a chapter exploring the uneasy deployment 
of the British forces during this period. The evacuation of R. I. C. barracks in rural 
areas in late 1919 and early 1920 is recognised as a mistaken withdrawal of British 
power from active areas at a time when military reinforcement could have relieved 
the situation for the police. To Hopkinson, it was this retreat that allowed republican 
militias to become the de facto civil authority in rural areas and, as such, represented 
`the most decisive development of the War of Independence' necessitating the later 
introduction of the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries, to win back the ground lost by 
the R. I. C. 19 However, this `ground... could never be fully recovered' due to `half 
measures' in government policy arising from a consistent failure to place the conflict 
on a war footing. 20 Therefore, despite the more `military' character of the conflict in 
the later period, the army were never elevated far beyond a subordinate role to the 
civil authority. 
Hopkinson highlighted two significant events that could be said to illustrate the 
military's ambiguous role in the conflict. The first concerned the government's failure 
to capitalise on search and arrest operations during the early part of 1920. New 
powers aimed at securing the arrest and deportation of suspects, were continually 
undermined by flawed police intelligence and by the government's retreat from its 
own policy. The most significant volle face on the part of the government eventually 
resulted in the release of convicted prisoners following a series of hunger strikes in 
April 1920. The second notable event concerned was the capture and imprisonment of 
Brigadier General Lucas in June 1920. To Hopkinson, this episode highlighted all the 
18 Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence. The broad scope of Hopkinson's study is demonstrated 
by a wide variety of chapters including (among others) studies of the background to the Irish 
revolution, British administration, the Dail government, the British security forces, guerrilla warfare 
and the pro-republican relationship between Ireland and America. 
19 Hopkinson, The Irish War of In dependence, p. 47. 
20 Ibid, pp. 50-51. 
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key elements of the army's irregular role in the conflict. As a respected military 
figure, the ease with which Lucas was captured, his failure to take adequate 
precautions, his time spent enjoying the hospitality of his captors, and finally, his 
calamitous escape, were a deep source of embarrassment for the military. His 
treatment also highlighted the differential status of policeman and soldiers at this 
stage of the conflict. As Hopkinson asserted, it became (after the capture of Lucas) 
`inconceivable that senior military personnel should be unprotected when off duty. ' 
This situation heralded the military's total immersion in the conflict from mid 1920.21 
Hopkinson's observations concerning the military (though insightful) were less 
developed than his analysis of the geographical spread of the conflict and the 
psychological purpose of guerrilla warfare. His account suggests that the uneven 
dispersal and the sporadic nature of I. R. A. operations (both between and within 
districts) was no real impediment to the success of a guerrilla campaign that made 
great currency from small-scale individual actions. In a rebuke to the traditional 
presentation, Hopkinson suggested that the scale or frequency of operations was not 
crucial to success in the conflict, but rather that the success of a guerrilla force is 
partly built on myth: from a British perspective it was a sinister, shadowy, intangible 
and ubiquitous presence threatening them anywhere and at any time. ' 22 
Regional Studies 
Equally valuable regional and intra-regional studies have proliferated in the last 15 
years. These studies have tended to focus on the general experience of conflict within 
specific regions and, via event based reconstructions and analytical narratives, have 
yielded valuable insights into the variety of military experiences in Ireland. This 
historiographical strain was largely inspired by the publication of David Fitzpatrick's 
Politics and Irish Life in 1977. Fitzpatrick set out to understand the interaction of 
politics and social experience at a provincial level and, despite his main focus on Irish 
political behaviour in County Clare, was careful not to separate members of the 
Crown forces from `the psychological power that popular movements exert upon the 
individual. '23 His account also highlighted the diminishing status of the soldiery in 
21 Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence, p. 53. 
22 Ibid, p. 201. 
23 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life 1913-21, p. 22. 
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Clare, as it developed from an `insider' status to eventual isolation from the bulk of 
the community. Despite this, he claimed that active rebels proved less willing to 
engage the army in combat than the police, and soldiers were, until 1921, able to 
patrol the streets without fear of molestation. To Fitzpatrick, their estrangement from 
the Irish people resulted from self-imposed isolation rather than `cruel social 
ostracism' and this separation led to a general malaise that seriously undermined their 
professionalism. 4 As republican violence intensified during 1921 much of the 
resulting frustration gave rise to revenge attacks. 
Fitzpatrick's study was an early attempt to relate political developments to 
community life. His thematic approach opened up the social, psychological and 
anthropological aspects of the period, and these strands have allowed later scholars to 
reach a new appreciation of the period. In particular, Peter Hart (a student of 
Fitzpatrick) has provided important provincial perspectives in respect of the socio- 
political aspects of the period. His account, The I. R. A. and its Enemies captured the 
experiences of Irish volunteers, civilians, policemen and soldiers in the flashpoints of 
County Cork. Like Fitzpatrick, he was primarily concerned with the motivating 
factors behind insurgency, and yet his book serves as a `wake-up call' for historians 
of the British army. Unlike Fitzpatrick's presentation of a military detached from the 
main experience, Hart described how, from an early stage, the army became 
embroiled in a cycle of terror and counter-terror. Furthermore, he highlighted the 
processes by which an irregular conflict resulted in a disparity of advantage in favour 
of the rebels, a factor which had serious implications for military professionalism. 
Hart was also anxious to convey the similarity of experiences between British 
infantrymen and Irish guerrillas, particularly in relation to the shared sense of 
isolation resulting from a hostile climate. To both sides, the landscape was `suffused 
with danger' and this compound of fear, isolation and chronic fatigue manifested 
itself in the form of reprisals, death squads and revenge attacks which converged to 
create a `dynamic of escalation' driven by a `reciprocal siege mentality. '25 
A strikingly different revolutionary experience was suggested by Michael Farry 
for County Sligo both during and after the Anglo-Irish conflict. Farry described how 
the military (in common with the civil population) never became as deeply involved 
in the revolutionary cycle as their colleagues in Tipperary, Cork or Dublin. This 
2; Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life 1913-21, p. 26. 
25 Hart, The I. RA. and its Enemies, pp. 96,102,108. 
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resulted, largely, from the unwillingness of local Volunteers to organise and combine 
against British forces in the area. During 1918, when arms raids on R. I. C barracks 
became commonplace in active areas, Volunteers in Sligo were not yet sufficiently 
numerous to mount a parallel campaign. By the time that adequate battalion strength 
had been established for this purpose. the R. I. C. had already abandoned their outposts 
and the Sligo I. R. A. had effectively `missed the boat. '26 Despite the best efforts of 
local republican activist Frank Carty, the Volunteers were never to recover from this 
deficiency of armaments and the Crown forces were subject to fewer enemy attacks 
than in other areas. In turn, a dearth of significant I. R. A. actions against the forces of 
the Crown produced fewer notable reprisals: `When attacks and deaths did take place 
the reprisals were limited in area and intensity. None resulted in loss of life, nor was 
there any civilian death as a result of other Crown forces activity. ' 27 Consequently, 
there was no real escalation in the cycle of violence which may have converted local 
republican sympathies into more active rebellion against the Crown forces. Unlike 
Hart's description of the situation in West Cork, the relationship between local 
republicans and British soldiers was never defined by a murderous animosity. 
A very different experience again was suggested by Marie Coleman in her 
account County Longford and the Irish Revolution 1910-1923. In her introduction, 
Coleman stated her intention to produce an exclusive `study of Irish nationalism' 
within a specific county, and yet her account did in passing' offer some particularly 
useful insights into the predicament of the Crown forces within a specific and 
anomalous locality. 28 
Coleman claimed that `proportionate to its population, Longford was more 
violent than any other county in Leinster... and was the most violent county in the 
country outside Munster. '29 For the military, the rebels' impressive work-rate 
prompted a response in kind; troops were engaged in a variety of counter measures 
consisting mainly of raids, arrests, patrols and area searches. By far the most 
significant operation was launched in May 1921 when joint police and military 
patrols scoured the 5th Division area for I. R. A. suspects and secured 600 arrests of 
which twenty-eight were detained. 30 Despite these successes, troops were subject to a 
26 Farry, The . Aftermath of 
Revolution, pp. 8-9. 
27 Ibid, p. 16. 
2' Coleman, County Longford, p. 7. 
29 Ibid, p. 5. 
30 Ibid, p. 131. 
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relentless campaign by a numerically deficient I. R. A. battalion and the combined 
efforts of the military and the local I. R. A. eventually led the military to impose a 
curfew order in January 1921, in preference to full martial law. 
Joost Augusteijn placed regional studies of the conflict on a new level by 
highlighting important local perspectives, and establishing a valuable comparative 
dimension. Particularly useful for this study was his attempt to understand how 
soldiers and policemen reacted to the demands of conflict. Of the police, he claimed 
`they either resigned, stayed but attempted to remain out of trouble or, or met 
violence with violence' an assessment that could easily be extended to the military if 
`resignation' were understand to mean `desertion' or `forced incapacity. ' 31 
Augusteijn also forwarded his own theory to explain differential levels of 
violence between counties. Unlike Hart's later description of escalating violence in 
County Cork, he recognised that a `tit for tat' pattern of violence in some areas co- 
existed with `downward spirals' in the level of violence in others. Where violence 
escalated further violence in County Cork - in the counties of Mayo, Wexford and 
Derry violent incidents met with a cautious response on both sides. Augusteijn also 
demonstrated how violence could also diminish violence where news of police, 
military or rebel atrocities in active areas discouraged similar actions on the part of 
troops, policemen and nationalists in quiet areas. Therefore, rather than nurture 
violent tendencies, the most common reaction to violence was a heightened survival 
instinct: 
Volunteers everywhere were well aware that violence against the 
Crown forces would engender violence against them, and many 
consequently remained inactive ... The attempts 
by many 
Volunteer officers to keep killings to a minimum stimulated 
similar diligence on the other side. This was occasionally the 
start of a downward spiral in the level of violence, leading 
eventually to an unofficial stand off. 32 
Anxiety, fear, hesitancy and self-preservation are much overlooked elements in the 
study of conflict and their effect on combatants is crucial in determining the nature of 
31 J. Augusteijn, From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare - The Experiences of Ordinary Volunteers 
in the Irish War of Independence, (Dublin, 1996) p. 222. 
32 Ibid, p. 223. 
11 
engagements. In Ireland, a fear of the consequences of violence had the effect of 
drawing many areas into a military stalemate. 
Despite this, in areas where the pattern of violence did become established, all 
combatants became prone to violent offensives as a means bey which to eliminate any 
further threat: 
Fear guided the behaviour of many in the Crown forces. Minor 
sniping attacks often resulted in an indiscriminate fusillade from 
the barracks. The men cooped up inside, scared by stories of 
attacks elsewhere were extremely nervous. When caught in an 
ambush, their reaction was similarly indiscriminate. 33 
According to Augusteijn, many Crown troops graduated from defending their 
positions to rampaging through towns and villages in an effort to eliminate their 
opponents. Whether in attack or retreat, their actions usually resulted from a 
heightened sense of self-preservation, which in turn lead to a `growing familiarity 
with bloodshed. '34 
Military Studies 
Whereas the role of the military is threaded through many regional studies, it has 
never formed the main focus of study. Nonetheless, Con Costello's meticulous 
account A Most Delightful Station: The British Army on the Curragh of Kildare, 
1855-1922, despite being mainly concerned with the historic links between the 
military and civilians in Irish garrison towns, did provide an exclusive military 
perspective on the period. The emphasis of Costello's account differed greatly from 
other treatments of the military during the period. His account covers the 
development of military culture and barrack life from the establishment of a camp at 
the Curragh in March 1855 to the final withdrawal of British forces in May 1922. A 
lively description of the social scene that developed between the military and the 
local populace is particularly vivid in his account. Costello revealed how Kildare's 
traditionally gentrified social life, (involving racing, polo, cricket and shooting) was 
boosted by the influx of `gentlemanly' officers who immersed themselves in a virtual 
33 Augusteijn, From Public Defiance, p. 227. 
Ihid, p. 246. 
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colonial playground. Likewise, the lower ranks (more restricted by the demands of 
training and the drill season) embraced the sporting [and educational] opportunities 
of the district' including `reading-rooms and libraries, cricket and football matches, 
with shooting clubs and all other attractions enumerated therein. ' 35 Costello's account 
also recalled how the military acquired an entourage of civilians of all classes 
attracted by `military revues, field days, manoeuvres, or ceremonial celebrations for 
royal birthdays. '36 Despite the burgeoning conflict, the most remarkable feature of 
Costello's account is the sense of continuity that he conveys between periods in the 
history of the British army on the Curragh. Despite the 'troubles', Costello wrote that 
the `the British military did not neglect its traditions or its sporting events ... 
Nery 
Sports Day at Newbridge in September 1920... attracted a large audience of military 
and civilian friends. '37 Even as late as April 1921, a military football match held at 
Newbridge attracted an enthusiastic civilian crowd and officers felt secure enough to 
continue to attend the Curragh races. 38 Above all, Costello's account of life on the 
Curragh suggested that the rebel campaign was never determined enough to splinter 
the historic links between the civilian population of Kildare and the British army. 
Costello's account provided a valuable insight into the experiences of the army in 
a unique area of traditional military influence during a period of rapid political and 
social change. By contrast, Charles Townshend's account of The British Campaign in 
Ireland 1919-21, (though not a dedicated analysis of the regular army) was the first 
and still the most important account of the wider employment of British military and 
paramilitary forces in response to the I. R. A. campaign. 39 It also represented the first 
proper institutional and policy study' of the period `and the first to register 
bureaucratic and political structures and decision making as a systematic focus of 
investigation'. 40 Townshend's main purpose was to demonstrate that modern state 
power had failed to respond adequately to the republican challenge. To this end, his 
study presented official discourses and disputes between (and within) the government 
and the military authorities, in response to an effective republican guerrilla campaign. 
35 C. Costello, A Most Delightful Station: The British Army on the Curragh of Kildare, Ireland, 1855- 
1922 (Cork, 1999) p. 177. 
36 Ibid, p. 178. 
37 Nery Sports day was held to commemorate a heroic action by L. Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery 
which resulted in the capture of German guns at Nery in Belgium in September 1914. Ibid, p. 317. 
38 Ibid, pp. 321,315. 
39 Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland. 
40 Ham, The I. R. A. at War, p. 7. 
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In so doing, Townshend catalogued the indecision and the inadequacy of the British 
response. His portrait of the exigencies of British military policy in relation to the 
spiral of republican dissent and confrontation has never been surpassed. Less 
prominent in his account was the extent to which the vacillations in military 
command (on a high political level) filtered down to the soldiers and policemen at the 
sharp end of the conflict. Townshend made only cursory references to the experiences 
of soldiers and suggested that the problem of morale amongst the army and R. I. C. 
never became critical, in fact, both displayed remarkable `forbearance' and an `easy 
going attitude' to their service. 41 
However, he did relate a number of instances where the pressures of service 
produced a violent reaction from soldiers. Furthermore, he drew attention to the 
physical and psychological privations of army service in Ireland and established how 
troop shortages created a heavy burden for those who remained. This frustration was 
also heightened by the complex nature of combat, which took the form of ambushes 
and isolated attacks as opposed to traditional forms of combat such as trench warfare 
and frontal assault, with which veterans were familiar. With no front line, or a 
designated arena for combat, the soldiers' experience in Ireland was one of military 
professionalism thwarted and this tended to have a profound effect upon his 
experience of service. Other aspects of military life were also suggested in 
Townshend's account, particularly the co-operative problems between the police and 
the armed forces and the friction that resulted from their mutual distrust. 
Townshend's account also provided a useful reference for the two way relationship 
between official policy and military requirements. Despite this, his references to the 
social aspects of soldierly life were kept to a minimum, or were left to be gleaned 
from the presentation of official sources. 
Aims, Content and Methodology 
Previous work on the subject has demonstrated that military life in Ireland involved 
considerable privations resulting from a determined rebel campaign and the failure of 
military policy to adapt to the situation. Shortages of troops, transport, and other 
equipment also resulted in the army being under-supported in a material as well as a 
Townshend, The British Campaign, p. 158. 
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tactical sense. This study will explore the harshness of service life (arising from this 
situation) in order to shed new light on the violence and the recrimination that 
followed. `Authorized punishments' and unofficial punitive measures will be 
considered as components of broader official and unofficial military strategies. In 
taking this approach, this study will be careful to avoid over-concentrating on the 
most sensational features of the period; many scholars still labour under the influence 
of republican propaganda regarding the unchecked violence of the Crown forces in 
Ireland. This account will be careful not to overlook the more `mundane' aspects of 
service, such as the conditions of barrack life or the experience of civil-military 
relations. Rather, it will seek to recognise their qualities as catalysts for some of the 
brutalities that followed, and establish their contribution to a culture in which 
violence flourished. 
Part I, comprising two chapters, will examine the constraints that followed from 
post-war demobilization and troop withdrawal, and consider how this affected the 
lives of soldiers who remained in Ireland at the sharp end of the conflict. It will also 
consider how this shortfall increased the intensity of duties for remaining soldiers. 
The second chapter will constitute the first serious attempt to understand the detail of 
military operations in Ireland. In so doing, it will further demonstrate how a failure to 
unite command in the Crown forces contributed to a lack of success in combating 
disorder, particularly in the field of military intelligence. 
The next two chapters will explore the physical and psychological rift that 
developed between soldiers and civilians during this period. The first will 
demonstrate the ways and means by which soldiers became isolated in their barracks 
and consider how this contributed towards a `defensive' military culture. The second 
will consider how this reinforced the separation of soldiers and civilians and examine 
the means by which Irish communities expressed their hostility towards the military. 
This chapter will also introduce previously unexplored counter-evidence 
demonstrating how this form of mutual antagonism could be overcome and how this 
tended to favour the military. 
The final part will establish how this combination of frustration, drudgery and 
isolation contributed to the falling off of discipline in the later period. A fifth chapter 
will examine frailties. weaknesses and brutalisation in the Irish garrison, and attempt 
to categorise the various forms of reprisals that followed, in the process shedding new 
light on their motives and underlying purpose. A final chapter will examine soldiers' 
1> 
views of the political and military aspects of the period and consider how troops were 
pushed towards extremes of both thought and action. 
By applying a holistic approach and employing mainly qualitative methods this 
study will elucidate a core of social experience that can contribute to the burgeoning 
social history of Anglo-Irish conflict. It will seek to fill the hiatus that has emerged in 
previous accounts; the gap between the regular army and its 'competent authority 
will be bridged with the thoughts, the feelings and the actions of soldiers. It will also 
provide a reference point for historians interested in the cultural and psychological 
aspects of conflict. Above all, it will represent a plea for further social investigation 
into the conflict, and a further move away from the existing paradigm of military and 
political studies. 
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Part I 
Soldiering 
1. Difficulties and Privations 
In his memoir, veteran soldier turned I. R. A. column leader, Tom Barry, portrayed the 
Irish garrison as the cutting-edge of a powerful imperial force: 
Armed with the most modern weapons, they had plentiful supply 
of machine guns, field artillery, armoured cars, engineering 
material, signalling equipment and motor transport. The finances 
of the world's largest empire were behind them. 1 
While military policy from mid-1919 onwards demanded that troops make 
themselves increasingly visible, Barry's description of a highly potent military force 
in Ireland fails to mesh with the actual numerical, tactical, material and financial 
weaknesses of the post-war British army. Rather, it was an imbalance between 
requirement and provision that actually prevented the military in Ireland from 
attaining the degree of control to which the government aspired. This chapter will 
highlight the negative consequences of post-war reform, demobilization and `imperial 
overstretch' on the Irish garrison, both in terms of its overall capacity and the effect 
on individual battalions. It will further consider the impact of a shortage of ancillary 
staff and equipment, and examine how inadequate or inappropriate training 
compounded these general shortages. Finally, it will set these difficulties against the 
backdrop of a concerted propaganda campaign against the Crown forces and examine 
the difficulties that arose from an unfamiliar and hostile station. Together with the 
second chapter, this section will provide context for the remaining chapters, which 
will tend to focus more heavily on particular aspects of service life. 
In the formative years of the conflict the armed forces were beset by major structural 
problems, most of which can be attributed directly to a sharp transition from war to 
peace. Public imagination and political enthusiasm struggled to accommodate the 
parallel development of peace in Europe with the possibility of a new threat in 
Ireland. Consequently, troops stationed there were placed in the peculiar position of 
combating growing disorder within the frameworks and philosophies of peacetime 
Barry, Guerrilla Days. p. 93. 
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soldiering. In the administrative sphere, this emphasis proved to be particularly 
intractable: one observer, writing in June 1921 (shortly before the truce) recorded that 
`a great deal of distress, delay and discontent is caused by the fact that the `'war" has 
to be run with the peace time machinery of administration.. 2 Likewise. the 'History of 
the 5th Division' recalled how `even when the troops were officially declared to be on 
"active" service in December 1920, administration and establishments were on the 
"Home" or "Peace" basis. '3 
"Peace" for the military spelt a reversion to efficiency, to invisibility and to 
aiding the civil power. In line with this, the British garrison (overall) diminished 
sharply after 1919 from 200,000 bayonets in November to just 25,000 in March 
1920.4 In Ireland, corresponding shortages, coupled with an exponential growth in 
rebel activity, created an inverse relationship between battalion strength and military 
requirements. However, post-war retrenchment was to severely affect the military - 
both materially and in terms of unit size; given the need for economy in all aspects of 
government spending, war-weary public opinion could hardly be expected to tolerate 
an army swollen well beyond its base size. Certainly, letter writers to The Times 
between 1918 and 1919, were lining up to wield the `Geddes Axe' against the British 
garrison in Ireland. One correspondent, writing under the pseudonym `Hard Hit' 
asked: 
Are we to believe that there is such an imminent peril of armed 
rebellion in Ireland that a force of 60,000 men supported by air 
fleets, tanks and armoured motor cars, must be held in continual 
readiness for its suppression? 5 
Another questioned how the government could justify `expenditure on or 
by... gigantic armies' during a time of necessary economy, when every item of public 
expenditure demanded the most rigorous scrutiny. 6 However, despite the public 
perception of a copious and under-employed garrison, the majority of soldiers in 
2 National Archives (hereafter `N. A. ') Records of the War office (hereafter W. O. ) 32/9572. 
Anonymous report - `36 Hours in Dublin', (1) Discussions and references to the Cabinet on measures 
to restore law and order and the respective responsibilities of ministers and the General Officer 
Commanding; (2) Great Britain: (estimated strength after imminent end of coal crisis). 16 June 192 1. 
3 General Staff, 5th Division, 'History of the 5th Division in Ireland: November 1919 - March 1922. ' 
(hereafter Hist. 5`h Div. ), Jeudwine Papers, Imperial War Museum, London, p. 9. 
° Townshend, The British Campaign, pp. 43-4. 
5 The Times. 14 Aug. 1919, p. 6. 
6 1bid, 10 Sept. 1919, p. 6. 
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Ireland at this time were undergoing training for overseas drafts or otherwise 
convalescing. Of 111,222 troops in Ireland in August 1918, a mere 9.919 were 
actually available for internal security work. This was despite (G. O. C. -in-C. ) 
Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Shaw's request for a minimum of 22.800 effective 
infantry in Ireland in December 1918. By January 1920 the actual number of troops 
still only amounted to 19,000, still well below Shaw's revised request in November 
1919 for an establishment of 25,000. In Dublin District, a division with a combined 
strength of 7,726 with just 4,270 troops available for operations was up against an 
IRA formation, divided into 12 battalions with 80 companies and boasting an 
estimated operational strength of 5,560. ' 
Throughout the conflict it proved to be extremely difficult for military 
commanders to secure troop commitments for any brigade area outside Ulster. The 
`History of the 5th Division' recalled how the `south' and particularly the `west of 
Ireland' were starved of adequate manpower and yet `there was no hesitation in 
supplying battalions from England to Ulster. '8 This situation further contributed 
towards the difficulties faced by battalions in Southern Ireland, many of whom were 
struggling to `raise 300 officers and men' and who, for short periods could 'consist of 
[just] a headquarters and the band. '9 Therefore, even at this early stage, it was 
extremely difficult for the army to perform its primary function in aiding the civil 
power, and in many cases detachments were forced to withdraw from outlying police 
outposts leaving the police dangerously exposed. In most cases, battalions could only 
muster very small companies to fulfil civil-military policing duties, Colonel 
C. R. B. Knight of the Buffs remembered that these isolated detachments could be as 
small as `an N. C. O. and six men. . . 
billeted in a tumble-down house. ' lo 
Naturally, a shortage of manpower affected the army's ability to perform its 
normal functions and fill all necessary garrison and regimental employments. In 
particular, communications were hampered by an endemic shortage of signalling 
personnel. Indeed, by May 1920 the shortfall was such that the whole section was 
Townshend, The British Campaign, Appendix VIII, p. 218; Figures for Dublin District calculated 
from individual unit figures listed in `A Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-1, and the part 
played by the Army in Dealing with it (Intelligence)' reproduced (with the omission of the 
introduction) in P. Hart (ed) British Intelligence in Ireland, 1920-21, The Final Reports (Cork, 2002) p. 
50. 
8 Hist. 5th Div., p. 52. 
9 lbid, p. 9. 
10 Colonel C. R. B. Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment) 3rd Foot 1919- 
1948 (London, 1951), chapter 1, p. 2. 
20 
practically inoperable. At this time the signalling section had only 106 of the 643 staff 
required to make it effective. This included just 23 drivers and batmen (a deficiency 
of 107), 12 motorcyclists, and not even a single cable man, harness maker, saddler or 
instrument repairer. Initiatives aimed at solving these problems included recruitment 
campaigns and proposals for the `employment of reliable ex-soldiers on non-military 
duties', both of which were hampered by the inexperience of new recruits and the 
generally poor state of health of veterans. ll 
A lack of signalling, combined with a scarcity of wireless technology. placed 
great emphasis on pigeons as a means of communication. The majority of military 
stations established pigeon depots, which were supplied by larger regional lofts at the 
Curragh, Belfast, Enniskillen, Derry and Claremorris. However, even in this method 
of communication, the army were hampered by a shortage of military loft-men. This 
resulted in N. C. O. s and selected other ranks being required to attend a three day 
course in `the care and management of birds'. 12 
Motor mechanics were also scarce, and this situation had obvious knock-on 
effects for military offensives that relied upon the speed and efficiency of motor 
transport. Administrative personal were similarly thin on the ground: Major-General 
G. F. Boyd, then commander of the Dublin District, found his two Brigade H. Q. s to be 
severely understaffed in terms of clerical personnel. As a result, specialised staffs 
such as `air force, artillery and education officers' were sometimes seconded to 
battalions as a hasty solution to the growing skills gap. 13 
The experience of the 1 st Buffs (East Kent Regiment) in the immediate post-war 
years provides an interesting case study of the impact of army reform on a regiment 
stationed in Ireland. Initially, demobilization stripped the Buffs of all their service and 
territorial battalions, leaving just three regular battalions. Subsequent to their arrival 
in Ireland in the autumn of 1919 '1 st Battalion absorbed the personnel of 3rd 
11N. A., W. O. 32/9522, Figures compiled from tables contained in a letter from J. Brind, G. H. Q. to 
Lieutenant Colonel H. E. Braine, Proposed Garrison in Ireland; Branch Memorandum regarding the 
deficiency in personnel (Infantry) in Ireland, 25 Feb. 1920. 
12 Though inconvenient, this form of training had the advantage of enabling officers to take out pigeons 
on convoys and patrols and quickly relay messages to base, which had obvious importance in the case 
of S. O. S. messages (pigeons returning to base with no message attached were understood to be an 
S. O. S. signal). The `History of the 5th Division' recalled one occasion when 21 pickets were 
established along the Ulster border to prevent two I. R. A. battalions (from Cork and Tipperary) 
travelling northwards to assist their `co-religionists' during an episode of rioting in Ulster in July 1920. 
Throughout the operation, the positioning and the movement of troops was co-ordinated via pigeon 
communication. Hist. 5th Div., pp. 30,52. 
'' N. A., W. O. 35/90/1, Dublin District War Diary 'A', 24 Feb. 1920. 
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Battalion, which henceforth remained a unit on paper only. The remaining battalion 
was broken up into small detachments 'spread out as far as Mallow in the west and 
Rosslare in the east. ' The new deployment left a small remnant of the battalion to 
`reorganize on the new peace establishment, which was supposed to include a 
machine-gun platoon of two sections of four guns each. ' This arrangement was 
intended to satisfy the military authorities' drive for economy and efficiency, and yet 
the result was hampered by material shortages. C. R. B. Knight remembered that the 
guns `were not provided until shortly after the time came to leave Ireland in 1922. ' 14 
In addition, 206 soldiers of the regiment had been drafted for service in Mesopotamia 
by January 1921, and a further 185 men had been demobilised by March 1921, a loss 
that was barely offset by the introduction of 63 new recruits. Taking the period from 
June 1920 to March 1921 (the most intense period of the conflict) in isolation, the 
regiment's operational strength was reduced from 947 to 681.15 
The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (O. B. L. I. ) stationed in 
Dublin witnessed a similar reduction in battalion strength and, according to the author 
of their Chronicle, the `axe' fell particularly severely on officers: `The Regiment, as a 
whole, lost involuntarily two captains and fourteen subalterns... This... gave the 
officers' profession a feeling of insecurity that it had never previously known. ' 
16 
Similarly, the Border Regiment stationed in Roscommon, Mayo and Galway 
witnessed a35 per cent reduction in ranks from 1,091 in September 1919 to just 709 
in December 1920, and a 37 per cent reduction in officers from 43 to 29. Service 
notes also suggest that the `task of demobilizing personnel serving on duration of war 
engagements' was `rendered more difficult' owing to the fact that the battalion was 
`destined to be split up into many detachments... a fact which severely handicapped it 
in the process of reformation. ' 17 Likewise, the King's Liverpool Regiment lost 400 of 
their 621 soldiers to drafts and demobilization, to be replaced by just 195 new 
recruits. 18 
Clearly post-war Britain was infertile as far as military recruitment was 
concerned, and neither did Irish conditions encourage the furtherance of military 
" Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs, chapter 1, p. 1-2. 
15 Hart, The IRA and Its Enemies, p. 90. 
16 Anon, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle, 1921 (London, 1922), p. 34. 
17 Digest of Service of the 2nd Battalion Border Regiment entry dated 9 July 1919, Carlisle Castle, 
Carlisle. 
'g Digest of Service of the Ist Battalion King's Liverpool Regiment, Kings (Liverpool) Regiment 
Collection. Regional History Department, National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside. 
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careers. In March 1921 the correspondent of the Green Howards' Gazette observed 
that `our station and the exciting life of rebel hunting is not a great incentive to the 
extension of service with Colours [sic] or in aid of the recruiting sergeant. ' 19 This 
feeling was intensified as experienced men continued to be lost to overseas drafts and 
demobilization (under the `first in, first out' principle) which increased the burden on 
those who remained. However, even prior to the intense military routine that defined 
the later period, units were already suffering the privations of a decline in recruitment 
that was failing to offset demobilization or meet required draft numbers. In February 
1920, a memorandum from G. H. Q. to the War Office warned that of the 34 infantry 
units that comprised the Irish garrison, 25 were below the establishment strength of 
933. Of these, some were more seriously depleted than others, for example, the 
Cameronians had a strength of only 647, the O. B. L. I. just 576, and the Yorkshire 
Regiment could only muster 537 infantry. The respective estimates for reaching a 
strength of 900 (based on the current rates of recruitment and drafts under order to 
proceed) were six, seven and five months. 
To further illustrate just how sluggish post-war recruitment had become, the 2nd 
Berkshire Regiment with a strength of just 738 (excluding drafts orders) was, at this 
time, recruiting an average of just two soldiers a week and had a further draft 
commitment of 119 for Mesopotamia. 20 Naturally, the increased pressure of service 
for those who remained, made the prospect of being drafted for an overseas campaign 
a desirable alternative for soldiers on Irish service. The correspondent of "The 
Snapper" noted that plans for a second draft to go out to Mesopotamia were warmly 
received by beleaguered troops in the 1st Battalion: 'There are strong rumours of a 
large draft, which is to go out after Christmas to swell the 2nd Battalion in "Mespot. " 
There will be lots of volunteers to get away from this distressful country. '21 Likewise, 
in December 1919, the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry Chronicle recalled how the 
battalion (then stationed in Portobello Barracks, Dublin) were relieved to be ordered 
to take up new posts in East Prussia. In this case, even the prospect of `a harsh North 
European winter' was insufficient to daunt the soldiers, who became `uncommonly 
19 Green Howards' Gazette, Journal of the Green Howards' Regiment, March 1921, Regimental 
Museum of the Green Howards, Richmond, North Yorkshire, pp. 5-6. 
20 N. A., W. O. 32: '9522, Figures compiled from minute sheet and a G. H. Q. Branch Memorandum 
entitled Deficiency in Personnel (Infantry) in Ireland, Proposed Garrison in Ireland; Branch 
Memorandum regarding the deficiency in personnel (Infantry) in Ireland, 25 Feb. 1920. 
21 Major K. A. Plimpton, "The Snapper", Journal of the East Yorkshire Regiment, The Prince of Wales' 
Own Regiment of Yorkshire Museum, York, Oct. 1920, p. 171. 
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cheerful, not to say excited", however. `just as packing was completed it was 
cancelled as suddenly as it had been ordered. . 22 
Between October 1920 and March 1921, over 9,000 troops were drafted to other 
overseas stations and a further 10 battalions were held in readiness to meet the threat 
of industrial unrest in Britain should they be required. To add to the uncertainty, the 
situation in Britain had the potential to deprive the Irish army of numbers and 
experience should the issue of homeland security require a concentration of troops on 
the mainland. In the event, although four battalions were transferred and placed on 
strike duty in Britain, industrial unrest in Britain never reached a level that actually 
required the active intervention of the army. In addition, the threat of agitation was 
recognised to have diminished significantly by November 1920. The alleviation of 
this threat was particularly fortunate for the military authorities; Mark Sturgis 
(Assistant Under-Secretary at Dublin Castle) had warned of dire consequences for the 
Irish garrison, should the situation require the removal of battalions of infantry: 
It will so weaken our garrison that we must leave isolated 
battalions in towns which they will be too weak to control if 
trouble breaks out, or else abandon whole areas altogether - say 
west of the Shannon - to the I. R. A. 
23 
In any case, the contingencies involved had made the efficient employment of already 
strained resources much more difficult and `the loss of activities for this period, 
though unavoidable, was a serious waste of valuable time. '24 In April 1920, four 
battalions were actually transferred to Liverpool and a further two were placed on 12 
22 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 34. 
23 N. A., Domestic Records of the Public Record Office (hereafter P. R. O. ) 30/59/1, Mark Sturgis 
Diaries, 19 Aug. 1920. Castle Official Mark Sturgis kept a remarkably frank diary of his liaisons, 
experiences and opinions between July 1920 and January 1922. His diary is the most evocative account 
that we have of the twilight days of Dublin Castle following the purge in the summer of 1920. 
According to Hopkinson, his [often humorous] descriptions vividly convey a `clublike atmosphere' 
and offer colourful insights into the relationships between officials from the various branches of the 
British administration in Ireland. To Fitzpatrick, his account `whiff[ed] of Wodehouse'. Similarly, Tim 
Pat Coogan wrote of Sturgis that he was able to observe just about `everything that passed, not merely 
in the Castle itself, but in the big houses and on the racecourse. ' An Etonian and a graduate of Oxford, 
his `vivid and breezy writing style' and `appealingly cynical view of humanity in general' give his 
diaries an edge of sardonic humour, that, on the surface, appears to belie their real historical 
importance. M. Hopkinson (ed. ). The Last Days of Dublin Castle: The Diaries of: l lark Sturgis (Dublin, 
1999) p. 7; Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, Bibliography, p. 288; Hopkinson, Ibid, pp. vii - viii, 9. 
2' `A Record of the Rebellion in Ireland and the Part Played by the Army in Dealing with it 
(Operations)', this account is a particularly rich source for the detail of military operations during the 
conflict. It was compiled and written by G. H. Q. staff responsible for the particular subjects recorded in 
the various branches of the Irish Administration and is contained within the papers of Lieutenant 
General Sir Hugh Jeudww ine, Imperial War Museum, London, p. 13. 
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hour standby for over a month. 25 This was a severe blow to regimental commanders 
who were struggling to implement military policy in Ireland. It did, however. please 
those soldiers who were fortunate enough to be posted to a 'home' station. Recalling 
the news of his imminent transfer back to England, Lieutenant E. J. A. H. Brush of the 
3rd Rifle Brigade wrote: 
Thank God, respite came when the Battalion was sent to 
Liverpool on strike duty. The dockers had come out and there 
were deep fears in those days, that the Bolsheviks from Russia 
were infiltrating the Trade Unions and that soldiers must be near 
at hand in case anything happened. 26 
For Brush, being `near at hand' meant being quartered in a static train carriage beside 
Aintree Racecourse, an experience which he contrasted favourably with the misery 
and the drudgery of Irish service. Echoing his sentiments, men of the Green Howards 
stated their preference for an English station over the extension of service in Ireland 
and craved `the comparative peace and quietness of England, in spite of all its 
industrial unrest and wave of Bolshevism. '27 For those who remained in Ireland, the 
situation was only partially alleviated in late May 1920 when fresh (but 
inexperienced) troops were sent to make up a portion of the shortfall. Nevertheless, 
the prospect of an open rebellion in Britain's coalfields also had a further knock-on 
effect for troops who remained in Ireland. The Digest of Service of the Duke of 
Wellington's Regiment recalled how on 16 October 1920 `2 Coys' at `Kilbride 
Camp' were withdrawn from a `muscatry course' to be placed in readiness for the 
`coal crisis. ' Consequently `all leave was cancelled' for remaining troops. 28 Similarly, 
in November 1920, `A' Company of the 2nd Green Howards waited in vain for the 
prompt return of their colleagues: `we only hope that the threatened coal strike will 
not prevent their return to this unfortunate country, as we are next on the leave 
roster. '29 
25 Townshend, The British Campaign, p. 109. 
26 Lieutenant E. J. A. H. Brush, `Rifle Green/Orange Flash', TS memoir, Imperial War Museum, London, 
ý. 14. 
Green Howards' Gazette, "A" Company notes, July 1920, p. 99. 
28 Digest of Service of the 2nd Battalion Duke of Wellington's Regiment, 16 Nov. 1920, Bankfield 
Museum, Halifax- 
21) Green Howards' Gazette, Vol XXVIII, November 1920, p. 109. 
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By December 1920, there was general widespread support in the War Office and 
across the Cabinet for the diversion of battalions back to the Irish front. This 
represented a partial recognition on the part of the government that the threat of civil 
unrest created by the Irish insurgency was more realistic than that posed by industrial 
malcontent. Risks had to be taken: 
From the military point of view it is vital for us to avoid the 
mistake which lost the Germans the war, namely the failure to be 
quite strong enough to ensure a decision on one front through 
fear of taking the necessary risk on the other. 30 
Nonetheless, events overseas, together with a dearth of experienced troops and 
deteriorating conditions in Ireland continued to diminish troops' leave entitlement. 
Commenting on the closing months of 1920, Major-General Douglas Wimberley 
recalled how `all leave for officers was stopped for a time' adding `I think it was after 
a lot of officers had been murdered one night in Dublin. ' 31 Wilfred Ewart, a former 
officer of the Scots Guards, visiting Victoria Barracks, Cork, in May 1921 found a 
garrison in a state of physical and mental exhaustion due to the demands of service. 
He spoke to a young subaltern who had served a whole nine months in conditions 
approximating war, having received `only one leave since August. ' 32 Long periods of 
unalleviated service on the part of his troops were a real concern for (G. O. C. -in-C. ) 
General Sir Nevil Macready (whose correspondence provides an important link 
between the Cabinet, military policy, and the soldiery) who feared that the strain 
would render the majority of his garrison unfit for service. In an impassioned plea, he 
issued a memorandum in July 1920 to the effect that: 
The men are deprived under present conditions of their 
amusements and those restrictions which are so necessary for the 
contentment and health of young men, and many officers have 
been serving in conditions which are even worse than actual 
30 N. A., W. O. 32; '9521, Memo from Major-General Radcliffe, (Director of Military Operations - 
D. M. O. ) to Winston Churchill, (Secretary of State for War), Ireland. Reinforcements in certain 
contingencies, 2 Dec. 1920. 
31 Major-General Douglas Wimberley, `Scottish Soldier', Chapter 13 'Ireland and the Troubles', TS 
memoir, Imperial War Museum, London, p. 149. 32 Ewart, .4 Journei in Ireland, p. 71. 
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warfare for nearly a year with practically no leave. This cannot 
continue without deterioration setting in. 33 
Having received no assurances regarding troops' leave on this occasion, Macready 
reasserted his position in May 1921: 
The present state of affairs in Ireland so far as regards the troops 
serving there must be brought to a conclusion by October or 
steps must be taken to relieve practically the whole of the troops 
together with the great majority of commanders and their staffs. I 
am quite aware that troops do not exist to do this, but this does 
not alter in any way the opinion I have formed in regard to the 
officers and troops for whom I am responsible. 34 
Clearly the nature of the conflict combined with the persistent problem of troop 
shortages did not favour soldiers being able to take adequate respite from their duties. 
Furthermore, as Macready's entreaty indicates, the problem was to remain largely 
unresolved throughout the period of the conflict. It was the timeliness of the July 
truce that eventually relieved a desperate situation for a beleaguered garrison. 
In spite of the restrictions on leave entitlement, Macready could still only muster 
25,000 infantry effectives from the existing garrison at the beginning of 1921, of 
whom a substantial portion were required for guard duties or peacekeeping initiatives 
in Belfast. Added to this, a lack of appropriate training (particularly amongst the 
lower ranks) left just 15,000 men who were actually capable of carrying out 
counterinsurgency operations. As Curran has observed, this force may have 
significantly outnumbered the total number of active guerrillas in Ireland but, given 
the context of a brigade area that comprised `over 30,000 square miles' there was 
very little possibility of establishing the close control that was required. 35 This 
concurs with observations made by General Staff Irish Command (G. S. I. C. ) in their 
`Record of the Rebellion': 
33N. A., W. O. 32/9520, G. O. C. -in-C. to G. H. Q., Memorandum on present military situation and general 
proposals in regard to troops during coming winter, 26 July 1920. 
4 N. A., W. O. 32//9572. Memorandum from G. O. C. -in-C. to C. I. G. S., (1) Discussions and references 
to the Cabinet on measures to restore law and order and the respective responsibilities of ministers and 
the General Officer Commanding; (2) Great Britain: (estimated strength after imminent end of coal 
crisis). 23 May 1921. 
35 Curran The Birth of the Irish Free State, pp. 48-9. 
27 
Ireland consists of some 30,000 square miles, in every part of 
which lawlessness and disorder might and did occur. The 51 
battalions which at this time (December 1920-July 1921) were in 
Ireland, even with the addition of the R. I. C. and Auxiliary 
Division, were obviously insufficient for dealing rapidly with the 
whole of this area, especially as the battalions were very weak, 
averaging roughly 250-300 men for offensive action after 
deducting barrack guards and other essential duties. 36 
The numerous constraints on operational strength went hand-in-hand with serious 
material shortages, which were most evident in the perennial transport problems that 
beset the military. Owing to a lack of mechanics, the maintenance of vehicles was 
extremely poor, and only a limited number of the earmarked vehicles were actually fit 
for military use at any one time. The `History of the 5th Division' claimed that: 
The Disposals Board appeared to have sold out all the best 
vehicles and to have retained those which were nearly worn out, 
or which were deficient in the necessary spare parts. The repair 
of the vehicles already part worn could not be carried out 
because at first there were no workshops... Those were bad days 
in 1920 and the inefficiency of the motor transport was a daily 
cause for complaint. 37 
With inadequate provision for maintenance, depreciation was particularly rapid 
amongst the heavier vehicles. These included three-ton and 15-cwt lorries of which 
35 and 20 per cent respectively were off the road by March 1921.38 In addition, 
problems arising from a dearth of motor transport were little remedied by an 
inexplicable shortage of bicycles in the early period, of which no unit in the 5th 
Division could boast more than 10 by January 1920.39 Added to this, a railway 
embargo from May 1920, ensured that existing army transport was employed mainly 
for supply purposes, severely limiting its use during operations. The `defensive' and 
'offensive' use of motor transport was further imbalanced when the weakened fleet 
36 Record of the Rebellion, p. 33. 
37 Hist. 5th Div., p. 28. 
38 Ibid, p. 89. 
391bid, p. 27. 
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became increasingly utilised by the R. I. C. to carry defence stores and to assist in the 
evacuation of barracks. 
To soldiers facing an increased threat of attack during motor patrols, the logistic 
rather than operational use of vehicles was rather fortunate given that the government 
were slow to equip the vehicles with standard military defences. The majority of 
lorries lacked armour plating and, of those that were so equipped, very few were of 
the `pistol proof specification that was deemed necessary. As a result. Irish 
Command entered the period of martial law, with just 25 armoured and 15 protected 
lorries, together with 54 Peerless and two Rolls-Royce Armoured Cars. 40 By the 
spring of 1921, armoured cars had increased to 70 Peerless, with a vastly improved 
quota of 34 Rolls-Royce. However, these proved to be little use in the absence of 
specialized personnel to maintain and to operate the vehicles. The only real expertise 
in this area was provided by a skeleton Tank Corps working in tandem with officers 
of the 5th Armoured Car Company. In the majority of cases, drivers and mechanics 
were drawn, as required, from infantry and cavalry regiments. Ambitious proposals 
for Armoured Car Companies attached to each of the four divisions never came to 
fruition 
. 
41 As a consequence, military motor convoys were rarely able to provide the 
imposing spectacle that had been anticipated by military command. Added to this, the 
effectiveness of armour plating on vehicles was severely limited, especially in cases 
where armed rebels approached in numbers: 
In country districts, where a larger proportion of the rebels were 
armed with rifles, the usefulness of these lorries was not so 
great... as the training of lorry patrols insisted on the necessity, 
when attacked of getting quickly out of the lorry, therefore the 
armouring ceased to be of much value after the rebels had fired 
the first volley. `` 
Military lorries were also ill-suited to country lanes, especially those burdened with 
the extra weight of armour plating. Major A. E. Percival of the 1st Essex Regiment, 
recalled how: 
Experiments were made with armour plating on lorries, but 
though useful for town work, it was found that lorries became 
40 Townshend, The British Campaign, pp. 143-4, Record of the Rebellion, p. 32. 
41 Record of the Rebellion, p. 32. 
421hic1, p. 32. 
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too heavy for work on the country roads. Most lorries were. 
however, provided with plating to protect the drivers. 43 
The lack of adequate provision for motor patrols was readily apparent to those 
soldiers who were unfortunate enough to depend upon motorized transport. The slow 
progress of these convoys was ridiculed in a poem by `E. N. ' a contributor to The -9"News: 
The cars were standing waiting 
In case we'd be too slow; 
But when the drivers took their seats 
The damned things wouldn't go 
It now was after four, sir, 
We started off all right 
But going out the gate we found 
We had no Very light 
So back we came again, sir, 
And got one from the store: 
We tried to get some petrol, 
But they hadn't any more. 44 
As the poem suggests, transport shortages were compounded by shortfalls in other 
areas: this was particularly telling for small military detachments who often lacked 
the wireless technology necessary to maintain lines of communication with the main 
body of their battalion. A want of communication between brigades, regiments and 
isolated detachments was further compounded by a lack of attendance at remote 
outposts on the part of senior officers. Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke of the 1St Essex 
Regiment recalled being billeted for a month in a lighthouse at the Old Head of 
Kinsale, during which time he was `never visited by a senior officer' and had `no 
means of contact with the outer world except by patrols. ' Brigade orders were 
received via a `telephone... in the local post office cum - public house [sic] about a 
mile down the track towards Kinsale. ' Clarke also realised that from `the point of 
view of security' this arrangement was 'useless. ' Henceforth, he communicated with 
43 Major A. E. Percival, Lecture: Guerrilla Warfare - Ireland 1920-21 (1), 1920 to Spring 1921. p. 19. 
44 The 79`" , yews. Journal of the Cameron Highlanders, Cameron Highlanders' Regimental Museum, 
Fort George, Ardersier, (near Inverness). June 1921, pp. 207-8. 
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other officers in `kitchen Urdu' to avoid detection, and the inherent communication 
difficulties almost resulted in him misinterpreting a brigade order. ', The 'History of 
the 5th Division' recalled that: 
It was very difficult to get additional wireless sets and the trained 
personnel for their working. The arrival of wireless transmission 
sets, charging sets, spare bulbs etc., was a slow business, and 
instrument repairers were few and far between. At the Curragh 
means could be found for training only 12 men every 3 months 
in wireless... There still remained 22 military stations without 
wireless in the 5th Division area. 46 
Typewriters and typists were similarly lacking across all levels and departments 
of Irish command. Until April 1920, Dublin District Brigade H. Q. lacked a single 
typewriter, and even the office of Lord French, then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, was 
lacking in this respect. However, the useful effect of greater provision after April 
1920, was nullified by the government's seeming inability to balance material 
requirements with required injections of human capital: as the `History of the 5th 
Division' recalled, `trained clerks and typists were practically non-existent. ' 17 Added 
to this, shortfalls in ancillary staff usually resulted in infantry battalions being 
plundered for men to perform clerical duties for which they had little training and 
even less appetite. In the early months of 1920, even telephone offices and exchanges 
came to be staffed by young soldiers more acquainted with the demands of musketry 
and field training than plug boards and panel switches. 48 
Commenting on troop shortages in Ireland in May 1920, a correspondent of The 
Times reported that `the opinion in well informed circles is that Sir Neville Macready 
will depend less on weight on numbers than on vigilance, organization and mobility. 49 
For troops on Irish service these watchwords spelt increased duties. The three major 
planks of military policy in Ireland were the proclamation of Clare, Kerry and West 
Cork as Special Military Areas under the D. O. R. A. in February 1918, and of South 
Tipperary in January 1919; the introduction of R. O. I. A. in August 1920; and Martial 
45 Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke, `The Memoirs of a Professional Soldier in Peace and War', TS memoir, 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Studies, King's College, London, Chapter 6, pp. 5-6. 
46 Hist. 5th Div., p. 91. 
" Hist. 5th Div., p. 29. 
48 Ihid, p29. 
49 The Times 19 May 1920, p. 16. 
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Law in late December 1920. Each of these legislative steps required the army to take 
to the field and to maintain an offensive spirit against their rebel counterparts, whilst 
creating an illusion of control over the general population. Soldiers had to adapt to a 
wearying routine of enforcing curfews, prohibiting gatherings, maintaining pickets 
and cordons, patrolling large areas, providing guards and escorts, taking part in round 
ups, searches, sweeps and raids as well as providing assistance to a besieged R. I. C. 
This seemingly constant pulse of military activity from mid-1920 onwards was only 
achieved by the sheer weight of combined physical effort. With few exceptions, all 
military sources from the period give a strong indication of the spiralling workload: 
the Digest of Service of the Duke Of Wellington's Regiment reveals that between 22 
November 1920 and 6 April 1921, the regiment performed 199 raids and almost daily 
rounds of patrols, yielding 106 arrests, each of which required guards, escorts or 
convoys. 50 During the year 1920, the South Lancashire Regiment, with an operational 
strength of just 262, had several encounters with rebels and carried out no less than 
274 separate raids, arresting 146 people. In addition, the regiment was also utilized in 
several large-scale sweeps organized at brigade level. 51 Over the course of just five 
days between 26 and 30 November, 1920, the combined forces of the 24th and 25th 
Brigades mounted 354 raids in Dublin District, securing the arrest of 274 persons. 
This was followed in December by a further 879 raids and 569 arrests. The onslaught 
may well have continued had it not been abruptly curtailed by the complete 
`congestion of civil and military prisons' in January 1921.52 Even in the relatively 
benign 5th Divisional area, nine battalions of troops (covering an area of 12,000 
miles) were able to secure the arrest of 1,600 `I. R. A. officers and "wanted" men' in 
the first half of 1921.53 
The Manchester Regiment, operating in the fractious West Cork district, 
managed to secure 152 arrests through the mobility and frequency of their operations. 
An examination of their `Record of Arrests' reveals just how deeply they penetrated 
West Cork society. Their arrests were extremely hard-gained and the trivial nature of 
50 Quantified from the Digest of Service of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, Nov. 1920 to April 
1921. 
51 Colonel B. R. Mullaly, The South Lancashire Regiment - Prince of Wales' Volunteers (Bristol, 1955), 
p. 59. 
52 N. A., W. O. 35/90. Figures compiled from `Preparation of Daily Operation Reports' and entries 
between 1 Dec. and 31 Dec. 1920, (1) War Diary - General Staff H. Q. Dublin District - December 
1920; (2) War Diary - General Staff H. Q. Dublin District - January 1921. The 24th and 25th Brigades 
comprised 12 battalions in January 1921. 
53 Hist. 5th Div., p. 86. 
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some of the offences indicated that the Regiment must have established a certain 
omnipresence in the district. To illustrate the point, their `Record' reveals that of the 
arrested persons, 12 were found in possession of seditious leaflets. and a further 22 
were observed consorting with armed rebels, of whom 27 were arrested for illegal 
assembly. A further 19 were detained on suspicion of being I. R. A. officers. Two 
people were caught destroying bridges, 13 breaking the curfew, 17 carrying arms, two 
were found to be sleeping in a house unregistered, one man persisted in `shouting at 
the Crown forces' until his eventual arrest, and another was arrested for giving a 
`false destination for his recent holiday. ' 54 
The Manchesters' blanket presence in West Cork belied their actual numerical 
strength. In July 1920, the Regiment had an operational strength of 594, woefully 
inadequate to cover their brigade area, which comprised 240 square miles of the Lee 
valley. Similarly, the Essex Regiment, comprising some 600 men, were responsible 
for an area of `thick and intricate country' criss-crossed by innumerable `borheens' 55 
stretching from `Queenstown to Castletownbere, a distance of approximately 100 
miles in length -) . 
56 
Given the vastness of brigade areas and the closeness of control demanded by 
military commanders, the real cost of maintaining a facade of military supremacy fell 
heavily upon the regular foot soldier. Often the result was physical and mental 
exhaustion: the Gazette's resigned summary of the military routine as `hard and 
depressing' is echoed throughout military accounts from the period. 57 In November 
1921, Private D. E. Griffin of the 1st Manchesters wrote a letter to his father 
complaining that `last week every man in the company had two nights on guard to 
one in bed and some did three nights running. ' 58 Similarly, the South Staffordshire 
Regiment Digest of Service reported that: 
The total number of duty N. C. O. s and men was less than 200, 
which meant, owing to the numbers of duties to be found, no 
54 Record of Arrests - 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment, Ireland 1921, Tameside Local Studies 
Library, Manchester. 
ss Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II), A `Borheen' is Cork dialect for a small track. p. 5. 
56 Ibid, pp. 11,22. 
57 Green Howards ' Gazette, Dec. 1920, p. 116. 
58 D. E. Griffin, undated letter to his father, Imperial War Museum, London. 
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duty man got more than two consecutive nights in bed, and 
59 sometimes only one night in bed. 
Likewise, E. J. A. H. Brush recalled bitter memories of gruelling service in Dublin 
during the closing months of 1920: 
Guards were on almost every portion of Dublin. One came off 
the North Wall guard to get one night in bed before going on the 
Bank of Ireland guard. Another night in bed and then either on 
foot patrol around Dublin or on curfew enforcement. 
Concerns were raised at G. H. Q. that `the small number of nights in bed was a serious 
drain on the health of the young and immature troops. ' 60 Indeed, for some, the 
physical demands of service (coupled with the risks involved) contributed to a state of 
nervous exhaustion: an officer's wife stationed in Dublin remembered that `a great 
deal of the soldiers' work is done at night. He is often short of sleep and the strain on 
his nerves is appalling. ' She also questioned how soldiers could be expected to 
shoulder the excessive workload and cope with the parallel threat of attack: `I cannot 
understand how men can go on, week after week, month after month, motoring, 
living, sleeping, always in danger. '61 Macready was also generally sympathetic to the 
plight of overworked soldiers and made continual representations on their behalf in 
his Weekly Situation Report. In July 1920, in response to criticisms from G. H. Q. that 
military guards were ineffective in preventing raids, he retorted that the capacity to 
afford protection depends upon the limitation of numbers, and the "nights in bed" 
which it is possible to obtain for troops. '62 
Clearly, incessant military duties crowded out opportunities for leave, leisure 
and, most significantly, training. As early as July 1920, "The Snapper" commented 
that `the ordinary training and daily routine of a soldier is being somewhat marred in 
Mullingar... Not a day passes in which troops are not needed for some stunt. '63 
Similarly, Brigadier E. M. Ransford, stationed in Boyle, County Roscommon (a 
relatively quiet district), found that 'there was practically no opportunity for training' 
due to the demands of service and the `frequent S. O. S calls (by pigeon or cyclist! )' 
59 Hart, The I. R. A. and Its Enemies, p. 92. 
60 Record of the Rebellion, p. 17. 
61 Anon, Experiences of an Of ficer's Wife, pp. 24-25. 
62 Memorandum from G. O. C. in C. to G. H. Q., 26 July 1920. 
63 Plimpton, 1st Battalion, `D' Company notes in "The Snapper", July 1920, p. 106. 
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from police barracks or from military patrols. 64 The Buffs were similarly concerned 
that their normal training routine was being displaced by an unfamiliar civil-military 
policing role: 
With a battalion composed mainly of young soldiers the primary 
need was for training, but little or no opportunity was to be 
granted for this, for the time had now arrived for the regular 
employment of troops in support of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary. 
After the regiment had been broken up and dispersed to their various outposts, 
Lieutenant Colonel L. W. Lucas was given sole responsibility for the training of new 
recruits: `at times more than two hundred in number. ' This was besides his other 
responsibility as commander of 'A' Company. 65 
As Sir John Anderson, reflecting on his initial appointment as Joint Under- 
Secretary at Dublin Castle, observed `the military forces in the country were 
insufficient in numbers and so far as rank and file were concerned quite raw. ' 66 
Likewise, troops themselves were similarly concerned by the lack of suitable training 
provision for themselves and the new recruits. Despite this, a minority formed the 
opinion that the experience of Irish service was the perfect induction to military life. 
In mitigation for a lack of formal training provision (certainly from mid-1920 
onwards) The 79 `h News suggested: 
However unpleasant life in Ireland may be, it affords unrivalled 
training for the young soldier, every day teaches him to be alert 
and vigilant on duty, and indeed, at all times to have confidence 
in his rifle and himself and to take care of both. 67 
Although Irish service was a steep learning curve for young recruits, experience 
gained in the field during dangerous manoeuvres, in lieu of appropriate training, was 
clearly unsatisfactory. In June 1920 it emerged that of the 23,000 `effectives' 
64 Brigadier E. M. Ransford, One Man's Tide', TS memoir, Imperial War Museum, London, p. 19. 
65 Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs, chapter 1, pp. 1-2. 
66 Sir John Anderson to Hamar Greenwood (Chief Secretary for Ireland) letter dated 20 July 1920, 
Lloyd George Papers, F/192114. 
67 The 79`" ; VL'v s, 2nd Battalion notes, April 1921, p. 141. It should be noted however, that regimental 
journals were produced as a morale boosting exercise, and this was especially true of The 9` News 
which (with rare exceptional articles) was usually written in a rather light-hearted military mien. 
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available in Ireland `3,000 had never even fired a musketry course. '68 This was 
particularly significant in the context of the guerrilla conflict in Ireland, as indicated 
by Percival in his post-conflict lectures on guerrilla warfare in which he asserted that 
`troops taking part in such warfare should have very thorough musketry training as 
each individual man really becomes a sniper. ' 69 
Likewise, officers in Ireland (especially N. C. O. s) were heavily criticised for their 
lack of organization and tactical uncertainty. Shortly after his appointment in April 
1920, Macready had formed the opinion that `there is a shortage of good company 
officers, and when it comes to N. C. O. s, the weakness of the army is woefully 
apparent. '70 Similarly, `The History of the 5th Division' claimed that the majority of 
N. C. O. s lacked either the background, in terms of relevant training, or the battle 
experience to justify their seniority over lower ranks: 
... the material 
in officers, N. C. O. s and men was indifferent. Few 
senior officers of battalions had at that time rejoined their units, 
and the junior officers with war experience had themselves not 
been properly trained except in a limited knowledge of trench 
warfare. The majority of N. C. O. s had exactly the same amount 
of service as the men who were practically untrained. 7' 
The lack of basic skills such as marksmanship, skirmishing and sniping was often 
brought into sharper relief by an absence of guerrilla training. This shortfall partly 
resulted from the events of Bloody Sunday and the later declaration of martial law, 
which effectively scuppered the army's limited plan to offer training in this area. By 
the time of the truce, only 5th Division had received this form of instruction and the 
little training that was given lasted only three days and, according to Townshend, 
consisted of `first day, cycle patrols; second day, lorry convoys in ambush; third day, 
daylight lorry raids. '72 As this study will demonstrate, this was a great missed 
opportunity given that soldiers were to become engaged in this form of activity on a 
daily basis. 
68 Imperial General Staff, Note on the Garrison in Ireland, 15 June 1920, quoted in Townshend, The 
British Campaign, p. 53. 
69 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II), p. 5. 
70 N. A., W. O. 32/9520. G. O. C. -in-C. to G. H. Q., Memorandum on present military situation and 
general proposals in regard to troops during coming winter, 26 July 1920. F' 
Hist. 5th Div., p. 134. 
72 Townshend, The British Campaign, p. 146. 
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The military also faced further difficulties arising from a concerted republican 
campaign of provocation and propaganda, with (in the latter case) little in the way of 
a counter-effort on the part of the military authorities. The deliberate provocation of 
troops was a feature of community life in Ireland at this stage, but there was also a 
sense amongst the soldiery that any enemy action constituted provocation. Few (if 
any) accepted rebel actions within the context of war, and in this respect their 
attitudes were akin to those of the government. 73 In addition, non-violent provocation 
was also a consistent feature of the period (see Chapter 4). However, despite 
highlighting provocation as a feature of service life, very few soldiers detailed the 
typical forms of aggravation to which they were subjected. K. A. Plimpton made one 
sketchy reference to the `periodical attack of wind-up' to which the 1st East 
Yorkshire Regiment were exposed to in Longford. 74 Others regarded the refusal of 
the native population to observe Armistice Day silences (or to remove their hats for 
the national anthem at the end of military displays) as a form of provocation. 75 More 
serious were allegations that rebel gunmen were using ammunition outlawed by the 
Hague Convention of 1899, including `dum-dum', `soft-nosed', 'expanding', 
`jacketed' or `split nose' bullets, as a means by which to cause maximum damage and 
provoke retaliation. 76 However, the most frequently visited form of provocation 
would appear to be the relentless campaign of propaganda against Crown force 
troops. For soldiers, this was aggravated by the perception that their own countrymen 
were prone to subscribe to (as well as to corroborate and contribute to) Dail 
propaganda concerning their conduct. Indeed, British and Irish propagandists played a 
crucial role in shaping the conflict, as Roy Foster has asserted: 
The war itself was conducted by means of public opinion - aided 
by engage British Liberals as much as by Erskine Childers' 
tersely efficient propaganda machine (brilliant at scaling up any 
military activity into a notorious looting or sacking. )77 
Under Childers" guidance the production and dissemination of anti-military and anti- 
British propaganda became the primary task of the Däil's Propaganda Department. 
73 For a more detailed analysis of the government approach to classifying the conflict see pp. 71-72 
74 Plimpton, "The Snapper ", Ist Battalion, `D' Company notes, May 1920, p. 7. 
75 Green Howards 'Gazette, 2nd Battalion notes, Dec. 1920, p. 116. 
76 See interview with Colonel R. H. G. Wilson, contained in a Daily Chronicle report, 'Split-Bullets at 
Pettigo! ', 8 June 1921, Colonel R. H. G. Wilson Papers, Museum of Lincolnshire Life, Lincoln. 
77 R. Foster, Modern Ireland (London, 1988) p. 499. 
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Independent press support for these propaganda efforts from Ireland's two biggest 
daily papers, the Irish Independent and the Freeman 's Journal ensured that the 
message was propagated effectively. As Tom Bowden has stressed: `through the 
vitally important and often neglected revolutionary medium of rumour. the terror and 
the Irish cause reached a mass audience through the medium of the press. ' 78 This 
system of filtration was combined to good effect with the production of a regular 
newssheet, The Irish Bulletin, which first appeared in November 1919. Through 
publications of this kind, the Dail were able to reinforce the notion of the I. R. A. 
campaign as the defence of Ireland against a foreign aggressor (despite the legitimate 
constitutional arrangement between Britain and Ireland). The important factor in 
republican propaganda was the public perception of Ireland as an independent nation. 
Despite its annexation by Britain, the Irish nation retained legitimacy in the 
perception and minds of people in Britain and Ireland alike. Thus, soldiers and other 
servants of the Crown (as the face of British rule) became the principle target for 
demonisation by Dail propaganda. 
The efforts of republican propagandists were never sufficiently counteracted by 
elements of the `doped' English press who, with wide circulation in Britain, Ireland 
and abroad, had the potential to seriously undermine Dail propaganda via a basic 
enquiry into the actual detail of events. This situation greatly contributed to bitterness 
in the Irish garrison: 
There started amongst the troops the feeling that there was no 
understanding in England and Scotland of their difficulties in 
Ireland, and that no efforts were being made across the channel 
to put the real facts of the situation before the British public. 79 
Even a cursory glance at soldiers' accounts suggests that the single-mindedness of 
rebel propaganda, combined with a lack of objective reporting, was a deep source of 
frustration for professional soldiers. As one general recalled: 
If the troops fired on or wounded a civilian, or killed him 
whatever the circumstances, a dozen civilian witnesses were 
always ready to come forward to state that the man concerned 
74 Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security, p. 64. 
79 Hist. 5th Div., pp. 38,44. The phrase "doped press" was used to describe the press' attitude towards 
hunger strikers which, it was claimed, had influenced public opinion to support the strikers' cause 
thereby contributing to their release. 
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was invariably one of the most loyal inhabitants in all County 
Cork, and as often as not the unfortunate officer or N. C. O. in 
charge of the army party concerned would then receive an 
official reprimand, while the local Irish press fulminated over the 
actions of the brutal and licentious Cameron Highlanders! 80 
Troops were also acutely aware that large elements of the Irish public carried and 
transmitted these propaganda claims or, as Lloyd George claimed 'every Irishman is a 
natural propagandist for his country. ' 8' Macready recounted an incident in Cork 
which he felt had resulted from the willingness of civilian witnesses to grossly 
misrepresent the actions of the Crown forces. The incident occurred during an 
execution at Cork prison when an armoured car and crew on duty outside the prison 
were engaged in making repairs to their vehicle. This was taken by the gathered 
crowd as a demonstration of their lack of respect for the solemnity of the occasion. ' 
Later it was claimed in the press that the soldiers had `danced around their car singing 
ribald songs among the people who were kneeling down praying' - allegations that 
Macready later dismissed as a complete 'fabrication'. 82 
Writing in March 1921, the correspondent of the Green Howards' Gazette 
claimed that the `scurrilous campaign of propaganda' that followed any major or 
minor incident involving the military was an `attempt to exasperate and tempt the 
troops to break the bonds of discipline. ' 83 Indeed, the `Record of the Rebellion' later 
concurred (based on information received in July 1920) that rebel leaders had 
developed the propaganda weapon as `systematic attempt to irritate troops into 
rebellion. ' Thus, troops were provoked to add `fuel to the fire' in order to make the 
propaganda campaign a self-perpetuating system. One main facet of this campaign 
was the attempt to represent all outrages committed by the I. R. A. as 'counter- 
action. ' 84 Another tactic involved encouraging the public to exaggerate damages and 
personal injury claims following crown force raids in order to convert (often 
uneventful) routine operations into acts of military terrorism. Colonial Office records 
indicate that, in County Cork alone, 207 criminal injury claims were filed against the 
80 Wimberley `Scottish Soldier', p. 147. 
R' Lloyd George to Greenwood, letter dated 21 April 192 1, Lloyd George Papers, F/19ý3'17. 
82 Macread,, -Annals, Volume II pp. 544-545. 83 Green Howards' Gazette, March 1921, p. 1 16. 
84 Record of the Rebellion, p. 15. 
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Crown forces between July 1920 and November 1921, of which 148 were eventually 
determined in favour of the claimant. 85 
By mid-1920, republican propaganda had achieved such an influence on the 
national mind in both Britain and Ireland that even objective journalistic reporting 
would have been unlikely to deviate opinion from the accepted version of events. The 
only solution lay in the suppression of the republican press and the development of 
effective counter-propaganda. Comprehensive press censorship had proved 
problematic owing to `the difficulty of obtaining adequate staff', by which Sturgis 
understood that it was difficult to recruit `civilians, since there are not soldiers enough 
to censor the press. ' 86 A better option was to promote counter-propaganda as a means 
by which to `neutralise news items and descriptions of events that might be harmful 
to the British Government' and to `boost morale and discipline the 'wild boys' of the 
Crown forces. '87 Macready had established a press section at G. H. Q. for this purpose 
shortly after his arrival, but it was not until the appointment of Basil Clarke as head of 
the News Bureau in August 1920 that a government department actually became 
operational for this purpose. However, Clarke's `failure to counter in any coherent 
way the wave of propaganda resulting from the deaths of Terence Macswiney and 
Kevin Barry' provided immediate evidence of his unsuitability for this role. 88 
Thereafter, British counter-propaganda came to be characterised a lack conviction 
and urgency, as Macready testified: 
Day after day scandalous and lying statements appear, and no 
action is ever taken beyond somewhat feeble contradictions 
which appear some days after the original statement has been 
published and which have little or no effect. 89 
Bowden has provided a vivid illustration of the hesitancy with which the Castle's 
News Bureau approached their task. He also exposed just how easily their 
counterparts were able to outflank them. Following the capture of an I. R. A. document 
in November 1920 which appeared to describe the best methods by which to conduct 
germ warfare against British troops, Bureau staff sensed an opportunity to create 
85 N. A., Records of the Colonial Office (herafter C. O. ) 905/15. Figures compiled from individual 
entries in Ireland - Criminal Injuries to Private Persons - 1920 - 1922. 86 Strurgis Diaries, 4 Jan. 1921. 
8' Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security, p. 112. 
8' Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence, p. 45. 
89 Macready, Annals, Volume II, p. 504. 
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mass public revulsion against I. R. A. methods. As Bowden observed `[whether 
authentic or not] the furore in the press over British reprisals would have palled 
alongside the use of germ warfare. ' However, a dilatory response from the Bureau 
allowed the I. R. A. to neutralise the outcome by releasing information to the Press 
which implied that the whole affair was staged. ' Despite, at the last minute, a British 
messenger being despatched in a hurry across Dublin, the I. R. A. were able bring their 
statement to press first thereby `nullifying the potential impact of the document by 
casting doubts about its parentage. ' 90 
Not all the difficulties that faced British troops can be attributed to the arena of 
human relations or organisational decrepitude. A strong sense of discontent with 
location and climate also contributed towards a general malaise throughout the 
garrison. In fact, the psychological and physical limits imposed by the landscape and 
the natural or urban environment are burgeoning elements in the fields of history and 
cultural or historical geography, and the sources generated by Crown soldiers 
certainly bear witness to the influence of place and environment on human 
experience. 91 Indeed, some soldiers saw their opinions of a hostile and aloof public as 
being reflected in the environment itself: 
Limerick is largely a city of decayed Georgian houses which 
were once impressive, but now have the look of having seen 
better days, a look then characteristic of so many people as well 
as houses in Southern Ireland. 92 
Similarly, the Green Howards' Gazette reported that: `everything in Ireland is sad 
looking, the weather remains truly Irish and there is always a look of depression on 
the face of an Irishman. 93 Many soldiers saw bleakness, melancholy and decay in the 
rural and urban environment and tended to project this back on aspects of their 
experience, their duties, the Irish people, and even Irish nationalist aspirations: 
90 Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security, pp. 127-131. The document, allegedly sent by Richard 
Mulcahy (Commander in Chief of the I. R. A. ) to Michael Collins, proposed troops' milk supplies as the 
`best means of conveying [typhoid bacillus]' 
91 See examples: D. Matless, Landscape and Englishness (London, 1998) or F. Driver & L. Martins (eds) 
Tropical 1 isions in an Age of Empire (Chicago, 2005). 
92 Captain J. B. Arnold, 'Against the Stream in Ireland', MS memoir, Peter Liddle Collection, 
Brotherton Library, Leeds University, p. 132. 
93 Green Howards' Gazette, Nov. 1920, p. 142. 
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After leaving the pass, Kilbeggan appears in sight and gives one 
a nasty jar. Kilbeggan seems in a crumbling state of decay, the 
buildings badly neglected like the people who walk about 
listlessly and appear to have no object in life (except to blame 
the government for their wretched conditions). 94 
Some soldiers (whilst not drawing parallels between location and the Irish 
people) wrote of the bleakness and quietness of Irish provincial life. C. Hendv, serving 
with the 1st Manchester Regiment in Cork between 1919 and 1922, captured his 
discontent with the location in doggerel form: 
Of all the places in this land 
That have been made by human hand 
There is one I can ne'er understand 
That's Ballincollig. 
There are no shop or market stalls, 
There are no clubs or music halls, 
But when it rains the water falls 
At Ballincollig. 95 
The sentiment is typical of soldiers' feelings towards their location during this period. 
Many battalions were dispersed in small detachments in towns and villages far 
removed from any major urban centre. Compared to barrack life in large self- 
contained military communities back home, the sparse population centres of rural 
Ireland were `backwaters' offering few entertainments to the soldier. Consequently, 
the bleakness of location, the adverse weather and the apparent inactivity of Irish 
provincial towns became for many some of the most trying aspects of service. 
The various hardships arising from a lack of basic training, insufficient unit size and a 
general discontent with service conditions came to be reflected in pressures on the 
operational effectiveness of the Irish garrison. These limiting factors. arising from the 
post-war climate and from weak government, greatly added to the demands placed 
9' Plimpton, "The Snapper". Oct. 1920, p. 46. 
95 C. Hendy in ; t-fanchester Regiment Gazette, July 1921, p. 133. 
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upon the troops, arising from both military policy and rebel determination. As the 
Irish army entered the final and most intense year of the conflict, it remained 
undermanned, untrained, inexperienced, and ill-equipped to meet the demands of an 
irregular conflict. Henceforth, military commanders could only remedy the shortfall 
by increasing the burden of duty for the troops at their disposal. 
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2. Military Operations 
The individual or `front-line' experiences of soldiers involved in military operations 
in Ireland have been largely neglected by previous studies of the period. Ill-defined 
general terms such as `raid', `patrol', `sweep', `picket' and `guard' have often been 
used to describe the operational routine of the military, with few attempts made to 
elaborate on these terms, to discover their meaning within the context of Irish service, 
or assess their contribution to a failed campaign. Therefore, a more complete picture 
of military life in Ireland is requiring of a more detailed description of the everyday 
activities that came to define it. During this period, the army was also beset by 
difficulties arising from its obligation to co-ordinate operations with the R. I. C. 
Therefore, this chapter will provide the first concerted attempt to analyse the 
fractured relationships in the Crown forces. This analysis will also highlight the 
significance of the government's failure to unite the command of the security forces, 
and the impact of this failure will be related back to soldiers' experience of civil- 
military policing. A further detailed study of the difficulties encountered by military 
intelligence officers in the course of their duties will provide a case study for the 
major arguments laid down in this chapter. 
Military sources from the period suggest that `raiding' was the primary duty of troops 
in Ireland. The author of the Oxford and Bucks Chronicle wrote at length on the 
subject, recalling how: 
A list of places to be raided each night was received daily from 
Brigade Headquarters. It might consist of five or six tasks, 
including the raiding of buildings suspected of being the 
headquarters of organizations, printing presses, bomb factories, 
and those containing stores of enemy arms and ammunition: 
sometimes it involved the arrest of individuals wanted for 
murder or lesser crimes. particularly Sinn Feiners on the `run. ' 
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Typically, small parties of two to three travelling in lorries or armoured vehicles 
performed the majority of raids, although larger operations could involve: 
The cordoning off of a village, or an extensive area, while a 
house to house search was made within the dark pool segregated 
by the searchlights. If armed resistance was expected the troops 
might be accompanied by armoured cars, or tanks, two of which 
were permanently attached to the battalion. ' 
For example, a large-scale search of all the country within ten miles of Kilbrittain' in 
June 1920 occupied most of the operational resources of 6th Division and resulted in 
`one hundred and fifty houses being searched, without result' in just one night. 2 
Raiding could also be time-consuming, with efforts usually being directed towards 
the seizure of arms, wanted persons, and seditious literature. To locate these targets 
raiding parties usually had to make thorough and exhaustive searches of houses and 
their contents. Douglas Wimberley recalled a raid on the house of a suspected rebel in 
Queenstown, County Cork in August 1920, during which his party struggled to 
uncover any incriminating evidence, even in the absence of the occupant. Through 
sheer persistence, Wimberley discovered a cavity beneath an unsecured floorboard, 
which revealed a document containing a `hate poem' that ran: 
"God curse the British Empire, 
May he wither the flag that flies 
May he shatter the strength that still remains 
Of that father of sin and lies 
May he strengthen the hands of its enemies 
May he hasten its dying gasp 
May Satan rise from the depths of Hell 
"3 That ulcer of earth to grasp. 
Despite failing to find arms or capture any documents betraying the plans or tactics of 
the local I. R. A., the operation ended on a note of satisfaction for Wimberley whose 
haul of seditious literature was sufficient to secure the arrest of the occupant. 
1 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, pp. 29-30. 
2 J. W. Burrows, Essex Units in the War 1914-19, (Southend on Sea, 1920) p. 189. 
Wimberley, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 148. 
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Wimberley's account demonstrated how professionalism and persistence could 
yield worthwhile results. Similarly, an officer's wife based in Dublin provided a frank 
description of the thoroughness with which soldiers approached their raiding duties: 
Beds, cupboards, chimneys were searched and carpets raised. 
Ladies' clothing hanging in wardrobes was always carefully 
investigated. This was often a favourite hiding place for 
revolvers, ammunition, or seditious documents. 4 
Likewise, intelligence reports highlight the careful planning and organization that 
preceded a successful raid. Raid operations were rarely based on speculation or 
opportunism alone, usually they followed thorough reconnaissance: 
As a general principle it was desirable to make a previous 
reconnaissance and if a house in a town was likely to lead to 
important results to raid another and, as far as possible, similar 
house in the street in the same street so as to ascertain the type of 
building. Not only was previous reconnaissance desirable but a 
clear and definite plan for searching and guarding during the 
search was essential. In important raids personal and thorough 
searches should be made of every inmate in the house, unless 
they were so numerous that it was inconvenient or impossible. 
Documents and weapons were hidden in most unexpected 
places, and in many instances were overlooked owing to sheer 
bluff. It was therefore necessary that those who conducted a 
search should have studied beforehand all available notes on the 
various types of hiding places. 5 
Despite its thoroughness and the grave risk to those involved, from a military 
point of view raiding was a largely fruitless activity in Ireland. Careful planning could 
easily identify the premises of suspected rebels, but such reconnaissance was highly 
unlikely to secure arrests. Military communication was never able to keep pace with 
the rapidity of republican information networks: Percival recalled how his opponents 
developed an extraordinary way of getting their orders circulated' that involved 
a Anon, &periences of an Of cer 's Wife. p. 63. 
Record of the Rebellion (Intelligence) in Hart (ed) British Intelligence p. 50. 
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leaving `verbal instructions at fixed meeting places' such as farmhouses or public 
houses. This network, comprising numerous outposts and spanning large areas of 
remote country, facilitated the rapid deployment (or withdrawal) of republican units 
during the course of military operations. The continual thwarting of targeted raids 
encouraged Percival and his men to shift their focus to raiding these meeting places, 
which quickly became `one of our main objects to find and surprise. '6 Shaw was 
similarly aware that co-ordinated raids aimed at multiple targets were also hampered 
by the velocity of basic `word of mouth' communication: `it is difficult... in a country 
district to concentrate the troops necessary to raid the houses of half a dozen I. V. 
officers living in different villages without attracting attention. '7 Likewise, in Dublin 
District men of the O. B. L. I. described how the mobility of their opponents created 
difficulties in tracking wanted persons during the course of a raid: 
The Sinn Feiners rarely slept in the same place twice, tonight a 
city tenement, tomorrow a cabin on some lonely hillside. 
Sometimes the soldiers won, more often not. Information was 
scrappy and came at unexpected times and places. 8 
This often led to a form of `blind hitting-out' which posed serious problems for troop 
morale since `raids on houses on insufficient information raised resentment for which 
the results obtained did not compensate. '9 Augusteijn has claimed that `without 
sufficient local information' the key sites believed to host prominent republicans were 
`continuously raided even when most of the men concerned were on the run. ' His 
`self-preservation' thesis also works well here if we accept his claim that soldiers and 
policemen were fully aware that they `would not find anyone in these houses' which 
meant that `they would avoid getting into a fight. ' 10 Therefore, arrest raids on 
premises known to be vacant may have been entirely counter-productive in a military 
sense, yet it presented soldiers with the rare opportunity to remove themselves to a 
safe location and to avoid potentially dangerous operations elsewhere. 
6 Sir Warren Fisher (Head of the Civil Service) to Lloyd George, Bonar Law (Lord Privy Seal) and 
Chamberlain (Chancellor of the Exchequer) letter dated 15 May 1920, Lloyd George Papers, 
F/31/1'33; Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II), p. 9. 
Statement from G. O. C. -in-C. on the present state of affairs in Ireland, 27 March 1920, p. 19. 
8 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 29. 
9 Record of the Rebellion, p. 7. 
10 Augusteijn, From Public Defiance, p. 229. 
47 
One particular aspect of raiding that drew heavy comment from soldiers stemmed 
from their first contact with the poverty of rural and provincial Irish households 
during this period. Douglas Wimberley regarded this `clash of worlds' as the most 
`distasteful and unpleasant' aspect of raiding duties. He recalled that most of the 
houses he entered: `were literally swarming with fleas, which «we then invariably 
picked up... as soon as I got back to camp I used to bathe myself and change my 
clothes. ' 11 Likewise, F. A. S. Clarke was similarly unnerved by his first sight of Irish 
rural poverty, his description of the search of a farmhouse near Kinsale conjures an 
image of grotesquery: `We searched a so-called farm and found one old woman in a 
bed sharing the one room with fowls, pigs and traces of a cow. The stink was awful. ' 
The raiding party then moved on to a neighbouring farmhouse `a better farm with two 
storeys' though his first impressions were challenged when his sergeant `rushed 
downstairs and was violently sick outside... [he] would never tell me what horrid 
sight he had seen upstairs. ' 12 
An officers' wife expressed her distaste for raiding (on the part of her husband) 
in terms of the unwanted insight it offered into the lives of Dublin's urban poor: `the 
occupants of the house usually presented a curious appearance in various odd 
deshabilles... If the house was moderately clean this work was bearable, though 
unpleasant. ' She further recalled how some unfortunate soldiers were charged with 
raiding `the filthy tenement houses of the Dublin slums. "3 
Some soldiers were particularly uncomfortable regarding the intrusive aspects of 
raiding: E. J. A. H. Brush regarded it as `distasteful for soldiers to have to pry into other 
people's private houses and private possessions. '4 Despite this, some raiding parties 
relished such rude incursions into Irish domestic life; the correspondent of the Green 
Howards' Gazette reported that: 
The searching of houses at all hours of the day or night still 
continues, and if an unpleasant job, it nevertheless presents some 
humorous aspects. Usually we are treated well but at times the 
" Wimberley, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 148. 
12 Clarke. 'Memoirs of a Professional Soldier', Chapter 6, pp. 3-4. 
13 Anon, Experiences of an Officer's Wife, p. 63. 
14 Brush, `Rifle Green/Orange Flash', p. 16. 
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youthful beauty of the house becomes truculent - in which case 
quiet sarcasm is most assuredly the remedy. '5 
An officers' wife (despite her account of the decrepit state of the Dublin slums) 
recalled how raiding became a popular duty because it sometimes provoked a 
confrontation to relieve the boredom of military service: 
... it was a break in the monotony of the everlasting guards. There 
was always the hope of a scrap. of getting a little of their own 
back. When volunteers were called for the whole regiment 
usually responded. 16 
Therefore, innate curiosity and the possibility of a violent encounter attracted many 
soldiers to raiding duties. Even greater excitement was generated by the prospect of a 
valuable haul. The Oxford and Bucks Chronicle remembered that: 
... 
late one evening a note was handed through the barrack fence 
by a girl who then disappeared. It purported to give the address 
at which Michael Collins, the Sinn Fein leader, would spend the 
following night.. . 
it was decided to visit the address during the 
course of the night's operations. The house specified in the note 
was quietly surrounded and entered. Almost at once success 
appeared imminent, for there in the bedroom a man was sleeping 
of whom the remainder of the household claimed they knew 
nothing; they had never seen him before, they said, excitement 
became intense. By now, the man was very much awake, but 
apparently was unwilling to talk. Someone turned back the 
bedclothes, disclosing the fact that he wore a long, ginger beard 
-a most excellent disguise in Dublin. A quick tug 
failed to 
remove it... if the assault had no other effect it induced 
loquacity... the man explained... exactly who he was: the N. C. O. 
verified the full statement, and apologized handsomely... The 
15 Green Howards ' Ga: ette, Nov. 1920, p. 99. 
16 Anon, Experiences of an Officer's Wife, p. 60. 
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girl and her motive? No one knew. It was like that in Dublin in 
those days. 17 
If raiding evoked a mixture of anticipation and apprehension, military patrols 
were almost universally disliked. Of all military duties, they probably posed the 
biggest safety threat to troops. During patrols the element of surprise that 
occasionally allowed the military to gain the upper hand during raids, was reversed in 
favour of the enemy. Therefore, mobile I. R. A. units were able to co-ordinate their 
attacks in accordance with the predictable pattern of motor, foot and cycle patrols. 
Indeed, Percival claimed that an `unnecessary routine movement' was a key 
contributory factor to the Kilmichael ambush of 28 November 1920.18 Likewise, the 
Manchester Regiment's Record of Service detailed how a cyclist unit was attacked by 
`40 men, disguised with beards, black faces etc... ' during their regular patrol of the 
West Cork village of Ballyvourney. 19 The attack claimed the life of one officer and 
left four other ranks wounded. On another occasion, a party of armed rebels surprised 
the same regiment as they patrolled their regular route along the Dripsey Road, near 
Ballincollig. This time the ambushing party (being well aware of the size and 
structure of the motor patrol) had allowed another Crossley van `which was about a 
mile ahead to pass through the ambush. ' As the second Crossley approached `an 
attempt was made to drop a tree in front of it' and the ambushing party was extended 
along the sides of the road for a distance of 200 yards' where they discharged over a 
100 rounds in the direction of the immobilized tender. 20 
" Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, pp. 29-30. Anonymous letters of this kind were common 
throughout the period. For the most part they were intended to create a diversion or add to the 
frustration of raiding parties, however Percival claimed that these false leads were sometimes the result 
`of one family trying to get a bit of its own back on a neighbouring family. ', Guerrilla Warfare (II), p. 
15. 
18 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II) p. 17. This attack by a flying column of the West Cork Brigade 
I. R. A. under the leadership of Tom Barry resulted in the death of 17 Auxiliaries on 28 November 
1920, detailed accounts of the ambush and its aftermath can be found in Hart, The I. R. A. and Its 
Enemies, pp. 21-38 and Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence, pp. 74,110. 
19 Record of Service of the 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment 1919-22,18 Aug. 1920, Tameside 
Local Studies Library, Stalybridge, Greater Manchester. This particular incident, which has not had 
wide coverage in accounts of the period should not be confused with the 'Ballyvourney ambush' of 
July 1918 during which two armed constables were attacked by armed Volunteers who shot one and 
beat the other until he became unconscious, see Hart, The I. R. A. and it's Enemies, p. 62. 
20 Ibid, I Sept. 1920. This incident, which led to a substantial exchange of fire between the opposing 
sides, has been largely neglected in surviving military records from the period and was left completely 
unrecorded in the detailed tally of incidents contained within the army's own The Irish Rebellion in 
the 6`h Divisional Area: From After the 1916 Rebellion to December 1921. ' General Staff. 6th 
Division, (hereafter 'Rebellion. 6th Div. ') Strickland Papers, Imperial \V'ar Museum, London. 
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The success of ambushing parties largely depended upon ingenuity, patience. 
preparation, organization and steely determination. Sean Moylan provided one of the 
most vivid accounts of an I. R. A. ambush in his description of the Clonbannin ambush 
of February 1921: 
Courage and enthusiasm are at a low ebb in the hours before 
dawn. It was bitterly cold and we trudged along in grim silence 
across the sodden fields to our destination... as necessity arose 
men were engaged in cutting holes in the thick hedges with 
billhooks. When this work was done there was nothing to do but 
wait. . . the 
hours seemed endless. At eleven o'clock we were still 
crouching beneath the fence and still there was no sign of the 
British. Suddenly we heard the sound of a lorry and the order 
went down the line: "Let the first one well in before you fire. " 
On it came. We waited for the second lorry. Out through the gate 
swung the farm cart; those who propelled it scuttled back. We 
opened fire. In five minutes the fight was over. By some 
mischance there was only one lorry on the road that morning... 
Those English boys showed grit but they were outnumbered and 
caught in a trap. All of them were wounded; their driver was 
killed. I looked at the young driver as he lay dead across the 
wheel. I am no soldier. I hate killing and violence. The thought 
ran through my mind: - "God help his mother. "2' 
However, not all successful rebel operations depended upon such meticulous 
preparation: random or even targeted patrols were usually too bulky and too slow 
moving to retain the element of surprise for long, and their torpid movements created 
excellent spot chances for opportunist attackers. The chronicler of the Royal Scots 
Fusiliers recalled: 
... 
frequent patrolling in box-bodied Ford cars, Crossley 18-cwt. 
tenders and 3-ton lorries. Two peerless armoured cars each 
21 Moylan, In His Own Words, p. 68. 
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mounting two Hotchkiss guns were also available for assistance 
but proved clumsy and unreliable. 22 
F. A. S. Clarke also observed that: 
... movement in trucks was unsatisfactory, not only did it give 
the game away, but one soon heard that the most successful 
ambushes of troops and police were when [they were] riding in 
vehicles. 23 
These ponderous and awkward patrols were in sharp relief to the mobility of their 
opponents whom one soldier observed as being able to travel great distances with 
astonishing speed. ' They also manipulated the terrain to further the mobility gap 
between themselves and their opponents by `turning off the main roads, and using the 
innumerable tracks and lanes with which the country was intersected' thereby 
`continuing their journey at top speed. '24 Contrast this with Sean Moylan's 
description of a military motor patrol of the Gloucester Regiment that was so 
awkwardly large (and so thorough in its coverage of the North Cork area) that it 
generally proceeded `at a rate of not greater than one mile an hour. ' This allowed him 
to watch it from his vantage point for `several hours [until] it passed out of sight. '25 
Only on rare occasions did military patrols retain the element of surprise long enough 
to anticipate an ambushing party. A good example was provided by a joint 6th 
Division military patrol near Bandon in August 1920 which was reported to `have 
surprised a large party of men who were ambushing near Brinny, about four miles 
from Bandon. '26 Such incidents undoubtedly brought a measure of satisfaction to 
those involved, and yet they were far too infrequent to alleviate the irritation of labour 
intensive, fruitless operations. Some patrolling parties experimented with a 
combination of motorised transport and foot advances as a means by which to 
confuse and disorientate the enemy. 27 However, the only genuine defensive tactic for 
military motor patrols was simple weight of numbers. Marie Coleman observed how. 
22 Anon, History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, (Glasgow, 1954), Midleton Library, Glasgow. p. 5. 
23 Clarke, `Memoirs of a Professional Soldier', Chapter 6, p. 3. 
24 Brevet Major T. A. Lowe, Some Reflections of a Junior Commander upon "The Campaign" in 
Ireland 1920 and 1921. ' Army Quarterly (Oct., 1922) pp. 56-7. 
25 Moylan, In His Own Words, p. 130. 
26 The Times, 31 Aug. 1920, p. 11. 
27 Brennan, The War in Clare, pp. 46-7. Brennan recalled how the British adopted a plan of sending 
out strong detachments at night and dropping them at strategic points on the roads... often they came in 
lorries xN hich left them and then drove on. ' 
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in Longford `they became more successful at evading the I. R. A., travellin`i in much 
larger convoys, thus making it increasingly difficult for the I. R. A. to initiate 
engagements with them. '28 In Sligo, Farry cited an incident whereby a large planned 
ambush was averted by the presence of a formidable military convoy: `They [the 
ambushing party] stayed until 5pm... when four loads of military came along and they 
were let go through... Carty [Sligo I. R. A. leader] was unwilling to engage such a large 
number of soldiers. '29 Sean Moylan was similarly aware that a greater number of 
lorries, created a better opportunity for the military to spread out during an attack, 
which sometimes `permitted the British to outflank our position'. As he recalled, the 
Gloucester Regiment stationed in North Cork (despite their torpor) were a constant 
source of frustration for an operationally-minded I. R. A. leader: 'they always moved 
in such large bodies that it would be madness for us to think of attacking them. ' 30 The 
risks created by smaller patrolling parties and by the `bunching' of military vehicles 
were well known to soldiers of the Essex Regiment. Their 1 st Battalion established 
clear guidelines stating that `lorry convoys should consist of not less than 6 lorries 
with a suitable escort', they were also careful `to avoid all being ambushed 
simultaneously' by dividing lorries into `two or more groups which moved at 300 or 
400 yards interval. ' 31 
Inevitably, the susceptibility of patrolling parties arose in connection with their 
main purpose which was to establish a visible presence in remote districts. Their use 
as an `imposing spectacle' was recognised by Captain E. F. Chapman who was billeted 
in Killarney, County Kerry at the time of the Easter Rising in Dublin. He recalled 
how he spent much of this period of upheaval: `march[ing] about the country to make 
a wholesome impression on people's minds. '32 In the later period however, smaller 
isolated patrols (emanating from detached units) tended to convey an impression of 
vulnerability that invited assault. F. A. S. Clarke recalled how he was required to take 
`small patrols round the streets of the town [Bandon]' a routine which encouraged 
local rebels `contrary to their usual tactics' to take the `offensive against us and 
several other of the Regiment's detachments. ' 33 Foot patrols were especially 
vulnerable and their safety usually depended upon both their weight of numbers and 
28 Coleman, County Longford, p. 13 1. 
29 Farry, Sligo 1914-21, p. 251. 
30 Moylan, In His Own Words, pp. 88,130. 
Percival, Guerilla Warfare (I), p. 12. 
32 Captain E. F. Chapman, letter to a friend, dated 30 April 1916, Imperial War Museum, London. 
3-' Clarke, 'Memoirs of a Professional Soldier', Chapter 6, p. 8. 
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their ability to maintain a regular military formation. A visiting journalist observed an 
organized patrol through Limerick city in May 1921, in which he recalled: 
... soldiers walking through the streets in their curious patrol 
formation. A line of six men with arms at the trail comes first, 
followed by a file of men on opposite sides of the street, then the 
officer and his N. C. O. in the centre of the roadway, another file 
of men and another line. They advance in a leisurely manner, the 
officer occasionally pulling up somebody crossing the road and 
questioning him. 34 
Soldiers of the Essex Regiment also made frequent use of foot patrols as a means to 
exhaust itinerant rebel groups: 
Local patrolling was carried out by each detachment, so as to 
keep the enemy on the move, and prevent him from resting, in 
any quiet area. The general idea was that there should be no quiet 
areas, and that the enemy columns should be constantly 
harassed. 35 
Alongside the constant threat of ambush, patrols had to contend with felled trees, 
land mines, exploded bridges and innumerable road trenches intended to impede the 
passage of motor patrols (cycle patrols were usually stopped in their tracks by the 
laying down of `tin tacks' across the roads. ) 36 On occasions these practices were 
intended to stall patrols in order that insurgents could ambush the immobilised 
vehicles and their occupants. In this way: 
[men of the Lincoln Regiment] travelling in two motor lorries 
from Fermoy to Tipperary were ambushed by a large party of 
men who fired on them from both sides of the road. A tree had 
been felled and thrown across the road, and when the lorries 
pulled up shots were fired at them. 37 
On most occasions, these measures were designed to inconvenience and frustrate 
the military or to hamper their mobility and reduce their operational effectiveness. 
34 The Times, 23 May 1921, p. 14. 
35 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II), pp. 2-3. 
'6 The V'' Neºtws. Our trek in Ould [sic] Ireland', July 192 1, p. 187. 
37 The Times, 20 Dec. 1920, p. 10. 
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The Record of Service of the Manchester Regiment contained a series of weary 
entries regarding the problems encountered by patrols: on 6 August ' ... a patrol 
found 
a trench dug across the Macroom-Garrane-Ballyvourney road. they refilled it'; On 20 
August: `various roads had trenches dug across them in this area [Ballymakeerv ]. ' 38 
Trenching was by far the most common ploy used to impede the free passage of 
Crown Force patrols. One very plausible explanation for this was provided by the 
`Record of the Rebellion' which claimed that trench digging was a suitable outlet for 
the energies of moderates in the ranks of Sinn Fein: 'The practice provided a safe way 
for the less bold spirits of the rebels to show some form of activity, and local units of 
the I. R. A. became responsible for this action. '39 
This form of interference with the transport infrastructure was a severe logistical 
problem for the Crown forces. It also ran parallel to a determined `transport boycott' 
which meant that the military were reliant entirely upon their own transport (see 
Chapter 4). 
The I. R. A. also experimented with land mines as a means by which to cause 
maximum material and human damage to Crown Force patrols. During this period, 
I. R. A. explosives were fairly rudimentary, and usually posed more of a risk to those 
engaged in their production than to their intended target. While the vast majority of 
these crude contraptions failed to detonate on impact, those that did tended to have a 
devastating effect. On 31 May 1921, a musketry party of the Hampshire Regiment, 
marching along a road near Youghal, County Cork came into contact with a number 
of mines `fired mechanically across the road' resulting in the death of `seven soldiers 
[mainly bandsmen]' with `19 wounded. 40 
To further illustrate the problem of road obstacles, it is worth quoting from the 
account of a visiting reporter in May 1921 who chose to walk the 20 miles from Cork 
to Mallow by road in order to 'discover the realities of the countryside': 
There were sometimes loose places in the surface of the road, as 
though it had been dug up and replaced. But not until I had 
covered more than half the journey and passed through a 
straggling village of white and grey cottages did I come upon a 
definite reminder of the realities of the countryside. Where an 
38 Record of Service of the 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment, 6 Aug., 20 Aug. 1920. 
39 Record of the Rebellion, p. 38. 
S0 Record of the Rebellion, p. 42, Rebellion. 6 `h Div. p. 29. 
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old grey stone bridge crossed a stream which sang and rippled 
down a narrow ravine, a neat trench four foot deep by three 
broad had been dug across the road. " 
On another excursion along the Tullamore road from Bin he discovered that: 
Three miles out a wide, deep trench had been dug across the road 
-a trench just wide enough and just deep enough to wreck any 
vehicle that should try to compass it. A long empty stretch 
between the bog and the hillside followed at the end of which 
three holes, of the size and depth of shell holes, had been dug 
triangular wise in the roadway leaving a narrow pathway for the 
foot passenger but ensuring certain perdition to bicycle or car. 42 
These `realities' were an everyday obstacle to military patrols, and were 
sometimes used as a means by which to funnel military traffic to planned ambush 
sites. Through strategic road cutting and the exploding of bridges. I. R. A. units (with 
the aid of forced civilian labour) were able to obstruct `all roads except one or two 
selected main roads which they left open for the ordinary civilian traffic and also with 
a view to catching lorry convoys in ambushes on these roads. ' 43 These strategic 
patterns were evident in the 5th Division area, especially in the area surrounding the 
Curragh: `The map on which were marked up the "road obstacles reported", showed a 
distinct attempt to cut off the Curragh from direct communication with the north west, 
west and south west. '44 
Many of the initiatives designed to overcome these obstacles proved to be clumsy 
and time consuming, not to mention futile. Refilled trenches could easily be re- 
opened and bridging materials such as planks were cumbersome and liable to break. 
On the other hand, road blockages could usually be dealt with adequately via the use 
of Stokes mortar bombs. In the case of road trenches, soldiers of the Cameron 
Highlanders became so exasperated that they used forced `civilian labour... collected 
in the customary way' to remove obstructions and level road surfaces. 45 The Buffs 
" The Times, 19 May 1921, p. 12. 
42 Ibid, 20 May 1921, p. 14. 
4' Percival, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 17. 
44 Hist. 5th Div., p. 80. 
45 The '9`h ; V¬'u+s, 2nd Battalion notes, April 1921, p. 14 1. For more in-depth anal'. sis of the Cameron's 
use of coercive measures see Chapter 4. The use of forced civilian labour to refill trenches appears to 
have been widespread throughout all divisional areas. The collection of civilians for this purpose as 
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even devised an ingenious counter-obstruction tactic that involved a 'road block' 
being `converted into a booby trap', a ploy that reportedly `caused many Sinn Fein 
casualties. '46 Late in the period, training was provided to enable soldiers to surmount 
obstacles more effectively and an astonishing variety of materials were provided to 
assist them to do so. These included `cross-out saws', 'felling axes', -hawsers'. 
`portable bridging materials', `artillery mats', `strips of expanded metal' and the 
intriguingly named `ammonal sausages' apparently used for 'blowing up trees'. '? 
Nonetheless, these counter-obstruction aids (however elaborate) were simply surplus 
to requirement in cases where road obstructions had been so placed to create 
opportunities for ambushing parties. Sean Moylan recalled one occasion when a 
group of soldiers travelling by car approached his party who were in the process of 
digging a trench near Shinanagh, North Cork. Unable to turn the vehicle around and 
faced with an armed I. R. A. unit, the driver of the car, already under fire: 
... saw the twelve feet wide trench yawning before him, trod on 
the accelerator, charged it and almost got away. But the car was 
too heavily laden, its back wheels struck the face of the trench on 
the far side and it toppled back into the trench almost on top of 
the men who had been digging. 48 
Searches were also impeded by disruptions to travel and communications, 
especially in the aftermath of the Fermoy incident (see Chapter 5). In this case, the 
attackers made preparations for their flight by cutting telegraph wires in the 
neighbourhood thereby reducing the army's potential for a rapid response. The 
assailants fled the scene in motorcars and the military were hampered in their pursuit 
owing to the roads being blocked with felled trees. As a result they were 'forced to 
abandon the pursuit' and despatch aircraft to track down the raiders. However, even 
this initiative proved unsuccessful on account of fact that `the telephone wires 
sometimes recorded in war diaries as though a regular military operation. For example an entry in the 
War Diary of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade revealed that 'I officer and 25 other ranks of the Carbiniers' set 
out to `collect civilians to repairs roads. ' This entry also suggests that gathering civilian labour was 
labour intensive on the part of the military as well as being time-consuming. It is also fair to assume 
that civilian parties under instruction from the military were neither the most co-operative, nor efficient 
workers for this task. N. A., W. O. 35'93/2, War Diary - 3rd Cavalry Brigade (5th Division) - May - 
July 1921. 
46 Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs, chapter 1, p. 3. 
47 Hist. 5th Div.. p. 136. 
48 Moylan, In His Own li'ords, p. 89. 
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between Fermoy and the neighbouring aerodrome were also cut. "9 This disruption 
led to a slow response on the part of the R. A. F. who were unable to further assist the 
army in their pursuit. 
The proliferation of attacks on patrols, convoys and search parties necessitated 
some extreme (even inhumane) measures on the part of the military, the most 
notorious of which involved the use of I. R. A. hostages either strapped to or contained 
in military vehicles to deter would-be attackers. Nonetheless, these measures were 
insufficient to prevent an ambush of the Crown forces at Macroom in February 1921. 
In this case, the carrying of `a Sinn Fein hostage' failed to deter the attack, and the 
unfortunate hostage was reportedly `killed during the fight. ' All told, the battle at 
Macroom was reported to have lasted two hours during which time military 
reinforcements from Bantry and Glengariff were unable to assist the besieged patrol 
owing to the familiar reason that transport was obstructed by the destruction of 
bridges. In particular, `a large bridge spanning the Cork and Bandon railway line at 
Aughaville was blown up by republicans' and `rail transport was brought to a 
standstill by a blocked railway line. ' 50 
The threat to motor patrols was so serious that it prompted commanders in the 
5th Division area to establish a series of standing orders for armed parties moving by 
lorry. The fulfilment of these requirements was often complex, and always labour 
intensive, as the following extract demonstrates: 
(6) Every lorry which carries armed personnel will have the 
following minimum number specially told off for look-out duty 
and for `immediate action': 
(a) A -Forward Look out" consisting of an Officer or N. C. O., 
or man, sitting beside the driver. 
(b) Two "Side Look-outs one on each side of the lorry. 
(c) A "Rear Look-out" by the tail-board. 
Note - The "Side Look-outs" will be doubled if there are more 
than 10 men in the lorry. 
49 The Times, 8 Sept. 1921, p. 11; 9 Sept. 1921, p. 12. 
50 The Times, 26 Feb. 1921, p. 10. On 25 February, 1921,70 Auxiliary Cadets travelling by lore from 
Macroom to Ballyvourney were ambushed by an I. R. A. battalion reported as being `500 strong' 
resulting in the death of 10 Auxiliaries and a civilian. 
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(9) In addition to the "Look-outs" one or two men will be told 
off specially to drop the tail board of the lorry if required. 51 
Despite the most stringent precautions, the inertia of large, cumbersome military 
patrols was always likely to make them a target for attack. By ýv ay of response, the 
government had, as early as May 1919, touted plans to switch to a system of `garrison 
posts and flying columns' for the purpose of `carrying out a relentless pursuit of the 
terrorists. ' 52 However, it was not until May 1920 that troop numbers allowed 
regiments to form into flying squadrons of cavalry. At this time, the Cabinet were 
determined to promote a military solution involving flying columns as a means of 
avoiding the need to introduce full martial law. 53 In May 1920, The Times began to 
report that mobile troops had begun patrolling the mountainous districts of Counties 
Dublin and Wicklow. 54 However (according to intelligence reports) in spite of the 
influx of fresh troops in May 1920 `military forces.. . were not yet strong enough to 
form mobile columns of any strength or to do more than raid and patrol in the vicinity 
of their stations throughout the country. ' 55 
Despite their limitations, the new arrangement proved to be much more effective 
than bulky motorized patrols. A new initiative involving small foot columns 
accompanied by cycle sections was, as Townshend has maintained `perhaps the only 
true counter-guerrilla tactic employed during the whole conflict. ' 56 However, while 
these columns sometimes lent themselves to tactical flexibility, concerns remained 
about the true alacrity of their response. The History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers 
recalled how: 
... 
flying squads were held in readiness to deal with "incidents" 
but were always absurdly late in their arrival on the scene; the 
quarry had struck long since and melted away, to re-appear 
elsewhere at some unguarded spot. 57 
51 Hist. 5th Div., Colonel W. Maxwell Scott, General Staff, 5th Division - Appendix X- Standing 
Orders for Armed Parties Moving by Lorry and for Lorry Convoys. 
52 The Times, 19 May 1920, p. 16. 
53 N. A., Cabinet Papers (hereafter CAB) 23/037, Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers held at 10 
Downing Street on Monday 3 Ist May 1920 - General Policy in Ireland. At the conference, Greenwood 
`expressed himself against the introduction of martial law at the present moment, but would prefer to 
await the result of a new method of putting down outrages by the use of mobile troops. ' 
sa The Times, p. 16. 
ss Record of the Rebellion (Intelligence) in Hart (ed. ) British Intelligence p. 24. 
56 Townshend, The British Campaign, p. 177. 
57 Anon, Histori of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, p. 5. 
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Similarly, Peter Hart has claimed that mobile units `were still sometimes awkwardly 
large' citing the example of the multi-platoon columns 'devised by Major Percival of 
the Essex Regiment' nicknamed `Percival's mule column' by local republicans. 58 
An article in The 79th News provided a frank description of life on a mobile 
column. Written by a serving soldier, the account suggests that bare comfort, 
monotony, long hours and danger were the most salient features of column life. The 
author `J. C. T' recalled a typical morning with his colleagues in 'C' Company on the 
Cameron Highlander's Flying Column: 
Breakfast 04.00 hrs, Nos. 1,2 and 4 Platoons proceeded to 
Aghada, dealing with all the intervening country en route. On 
arrival they embarked on a steam launch and proceeded to 
Queenstown. At 06.15 hours Horse Transport and No. 3 Platoon 
as escort marched via Middleton to Queenstown. a distance of 17 
miles. 59 
The `History of the 5th Division' also provided detailed accounts of the activities 
of flying columns or "Circus" patrols as they were sometimes described. These 
descriptions suggest that mobile operations had a multiple purpose in providing 
training for young soldiers, creating a visible presence in remote areas, and pursuing 
targeted arrests: 
A "Circus" patrol consisted of a party of 20-30 cavalry, or 
artillery, or infantry, mounted on horseback, bicycles or in 
lorries, which went out into the country for not less than two and 
not more than seven days. The party billeted or bivouacked for 
the night, and was either self-supporting or else requisitioned 
food and forage from the inhabitants. These patrols afforded 
most useful instruction for all ranks, they "showed the flag" in 
out of way districts, and very often they had definite objectives 
such as the arrest of one or more "wanted men". 
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Curiously, most official sources give few indications of the success of these 
initiatives. Nevertheless, flying columns could be quietly effective in mapping rural 
58 Hart, The I. R.. A. and Its Enemies, p. 95. 
59 The V" News, 'Our Trek in Ould [sic] Ireland', June 1921, p. 187. 
60 Hist. 5th Div., p. 68. 
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areas. They also acquainted troops with the tactics of counter-insurgency. Intelligence 
notes recalled how (in common with experiences in the 5th Division): 
mobile columns did not achieve any tangible or sensational 
results, beyond improving our knowledge of the country and 
training the troops to a system of tactics which were quite new to 
them after their experience of the war in Europe. 61 
The responsibility for providing escorts and guards also transferred from the 
police to the military. This need was created by the disturbed state of the country, and 
escorts were employed to convey military stores in the absence of a reliable transport 
infrastructure. Sometimes the movement of civilians (especially prominent loyalists) 
necessitated the use of military escorts for protection. These duties naturally exposed 
soldiers to an increased threat of rebel attack. By definition, an escort (in the military 
sense) is placed to protect a potential target, and to form an effective human barrier 
between the target and the assailant. Such a responsibility could be costly for soldiers, 
even when the persons or items being escorted were seemingly innocuous. The Digest 
of Service of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment recorded a famous incident when, 
on 20 September 1920, `an attack [was] made on a bread lorry and escort in Church 
Street, Dublin' during which two soldiers were killed and one wounded. ' 62 
In a rare and fascinating account, A. C. Hannant, stationed in Dublin at the time of 
the Easter Rising recalled how a detachment of his squadron were detailed to escort a 
cargo of ammunition from Dublin's North Wall Docks to Marlborough Barracks 
adjoining Phoenix Park. The journey took them through the flashpoints of a city in 
the grip of rebellion: 
The detachment moved out under the command of Lieutenant 
Sheppard and half troop as escort. As they proceeded along the 
North Circular Road firing could be heard over the City towards 
Jacobs Biscuit Factory, and around the area of Dublin Castle. As 
they took some back turns to the Docks crossing Talbot Street 
they saw armed men running towards the G. P. O in Sackwille 
61 Record of the Rebellion (Intelligence) in Hart (ed. ) British Intelligence, p. 29. 
62 Digest of Service of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 20 Sept. 1920. The ambush 
described here became a `famous incident' because it led to the capture and (later) execution of 18 year 
old medical student, Kevin Barry. For further biographical detail regarding Kevin Barry see p. 225. 
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Street... There was confusion at the docks, but Lieutenant 
Shepard managed to load the ammunition and get away. 
At this point, one of the escorting party, Private S. S. Scarlet, was detailed to go ahead 
as a `scout' with a `connecting file between him and the detachment': 
They crossed Sackville Street and as they came up the Liffey, 
armed men could be seen on the roofs of houses. S. S. Scarlet 
called up his connecting file to report, he galloped up but was 
turned back by heavy rifle fire, and S. S. Scarlet was shot dead. 
As they came up to the Four Courts the fire became very heavy 
and Lieutenant Sheppard decided to save the ammunition and his 
men, he cut the horses loose, saving saddles and blankets, got the 
ammunition and everything into an empty house in Church 
Street and turned over the G. S. wagons in the narrow street. 
With just `five rounds of ammunition per man', the detachment managed to hold out 
in their position `until the following Friday' when they were finally liberated by men 
of the Dublin Fusiliers. The escorting party survived the ordeal, except for the heroic 
Lieutenant Shepard who `was found dead in upstairs room. '63 
Though the majority of escorts were unlikely to encounter the extreme adversity 
witnessed in Dublin in 1916, the escorting of arms, ammunition or republican 
prisoners was always a hazardous duty. In addition, after May 1920, cyclist escorts 
were required for military foot and motor patrols to provide advance warning of 
attack. Although these units had the security of knowing that large ambushing parties 
were less prone to attack them because this would betray their position, they 
nevertheless provided ideal fodder for lone gunmen. 
Armed escorts were also required for vehicles carrying military stores, 
particularly after July 1920 when the raiding of trains carrying ammunition became a 
favoured tactic. However, given that armed escorts were usually provided on trains to 
prevent rebels from gaining access to transitory military stores, ambushing parties 
became increasingly interested in troop trains. The I. R. A. was quick to realise the 
potential for attacking military escorts on trains. and many rebels took full advantage 
of the certainty of location, the element of surprise and the practical difficulties of 
63 A. C. Hannant, untitled TS memoir, Imperial War Museum, London, pp. 5-6. 
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returning fire. On 11 February 1921, an incident remembered as the Dishanebeg train 
ambush saw a highly successful ambushing party near Mallow, County Cork opening 
fire on a train carrying fare-paying passengers as well as a military escort. In the 
battle that ensued one officer was killed and another five ranks were wounded, rifles 
and other equipment were also seized, with no casualties being inflicted upon the 
attacking party. 64 During the Upton train ambush of February 1921. a party of 18 men 
of the 1st King's Liverpool Regiment were ambushed at Upton Station near Bantry 
whilst escorting mails and stores from Cork. On this occasion, none of the escorting 
party were killed but three were wounded: `Bandsmen Blundell subsequently had to 
have his leg amputated. ' In the crossfire, six civilians were killed and ten injured and 
the attacking party lost three men. 65 
Escort duties were also consuming of manpower. In particular, the escorting of 
prisoners tended to absorb a large number of officers and other ranks, and available 
sources suggest that the soldier to prisoner ratio was usually far greater than 1: 1. The 
1st Prince of Wales' Volunteers' War Diary recalled one occasion when 'a party 
consisting of five officers and 48 other ranks were employed removing 30 civilian 
prisoners from Arbour Hill detention barracks to Mountjoy prison. '66 
Guard duties could be similarly labour intensive: it has been estimated that an 
average of five battalions were required to guard internment camps alone. 67 Added to 
this, in accordance with custom, the military were also required to supply guards of 
honour, to `His Majesty's judges proceeding on their official duties. '68 This role was 
particularly disagreeable to soldiers because it combined extremes of inactivity with 
the constant threat of attack, and this combination could produce both nervousness 
and tedium. This placed a great `strain... upon the troops' as training opportunities 
were curtailed by the need to provide a guard for every `military establishment' and 
prominent public building. 69 In his diary, Private J. P. Swindlehurst of the Lancashire 
Fusiliers recorded how he was quite unable to see beyond the military routine to 
which he had become resigned: `little has happened that we know of, it just seems to 
64The Times, 14 Feb. 1921, p. 10. 
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be a constant repetition of guards and other duties. )70 Similarly. E. J. A. H. Brush 
recalled frustratingly long nights guarding some of Dublin's most prominent civic 
buildings. In June 1921, he was detailed to guard the burnt-out shell of the Custom 
House following its partial destruction by incendiaries of the Second Brigade of the 
Dublin I. R. A.: 
There were some guards which were more palatable than others 
- the Customs House was not one which came in the pleasant 
category, the I. R. A. set fire to all the documents, a great deal of 
bonded liquor and a great deal of money in notes, and most 
upsetting the public and private records which were 
indispensable to the people of Ireland and the legal profession, 
but which they had to learn to do without. The buildings were 
smelling of burning rubble and the guard was uncomfortable. I 
remember it was my first opportunity of exchanging fire with the 
I. R. A. 1 7 
Large operations aimed at securing arrests were commonly referred to as 
`drives', `sweeps' or `round ups'. These tended to follow a more random pattern than 
regular patrolling or the escorting of military stores. In addition, they were usually 
organized on a more ambitious scale, sometimes involving co-operation between 
battalion, regimental, brigade, and even divisional commanders. The first major 
operation of this kind took place in Dublin District in January 1920 and enlisted the 
support of the Royal Navy who stationed their destroyers at regional ports in 
readiness to transport prisoners to Britain. In the 5th Division, the first such operation 
(undertaken in May 1920) focused on the Mullingar-Tullamore District and involved 
`four cavalry regiments... assisted by local infantry units' under the orders of the 
Colonel Commandant of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. This form of operation also 
allowed military units to focus their efforts within a defined theatre of war. with 
designated areas being driven each day and all exits blocked by `infantry picquets. ' 
This particular initiative was to last seven days owing to the fact that the units were 
`self contained as regards supplies' and were therefore able to remain in the field at 
all times. The operation resulted in the arrest of 1,800 men of whom only a small 
70 Private J. P. Swindlehurst, MS diary, 13 Jan. 1921. Imperial War Museum, London. 
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number were detained. 72 A similar operation in the Clydagh Valley, County Kerry on 
6 June was described by General Staff in the 6th Division as The most extensive and 
elaborately organised operation... ever attempted' during the campaign. 73 This 
particular initiative involved six columns of infantry `numbering about 1,800 men', 
together with a contingent of Auxiliary police aided by aerial mapping and 
reconnaissance provided by the R. A. F. On this occasion, only 100 arrests were made, 
and yet the visible effort was enough to secure a place in republican folklore as the 
big round up. ' 74 
The success of these initiatives is difficult to ascertain from military sources, 
although the balance of opinion suggested that ambition usually outweighed success: 
Percival claimed that the visual impact of these operations was in disproportion to 
their material success: 
The troops carried out a great number of searches for arms, but 
usually without result. It is so easy in a country of this nature to 
hide arms and ammunition that it is almost impossible to find them 
and I am of the opinion that it is a waste of time to carry out too 
many searches unless very definite information has been obtained. 
When it came to wanted individuals, Percival's Essex units were naturally keen to 
avoid fruitless, and labour intensive `drives' and preferred the use of 
'bloodhounds.. . to track 
down culprits. '75 
Alongside search and arrest initiatives and a regular routine of patrols, soldiers 
were also charged with enforcing curfews and supervising markets and fairs, as well 
as enforcing proclamations and prohibition orders. In the case of prohibited markets, 
the military enforced orders via the creation of pickets, which restricted access to and 
from markets and fairs. E. M. Warmington of the K. O. Y. L. I. remembered his 
experience in Kinsale, County Tipperary where a serious outrage `elsewhere in the 
county' resulted in the battalion receiving `orders to prohibit markets for a period'. 
Warmington recalled how all roads into the town were picketed against entry... in 
order to stop all unauthorised people intending to come to the market [which «-as 
itself picketed]. ' He also recalled being `uneasy about the policy as being more 
72 Record of the Rebellion, p. 43; Hart, The I. R. A. and It's Enemies, p. 94. 
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provocative of ill will than preventative of ill deeds.. 76 Certainly, available military 
sources suggest that pickets were rigorously enforced and, as such, proved to be a 
serious impediment to the free movement of civilians. Extracts from a series of 
instructions issued to officers in Dublin District give us a flavour of the organisational 
exactitude that characterised the military's approach to these tasks: 
1. In the event of necessity arising for picqueting the roads leading 
out of Dublin, the code word "RASTA" followed by the numbers of 
the picquets which are to be posted will be sent out from the Office. 
2. No picquet will number less than 15 other ranks with the addition 
of at least one constable. 
3. Picquets will act as examining posts, but as far as possible the 
actual control and examination of civilians will be carried out by the 
Police with the assistance of Troops. 
4. All vehicles will be stopped, and any which appear suspicious 
searched for arms, ammunition, illegal stores and documents. 
5. A proper system for stopping vehicles must be arranged, and 
where necessary the road must be partially blocked. Where this is 
done the picquet must be provided with a lamp to warn vehicles 
approaching the post at night that the road is blocked. A proportion of 
the picquet should be under cover ready to deal with any persons who 
attempt to rush through. 77 
Troops were also given the widest latitude to disrupt or outlaw potentially 
seditious gatherings. However, their attempts to interdict illegal gatherings organised 
by Sinn Mn often provoked a violent response. Tensions during Lady Day in August 
1919 led to a number of Sinn Fein led demonstrations notably at Stewartstown, 
Coalisland and Dungannon being prohibited by the military. On this occasion, the 
Highland Cyclist Brigade based in Omagh were given the task of enforcing the 
prohibition and were quickly brought into the action when prominent republican 
-(, E. M. Warmington, 'Diaries of War Service 1914-19', MS memoir, Peter Liddle Collection, 
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orators addressed crowds in Coalisland in defiance of the military proclamation. The 
brigade were able to disperse the demonstrators but their actions prompted a 
retaliation from the crowd who launched `volleys of stones and other missiles at the 
soldiers'78 Similarly, a commemorative gathering to mark the anniversary of the 
execution of the `Manchester Martyrs' degenerated into a riot when the military 
interrupted a procession through Cork. This intervention provoked 'stone throwing' 
which was answered with `police baton charges. ' 79 
Curfew orders also created difficulties for soldiers because they necessitated 
`constant night patrols in order to enforce the curfew regulations. ' 8° Such patrols were 
carried out in a variety of ways: some military commanders chose to drive heavy 
motor patrols through the streets in order that the military could be both 'seen' and 
`heard' to impose the order. Other companies chose more subtle tactics to surprise 
curfew offenders. The Oxford and Bucks Chronicle described the full spectrum of 
tactics employed by the military to enforce curfews in Dublin, ranging from small 
secretive patrols to highly visible collaborative efforts. Writing in 1922, the author 
remembered how: 
At this time a curfew was imposed on Dublin from 10pm until 
6am and its enforcement was one of the many tasks that fell on 
the battalion. It was a difficult and wearisome affair, but very 
necessary. Normally it was carried out by patrols, moving 
sometimes on foot, wearing rubber-soled shoes, at other times on 
bicycles, and on occasions in lorries, supported by armoured cars 
and searchlights. 81 
J. P. Swindlehurst recalled one occasion when he was ordered out `on "Curfew 
Patrol" in a big army lorry' just as he was `thinking of getting to bed'. His account 
gives us a rare insight into the work of a typical curfew patrol despatched to `round 
up the stragglers... after 10 o'clock. ' Indeed, his description suggests that the [often 
considerable] tally of arrests achieved by curfew patrols was no real indication of 
their success as a counter-insurgency operation aimed at securing arrests. Of the 
`twenty men and women' arrested on his patrol in Dublin on the night of 20 January 
78 The Times, 18 Aug. 1919, p. 10. 
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1921, Swindlehurst recalled how the majority were 'men without homes', 'women of 
the streets' or `drunken cabbies' and `all were unarmed. ' 82 
The enforcement of curfew orders tended to become more and more sophisticated 
as the conflict progressed. Sporadic outbreaks of rioting in Derry from mid to late 
1920 prompted the army to employ the strongest measures available to them. 
Following four days of serious rioting between loyalists and republicans in June 1920 
(an outbreak that claimed the lives of 17 people) Brigadier General Carter Campbell 
announced a curfew order in the city `under which every man in the streets would be 
searched for firearms, and if they had any they would be taken from him. If he 
resisted he would be shot instantly [sic]. ' A proclamation was issued stating that 
`... all citizens must remain indoors between 11 o'clock at night and five in the 
morning unless provided with a permit. ' The peace-keeping initiative was backed by 
naval destroyers, strategically located in the Foyle. To demonstrate their total control 
the military paraded their full arsenal along the empty streets: 
At the hour of the curfew cyclist patrols of soldiers, fully 
equipped, appeared on the streets. Armoured cars began their 
rounds and large patrols of military in a kind of skirmishing 
order moved in the twilight, while now and then the beams of the 
destroyer searchlights in the Foyle swept over the city and 
surrounding hills. 83 
However, despite these shows of strength, curfews were extremely difficult to enforce 
upon an unwilling population. Townshend has pointed out that `curfew patrols were 
very active and made many arrests, but they could not hope to stop all nocturnal 
activity, nor could they work effectively over a wide area. ' 
84 Inevitably, the difficulty 
of maintaining tight control over large brigade areas tended to militate against the 
blanket presence that was required of the military throughout the later period. 
Amongst the more unusual activities that troops were required to perform during 
the period were initiatives that aimed at tackling cattle driving. Here (unlike other 
areas of military strategy) army commanders displayed considerable ingenuity in their 
approach to tackle problems arising from insurgents' attempts to 'drive cattle from 
the land of loyalists and replace it with the cattle of Sinn Fein supporters. ' Troops 
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responded by establishing a series of enclosures throughout the country which were 
then `legalized as "pounds. "' This allowed the military to drive 'driven' cattle into the 
"pound" and post notices for the owner advising them to apply to the military to 
recover the cattle (which, of course, they were reluctant to do). The success of these 
initiatives could be said to have been absolute: a "pound" constructed by troops of the 
9th Lancers near Castlerea was utilised in a successful `drive' by the same regiment 
on May 29th and resulted in `the impounding of 804 head of cattle, horses, sheeps, 
goats and donkeys. ' 85 
Certainly troops in Ireland were pressed upon to perform a variety of tasks that 
were not only distinctly `non-military' in character, but provided an unwelcome 
distraction to their substantive `military' duties. Thus, the responsibility for 
implementing government initiatives aimed at tracking the ownership and possession 
of motor vehicles also fell on troops. The army were required to issue military 
permits for all motor vehicles and enforce the restrictions by means of `patrols, 
examining posts, and the visiting of garages. '86 In the latter case, the military 
demanded that every garage proprietor keep a `log of hirings' to be `inspected on 
demand by any military or police officer. ' 87 Soldiers were even required to perform 
duties normally reserved for navy personnel. These included anus searches on remote 
river islands, especially on the inland waterways and lakes along the length of the 
Shannon. These searches were particularly hazardous because searching parties relied 
upon small, slow-moving and unarmed vessels in order to carry out their work, and 
this made them an easy target for snipers prowling the shores. The `History of the 5th 
Division' described one occasion when a `party of officers and men under Major 
C. F. Adams, Brigade Major of the 13th Infantry Brigade' embarked on a search of 
islands in Lough Ree near Athlone but ran into difficulties on the return journey: 
`when the boat was in the river close to the latter's debouchment from the Lough, fire 
was opened on it by a party of rebels concealed on the banks. ' This incident led to a 
successful application to the Admiralty for the provision of armed naval launches for 
use on the Shannon and Loughs Ree, Derg and Corrib, although the plan never came 
to fruition and was later abandoned. 88 
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The nature of the conflict also necessitated other diverse roles for soldiers. In 
particular, the extension of civil-policing duties brought them into unfamiliar 
territory. Initially, the military had proved reluctant to undertake these duties, and 
some commanders `made it clear that they did not want to become any more closely 
involved than in the emergency of 1880-2 and the strikes of 1911 and 1913-14. '89 
Despite these well-founded objections, a shortage of troops to effectively quell the 
rebellion tended to throw soldiers and policemen together for strategic and defensive 
reasons. 
The ambiguous relationship between civil and military authorities was largely, 
defined by the inconsistencies and incongruities of the Irish policy pursued by the 
Coalition government during this period. Throughout the conflict, the government 
had consistently failed to recognize the conflict as a situation approximating `war', 
clinging imperviously to an abstract `murder gang' theory. 90 To have accepted that a 
state of war existed would `have conferred belligerent status to the rebels and 
acknowledged that resistance was not confined to a small group of terrorists. '91 Thus, 
`the operations of insurgents' were treated as `criminal activities [that] were so 
widespread that the military was obliged to act in support of the civil power. '92 This 
presentation reduced the pressure to make `a bold decision between peace and war, 
between civil administration and martial law' and allowed the government to pursue a 
course that incorporated elements of both. 93 The inconsistency of government policy 
in Ireland has been roundly condemned by historians of the period as representing a 
`savage and calculated arbitrariness', or being `muddled and self defeating' or `an 
erratic coercion policy. '94 In fact, Lloyd George's doggedly maintained assertion that 
`you do not declare war on rebels', together with a commitment to suppressing crime 
and implementing the Government of Ireland Bill emerge as the only real discernible 
areas of consistency in government policy. 95 McColgan has claimed that the 
government's failure to achieve a settled policy resulted from antagonism in the 
89 Townshend, The British Campaign, p. 29. 
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Cabinet between a majority Conservative pro-Ulster element and a Liberal minority 
who advocated the granting of Dominion Home Rule status to Ireland as a means by- 
which to split the nationalist movement and quell rebellion. To McColgan, a 
`splintered' Cabinet `could only fail to adopt bold measures on any definite line of 
policy or fixity of purpose. '96 However, as Hopkinson has pointed out, any claim that 
Irish policy was restricted by divisions within the Cabinet ignores the presence of 
several `leading Conservatives, notably Lord Curzon and Austen Chamberlain [who] 
were supportive of conciliation. ' 97 
Undoubtedly, inner divisions within the Cabinet did act as a brake on reform and 
contributed towards a general atrophy of policy and yet, arguably, the main obstacle 
remained the government's emphasis in combating disorder. The continual failure to 
promote a conciliatory position, or, alternatively to apply a determined and ruthless 
coercive aspect to military policy led to the persistence of a civil-military policing 
approach. Unfortunately, the working relationship between the respective authorities 
was never clearly defined. Henceforth, an elementary failure to decide who would 
establish the `order of battle' effectively torpedoed many of the sterner measures to 
which the Cabinet had committed themselves. The Restoration of Order in Ireland 
Act which gained royal assent on 9 August 1920 should have pleased the `hard-liners' 
in the Cabinet and the military, through the establishment of "extraordinary 
immunities and extensive powers" These included `the power to intern anyone, 
without charge or trial, for an indefinite period, and the power to try any prisoner by 
court martial and without legal advice except in cases requiring the death penalty. ' 98 
However, the extra powers granted to the military under R. O. I. A. still fell way short 
of martial law, and divided authority between the police and the military was 
maintained under the act. Greater operational manoeuvrability was a poor substitute 
for a more efficient tactical grouping of the Crown forces that could only be achieved 
by the command of a single authority. The eventual establishment of martial la"- in 
December 1921 (whilst placing the conflict on a firmer military footing) did little to 
promote unity of command in the Crown forces, despite the appointment of officers 
as military governors. Civil courts continued to function, sometimes upholding 
appeals against decisions made by military courts, and the scope was restricted to the 
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counties of Munster. Furthermore, disciplinary control of the police remained outside 
military hands and several key measures anticipated by the military including 
comprehensive press censorship and a system of passport controls were overlooked in 
the final proclamation. 99 
Therefore it would seem that government policy was ill defined in terms of both 
`political ends' and `military means'. As Curran has claimed `the Cabinet would 
sanction stern measures, yet deny the means to implement them effectively' and this 
central contradiction meant that the tactical and disciplinary organisation of the army 
was further compromised. 
With regard to this lack of `means', soldiers were, arguably, the most important 
`front-line' witnesses to the fraught (and unresolved) relationship between civil and 
military forces. Their traditional roles were compromised by the need to act in aid of 
a civil power to which, operationally at least, they were subordinate for much of the 
period in question. It is surprising then that their role in this respect has never been 
studied through an examination of their operational experiences, a study of which 
highlights all the major difficulties arising from a clash of policies, institutions, 
purposes, and personalities. 
Initially, reactions to the army's relegated role evoked a combination of surprise, 
confusion and deep uncertainty: Brigadier F. H. Vinden of the 2nd Suffolk Regiment 
recalled his arrival in Boyle, County Roscommon in January 1921, following which 
he realised that his regiment's primary function was: 
... to assist the 
R. I. C... The help we gave to the police took the 
form of sweeps of an area chosen by the R. I. C. and two 
companies would be lorried out to the select spot and circle an 
area of some square miles. On a signal all would gradually close 
in with police officers questioning all the inhabitants and making 
some arrests of able-bodied males about whom they probably 
had information. 100 
However, the early relationship between policemen and soldiers was unbalanced by 
the fact that the R. I. C. were the priority target for armed rebels. Consequently. the 
defensive relationship usually required that the military protect the R. I. C. rather than 
99 See note dated 1 Dec. 1920, Jeudwine Papers. 
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vice versa. On occasions, offensive operations aimed at enforcing civil la« came to 
be led by the military, with R. I. C. assistance found to be lacking. Such was the case 
in November 1920, when the Green Howards' Gazette recalled an 'exceptionally 
busy month' involving `many important arrests ... the result being that the joy-rides of 
certain individuals have been very frequent' and yet the boost to morale was 
tempered by a bitterness that `... the company got no assistance whatever from the 
police. " 01 In the 5th Division military commanders claimed of the local police that: 
... their musketry training was almost non-existent, their fire 
discipline nil, and our officers had to go round their barracks to 
help them as much as possible in the effective use of the rifle, 
hand and rifle grenades, rockets and Verey light signals, and in 
the defence arrangements of their barracks. 102 
Some soldiers demonstrated a sympathetic recognition that the imbalance of the 
relationship resulted from the onslaught to which the R. I. C. had been subject from 
1918 onwards. This was evidenced by the widespread destruction of R. I. C. barracks 
during this period. During the month of April 1920,258 police barracks were burned 
and the first week of May alone saw the destruction of 90 police barracks either by 
fire or explosives. '03 Attacks on military barracks never occurred in any great 
frequency and where they did, they rarely had such devastating intent beyond a 
handful of opportunist shots at sentries. Consequently, many soldiers felt duty bound 
to defend their weakened allies. A report in The Times in June 1920 described the 
military's defence of Farran Police Barracks: 
They [the police] were roused from sleep by a heavy explosion 
and shaking of the entire building, followed by a fusillade of 
revolver, rifle, and bomb fire, which shattered their windows. 
The sergeant and his six men who returned the fire, and sent up 
Verey lights, found that one gable of the barracks had been 
demolished by gelignite. Their signals for help were observed at 
Ballincollig cavalry barracks, six miles distant, and a small 
patrol set out to their relief. .. The relief forces were obstructed 
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by the usual obstructions across the road, but arrived in time to 
prevent the capture of the barracks. 104 
Despite these notable acts, greater co-operation between the R. I. C. and the 
military continued to be dogged by disunity of command. Furthermore, as Jeffery has 
asserted `relations between the military, the police and the civil authority had never 
been clearly defined and were at times quite acrimonious. ' 105 Improvements in this 
area were little encouraged by the refusal of Macready to take up joint command of 
both forces. Despite his background in both police work and soldiering, he reasoned 
that the organization of the R. I. C. had so broken down that all his energies would be 
spent on reforming the police, to the detriment of the military. Macready's position 
was curious, especially when we consider that his selection had anticipated his ability 
to co-ordinate command. Nevertheless, he asserted (justifiably) that he could never 
have effectively combined the operations of both forces because the government had 
failed to define the nature of the relationship, nor had they indicated how combined 
forces could contribute towards the restoration of order. This argument is certainly 
borne out in military sources: E. M. Ransford of the Suffolk Regiment, stationed in the 
barracks of the Connaught Rangers, remembered being asked to co-operate with the 
R. I. C. but experienced great difficulty in doing so, he remembered: `... we were 
supposed to co-operate... but no unity of command, discipline or plan existed! ' 106 
Evidence from the 5th Division suggested that the command of the Crown forces was 
even more complex and unwieldy than a simple division in terms of civil and military 
forces `suffering as it was from a quadruple control of troops, R. I. C., Auxiliaries and 
of Royal Marine Detachments on the West Coast [who were] under the Admiral at 
Queenstown. ' 107 
The failure to unite command created huge complications for the military who 
were required to seek police assistance in order to carry out raids for suspects. The 
government issued arrest warrants for I. R. A. suspects, and the authorities had a stated 
preference for these arrests being made by the police wherever possible. However, in 
practice, troops often took direct action based on information supplied by the Military 
Intelligence Section, and in accordance with orders issued by the competent military 
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authority under R. O. I. R. In the martial law area, the police fell under the orders of the 
Military Governor who also lent troop support for operations carried out by the R. I. C. 
as required. This system was capable of achieving results provided that the chain of 
command and relative spheres of responsibility were strictly adhered to. However, 
after `two months experience of martial law' military commanders became 
exasperated by the `practice of the police authorities at Dublin issuing instructions 
direct to their subordinate police officials and commanders of companies of the 
Auxiliary Division, for the carrying out of operations. ' 108 R. I. C. District Commanders 
tended to follow the same practice; given the vagueness of their role 'within the 
R. I. C., and their position vis ä vis the military authorities' they usually failed to co- 
operate fully with either, in the process becoming `virtually independent warlords. " 109 
From December 1920, martial law had tended to release the military from its 
obligation to work co-operatively with the R. I. C. with the result that `operations 
assumed a military aspect'. '10 Nonetheless, in terms of overall strategy, the reluctance 
of R. I. C. commanders to submit to military authority, led to the possibility that 
operations could be disrupted or duplicated by two branches of the Crown forces 
operating under their own authority. At the very least, this disunity led to a `lack of 
coordination and wasted effort. ' " Where coordination was established on a local 
level (through personal initiative) it was often undermined at a district level by 
commanders with little appetite for joined-up strategies. Lord Desart, a Unionist Peer, 
recalled a meeting with the County Inspector of the Kilkenny R. I. C. in which he 
discovered that a highly successful local arrangement between the County Inspector 
and the C. O. of the 15th Hussars for joint patrols in the area, was outlawed by 
General Sir Peter Strickland (G. O. C. 6th Division) despite the fact that it mirrored 
operational strategies that were being pursued by the military at the time. ' 
12 Further 
co-operative difficulties between civil and military forces tended to arise from the fact 
that two branches of the armed forces were under different heads, resulting in the 
purpose of the command structure never being defined in terms of overall strategy 
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(beyond the preference for a restoration of order by the civil authority). As has been 
noted, the failure to establish overall command of the Crown forces also reflected 
various disputes and disagreements that arose during this period bete een senior 
Cabinet officials and military commanders. These centred on question of the 
autonomy of the military vis ä vis the government and the civil authority. One such 
dispute erupted in early 1920 between Lord Birkenhead (the Lord Chancellor) and 
Shaw regarding Lord Birkenhead's claim that he, in the absence of the Lord 
Lieutenant, had the authority to call out the military in aid of the civil power if he 
deemed it to be necessary. In a chain of correspondence between the two men Shaw 
asserted that `the military authority' would retain a `discretionary power' in these 
circumstances. The matter was eventually settled by the former Lord Chancellor of 
Ireland, Sir James Campbell who mediated to the effect that the military authority is 
entitled.. . 
by law... to exercise discretion' if such a requisition was received from the 
Lord Chancellor acting alone, but that `immediate compliances' would be required if 
any such order were issued by government. ' 113 
Operational difficulties aside, an exposed R. I. C. was also a growing burden on 
military resources. E. M. Ransford was concerned that opportunities `for training' were 
being marred by continual 'S. O. S calls' from police barracks. 114 As a result, the 
R. I. C. and military sometimes cohabited in military barracks. This afforded a greater 
degree of protection to policemen. Douglas Wimberley recalled how many policemen 
had, by this time, been reduced to a state of nervous agitation due to the loss of their 
colleagues and concerns for their own safety: `The survivors naturally became 
nervous, and the morale of the force quite disappeared. ' As a result, many policemen 
became withdrawn from the military and from their duties in general. This tended to 
create further co-operative difficulties between the two forces: 
Soon they would no longer identify suspicious rebels we 
produced before them, as they knew that to do so meant revenge, 
and generally death later for them... We therefore used to arrange 
to parade our prisoners in the courtyard of the Guard room, and 
113 N. A., W. O. 32/18919, File of correspondence between Sir James Campbell, Lord Birkenhead and 
Shaw, Ireland: Military Aid to Civil Power., Jan. - March 1920. 
114 Ransford, One Man's Tide', p. 20. 
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we secreted a local R. I. C. Constable, where he could see the 
prisoners through a small peep hole. l5 
Clearly the loss of morale had serious consequences for the operational effectiveness 
of police forces. Percival recalled how, as the conflict progressed, 'their morale, with 
very few exceptions, gave way and thereafter they were of little assistance except as 
local guides. "' 6 Some soldiers even witnessed the external pressures on the R. I. C. 
leading to internal problems, such as infighting. Army Pensions Inspector, Malcolm 
Bickle recorded a conversation with an army officer stationed in Bantry, County 
Cork: 
He seemed to think the police are getting pretty 
demoralised 
.... 
He also described how they went to some houses. 
In one, the brother of a suspected murderer was in bed. The 
officer heard a huge row upstairs and went to find the police 
having a fine fight some raining blows down on the bed and one 
policeman wanting to shoot another. 117 
Despite the disunity of command and the R. I. C. 's growing dependence on the 
military, some soldiers' accounts suggest that relations with the old R. I. C. were 
cordial and many regarded the policemen of the R. I. C. and D. M. P. as being the real 
victims of the conflict. E. M. Ransford recalled how our sympathies were with the 
R. I. C. and the "Loyalist" Irish. ' 118 These sympathies could sometimes result in a 
well-defined working relationship: the Oxford and Bucks Chronicle recalled that 
`relations between the civil and military forces were uniformly excellent. ' 119 Even 
further up the chain of command, Macready (who consistently advocated a military 
solution) claimed that there was `no want of cordiality between Civil and Military 
Authority in any branch of either service. ' 120 The Royal Scots Fusiliers, stationed in 
Tullamore, enjoyed the full co-operation of the R. I. C., and were able to organize 
arrests in line with information furnished by the R. I. C. Through this collaborative 
effort, the Scots Fusiliers secured 80 arrests, and the regiment's historian remembered 
115 Wimberley, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 149. 
116 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (I), p. 10. 
117 Bickle Diary, 1 June 1920, Peter Liddle Collection. Brotherton Library, University of Leeds 
118 Ransford, One Man's Tide', p. 19. 
119 Anon, Oxford and Buck Chronicle, p. 30. 
120 N. A., W. O. 329520. Macready to G. H. Q, Memorandum on the present military situation and 
proposals for the accommodation of troops over winter, 26 July 1920. 
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that the battalion had received the utmost support from the R. I. C. 'under their County 
Inspector, Mr Ross, who was made a member of the officers' mess. ' 121 
The majority of these successes were a function of personal relationships 
between individual police and military staff, relationships that were little encouraged 
by ambiguous government policy that usually amounted to little more than 
`patchwork legislation' - responsive rather than consistent. 122 As Ulster Unionist 
leader, Sir James Craig suggested to the Cabinet at a conference held on 23 July 
1920, in a broad sense: `no overhead policy from which the government would not 
deviate appeared to exist. ' Craig further condemned the government for 'more or less 
drifting on various lines without co-ordination. ' 123 Later in the period, the perennial 
problem of co-ordinating the command of the forces on a higher political level was to 
be further complicated by problems arising within the military concerning the arrival 
of Auxiliary and later Black and Tan troops to reinforce the R. I. C. Where political 
vagueness had prevailed in police-military relations, the discipline of new R. I. C. 
recruits was soon to become a major concern for many soldiers (see Chapter 5). 124 
Ambiguous government policy, combined with the failure to integrate the 
command of the Crown forces, also seriously hampered the gathering and effective 
use of intelligence. Indeed, a consideration of the experience of military intelligence 
officers in Ireland highlights many of the key difficulties that prevented them from 
gaining the upper hand in the conflict. Furthermore, intelligence staffs were 
acquainted with the most trying aspects of military policy (or the lack of it) and their 
struggle to overcome these obstacles provides an excellent case study for a 
consideration of the difficulties of Irish service (as well as providing ample evidence 
for a critique of government policy). 
Prior to December 1919, the R. I. C. had largely taken responsibility for 
intelligence work in Ireland, and it was police information that serviced the military. 
As the police became weakened by persistent attacks upon their most active 
members, it was the military that were required to make up most of the resulting 
intelligence shortfall. As Augusteijn has noted, a lack of credible police intelligence 
1zß Anon, History of the Ronal Scots Fusiliers, p. 5. 
122 N. A., CAB. 241693, W. E. Wylie to Cabinet, Notes of conference - Officers of the Irish 
Government - held 10 Downing Street 23 July 1920. 123 Ibid, Sir James Craig to Cabinet. 
Whilst many soldiers were alarmed by renegade tendencies in the R. I. C., others became engaged in 
these activities and regarded retaliation as a source of comradeship or a binding factor in the Crown 
forces (see chapter 5). 
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also resulted from a failure on the part of R. I. C. intelligence officers to keep pace 
with the development of the conflict and its increasingly youthful protagonists: 
`attention during official raids was directed at the houses of well known Volunteers. 
Men who had been among the earliest activists, but who were not necessarily active 
fighters. ' 125 Therefore, whilst the police pursued `yesterday's heroes', the need for a 
shift of responsibility became further underlined by the rebels' increasing willingness 
to target the military. Furthermore, a transfer of responsibility for intelligence 
gathering from the police to the military reflected a general (if sometimes erratic) 
shift in policy that gradually transferred previous police duties to the military. The 
military's expanded role met with immediate success when a search and arrest 
operation in January 1920 (based almost entirely on military intelligence) secured the 
arrest of 60 known rebels. By 14 April 1920,317 arrests had been made, a total that 
was in large part `facilitated by a military raid [based purely on military information] 
on a Sinn Fein office in Dublin. ' During the course of the operation, the raiding party 
seized `the receipts of An TOglach, the journal of the I. R. A... which disclosed the 
names of many I. R. A. brigade and battalion commanders. ' 126 
Given this credible supply of information, intelligence officers were able to 
successfully penetrate rebel circles and identify wanted men, besides exposing the 
I. R. A. 's operational intentions. However, the progress in intelligence work in early 
1920 was quickly halted by the release of hunger striking prisoners on 14 April. This 
capitulation had the effect of demoralising an increasingly confident and successful 
intelligence service. During the course of the conflict, intelligence officers were to 
discover that exigencies in government policy would continually hamper their efforts 
to plug the intelligence gap between the military and their rebel counterparts. Such 
was the case when the Irish government decided that the R. I. C. (who were by this 
time sheltered by the military) should be restored to their primary role as intelligence 
gatherers. In line with this, an office of the Chief of Police was established in May 
1920 with the main Intelligence Branch as a component part. The purpose of this 
reorganization was to form an effective police counterpart to military intelligence, 
upon which the military could rely. In the event of martial law being proclaimed it 
was envisaged that the two systems could be easily amalgamated. However, this 
125 Augusteijn also claims that the police concentrated their efforts on previously arrested Volunteers 
and their families whilst iygnoring the most active volunteers many of whom had not even surpassed 
their teen years. From Public Defiance. p. 229. 
126 Record of the Rebellion (Intelligence) in Hart (ed. ) British Intelligence, p. 20. 
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future ideal was a dwindling prospect, and one that seemed even more remote given 
the initial delay in establishing the branch. When the new system was finalised, an 
official report on military intelligence from 1921 denounced the new police 
intelligence system as `an extraordinarily complicated and involved organisation. 
At this stage, Macready's reservations ensured that the military continued to expand 
its responsibility in the field of intelligence gathering: staffs were increased and 
almost every battalion employed an intelligence officer and sometimes a scout officer 
to assist in raids and searches. This expanded effort, coupled with the morale boost 
that followed from the government's renewed determination to `break the hunger 
strike weapon' meant that by October 1920 many of the most pro-active rebels had 
either been arrested or were `on the run' and dependent upon the security of I. R. A. 
flying columns. However, as Macready recalled, this situation was 'an unfortunate 
corollary of the wholesale arrests of I. R. A. officers' as `hunted men [were] driven to 
form themselves into "commandos" in the districts where their arrest is most 
difficult. ' 128 The operational effectiveness of mobile columns resulted in a sharp 
increase in the frequency of attacks on intelligence officers and efforts were 
redoubled to break up mobile columns through effective intelligence and duplicate 
military flying columns. 
Parallel to these developments, R. I. C. intelligence was on the offensive, bolstered 
by a wave of new recruits and much greater material resources. Consequently, the 
government were keen to link up police and military intelligence. Staff were 
employed by divisional commanders to bridge some of the gaps and to bolster 
provincial police intelligence as it expanded outwards from the Central Office in 
Dublin. Eight local centres were formed to furnish information to the Central Office. 
However, despite claims made by Brigadier General Ormonde Winter, as Director of 
Intelligence, that these `local centres formed the necessary connecting link between 
the two services' they were soon hampered by difficulties of co-operation between 
the military and R. I. C. 129 In particular, ambiguity remained concerning their relative 
duties, and the intransigence of senior police officers seriously hampered the adoption 
of new methods of intelligence gathering. The new strategy was further complicated 
127 Ibid, p. 23. 
128 N. A.. W. O. 32/9534., Macready to Wilson, 4 Dec. 1920, (1) Situation Report (2) Steps to meet the 
requirements of the Irish command in regard to armoured cars. Dec. 1920. 
129 Brigadier General Ormonde de ]'Epee Winter, Deputy Chief of Police and Director of Intelligence, 
'A Report on the Intelligence Branch of the Chief of Police from May 1920 to July 1921' fully 
reproduced in Hart (ed. ) British Intelligence, p. 93. 
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by the introduction of martial law in the 6th Divisional area. Under this arrangement, 
intelligence in the R. I. C., D. M. P., Auxiliary Division and Secret Service fell under 
the Chief of Police. Military intelligence services were responsible in areas where 
R. O. I. R was in force, whilst intelligence in the 6th Division was organized under 
martial law, with a special branch operating in Dublin. 
To illustrate the complications of a `double system of police and military 
intelligence' it is worth quoting at length an extract from the 'Record of the 
Rebellion' containing instructions to intelligence officers on the correct procedure for 
disposing of captured documents. To settle issues regarding the transmission of 
intelligence documents, Brigade H. Q. issued the following baffling instructions: 
(a) All documents captured by the troops are forwarded to the Brigade 
Headquarters. All documents captured by the troops are forwarded to the local 
centre at the Divisional Commissioner's office. 
(b) The military intelligence service is responsible for dealing with all documents 
relating to the operations, armament, training and organisation (including the 
order of battle and the names of commanders and officers) of the I. R. A. After 
duplication of such documents they are passed in original to the police 
intelligence service as signatures, handwriting, typing of such papers may 
often be important links in a chain of evidence. 
The military intelligence service transfered to the `Local Centre' of police 
intelligence all documents referred to in (c) below. 
(c) The police intelligence service is responsible for passing through to the 
military intelligence service all documents referred to in (b) above and for 
dealing with all documents relating to individuals, addresses, Sinn Fein police, 
Sinn Fein courts. Sinn Fein organization in Great Britain and abroad, 
propaganda etc., and for working up the police cases against individuals. 
(d) In cases where documents form the evidence against an individual or 
individuals charged with possession of seditious documents, the documents 
are forwarded by the local C. M. A. through the usual military channels to 
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G. H. Q., except in the martial law area where they are dealt with by the 
Military Governor. 130 
These labyrinthine procedures also tended to undermine Winter's initiative to 
`inculcate into all concerned the value of forwarding to Central Bureau all documents 
captured in raids. ' 131 In addition, a convoluted bureaucracy was a significant brake on 
the effectiveness of the intelligence service in Dublin: on 21 November 1920, the 
I. R. A. 's onslaught against Special Branch culminated in the murder of 12 British 
officers and the authorities were forced to centralise their intelligence network. As a 
result, Special Branch records came under the care of the Chief of Police and an 
organisation that had previously spearheaded military intelligence was now 
responsible to the head of the civil authority. Thus, Major-General Boyd (G. O. C. 
Dublin District) who was still responsible for organizing intelligence, found that his 
networks of agents were, in fact, still under the control of his police counterpart: 
At precisely the time when the army were assuming an 
increasing number of security duties, the collection and 
assessment of intelligence, vitally necessary for successful 
operations was taken out of military hands. The change, 
moreover was deeply resented in the Special Branch itself. Most 
of its personnel were ex-officers who seem to have had little faith 
in the Irish Police. Morale suffered under their new masters. 132 
The situation proved to be intractable, and was little remedied by ' duplicate 
organisations' set up to liase between the police and the military whose input resulted 
in `delays in taking action' and an `overlapping of work'. Following similar 
guidelines to those outlined above, the new centralised bureaucracy produced a 
registry of intelligence information `created on the lines of compromise and 
satisfactory to neither military nor police. ' 133 
It is plausible to suggest that in both the fields of military intelligence and 
operations on the ground (though the two were inextricably linked) a very similar 
pattern was emerging that involved serious co-operative problems between the 
130 Record of the Rebellion (Intelligence) in Hart (ed. ) British Intelligence, p. 30. 
131 Winter, `A Report on the Intelligence Branch' in Hart (ed. ) Ibid p. 69. 
1112 K. Jeffery 'British Military Intelligence Following World War I' in K. G. Robertson (ed) British and 
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component forces of the Crown. In both cases, success was usually the outcome of 
`personal effort rather than good organisation. ' 134 All too often, a chain of co- 
operative difficulties crowded out personal initiative and the organisation of the 
Crown forces was the first weak link. Sturgis' wonderfully vivid description of the 
apparatus of Irish administration as `a great sprawling, jealous hydra-headed monster 
spending much of its time using one of its heads to abuse one or other of the others' 
seems particularly pertinent in the case of military and police intelligence, where 
mutual decapitation was often the order of play. 135 
Bad foundations were a further disincentive to intelligence officers on the ground 
whose duties were amongst the most dangerous of any participant in the conflict. The 
nature of the hostilities ensured that belligerent I. R. A. forces had to remain 
indistinguishable from the civilian crowd (see Chapter 4). To locate them, 
intelligence officers had to adopt plain clothes and merge into this heterogeneous 
group. Adjutant H. W. Stewart of the Royal Scots Fusiliers recalled: 
This was a tricky job and very effectively done by Lieutenant 
Grant-Taylor, O. B. E., M. C., and 2"d-Lieutenant Strong, who 
were employed on intelligence duties. They were dressed as 
civilians and moved among the local inhabitants, picking up 
information as to the whereabouts of I. R. A. bands. 136 
According to the `Record of the Rebellion', military intelligence officers who 
were generally `young, enthusiastic and incredibly brave' were broadly successful in 
these secret service operations, principally because this type of work relied upon the 
skill and audacity of individuals. 137 Indeed, it would appear that secret service agents 
who were given increased scope for individual enterprise, often proved themselves to 
be unencumbered by procedural or organisational complexities. However, the price of 
their detachment from their battalion was a lack of security in the field; secret agents 
suffered heavy casualties, they were open to attack from both sides and their greater 
mortality rate hampered the extension of this form of intelligence, also discouraging 
further recruitment. Nonetheless, remarkable results were achieved by a small group 
131 Ibid, p. 38. 
135 N. A., P. R. O. 39/59/1. Mark Sturgis diaries, 19 Aug. 1920. 
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of men, and it is believed that by the time of the truce, military intelligence had agents 
in: 
... most of the steamship companies trading with Dublin, on the 
railways, as journalists or farmers, or even in the I. R. A. They 
made friends with Dublin citizens of every class and both sexes, 
they mixed with crowds and they were arrested with officers and 
men of the I. R. A. 138 
This capacity to mix with all levels of society also enabled intelligence officers to 
penetrate provincial and rural circles outside Dublin. In particular, personal 
investigations in these areas were facilitated by the agents' involvements in race 
meetings and hunting events. In all cases the risks of discovery were considerable; 
newcomers were extremely conspicuous in Irish towns and villages, and English 
agents often found that `their accent betrayed them. ' 139 Indeed, it was generally 
understood amongst intelligence officers that an `officer or soldier who tried to pose 
as a local Irishman was found out immediately. ' 140 
Personnel, training and material shortages were also a brake on the intelligence 
service. A lack of complete and up to date intelligence records usually arose from a 
lack of clerical staff to complete filing and typing rather than any reluctance in the 
field of intelligence gathering. Furthermore, due to a lack of training and knowledge 
in the methods of guerrilla war, officers were sometimes criticised for being slow to 
interpret the meaning of the scraps of information that they gathered. Personal 
initiatives were also let down by a corresponding lack of informers amongst the civil 
population. In part, this was due to the deterrent effect of the I. R. A. 's campaign 
against informers, though `informing' was little encouraged by intelligence officers' 
lack of funds to meet the spiralling monetary rewards that they demanded. 
If operational effectiveness was hampered by a convoluted intelligence system. 
the military's prospect of success was further diminished by the nature of the combat 
itself. This was rarely a traditional conflict; the classic pattern of trench warfare and 
frontal assault was entirely replaced by guerrilla tactics. Indeed, following Richard 
Bennett's claim that the conflict `consisted of a number of small violent incidents 
which would have gone unnoticed in a general war' Peter Hart has studied casualties 
138 Ibid, p. 56. 
139 Record of the Rebellion (Intelligence) in Hart (ed. ) British Intelligence, p. 55. 
140 Hist. 5th Div., p. 24. 
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in Cork in 1920-1 in accordance to whether they occurred in combat, which he 
defined as attacks upon armed units. Hart's statistics suggest that of 566 overall 
casualties in 1921, less than a half of crown force victims died in combat and more 
than half of crown force killings were perpetrated against civilians. Therefore the 
cycle of cold killing applied in large proportions to both sides in the conflict. 
Furthermore, Hart only identified nine encounters in Cork in which both sides 
suffered casualties, suggesting that confrontations usually occurred when the 
attacking side (by dint of the surprise element or greater numbers) was at an 
insuperable advantage. 141 
I. R. A. and Volunteer units demonstrated an acute awareness of both their 
opponent's strengths and weaknesses and developed strategies that would exploit 
their inexperience and frustrate their potential. As Tom Barry claimed: `close quarter 
fighting did not suit them. Keep close to them should be our motto, for generally they 
must be better shots than us, because of their opportunities for practice and their war 
experience. ' 142 However, even Barry's description of a skirmishing rebel force 
perhaps overstates the general experience of I. R. A. column men. In fact, the pattern 
of hostilities was never particularly `military' in character or intent, nor did insurgents 
aim to evict the British garrison by means of overwhelming force. During the later 
period (like in 1916) rebels demonstrated a clear understanding of the effect of 'non- 
military' action on the `national mind'. 143 Commenting on the mobile formations of 
I. R. A. units in the final year of the conflict, David Fitzpatrick has claimed that the 
guerrilla campaign was not a preconceived strategy for undermining the state' but 
rather `an agglomeration of expedients by men intent on evading capture and securing 
arms. ' 144 However defensive their ends, the plain fact of their continued existence 
tended to promote the legitimacy of their demands. 
For most, this pattern of warfare was quite beyond the scope of military training 
and experience. Consequently, it often had the effect of impeding troops' 
1aß R. Bennett, The Black and Tans (London, 1959) p. 35; Hart, The I. R. A. and Its Enemies, pp. 87-88. 
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occupational expectations, as well as seriously interrupting the military routine of the 
professional soldier. In this sense, it was a considerable challenge to military 
discipline. Brevet Major T. A. Lowe of the Essex Regiment eloquently recalled the 
innovative methods pioneered by his opponents, as well as the military's struggle to 
keep pace with them: 
They were careful to avoid anything in the shape of a battle but 
they continued their vendetta with the police, the coastguards 
and with isolated loyalists with unabated violence .... 
It was by no 
means unusual to hear of a rebel column moving by road in light 
rubber wheeled traps commandeered from loyalists. These 
vehicles would be protected in front and rear by parties of scouts 
on bicycles, moving along in pairs and ready at any moment to 
spread the alarm. Info [sic] as to the state of the country through 
which they were moving would be supplied by small boys and 
girls of whom there were a vast number employed as spies by 
Sinn Fein.. . These 
kind of tactics were very hard to grapple 
with... and only by the most careful thinking ahead as to the 
enemy's probable intentions could any success in the pursuit be 
obtained. 145 
Undoubtedly, many officers did seek to `grapple' with their opponents' 
unconventional tactics, and a number of `ruses' were devised to exploit the 
observable habits of rebel groups. In the 6th Division area, Percival recalled a 
subterfuge method known as the "Q' lorry', in which a three-ton lorry `armour plated 
on the inside' was manned by an armed crew and `driven out into a desolate part of 
the country, where it would break down and be ostensibly left on the side of the road. ' 
Abandoned vehicles were usually destroyed by rebel groups in order to prevent their 
being recovered by the military, but in this case the vehicle acted as a `Trojan horse' 
designed to penetrate remote rebel strongholds, and the concealed crew would 
surprise the sabotaging party as soon as they came within firing range. 
'46 Despite the 
success of these initiatives 147, actual formal training in guerrilla warfare was not 
145 Lowe, `Some Reflections of a Junior Commander' pp. 56-57. 
146 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II), p. 17. 
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86 
forthcoming until October 1920, and even then it was restricted to young officers and 
senior N. C. O. s. The "5th Division Guerrilla Warfare Class" lasted for '3 days' and 
consisted of both `lectures' and `practical tactical exercises' involving mock 
ambushes and raids, particular attention was given to `instruction in the issue of clear 
and definite orders. ' All told, over 280 officers and N. C. O. s participated in 10 courses 
held at the Curragh from October 1920.148 However, this form of limited practical 
instruction was never likely to restore balance in the conflict, given that many officers 
were `dyed in the wool' veterans of more conventional forms of warfare and I. R. A. 
mobile columns had already achieved a certain mastery of the tactics of guerrilla 
tactics. 
The difficulties faced by soldiers in adapting to a new form of conflict often led 
to comparisons with their experiences in the Great War. More surprising (given the 
relative dangers) were accounts written by veteran soldiers that expressed a clear 
preference for conditions in France. Upon arrival in Dublin in Easter 1916,2nd 
Lieutenant A. M. Jameson was shocked by the ferocity of the violence he witnessed in 
Dublin and shared the consensus opinion of his colleagues: `everybody who had been 
in France seemed to think that the Dublin fighting was a far worse thing to be in. ' 149 
The unfavourable comparison of `two evils' was not unique to the extreme events of 
Easter 1916, throughout the period soldiers were prone to making similar 
comparisons: 
They (the troops) all agree that it is much worse than France, the 
strain far greater. There is no "behind the line" in Ireland. There 
is no relief from the atmosphere of murder and spying. At every 
street corner there is a knot of men and youths, any of whom 
may throw a bomb or fire a shot at you, in the absolute certainty 
that, in that event, no one will give them away; and that they will 
be able to escape with ease and certainty down a side street or 
through a shop or house, leaving the innocent passers by to bear 
the brunt of any shots that might be fired in reply. 150 
wounding of three rebel incendiaries. Following another succesful outing in Limerick during the next 
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Wilfred Ewart visited a besieged garrison in Mallow, County Cork in May 1921 and 
fell into conversation with a nervous and fractious staff officer who outlined a tale of 
`cowardly cunning' on the part of his opponents before announcing that he ' would 
sooner do another two-and-a-half years in France than the same length of time 
here. ' 151 Similarly, The 79`h News claimed `we find ourselves under conditions almost 
as bad, if not worse, than active service' further concluding that `war under peace 
conditions is an unpleasant experience for both officers and men. ' 152 Undoubtedly. 
pronouncements of this kind were sometimes used for effect, or were a 'heat of the 
moment' response to the pressures of Irish service. Nonetheless, the majority of 
senior military commanders and a considerable element of the press shared the 
soldiers' distaste for `unsporting' guerrilla war. Even Macready himself demanded a 
lump-sum payment of £5,000 as a condition of accepting the offer of appointment as 
G. O. C. -in C. by way of compensation for the "disturbance" caused by a 'dangerous 
and arduous' appointment. '53 Likewise, when Colonel Cameron, then G. O. C. 6th 
Division, inspected the departing Green Howards' Regiment in January 1922 he 
thanked them for their assistance to him and to `the whole empire in what had been 
the most trying experience in the history of the army. '''` Following the events of 
`Bloody Sunday' in November 1920, a reporter for The Times felt it necessary to 
inform the public that: 
... 
in the execution of duty, these men, soldiers, police, and 
Auxiliaries carry their lives in their hands and undergo daily an 
ordeal even more trying than that to which most of them were 
exposed in the war, when the enemy was an open enemy and 
they themselves carried weapons for self defence as well as 
offence. '" 
Inevitably, the strain of service forced many soldiers to take drastic measures to 
guarantee their survival. As Augusteijn has noted, unlike their colleagues in the 
R. I. C., troops did not have the option of resigning their position. For soldiers, the only 
15' Anon, 'Life in Mallow: An English Officer's Impressions' The Times, 23 May 1921, p. 14. 
152 The 79'h News, 2nd Battalion Notes, May 1921, p. 97. 
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exit strategy was desertion (see Chapter 6) or injury, as Augusteijn has claimed 'self- 
inflicted wounds were one way in which soldiers attempted to get out of their 
predicament'. 156 J. A. G. Registers indicate that only two soldiers. Private A. "". Edgar 
of the East Lancashire Regiment and Private C. B. Reid of the Royal Berkshire 
Regiment, were actually court-martialled and found guilty of this offence. 157 
Nonetheless, qualitative sources suggest that this was a recurring phenomenon and 
one that seriously concerned the military authorities: E. M. Ransford of the Suffolk 
Regiment recalled how he `put a . 
45 bullet through a toe (and my boot! ) during 
instruction in revolver target practice' and (despite it being accidental) was threatened 
with `dire penalties, Court-Martial etc. for self-inflicted injuries which were 
happening rather frequently. ' 158 
A detailed study of the everyday routine of the British soldier in Ireland (based 
largely on soldiers' own accounts) highlights all the major tactical shortcomings of 
military policy during this period. These included the failure to establish a structure or 
framework for civil-military policing, the inability to evolve strategy to meet the 
topographical and tactical context of an irregular conflict and develop methods 
appropriate to it. This was coupled with a failure to balance operations to available 
resources (which was an outstanding feature of their opponents' campaign). 
Therefore, the pressures arising from an intense and uninspiring operational routine 
often precluded further difficulties arising from the rebel campaign, thereby providing 
a context and structure for the development and evolution of a successful guerrilla 
campaign against the Crown forces. 
156 Augusteijn, From Public Defiance, p. 227. 
"' N. O., W. O. 213.32, Judge Advocate Generals Office: Field General Courts-martial (In field and 
Ireland) Register, 21 July 1920 to 19 Nov. 1921. 
158 Ransford, One Man's Tide' p. 19. Imperial War Museum, London. This incident is also cited (but 
not directlN quoted) by Augusteijn, From Public Defiance, p. 228. 
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Part II 
Isolation 
3. Barrack Life in Ireland 
By the institution of barracks, these men [soldiers] are kept away 
from the people, in the eye and obedience of their respective 
officers and thereby withheld from insulting or being insulted, as 
is commonly the case in scattered quarters. By being active and 
powerful in the suppression of riot in others, they become also 
more formidable to lovers of sedition and peace is thereby 
preserved throughout the nations. ' 
If the nature of operations added greatly to the insecurity of service life in 
Ireland, many soldiers came to regard military barracks as a place of sanctuary and 
respite. Consequently, detailed descriptions of barrack conditions tended to be 
foremost in the memoirs of soldiers who arrived in Ireland during this period. This 
preoccupation with living conditions was only natural: barracks were the professional 
soldiers' habitat, their standard, facilities, amenities, location and, above all else, the 
routine of life, exercised a profound influence on the soldiers' period of service. 
Besides comfort and security, the `institution of barracks' (in the context of Irish 
service) could also be said to have both originated and reinforced a sense of isolation 
amongst the soldierly, an experience cited by many as one of the most frustrating 
aspects of military life. This chapter will explore this isolating effect through the 
presentation of four key areas, namely soldiers' views of their accommodation, their 
experience of forced and unforced confinement to barracks, the external threat posed 
by armed rebels to normal barrack life, and the soldiery's curtailed opportunities for 
leisure and recreation. The theme of `isolation' developed in this chapter will also be 
used to set up a further chapter examining the precise nature of the relationship 
between soldiers and civilians. 
' Anonymous document dating from 1701 relating to the construction in Dublin of the first purpose 
built barracks in Ireland, cited in Colonel M. Heffron 'Collins Barracks, Dublin' in . An 
Cosantoir. The 
Irish Defence Journal (May, 1968) p. 132. 
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Besides responding to the challenges of an armed uprising, there was a strong 
historically determined rationale for the maintenance of strong military- bases in 
Ireland during this period. The British army was already well established in the 
province; the English Act of 1699 stipulated that 12,000 troops were to be maintained 
in Ireland, and this base establishment appears to have been honoured up to the Act of 
Union of 1801 and beyond. The overall size of the Irish garrison was further 
stimulated by the `revolutionary cataclysm in France and Ireland, and the war against 
France allied to the war in America during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. ' 
In particular, the appearance of French vessels in Bantry Bay in 1786 'convinced 
Britain of the vulnerability of its traditional backdoor. '2 Added to this, the long 
cyclical history of Irish rebellion ensured that a healthy garrison was maintained 
throughout the nineteenth century, with 1828 being the peak year with 24,918 troops 
were billeted across six divisions. 
Besides responding to the recurring threat of rebellion, Ireland also provided a 
secure training ground for cadets, who were posted to large established barracks such 
as those at Moore Park, Portobello and Fort Charles in order to receive their military 
training. The security offered by large camps and fortress barracks was integral to the 
maintenance of the British presence in Ireland up to and including the period in 
question. However, the unusual nature of the 1919-21 rising (in which previously 
quiet districts were drawn into the conflict) did not allow for a heavy concentration of 
troops. This necessitated the construction of makeshift barracks, usually involving the 
fortification of public or private buildings with no previous military use. Furthermore, 
as the flashpoints of the conflict spread and multiplied, battalions became divided, 
subdivided and further dispersed into small detachments quartered in cottages, 
courthouses, tin huts, even lighthouses. As the conflict progressed to remote rural 
areas, some detachments were even required to become hardened to a routine of 
bivouacking and outdoor living. 
In the early period, when the army's commitment was minimal (even compared 
to peacetime levels) soldiers still enjoyed the privilege and the protection of older 
established barracks. At this time, the majority of soldiers in Ireland were undergoing 
retraining or being primed for war service. Others were awaiting a return to the 
Western Front following injury or temporary demobilisation. Many in this early 
2 Costello, .4 Most 
Delightful Station, pp. 19-24. 
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period were prone to draw favourable comparisons with their living conditions in 
France. 2nd Lieutenant W. R. H. Brown remembered his arrival at Moore Park near 
Fermoy in February 1918: we soon made ourselves cosy... and were delighted to find 
ourselves in comfortable quarters with real beds to sleep on! ' Brown enthused greatly 
about his temporary home in Moore Park, recalling how compared to the misery of 
the Somme ... Moore Park was an ideal place for training as it consisted of some 
miles of varied country. ' However, even at this early stage, he was acutely aware of a 
nascent conflict and regarded his barracks as a haven, amidst a landscape riddled with 
danger for the British soldier: `most of our movements were confined to its 
boundaries. This was just as well, as some of the Irish people were not too pleasantly 
disposed towards us. 3 
In this early period, the majority of soldiers regarded their traditional peacetime 
barracks as more than adequate, if rather anachronistic. Cameron Highlander, 
R. Burns, arrived at Bin barracks in November 1917, a place he considered to be 
`very old - out of date I would say. '4 Similarly, E. M. Warmington, stationed in 
Kinsale in the autumn of 1918, referred to his time in the `solid old stone barracks 
above the town'. 5 Later, F. A. S. Clarke, also stationed in Kinsale, described his 
quarters as `ancient barracks designed for defence as well as accommodation, a 
characteristic of most, if not all, the barracks in Southern Ireland. ' He later found 
himself billeted with "B" Company of the Essex Regiment at Fort Charles: ' ... an old 
fort 
... 
built during the reign of Elizabeth I. 96 It would appear therefore that most 
soldiers found traditional barracks to be comfortable and accommodating, if curiously 
bleak and outmoded at the same time. The Oxford and Bucks Chronicle recorded the 
fate of the 2nd Battalion who found themselves `quartered in Portobello barracks 
[Dublin] - as dreary and depressing a collection of buildings as any other barracks of 
the period. '? E. F. Chapman (after a stay in the `best hotels' of Killarney) was ordered 
' W. R. H. Brown, untitled TS memoir, Imperial War Museum, London, p. 18. Moore Park was one of 
the better military barracks of the period spanning some 2,500 acres of land. Acquired in 1903 from 
Lady Harriete-Smyth (daughter of the Earl of Mountcashell) for the sum of £35,000, by 1919 the camp 
could accommodate `almost 3,000 troops... in lines of timber huts, each one taking 50 men. The Camp 
was arranged in three units, the Infantry lines, the Royal Engineers lines and the Army Service Corps 
lines. ' K. Jordan (ed. ) Kilworth and Moore Park British . army Camps 
from 1896-1922 (Fermoy, 2004) 
pp. 66,74. 
R. Burns, `Once a Cameron Highlander', TS memoir, Peter Liddle Collection, Brotherton Library, 
Leeds University, p. 163. 
5 Warmington, `Diaries', p. 37. 
6 Clarke, 'Memoirs of a Professional Soldier'. Chapter 6, p. 1. 
7 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 27. 
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to the old barracks at Fermoy in April 1916. Upon arrival he found them to be 
thoroughly neglected: `the rooms we had were horrid: they had been shut up for about 
a year and so felt very stale and nasty. The dirt was awful. ' 8 
General conditions in Irish barracks had improved little by 1920 and the squalid. 
(and often insanitary) conditions were established to have contributed to the general 
poor state of health displayed by veteran troops in Ireland. A report on The Health of 
Troops' for the 5th Division area indicated that during the five months from January 
to May 1920 there were 201 cases of venereal disease and 448 cases of scabies 
amongst the troops. In the latter case, the report concluded that scabies was `in some 
measure the result of the war aggravated by the conditions in which the troops in 
Ireland were accommodated in the earlier stages and the lack of bathing facilities at 
isolated stations. '9 
Larger equipped barracks were generally more conducive to the good health of 
troops, and many inmates also came to appreciate the defensive qualities of old stone 
barracks. Therefore, although such places offered a `retreat' like quality, the safety 
and security of established barracks could not be accorded to all troops in the long 
term. The period following the Soloheadbeg ambush of January 1919 witnessed an 
increase in the scale and the ambition of rebel activities, and as the outbreak became 
more widespread and more menacing, the military were prevented from remaining 
concentrated in larger barracks. This resulted in many smaller detachments being 
dangerously exposed to the enemy. The dispersal of battalions was also a natural 
consequence of the Crown forces' need to continue to `show the flag', or to re- 
establish and maintain civil authority in areas that had been vacated by the police: 
There was a perpetual antagonism between the sound military 
policy of concentration of force and the political requirements 
which demanded a considerable dispersion in detachments for 
the purpose of protecting and putting heart into loyal or law- 
abiding citizens and bolstering up the influence of the R. I. C. 
'° 
Differences of opinion regarding the most effective strategic positioning of 
troops had also led to a certain amount of policy wrangling between police and 
military command. Shaw was adamant that `the military necessity for concentration 
8 Chapman, letter to a friend, dated 30 April 1916. 
9 Hist. 5th Div., Appendix V- The Health of the Troops. 
10 Record of the Rebellion, p. 33. 
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and training [was] diametrically opposed to the police demands for dispersion and 
local support. ' On the other hand, Byrne, the Inspector General of the R. I. C. argued 
tirelessly for the `re-detachment of troops" to strengthen vulnerable R. I. C. barracks or 
establish a military presence in rural areas. l l Despite a mounting collision course, the 
issue did not appear to be of great concern to the Cabinet until the closing months of 
1920 when Macready expressed his fears regarding the winter accommodation of 
dispersed troops. This issue, highlighted similar antagonisms between the need to 
`afford immediate and constant support to the police' and the need for `concentration 
to allow of some comfort, training, leave and rest to the troops. ' However, despite the 
greater profile that Macready brought to the issue, there was to be no immediate 
respite for detached units. His plea for `some areas of the country to be abandoned 
during winter and small detachments be withdrawn and some field and heavy artillery 
be transferred to England to free up accommodation' fell on deaf ears. '2 As winter 
approached, it usually fell on divisional commanders to organise their forces in such a 
way as to guarantee their comfort and security. Concerted attempts were made in the 
5th Division area to resolve the twin problem of undermanned garrison posts and the 
lack of fixed barrack accommodation: 
At the beginning of August 1920 orders were issued for the 
preparation of a scheme of winter accommodation of the troops 
on the basis that no detachment would be of less strength than 
one company and that troops were to be housed in buildings, 
commandeered if necessary. At this time the greater part of the 
9th Lancers and Carabiniers were under canvas. 13 
The successful dispersal of detachments usually depended upon the pragmatism 
and haste of local commanders in being able to acquire suitable accommodation. In 
May 1920, `D' Company of the 1st East Yorkshire Regiment requisitioned a 
courthouse in Carrick on Shannon as a make-shift barracks. In order to deter rebel 
attacks they rigged up `an old piece of drain pipe on the roof of the courthouse' to 
resemble `a gun overlooking the town'. Another detachment of the regiment found 
themselves billeted at nearby Gorvagh in a 'small isolated house' where they were 
t' O'Halpin, The Decline of the L'nion, p. 191-2. 
12 N. A., W. O. 32 9520, Macready to G. H. Q, Memorandum on the present military situation and 
general proposals in regard to troops during coming winter, 26 July 1920. 
13 Hist. 5th Div., p. 62. 
95 
continually `subjected to sniping'. 14 `D' Company of the 2nd Green Howards, 
stationed in Newcastle West, County Limerick, were even forced to billet their troops 
`in a house with the Irish Republican H. Q. next door. ' 1' On occasions, old (often 
ruined) country houses or castles were commandeered by the military to house their 
troops. A 5th Division War Diary detailed how detachments of the Royal Artillery 
Brigade garrisoned Coolmoney House and Leitrim Castle for the winter in order to 
`protect stores on the Glen-Imaal Artillery Ranges. ' 16 Invariably, these vast landed 
estates had fallen into an irreversible decline: E. Craig Brown of the 2nd Cameron 
Highlanders (writing to his mother) claimed of his new makeshift quarters at Belmont 
House that it was `a most dilapidated and thoroughly Irish looking dwelling which 
has seen better days many years ago. You would laugh if you could see it. ' 17 
Other more suitable quarters were established in buildings that had originally 
been designed for internment. A detachment of the 3rd Essex Regiment took over a 
workhouse in Clonakilty, County Cork, in May 1919, another detachment occupying 
`an ancient lunatic asylum'. A further company took to Kilbrittain Castle as a suitable 
base. 18 Sean Moylan of the North Cork Brigade I. R. A. recalled the arrival of `a 
Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment to Kanturk early in April 1921 ' who 
proceeded to clear out `the occupants of the old Union Workhouse and install 
themselves within. ' 19 In addition, old gaol houses were sometimes requisitioned as 
suitable quarters. A Times report of May 1920 suggested that the burning of so many 
barracks' by arsonists meant that: 
Troops now arriving in Ireland are finding accommodation for 
themselves. Yesterday, Colonel Chaplin and a party of men of 
the Cameronians arrived at the Baltinglass workhouse [County 
Wicklow] and told the master that accommodation was required 
for 100 men. The colonel afterwards took possession of one of 
the wings of the building. A party of the 1st Essex Regiment, 
which has been sent to Midleton, County Cork, has taken up 
quarters in a factory belonging to Messrs. Cleeve. 
14 Plimpton, " The Snapper", 1st Battalion, `D' Company notes, May 1920, p. 7. 
15 Green Hotivards' Gazette, "D" Company Notes, Aug. 1920, p. 179. 
16 N. A., W. O. 35,193/2, War Diary - 5th Division General Staff, 25 Nov. 1920 to 31 Dec. 1920 
17 E. Craig Brown, letter to his mother dated 30 May 1920, Imperial War Museum, London. 
18 Burrows, Essex Units in the War, p. 188. 
19 Moylan, In His Own Words, p. 130. 
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Inevitably, the requisitioning of public or private buildings for military usage 
often led to resentment from the host community. E. J. A. H. Brush arrived in Dublin to 
find that an advance company of the Rifle Brigade had laid out the billets for the 3rd 
Battalion `in the beautiful showgrounds of the Royal Dublin Society at Ballsbridge. ' 
He further recalled how `Mr Bohane' the manager and organiser of the showý-grounds, 
`took grave exception to the influx of soldiers' and 'put every obstacle in our way,. ' 
The eventual transfer of the battalion in the summer of 1921 to live `under canvas in 
Phoenix Park' proved to be to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. 20 Aside from 
community hostility, the process of requisitioning barracks was also made 
significantly more difficult by the actions of insurgents. Writing in July 1920, 
Macready complained that `the survey of buildings which might be suitable for the 
future accommodation of troops has to be very carefully undertaken, otherwise the 
buildings are invariably destroyed by our opponents. -21 
Naval wireless stations such as those at Bunbeg and Malin Head were also 
garrisoned by small infantry detachments, although this situation was borne out of the 
necessity of keeping them operational as opposed to the need to find suitable 
accommodation. 22 Other (more makeshift) barracks could be crude in the extreme: at 
the height of the troubles, the East Yorkshire Regiment was required to provide and 
accommodate `9 detachments at the same time' consequently the provision at most 
of the places was very bad and officers and men had a hard time. ' 
23 Similarly, 
C. R. B. Knight recalled how the 1st Buffs: 
... were called upon to provide 
isolated detachments, varying 
from a company to an N. C. O. and six men, spread out as far as 
Mallow [County Cork] in the west and Rosslare [County 
Wexford] in the east, billeted mainly in tumble-down houses 
surrounded by barbed wire. A far from orthodox military 
deployment, it was nevertheless the result of the policy 
emanating from Dublin Castle, to which the greater part of the 
army in Ireland was committed. 24 
20 Brush, 'Rifle Green)'Orange Flash', p. 15. 
21 N. A., W. O. 329520, Macready to G. H. Q., Memorandum on the present military situation and 
eneral proposals in regard to troops during coming winter, 26 July 1920. 
21 Hist. 5th Div., p. 13. 
23 Plimpton, The Snapper" Ist Battalion, "D" Company notes, May 1920, p. 7. 
24 Knight, Historical Records (? f the Buffs, chapter 1, p. 2. 
97 
For the most part, the dispersal of battalions into detachments «as necessitated by a 
lack of large-scale barrack accommodation as opposed to the nature of the rising or 
government policy in combating the spread of disaffection. This could lead to an 
uneven dispersal of battalions throughout the country, which tended to expose small 
parties to large rebel bands. The most extreme example was provided by the 1 st 
Devonshire Regiment who, in August 1920, were providing no less than 15 
detachments covering Waterford, Wexford, Enniscorthy, Gorey, Taghmon, Rosslare, 
Carnsore, Newtownberry, Clonmel, Carrick-on-Suir, New Ross, Kilkenny, Callan, 
Thomastown and Craighenamanagh. 25 This dispersal lottery also determined 
soldiers' access to training facilities and other necessities. For example, the 'History 
of the 5th Division' recalled how `range accommodation was only available at certain 
of the larger stations such as the Curragh, Athlone and Mullingar, and at such hutted 
camps as Ballykinlar, Finner, Magilligan and Oranmore. ' Assault courses were also 
constructed at larger barracks for the purpose of enhancing troops' fitness and 
stamina, with smaller purpose built barracks establishing `tin rings' as an adequate 
substitute. 26 The fragmentation of battalions also hampered military reform during the 
final phase of post-war demobilization. The Digest of Service of the 2nd Border 
Regiment recalled how: 
Owing to a lack of accommodation and the disturbed state of the 
country the battalion was destined to be split up into many 
detachments, a fact which severely handicapped it in the process 
of reformation and rendered more difficult the task of 
demobilizing personnel serving on "Duration of War" 
engagements. 27 
In order to gain a `firm footing' in Ireland, newspaper reports of the time claimed 
that the government were contemplating an `elaborate system of blockhouses' to be 
erected throughout the country. ' It was claimed that the scheme would allow the 
military to establish dispersed strongholds throughout Ireland, which would facilitate 
training, security and reform in the armed forces. 28 However. the proposal proved to 
'` Rebellion. 6th Div., Appendix Il, Table 2: Showing units stationed in South of Ireland on 31 Aug. 
1920 and detachments found by them. 
2 Hist. 5th Div., p. 134. 
27 Digest of Service of the Border Regiment, 9 July 1919. 
2" The Tunes, 19 May 1920, p. 16. 
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be one of the innumerable `false starts' in military policy during this period. 29 In the 
absence of a `blockhouse' system, the lack of suitable existing buildings, meant that 
some detachments were required to accommodate themselves in flimsy, hastily 
erected hutment camps such as Ballyvonare Camp near Buttevant, County Cork, a 
place `bare of any comfort, dusty and remote. ' 30 Later, many small detachments 
found themselves living under canvas. J. M. Cordy of the 57th Field Company 
remembered being stationed under canvas with an infantry company near Athlone. 
during which time the officers and men `had to sleep on tables in the mess tent 
because the place was alive with rats. '31 The lack of fixed barrack accommodation in 
the Irish garrison was never resolved during the period of conflict, and even as late as 
autumn 1921 `six Battalions were still living under canvas as winter approached. ' 32 In 
a startling passage, the chronicler of the O. B. L. I. recalled with sardonic humour how 
(after the truce) the battalion were forced to camp in tents in Phoenix Park an 
unenviable position' in the "`no-man's land"' between `Free State Patrols and the 
I. R. A. ' 33 
Life on a military flying column could be even more precarious. Columns lacked 
even the comfort and security of a formal barracks to which they could return 
immediately following an ambush, raid or sweep: 
These columns, sometimes consisting of one or more companies, 
stay out for indefinite periods, and requisition their food and 
billets from the various towns and villages in whose vicinity they 
happen to be operating. 34 
In May 1920 the government had touted a system of `garrison posts and flying 
columns' as a means of `restoring order' and `carrying out a relentless pursuit of the 
29 N. A., P. R. O. 39/59/3. Mark Sturgis diaries, 31 Dec. 1920. The inconsistency of military policy 
during this period was also a great (off record) source of frustration for Castle officials as well as 
military commanders. Sturgis wrote that he was `entranced' by the government's military policy which 
he felt amounted to an 'amazing game of chance. ' 
30 Ransford, `One Man's Tide', p. 18. 
31 J. M. Cordy, `My Memories of the First World' TS memoir, Imperial War Museum, London. p. 39. 
32 N. A., W. O. 35/50/7, Winter Accommodation, Dec. 1921. This was partially accounted for by the 
widespread transfer of British barracks to the Free State Army. 
33 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 34. Lieutenant Colonel E. J. A. H. Brush of the 3rd Battalion 
Rifle Brigade also lived in the tented camp at Nine Acres in Phoenix Park which he described as 'a 
rather rough and read,, frontier camp', 'Rifle Green/Orange Flash', p. 17. 
34 The 79`h Neºvs, 2nd Battalion notes, April 1920, Cameron Highlanders' Regimental Museum, Fort 
George, Ardersier, Inverness, p. 140. 
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terrorists. ' Indeed, a Times report for the same month looked forward to 
reinforcements of mobile troops as the final solution to the military's predicament: 
The military will be constantly on the move ready at all times to 
protect the weak and to fight the assassin... That is the 
outstanding feature of the Government's plans. They are not 
proclaiming martial law or seeking to impose on the Irish people 
a form of military coercion. 35 
Enhanced mobility in the shape of flying columns was also regarded as a genuine 
alternative to failed strategies that depended upon weight of numbers (such as drives, 
raids and patrols). Lord Privy Seal, Andrew Bonar Law observed in a letter to the 
Prime Minister in May 1920 that `[Macready] attaches more importance to the 
mobility of the troops he now has than to an increase in their number. ' 36 Nonetheless, 
the optimism of journalists, politicians and military commanders was in stark contrast 
to the disillusion felt by troops serving in columns. The 79Th News published an article 
in June 1921, in which a soldier serving in a flying column complained that, `Billets 
were very hard to find. . . rations were all commandeered.. 
37 Where flying columns 
were required to remain mobile for lengthy periods of time, weather conditions were 
often the decisive factor that shaped their experience, and military column men 
appear to have been fortunate in this respect: 
The military columns lived in the open from April to July, and 
during that time there were to my knowledge only two wet days 
in the South West of Ireland... Weather is still the greatest moral 
factor in War. 38 
Likewise, soldiers engaged in the picketing of roads were occasionally required to 
bivouac or, alternatively, commandeer accommodation in the immediate vicinity of 
their post to allow them to maintain the effectiveness of the picket: 
It is possible that a picket may be kept on duty for several days at 
a time. In that case any suitable building in the vicinity of the 
examining post may be taken as a billet. A limited number of 
35 The Times, 19 May 1920, p. 16. 
36 Bonar Law to Lloyd George, letter dated 11 May 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/3l/1i30. 
37 The -. 9`h'N, e1t, s, 'Our Trek in Ould [sic] Ireland', June 1921, p. 187. 
38 Green Howards ' Ga ette, Feb. 1922, p. 179. 
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tents are available for posts where billeting accommodation 
cannot be arranged. 39 
The general tone of dissatisfaction with barrack accommodation and living 
conditions, drew many soldiers into making unfavourable comparisons with military 
life in England. The correspondent of the Green Howards' Gazette wrote 
nostalgically of the battalions desire to return to the `roomy portals' of their English 
barracks claiming, in turn, that they were prepared to accept 'even the worst of the 
many stations in England. 00 Similarly, C. R. B. Knight looked forward to the 
`amenities' of a `pleasant station in the regiment's own county.. 41 
Despite the unpopularity of Irish barracks throughout the period, there were, 
nonetheless, significant improvements in conditions towards the end of the 1920s. 
Barrack inspection reports from this period indicate that facilities at Boyle , Cootehill, 
Londonderry, and Tullamore were `very good', Dunshauglin, Galway, Belfast, 
Ballyomar, Killarney, and Kanturk were `good', Limerick was `good/fair' Kilbride 
was `fair' and Skibereen was `satisfactory. ' Nonetheless, in all cases, these judgments 
were qualified in accordance with the conflict situation: for example all the above 
reports included the postscript `... given the circumstances. ' This suggests that the 
majority of barracks remained well below the standards that soldiers serving on a 
`peace-time' basis had the right to expect. 42 
If soldiers were generally dissatisfied with the standard and the aspect of their 
accommodation, their predicament was little enhanced by severe restrictions on their 
movements outside camp. The kidnapping of Brigadier General Lucas in June 1920 
whilst on a fishing trip in Kilbarry, County Cork (see Chapter 4) had led divisional 
commanders to reconsider their position regarding the free movement of off-duty 
officers and men outside barracks. In June 1920, B. B. Cubittwriting on behalf of the 
Army Council informed Macready that `so far as the more senior officers are 
concerned the Council consider that where recreation cannot be indulged in without 
39 N. A., W. O. 35 90'l, Dublin District War Diary, "Schedule D", 'Instructions for Picqueting Roads'. 
4 Schedules "A", "B", "C" & "D" to accompany G. S. Dublin District War Dian', 24 June 1920. 
40 Green Howards' Gazette, Feb. 1922, p. 180. 
4' Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs, chapter 1, p. 2. 
42 N. A., \'V'. O. 35 50'6, Reports [barrack inspections] by Inspector of Quartermaster General's Services, 
Irish Command, Oct. to Dec. 1920. Barracks were rated according to the quality of their 
accommodation, dining hall and equipment, ration stores, waste disposal arrangements, kitchen 
facilities and cooks.. 
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adequate protection it ought to be abandoned.. 43 Similarly. following the murder of 
three officers near Fethard, County Cork, Strickland wrote to G. H. Q. to clarify the 
position with regard to the safety and movements of off-duty officers and men: 
The chief points were that all ranks should be made to realise the 
possible dangers that attended anyone outside barracks, that they 
should be always alert and suspicious, and finally that 2 was the 
minimum number of officers that should be out alone, and they 
44 would always be armed. 
Similar concerns were also raised by battalion commanders, some of whom felt 
the need `to put restrictions on the area in which the soldiers could `walk out', for fear 
of their being kidnapped. '45 However, as Strickland observed, there was a continual 
trade-off between the need for caution and the need to maintain troop morale via a 
liberal approach to troops' extra-curricular freedoms: to have confined all ranks to 
barracks, except when on duty, would have had a most demoralising effect . 
"t6 
However, despite Strickland's honourable intention to make provision for off-duty 
exercise, soldiers' testimonies suggest that these general orders only had a limited 
application at a local level. Bouts of increased I. R. A. activity usually resulted in all 
(or the majority of) ranks being confined to their barracks for long periods of time. 
The Dublin District War Diary of December 1920, recalled how, following the 
assassination of 12 officers on the morning of 21 November 1920, 'troops were 
confined to the barracks with the exception of 15% at the discretion of the C. O. 's. '47 
Major-General L. A. Hawes, following his arrival in Cork in May 1919, 
documented the encroachment of I. R. A. activity on the normal routine of the British 
soldier: 
The great access of leisure time was for a little most welcome. 
We used to play golf at a course about five miles out of Cork. 
Then the troubles got far worse and our movements became 
4' N. A., W. O. 32/4309. Cubitt to Macready. Whether officers in Ireland are on "Active Service", letter 
dated 30 June 1920. 
44 Strickland, copy of a letter addressed to G. H. Q., 30 Oct. 1920, Colonel R. H. G. \Vilson Papers. 
as Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II), p. 13. 
46 Strickland, cops of a letter addressed to G. H. Q., 30 Oct. 1920, Colonel R. H. G. \\ ilson Papers. 
47 N. A., W. O. 35'9 L7. War Diar\, General Staff H. Q. Dublin District, Dec. 1920. p. 1. 
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more and more restricted, until we were virtually confined to 
barracks. 48 
F. H. Vinden recalled his service in Boyle, County Roscommon between January 
1920 and December 1922 as a time `void of excitement.. . we were confined to the 
barracks, except when on duty. ' 49 This form of collective ennui also had serious 
repercussions for the ability of troops to maintain their discipline which. arguably. 
`increased the likelihood of disproportionate reactions to minor incidents. ' 'O The 
`demoralising effect' of enforced confinement was chillingly captured by C. Cordner 
of the 2nd Argyll and Southern Highlanders: 
the evenings after pay-out were very rough, fighting with 
barefists was commonplace. Those especially, who had returned 
from Active Service, were bored, and after drinking became 
maudlin in their cups, by the confinement to barracks [sic]. 51 
Douglas Wimberley observed a similar `drinking culture' amongst his men, 
which he also attributed directly to the isolation of barrack life: 
There is no doubt at this time, a good deal of hard drinking went 
on, especially in the sergeants' mess, and it was no wonder, for 
when off duty there was so little for them to do, cooped up as 
they were in a small camp surrounded by sentries and barbed 
wire. We did our best with games in camp and whist drives and 
the like, but we were allowed no wives or families there and few 
of the local Irish girls dared to be seen with a British soldier. 
Wimberley's account also suggested that an uptake in `drunkenness' in the later 
period began to affect the performance of men under his command. In January 1921 
he recalled being asked to provide a large party of men to hunt down a suspected 
ambush. After calling his men out on parade he discovered that ' ... several 
hundred 
men turned out, a good few in no shape for a lorried patrol, and I selected a composite 
force from the remaining teetotallers. ' 52 Indeed, J. A. G. Registers, indicate that 166 
48 Major-General L. A. Hawes, `Kwab-O-Kayal - The Memories and Dreams of an Ordinary Soldier', 
TS memoir, Imperial War Museum, London, p. 68. 
49 Vinden, By Chance a Soldier' p. 30. 
so Augusteijn, From Public Defiance, p. 226. 
S' C. Cordner, Untitled TS memoir, Imperial War Museum, London, p. 11. 
52 Wimberley, `Scottish Soldier', p. 154. 
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soldiers were actually court-martialled for 'drunkeness' between 1 January and 11 
July 1921, of which the majority were also charged with offences under section 40 of 
the Army Act of 1881 (updated annually) relating to 'act conduct [and] disorder or 
neglect to the prejudice of good order. '53 
That is not to suggest that barrack confinement was unique to the later period. As 
early as spring 1917,2nd Lieutenant C. Carter remembered that 'meetings of protest 
were held all over the country and we were continually confined to barracks owing to 
fear of riots. '54 Nor, as Fitzpatrick has asserted, did barrack confinement always result 
from stringent military directives, soldiers often displayed a strong isolationist 
tendency that confined them to familiar ground. This attitude was typified by a staff 
officer stationed in Buttevant in May 1921, who claimed We can't go outside 
barracks without risk of being shot in the back'. Faced with such insecurity, a great 
many soldiers opted for the safety and the tedium of barrack life. " 
In other cases (typically amongst smaller detachments) isolation usually resulted 
from a significant geographical separation. Sometimes the seclusion and utter 
bleakness of location reinforced a keenly felt sense of `apartness' from the main body 
of the battalion and from the conflict itself. In some cases, the soldiers' experience 
was one of unbearable quietness, inactivity and spartan endurance. F. A. S. Clarke 
recalled being ordered: 
... to relieve the garrison at the lighthouse on the old head of 
Kinsale about eight miles to the south west of the town. I was 
detailed to go with my platoon. We lived in old Coast guard 
cottages and suffered from intense boredom, bad rations, dust 
instead of coal and paraffin lamps. We were there a month and 
during that time were never visited by a senior officer... We had 
no means of contact with the outside world except by patrols. 56 
Percival recalled how lorry convoys travelling through dangerous, isolated areas were 
the only lifeline for the 6th Division's most remote outposts: `In the bad areas lorry 
53 N. A., W. O. 92/4: W. O. 213/32, Judge Advocate Generals Office: General Courts-Martial: register 
1917-1945; Field General Courts-Martial (In field and Ireland) Register 21 July 1920 to 19 November 
1921. For more detailed information on the process of Courts-Martial during this period and for 
offence codes relating to the Army Act of 1881 see J. Putkowski, British Army Mutineers 1914-22 
(London, 1998) p. 44. 
sa 2nd Lieutenant C. Carter. MS War Diary. 23 April 1917, Imperial War Museum. London. 
55 Ewwart. 'Life in Mallow: An English Officer's Impressions' The Times, 19 May 1921. 
56 Clarke. `Memoirs of a Professional Soldier', Chapter 6, p. 5. 
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convoys escorted by armoured cars had to be organised to take supplies to the various 
detachments and this was practically the only means of communication between one 
detachment and another. '57 
In more established barracks the sense of isolation was reinforced by the 
imperative of making barracks defensible. Heavy fortifications were constructed to 
protect from rebel attacks and these defensive measures contributed to the soldiers' 
sense of being under siege (even if the threat of rebel attack was negligible). The 
`History of the 5th Division' reasoned that `although a general rising was hardly 
probable ... 
dispositions were. . . taken to make all 
detachments secure by strong 
defences and with reserve supplies of rations, forage, fuel, petrol and water, varying 
from 7 to 30 days' consumption. ' 58 Sean Moylan (not without sympathy) recalled the 
`cramped quarters of the British in Newmarket' in which the soldiers had to live 
inside barbed wire and sandbag emplacements. ' 59 Similarly, the Oxford and Bucks 
Chronicle recorded how the soldiers' sense of barrack isolation was little improved 
`by the defence measures considered necessary - blocked gates, walls crowned with 
broken glass, long stretches of rusty wire, and sentries patrolling the perimeter. '60 
Likewise, the Buffs' historical records evoked a very familiar picture: 
It was necessary for the most stringent precautions to be taken; 
barracks were wired in and the main gates were covered with a 
cheval de fris, officers and men were allowed out only armed 
and in parties. 61 
The heavy use of defence measures tended to convert secure barracks into hemmed-in 
fortresses. Undoubtedly, the soldiers' sense of isolation must have been influenced by 
the fact that he viewed the outside world through the gaps in barbed wire and the 
spaces between patrolling sentries. The military authorities paranoia in this respect 
also contributed to the construction of artificial social barriers between the military 
and their host communities (see Chapter 4). 
Many troops felt that their distrust of the general population (which had, to a 
large extent, been cultivated by military command) was legitimised by I. R. A. 
57 Percival, Guerrilla War (I), p. 18. 
5' Hist. 5th Div., p. 65. 
59 Moylan, In His Own li'ords, p. 86. 
60 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 27. 
61 Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs, chapter 1, p. 2. 
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attempts to penetrate military barracks. This situation also convinced many that 
barrack fortifications separated them from certain death. In addition, the combined 
propaganda efforts of Sinn Fein and the British authorities led many to believe that all 
guns in the conflict were trained to and from military and police barracks. The level 
of alertness and suspicion that this generated actually misrepresented the true scale of 
the threat to barracks, and the situation was little improved by the need for continual 
patrols in the vicinity of military bases. These operations (by their very nature) tended 
to bring soldiers into conflict with their enemies, contributing to a skewed perception 
of the outside world. F. C. Penny, stationed in Tallaght, County Dublin, recalled how 
sentries were plastered around the airfield where he was based `... v, -ith orders to fire 
if any intruder failed to halt. ' Hearing shots one night he 'rushed to the scene to find 
that one of the guards had fired and shot a civilian. ' It later emerged that the 'civilian' 
was a night watchman who had been carrying out his regular duties. 62 Other soldiers 
spoke of `itchy-trigger fingers' or `shooting at shadows' whilst performing guard 
duties. 63 As Augusteijn has claimed, `fear... guided the behaviour of many in the 
Crown forces': incidents where `sheep or cattle were killed by random fire from 
nervous police and military near barracks' indicate just how developed the siege 
mentality had become. 64 Sean Moylan, detained in Cork Detention Barracks in May 
1921, observed that `British troops were always nervous and on the alert. So much so 
that on a number of occasions the sentries fired at their own comrades and one British 
soldier was killed by a sentry. '65 
In some cases troops could be forgiven for their irrational behaviour during 
sentry duty. There can be little doubt that, in certain areas, the sentries' existence was 
both precarious and wearisome. Besides actual physical exhaustion, guard duties also 
brought severe mental fatigue. The continual need to be alert and to take decisive 
action where necessary placed a severe mental strain on guards and sentries. In 
addition, the terrain immediately surrounding military barracks was as close to a 
'front line' as could be achieved in a guerrilla conflict. 66 Soldier guards were aware 
62 F. C. Penny, `Memories of Flying 1915-20', TS memoir, Peter Liddle Collection, Brotherton Library, 
Leeds University, pp. 15-16. 
63 Chapman, letter to a friend, dated 30 April 1916. 
64 Augusteijn, From Public Defiance, p. 227. 
65 Moylan, In His Own Words, p. 137. 
66 G. S. I. C. 's Record of the Rebellion goes even further to suggest that troops 'were, in fact, living 
inside the enemy lines' and given the presence of spies, informers and other infiltrators 'their every 
movement was known as soon as begun and in many cases was betrayed eý en before that. ' p. 33. 
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that the area in and around military and police barracks was the one place where 
rebels and Crown force troops could largely rely on each others presence. This 
situation could only favour rebel snipers who could avoid announcing their presence 
until the decisive moment. Soldiers were acutely aware of this disparity of advantage: 
J. E. P. Brass, who acted as King's Messenger to Ireland in the later period, recalled 
how guards at the various barracks were exposed to great danger: the grounds 
surrounding were plastered with sentries. I felt sorry for these wretched men; they 
made splendid game for prowling gunmen. ' 67 
As Percival observed, lone gunmen acting by night were also in the habit of 
`sniping the sentry and making off . 68 This made sentries an easy fixed-target; as 
early as 1917, Private C. Cordner recalled how the battalion's `sole sentinel' was 
`subject to an occasional rifle shot.. . 
during the hours of darkness. '69 Similarly, The 
79th News recalled how: 
... the sentry, Private Young, was shot down and severely 
wounded when a guard of the battalion were dispossessed of 
their rifles during a surprise attack on the barracks in 
Queenstown. 70 
Incidents of this kind led to the issuing in July 1920 of further orders `relating to 
the care of arms and the duties of guards and sentries on barrack gates. '71 However, 
the necessary vigilance that sentry duty fostered also began to infiltrate the interior of 
barracks, as soldiers who had enjoyed the relative comfort and privacy of their 
barracks became bound by increasingly cautious security measures. E. F. Chapman 
remembered being forced to sleep in uniform in order to repel an invasion at a 
moments notice: `we were not allowed to take off even our boots. ' 72 This tended to 
militate against the soldiers' assurance of respite within their barracks, and to 
reinforce the impression that there was `no back area" in the conflict into which they 
could withdraw. 73 
67 J. E. P. Brass, `Diary of a War Cadet 1914-21', TS memoir, Imperial War Museum, London, p. 232. 
68 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II), p. 3. 
69 Cordner, TS memoir, p. 11. 
70 The 79`h News. 2nd Battalion notes, Aug. 1921. 
'1 Hist. 5th Div., p. 67. 
71 Chapman, letter to a friend, dated 30 April 1916. 
73 N. A., W. O. 32, '9572, Memorandum - Ireland and the General Military Situation, 16 June 19-11. 
issued by Sir Laming Worthington Evans, Secretary of State for War (replaced Churchill in February 
1921). (1) Discussions and references to the Cabinet on measures to restore la\\ and order and the 
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There was of course a minor threat to the lives of soldiers in barracks. Initially, 
the republican campaign had tended to target police barracks in isolated areas. As the 
roles of the military and the police became fused, larger barracks hosting the army 
and the R. I. C. were occasionally targeted by rebel groups. These attacks only rarely 
took the form of full-scale assaults; attacks that aimed to overwhelm the occupants 
were neither realistic nor useful to an elastic guerrilla army. Battles (whether in the 
field or in defence of a fixed position) were never a typical feature of the conflict; 
vandalism, theft and intimidation were usually the order of the day. The ; "9`h Nell's 
reported (with great amusement) that `Shinners' had been `creating' at the A 
Company barracks on Spike Island: `they endeavoured to turn the place into a 
sanatorium. They seemed to think that the fresh air cure was best for all diseases and 
so knocked all the windows out. ' 74 E. Craig Brown wrote to his mother in May 1920 
regarding his barrack confinement, and the omnipresence of his enemies, claiming 
that `a Sinn Fein sentry stands outside our barrack gate and watches everybody- and 
every wagon going or coming. He no doubt reports to Sinn Fein H. Q at the end of his 
tour of duty. 75 Whether intimidation or espionage, these occurrences were 
disproportionately alarming to soldiers who depended on the safety and the security 
of their barracks. More unsettling still were incidents of theft from military barracks. 
Such incidents were an infiltration into the private sphere of barrack life and the 
effect on the military was both physical and psychological. The correspondent of the 
1 st East Yorkshire Regiment, recalling a plot to procure arms from the courthouse 
barracks in Carrick on Shannon, described how: 
... a couple of civilians entered on the plea of 
interviewing the 
caretaker, who is a saddler by trade. They passed through the 
hall to the caretaker's quarters and started to unlock a door that 
opens out at the back of the courthouse.. .a party was 
detailed to 
be in readiness just over the wall behind the Court-House. while 
the two leaders got the caretaker's back door open; then there 
was to be a combined rush from the back and the front, in the 
hope of overpowering the guard and getting our rifle. However, 
respective responsibilities of ministers and the General Officer Commanding; (2) Great Britain: 
(estimated strength after imminent end of coal crisis). 
74 The 79`h News, 'A' Company Notes, Dec. 1921. 
75 E. Craig Brown, letter to his mother dated 30 May 1920 
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the caretaker, hearing a noise came out of his room and not 
knowing the men ordered them out, and they left the way they' 
came. . . their plans had miscarried. 
The same correspondent noted that these daring stunts became less frequent as 'D' 
Company became centralised in the courthouse. However, simple weight of numbers 
was no guarantee of safety: in November 1920 the same company were attacked in 
their barracks twice in one night. On this occasion the military forcibly demonstrated 
their strength relative to their attackers: 'they only fired about half-a-dozen shots to 
our eighty. . . the 
Sinn Feiners appear to have got a good fright, as they have left us 
alone since then. 76 
A more concerted effort to overpower soldiers and to seize arms from barracks 
occurred in April 1921 when a group of insurgents attacked Westridge barracks in 
County Cork. On this occasion the attackers lay in wait fully aware that the battalion 
[Cameron Highlanders] had gone out on a route march' with the 2nd Gloucesters. 
After half an hour shots were fired into the barracks: 
The main target of the assailants was the lines of the 2nd 
Gloucesters... The assailants had probably known that both 
battalions were going out, and rather fancied their chances of 
securing a few rifles without much difficulty. 
On this occasion a party of the Gloucesters and two parties of the 2nd Cameron 
Highlanders were able to repel the attackers. No soldiers were hurt in the attack, but a 
number of sentries narrowly escaped being injured by the hail of bullets directed 
towards the guardroom. 77 
Besides group infiltration for the purpose of raiding or attacking, there was a 
suspicion amongst soldiers that lone republican agents were operating amongst them. 
The `History of the 5th Division" provided some justification for this view: `Sinn Fein 
had its agents everywhere throughout the country, and also inside and outside 
barracks. Certain threats of action under R. O. I. R. had to be issued against loitering by 
civilians outside barrack gates. ' 78 Percival recalled one occasion when the `secretary 
of the Demobilised Soldiers and Sailors Federation' requested an interview with him, 
76 Plimpton, " The Snapper", 1st Battalion, `D' Company notes, pp. 7-8, May 1920. 
" The 70' News. The Battle of Westridge', April 1921, p. 146. 
78 Hist. 5th Div., p. 90. 
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offering `on behalf of his Society to do all he could to help us. ' Following several 
interviews, he received intelligence to the effect that the individual also 'held the 
position of Battalion Commandant in the I. R. A. and that his visits were designed to 
gain firsthand information of the interior of our barracks! ' 79 Furthermore, spies and 
informers operating within barracks were, by no means, always civilians engaged in 
subterfuge: Coleman drew attention to an arms raid on the `Upper Military Barracks 
in Longford town' led by members of the 1St Battalion I. R. A.. the success of which 
owed much to information supplied by a soldier of the 18th Lancers known as 
'Jordy'. This soldier had established contact with local rebels for the purpose of 
supplying `arms and ammunition' during his service in the barracks, and only 
deserted to Sinn Fein when he came under suspicion. It was claimed that his 
`firsthand knowledge of the layout of the barracks and of where arms were stored' 
allowed a raiding party to seize eight rifles and a quantity of ammunition. 80 
Although the threat of Sinn Fein must have appeared overbearing to soldiers in 
their barracks, it very rarely interrupted the normal routine of barrack life to such an 
extent that recreation was impossible. In many cases, soldiers enjoyed a great access 
of unrestricted leisure time in their barracks. Some accounts even evoked a `holiday- 
camp' atmosphere. For example, E. Craig Brown recalled a riotous guest night at 
Belmont barracks: 
We had great dancing after dinner, I took the floor with 
Commander Weston, the padre and Captain Mc Watt. . . we 
finished off with a rugby football match with the medicine 
ball 
... my shirt was red with someone else's 
blood! 81 
These guest nights (mainly for the benefit of officers) tended to become a focus for 
gaiety and celebration: 
We young officers managed to have quite a lot of fun in Ireland. 
We had, for instance, a number of jolly guest nights.. . we were 
full of fun and enjoyed after dinner wild reel dancing and riotous 
games. 82 
79 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II), p. 17. 
ao Coleman, County Longford, p. 120. 
81 E. Craig Brown, unaddressed letter dated 22 June 1920. 
82 Wimberley. 'Scottish Soldier', p. 153. 
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Wimberley recalled another occasion when (Naval Commander-in-Chief) Admiral Sir 
Reginald Tupper visited Queenstown barracks: 
He was a splendid old sportsman and seemed to thoroughly 
enjoy his time with us. After dinner we got him into the middle 
of a rather wild eightsome reel, and once in the centre we never 
let him out; Each one of us in turn "hooched" the old chap, and 
did our reel steps to him which he nobly tried to follow. 83 
Lively descriptions of guest nights in barracks or soirees with local loyalist families 
were commonplace in officers' memoirs. Such events provided a counterpoint to 
other aspects of Irish service and, as such, were very much the antithesis of the 
drudgery of service. 
It would appear that very little could quell officers' appetites for leisure, comfort 
and privilege. A report on the proposed `reappropriation [sic]' of military barracks in 
Ireland from December 1920 reveals that officers based at Kildare barracks submitted 
a proposal to the War Office to dispense with an infants school in the barrack grounds 
and `reappropriate the Sergts' Mess West as an Infants" School and the Infants' 
School East as a Sergts' Mess. ' This was deemed necessary because `the Sergts' 
Mess is too small owing to an increase in members. ' The new arrangement was 
intended to allow officers to create [the unlikely combination of] a combined adults 
and infants school and sergeants' mess that included a billiard room, reading and 
writing room, mess room, liquor store and beer cellar. The new layout would also 
reduce the infants' school to just two rooms, one of which would be earmarked 
during the present emergency for military training purposes. 84 
Regular soldiers were also driven by the need to maintain the semblance of an 
active social scene. E. M. Warmington, describing his quiet station at Bere Island, 
County Cork, recalled how: 
Many men missed the noises and bustle and entertainments of 
their native or familiar towns ... yet 
I feel that we managed pretty 
well. Our non-military social life was active and even talented, 
including concerts and dramatic performances, open in every 
83 Wimberley, `Scottish Soldier', p. 156. 
84 N. A., W. O. 335, '5013. Barracks: Reappropriations and Misappropriations., Dec. 1920. There is no 
indication in the application as to whether permission %ý as eventually granted for the proposal. 
respect to all ranks and to outside guests. The play 'The Private 
Secretary' proved popular on our stage. We had an orchestra 
which could play Bach, and there were expert pianists among 
both officers and other ranks. 85 
Musical concerts and amateur dramatics were especially popular in the Irish 
garrison. Most battalions were accompanied by a regimental band, which provided 
some distraction from everyday fatigues. R. Burns recalled how his arrival in 
Limerick in 1918 was greatly `enlivened' by the presence of the Cameron 
Highlanders' Pipe Band. Other soldiers spoke fondly of their involvement in 
theatricals. 86 E. M. Ransford remembered the Suffolk Regiment's performance of the 
`The Speckled Band' at Belfast Theatre: `I was cast for Sherlock Holmes! ' 87 
Similarly, the anonymous author of the History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers (having 
previously struggled to strike a light-hearted note concerning the experience of the 1 st 
Battalion in Ireland) concluded with a fond remembrance of `the amateur theatricals 
staged by "A" Company at Hunstanton House under the energetic leadership of 
Captain Fleetwood and 2nd Lieutenant Strong in which the latter displayed yet another 
of his many talents. ' 88 
Concerts and performances were one aspect of leisure in Ireland in which officers 
and men became jointly involved. For the most part, the leisure activities of senior 
and lower ranks demonstrated a clear separation in this respect, with officers tending 
towards more individual pursuits such as golf, fishing and shooting. 89 Adrian 
Clements Gore, a young officer of the 2nd Rifle Brigade, fondly recalled his 'salad 
days' in Ireland spent `patrolling the country with fishing rods and guns handy in the 
car. '90 By way of contrast, lower ranks tended towards team sports within their 
barracks and occasionally with neighbouring units where conditions allowed. The 
satisfaction of officers' leisure needs was usually dependent upon the co-operation of 
85 Warmington, `Diaries', p. 33. 
86 Burns, `Once a Cameron Highlander' p. 168. 
87 Ransford, `One Man's Tide', p. 20. 
88 Anon, History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, p. 7. 
89 This separation was reflected in the right of officers to live outside barracks in the early period. 
J. M. Cordy arriving in Ireland in November 1919 recalled how he `hired a bedsitting room in a cottage 
in a village close by [Curragh camp] and my wife came out and we had a very pleasant time. ' Mý 
Memories', p. 39. 
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other ranks who were sometimes required to provide armed guards for officers' 
sorties outside barracks: 
Officers stationed at Tullamore and Bin were able to enjoy an 
occasional outing on the local golf courses. Their efforts were 
observed with close attention by armed fusiliers patrolling just 
off the fairway. 91 
In particular, the contrivance of officers to continue their regular golfing routine 
placed a heavy burden on regular troops. In November 1920, The 79`h .\ etit's published 
extracts from Brigade Orders regarding the playing of golf in Ireland. Some of the 
guidelines read like a dark comedy: 
... parties will 
invariably send out advance and rear guards, the 
actual players being regarded as the main body. Before the 
players drive off a pair of fore caddies will be sent on to make 
good the first line of bunkers and as soon as the players have left 
the tee, their caddies will push on to the green and will exploit as 
far as the next tee, where they will take up a suitable defensive 
position. 
In the case of short holes the players will not drive off until 
the fore caddies have made good the next tee. 
At blind holes the greatest care is to be taken to ensure that 
before any advance is made the fore-caddies have the reverse 
slope under observation. 92 
Nevertheless, experiences in County Kerry suggested that these safety concerns were 
both necessary and prudent in relation to golfing parties. On 9 April 1921, men of the 
Boherbee section of the Tralee I. R. A. tracked Major John Mackinnon, a deeply 
unpopular Auxiliary officer, to a golf course in Oakpark, Tralee, where veteran 
soldier James Cornelius Healy shot him twice in the head as Mackinnon steadied 
himself to putt on the third green. Historian T. Ryle Dwyer described Healy's feat of 
marksmanship as `the most famous shots ever made on any Tralee course. '93 
91 Mullal-,, The South Lancashire Regiment, p. 350. 
92 The 70. \'eii s. `Golf in Ireland', Nov. 1920, p. 22. 
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On the other hand, lower ranks usually confined their leisure activities to the 
safety of the barracks. Battalion whist drives and other card games were a popular 
pastime. Practical joking was pursued with relentless vigour. W. R. H. Bro vn 
remembered that `there was much "ragging"' between the companies in Moore Park: 
One night we threw a smoke bomb into a hut in B Company's 
lines which prevented the occupants from entering for a couple 
of hours. In return they raided us, and, as we had barricaded our 
doors and closed our windows, they threw a fire bucket full of 
water clean through one of our windows, drenching the nearest 
bed. 
Another tumultuous occasion resulted in a newly arrived cadet being 'carried to the 
washhouse in his night attire and, with legs tied, laid on a bench with two taps turned 
on him. He was then left to "rescue" himself as well he could. ' Brown further added 
that `dozens of similar incidents took place, giving a touch of spice to our existence 
and helping to keep the place alive. '94 
Troops also benefited from a greater access to education which `formed an 
integral part of the soldiers' training... even throughout the most troublous [sic] times 
of 1920 and 1921. ' In the 5th Division, this form of provision resulted in 3,652 
certificates of education being awarded to troops during the period. 95 In some areas 
soldiers also benefited from organised lecture programmes. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade 
were particularly active in this respect, even promoting a course of lectures on 
`Imperial History and Geography' in late 1921 and early 1922.96 A more light-hearted 
series of talks and lectures were organised by officers of the Essex Regiment who 
made presentations on `local I. R. A. celebrities' and encouraged troops to volunteer 
information to enable them to construct profiles. 97 In May 1920, the military acquired 
an Agricultural School in Ballyfair and offered courses of practical instruction to 
troops. In addition, a course in Market Gardening was established at the Curragh, and 
ran until December 1921.98 
Inter-regimental sports competitions were another means by which to maintain 
morale and encourage the health and vivacity of troops. These included the Challenge 
94 Brown, untitled TS memoir, p. 19. 
95 Hist. 5th Div., p. 138. 
96 Jbid, p. 139. 
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trophy for boxing, 1920-21 and the Irish Army Cup Association Football Competition 
in 1921-22. League rugby (union) was established in the 5th Division for the season 
1921-22, and ran alongside the 5th Division Hockey Cup. Unit teams also 
participated in cross-country running events, which were utilised by officers to both 
maintain the health of troops and develop their knowledge of the topography of the 
brigade area. Despite severe restrictions, soldiers' passion for these events continued 
unabated throughout the period. As late as September 1921, Wimberley recalled one 
such Brigade Sports Meeting in Cork hosting eight infantry regiments: 
Travelling to and from Sports meetings and inter-unit games at 
that period was an unusual affair. We were conveyed to and 
from in old fashioned motor vehicles, covered with rabbit netting 
to keep out any Sinn Fein grenades thrown at us, and all armed 
to the teeth with Lewis guns, rifles and grenades. 99 
As late as June 1921, some regiments were still contriving to engage civilians in 
team sports, which created dangerous situations for both players and spectators. An ill 
advised `Military v Civilians' cricket match in the grounds of Trinity College on 3 
June 1921 was interrupted by revolver shots from the direction of Nassau Street 
resulting in the death of a female spectator. ' 00 Nonetheless, the best efforts of armed 
rebels could do little to quell the soldiers' appetite for these events. The only serious 
obstacle to leisure was created by the proliferation of military duties as the contours 
of barrack life became defined by an incessant military routine. The Green Howards' 
Gazette recorded in September 1920: 
We fear there will be no chance of sport of any kind until 
Ireland's troubles are over. With increased duties and men 
becoming more scarce, very few of us have any chance of doing 
anything apart from work. ' 01 
Similarly, The Oxford and Bucks Chronicle summarised military life in Ireland as 
being composed of `raiding and search parties, guards and escorts of all kinds, 
spasmodic bouts of training and, of course, the ubiquitous fatigues. ' 
102 
99 Wimberley, -Scottish Soldier' pp. 150-1. 
10° N. A., W. O. 3593%2. War Diary -G (operations) -1 Dec. 1920 to 31 Dec. 
1921. and War Diary - 
General Staff H. Q. Dublin District, June 1921, entries dated 3 June 1921. 
101 Green Howards' Ga: ette, Sept. 1920, p. 60. 
102 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 32. 
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J. P. Swindlehurst, a prolific diarist, even ceased entries for a whole month owing to 
fact that `each day was a repetition of the day previous. if we weren't on guard in 
some place, we were patrolling somewhere else, or else on a route march. ' 103 These 
accounts contrast greatly with those of the earlier period when barrack life could be 
inactive to the point of tedium. Robin Salisbury, stationed in Dublin. ýNTote to his 
mother in October 1917: 
I really haven't a bit of news. My day up here consists of either 
sitting through awful lectures being bored stiff or crawling over 
small hills with guns and being more bored stiff if possible. 104 
Other soldiers lacked even the demands of training with which to occupy themselves. 
L. A. Hawes recalled his humdrum military life in Cork: 
My only work was each Saturday morning to sign a return 
showing how many rats had been killed during the week. This is 
a fact to add to my frustration with my work, I had come from a 
very active and essential appointment, to a useless one. '0' 
Cecil Plumb, based at the Old Barracks in Fermoy in 1917 converted his standard 
issue `Field Message Book' (for the use of non-commissioned officers of cavalry) 
into a diary of service. His descriptions convey the boredom and inactivity of an Irish 
station during this period, punctuated by `joy rides on the sergeant's horses'; 
`gardening in front of the O. C's room'; `scraps with my bed mate' and strolls in 
Moore Park `in the hope of getting a tart! ' 106 Plumb's vigorous pursuit of leisure, his 
extra-marital agenda, and his `joy rides', provide firm counterpoints to the more 
regimented existence of soldiers in the later period. 
It is clear that troops access to leisure varied greatly according to considerations such 
as time period, rank and district. However, this section has demonstrated that, 
regardless of these influences, the pursuit of leisure was an integral need amongst 
103 Swindlehurst, MS diary, 28 Feb. 1921. 
104 Robin Salisbury, letter to his mother dated 15 Oct. 1916, Peter Liddle Collection, Brotherton 
Library, Leeds University. 
105 Hawes, 'Kwab-O-Kayal', p. 67. 
106 Cecil Plumb, Field Message Book, MS Diary, entries dated respectively 24,24.28,20 June 1917, 
Imperial War Museum, London. 
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soldiers, and its satisfaction was the flipside to the constraints of barrack life. The 
historic links between the military and civilians in Irish garrison towns began to be 
eroded by the regular confinement of soldiers to barracks and the defensive measures 
required to fortify fixed military positions. This could lead to alienation, inaction and 
a false perception of the conditions under which troops served. Soldiers sought to 
relieve the tension of barrack confinement and the hardship of the operational routine 
through recreation. Their sustained effort to pursue leisure reveals much about the 
pressures of military life and their social exclusion (real or otherwise) from the life of 
the community. 
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4. Soldiers and Civilians: Relations Between the Military 
and their Host Communities. 
An understanding of the limitations created by barrack life is a prerequisite to 
understanding the wider picture of civil-military relations in Ireland. Whilst the fiats 
of military commanders and other aspects of barrack life acted as a limiting factor on 
social contact between soldiers and civilians, the conflict itself tended to bring 
soldiers and rebels head-to-head in busy urban settings. Skirmishes often occurred 
under the gaze of civilian bystanders, with the streets of towns and villages forming 
the battleground for conflict. This pattern of hostilities ensured that the civilian 
population could never remain entirely detached from the conflict, and were 
vulnerable to the coercive influences of both soldiers and rebels. Active insurgents 
depended upon the active or passive co-operation of civilians in order to ensure the 
success of their actions. Likewise, the co-operation of the civil population was vital to 
the military's efforts to expose threats, collect reliable intelligence and secure 
convictions. Therefore, the nature of the conflict required that both sides forge 
positive links with the civil population or risk losing touch with their opponents' 
campaign. It would not be overstatement to suggest that the overall outcome of the 
conflict hinged upon the actions and ultimate loyalties of the `man in the street. ' 
Setting aside military considerations, closer links with the community were also a 
conduit for developing friendships, pursuing leisure and ensuring consumer supply. 
As has been demonstrated, both battalions and military detachments often found 
themselves quartered in the heart of the community, sometimes in public buildings 
converted for military use. In the absence of self-contained (or self sufficient) military 
communities, many soldiers were anxious to establish relationships with local 
shopkeepers, churches, families or publicans in order to maintain some semblance of 
a social life and to maintain or develop a `civilian' outlook. 
' 
Helen McCartney in her recent book Citizen Soldiers, The Liverpool Territorials in the First World 
{i'ar (Cambridge, 2005) explored the continuity of aspects of civilian life amongst soldiers in the First 
World War, especially those arising from regional and class based identities which remained intact 
within the context of locally raised territorial battalions. In regular battalions (such as those operating 
in Ireland during this period) the region in which a battalion was raised was a less reliable indicator of 
the regional origin of soldiers. Shared identities tended to converge on belonging to a particular 
regiment or to a British (or sometimes English, Scottish or Welsh) identity. Nevertheless, aspects of a 
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Therefore, if the conditions of conflict immured soldiers in their barracks, the 
attractions, opportunities and dangers of civilian life were usually close at hand. This 
chapter will study the nature of this social interaction through the presentation of a 
series of case studies highlighting the varying experiences of regiments stationed in 
both hostile and quiet districts at different periods during the conflict. It will also 
highlight relevant themes, including the commercial and social boycott of the Crown 
forces and the regulatory influence of the I. R. A. on community life, to demonstrate 
the means by which community hostility came to be expressed and the motivations 
behind this dissension. Instances where barriers between the military and the civil 
population were successfully overcome will also be identified as a means to highlight 
the continuity of historic links between the military and civilians in Ireland. This 
should bring into sharper relief the lost potential evident in other areas. Above all, the 
chapter will consider the influence of civil-military relations on the soldiers' 
experience of service life in Ireland, and assess how this contributed to the success or 
failure of the British campaign. It is hoped that a detailed scrutiny of these issues will 
enable a clearer picture to be constructed from a mass of seeming contradictions. 
Republican memoirs have tended to portray civil-military relations in Ireland as being 
uniformly hostile. Likewise, newspaper reports and propaganda from the period 
tended to emphasise the explosive nature of community relations. For the most part, 
the military and the civil population emerge from these accounts like two separate 
chemical elements that, when brought together, were almost bound to produce an 
exothermic reaction. As early as July 1919, The Freeman 's Journal was already 
describing the atmosphere between the military and the general population as one of 
`poison gas'. 2 Similarly "The Snapper" regarded the deteriorating relationship as a 
`fever prevalent in the country'. 3 In the same vein, The 79`h News claimed that the 
introduction of military detachments to Queenstown. Ballincollig, Midleton, 
Killetagh and Youghal in April 1920 had created `hornet's nests! ' in South-West 
4 Ireland. 
more general civilian experience involving cinema and theatre outings, sightseeing and the enjoyment 
of local hospitality were carried over to Irish service as a means by which to bolster morale. 
The Freeman's Journal, 9 July 1919, quoted in The Times, 10 Jul} 1919, p. 14. 
3 Plimpton, "The Snapper", July 1920, p. 106. 
The 79`h News, April 1920, p. 96. 
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Despite the inflammatory language, the soldiers' experience of opposition «-as, 
for the most part, far less volatile than these descriptions suggest. Initial forms of 
resistance tended to be passive; community hostility only rarely took the form of 
violent physical assaults. The most common means by which civilians indicated their 
disapproval was the simple, yet effective, device of disassociation. Therefore, 
community hostility was not only expressed in `stories of soldiers being thrown into 
the river'5, nor even in the `battery after battery of coldly hostile glances' observed by 
a visiting reporter. 6 It could also be subtle, almost discreet: Private J. W. Rowarth 
remembered that: `there was no violence. In the early days before going to France 
you did get a smile or two from the locals, now nobody spoke, or even nodded their 
heads to me. '7 After the `permanent joy' of his station at Bere Island where the local 
population `treated us as friends', E. M. Warmington recalled his arrival in Tipperary 
in the spring of 1919 where he found a community `not yet afflicted by violence' but 
unwilling to reciprocate any gesture of friendliness: `I saw ahead of me about twenty 
young men in civilian clothes on either side of the road. As I walked through that 
company I spoke a word or two with a smile, but got no reply. '8 This form of social 
ostracism was genuinely disconcerting to soldiers in Ireland whose predecessors had 
enjoyed the respect of the community `as "good customers" and "eager huntsmen" 
admired for their accurate marksmanship and lack of local connections. ' 9 
This growing estrangement was well documented by Douglas Wimberley, an 
officer stationed in Queenstown in the winter of 1920. Wimberley recognised his 
increasing isolation by the fact that `fewer and fewer of the local Irish families 
attempted to entertain army officers. "° Similarly Rowarth, returning to Ireland after 
the armistice, recalled his attempt to `visit some of the people [he] knew before' 
which proved unsuccessful because `this time [he] was not welcome. " 
1 The 
consciousness of social exclusion was perfectly captured by a visiting reporter in May 
1921. In a vivid passage, he remembered a spring day in the town of Limerick: 
White clad young men and women were playing lawn tennis in 
the gardens, old men were smoking and talking on the veranda 
5 Bums, `Once a Cameron Highlander', p. 164. 
6 Ewart, `In Rebel Hands: An English Officer's Impressions', The Times, 20 May 1921, p. 14. 
Private J. W. Rowarth, `A Soldier's Tale', TS memoir, Imperial War Museum, London, p. 27. 
8 Warmington, `Diaries', p. 43. 
9 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, p. 29. 
10 Wimberley, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 154. 
Rowarth, A Soldier's Tale', p. 27. 
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of a club that overlooks the river. A more peaceful scene could 
hardly be imagined ... A military band was playing somewhere 
near, and I found it eventually huddled away in a yard up an 
alley, nobody taking any notice except an armed sentry who 
stood at the entrance. 12 
This social boycott, which gathered strength and momentum after the armistice, was 
reinforced by a more overt campaign of commercial and infrastructural exclusion. 
Many shopkeepers and tradesmen had long refused the patronage of the military and 
their initiatives were to be later promoted by quayside workers in Dublin who refused 
to assist the military in the unloading of munitions. This fractured supply chain was 
finally broken by the refusal of railwaymen to transport war materials. 
The first rumblings of what was to become a more general transport embargo 
occurred on 20 May 1920 when a meeting of quayside workers in Dublin resolved not 
to handle `certain war material' on behalf of the military. 13 On the very same day, 
dockers and crane-men refused to discharge the cargo of the freighter Polberg, 
believing the vessel to be carrying munitions. This resulted in the freighter being 
landed in Kingstown on 21 May, and unloaded into railway wagons by troops driven 
in from Dublin. If this was a slight inconvenience to military, the situation was made 
considerably worse by the refusal of Dublin and South-Eastern railwaymen to convey 
the wagons to Dublin, followed by the refusal of men on the Great Southern and 
Western Railway to work the train from Dublin to the South of Ireland. As a result, 
the carriages remained under military guard in Kingstown for two days until the 
military could satisfy the railwaymen that the 160-ton cargo contained only preserved 
meat and not, in fact, munitions. 
The outcome may have been farcical, but it did nonetheless indicate a willingness 
by transport workers to co-operate against the interests of the military. When the 
government tug The Czaritza arrived in Queenstown on 30 May 1920, the alighting 
crew of Cameron Highlanders found themselves confronted by a conspiracy of non- 
co-operation from both transport workers and other civilians. Their first experience of 
Irish service entailed: a crew that refused to discharge the munitions, the fact that 'no 
civilians could be found to assist in the landing of Lewis guns and other equipment' 
12 Ewart, On the road to Ulster: An English Officer's Impressions', The Times, 23 May 1921, p. 14. 
13 The Times, 21 May 1920, p. 16. 
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and `the destruction of the shore gangway by unknown men'. 14 Similar,,, _ , 
in 
Millstreet, County Cork a detachment of the I st Manchesters found themselves cut 
off from military supplies by `the railway authorities' refusal to take 'two truckloads 
of military stores'. Their predicament was made considerably worse by 'reluctance 
amongst the civil population to allow the military to purchase food'. ' In the same 
fashion, the Green Howards' Gazette recalled a strike that involved the co-operation 
of both transport workers and the civil population. This entailed 'the closing of all 
shops and a total stoppage of the railways as a protest against the non-release of 
hunger strikers in Mountjoy prison ... a state of affairs that lasted two days. ' 
16 
Very soon railwaymen were refusing to transport troops as well as munitions: in 
July 1920 the correspondent of East Yorkshire Regiment lamented how for the first 
time, a party of East Yorkshiremen were refused to be taken on the train by the driver 
at Mullingar station. ' The troops were obliged to reach their destination by lorries, 
though they were greatly inconvenienced in doing so by the discovery that `4,000 
gallons of petrol, laying overnight in the goods yard... had been hauled out of the 
trucks, nearly every can punctured and thrown down the embankment'. '7 By these 
methods, the transport embargo was complemented by the actions of local traders and 
the civil population. Naturally, many soldiers began to regard such actions as a form 
of civil conspiracy; whereby transport workers sought to confine the military's 
movements and the civil population sought to heighten their discomfort within their 
confined locality. 
During June 1920 the embargo spread rapidly across Ireland. Earlier in the 
month, The Times had claimed that `the principle involved is upheld by railwaymen 
over the various systems. ' 18 However, in the absence of a sustained general strike, 
stoppages on the railways tended to arise spontaneously on the back of local 
initiative, as opposed to any clear policy directive on the part of the National Union of 
Railwaymen. Despite the lack of a unified policy, the majority of railway employees 
were soon refusing to assist in the transportation of soldiers, policemen and military 
prisoners, as well as munitions. This united front led to doubts being expressed 
regarding the sincerity of the railwaymen's actions. not least from , kwithin the railway 
1' The Times, 31 May 1920, p. 14. 
15 Record of Service of the 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment, 12 July 1920. 
16 Green Howards' Gazette, April 1920, p. 6. 
17 Plimpton, "The Snapper" July 1920, p. 106. 
18 Tu 1' Times. 5 June 1920, p. 14. 
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companies themselves: Fane Vernon, the Chairman of the Great Northern Railway 
Company wrote to the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Sir Hamar Greenwood in Juli 
1920 claiming that: 
A number of loyal servants of the Company have been 
kidnapped, kept prisoner, and forced at the point of a revolver to 
sign an undertaking not to work or assist in the working of 
military traffic, with the threat that a refusal would mean death. 
A driver has been tarred and feathered for previous working of 
military traffic. 19 
Whether through conviction or coercion, the transport boycott rapidly gathered 
pace: on 24 May 1920, drivers refused to transport three military prisoners from 
Ballinamore to Sligo Gaol. 2° On 22 June, drivers on the Great Southern and Western 
Company's line from Cloughjordan to Dublin refused to drive the train from 
Cloughjordan on the grounds that a number of policemen were amongst the civilian 
passengers. 21 At Kingstown on 28 June, dockers even declined to unload the Sunday 
newspapers (presumably on the grounds that they represented British propaganda). In 
the same report, The Times provided a summary of the overall state of the transport 
system in Ireland: 
It is no longer possible to hope that a stoppage will be averted. 
This is a strike in everything but name, an accumulation of 
individual and scattered stoppages, making up to a paralysis of 
the general transport system. 22 
The railwaymen's actions were to last roughly six months, despite the rail companies' 
efforts to dismiss workers who discriminated between cargoes which resulted in 
approximately 1,750 men being discharged by August 1920.23 
The army did develop some notable counter-actions, the most popular of which 
involved `detailing... troops or police to enter trains at various stations daily. These 
19 N. A., W. O. 32/9516, Memorandum from Eric Geddes to the Cabinet - Difficulties of transport of 
stores and troops to and from Ireland. Extract from a letter from Fane Vernon to Greenwood, dated 19 
July 1920. 
20 The Times, 25 May 1920, p. 10. 
21 Ibid, 22 June 1920, p. 17. 
22 Ibid, 28 June 1920, p. 17. 
23 N. A., W. O. 32/9516., Memorandum from Eric Geddes to the Cabinet, Difficulties of transport of 
stores and troops to and from Ireland. Geddes' figures included those `dismissed for disobedience' and 
those 'dispensed with in consequence of the lines having been closed. ' 
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parties took rations with them, and if the driver refused to work the train they 
continued to sit in the train until it was cancelled or proceeded on its journey .' This 
did raise concerns at G. H. Q. that `it should be necessary for His Majesty's forces to 
have recourse to such undignified methods' which were also taken as 'eloquent 
testimony of the ineffectual powers that were given to the Commander-in-Chief for 
dealing with the situation. '24 Nonetheless, despite the military's tactical (if 
undignified) response, the only sure way to obviate the negative effects of the 
transport embargo was to rely upon military labour and transport. This task was 
undertaken by the military with a certain amount of belief in their own self- 
sufficiency: 
The closing of the railways is indeed a tragic comedy, since the 
only sufferers will be the "good citizens of the Irish Republic" 
who are already beginning to feel the pinch. For the past six 
months "armed forces of the Crown" have been content with 
motor lorries and will continue to be so until the end of time if 
necessary. 25 
Nonetheless, a growing resort to coercion betrayed this defiant stance. In October 
1920, a correspondent of The Times reported on a signalman's refusal to receive a 
troop train at Armagh station, which prompted a desperate action on the part of the 
officer in charge. Acting outside his authority, the officer was heard to address his 
party and the signalman with the order: `... the train will go in anyhow, and you will 
go on it. Corporal take two men, and put this man under arrest on the train. '26 
Therefore, despite the bluster and the bravado evident in many accounts, the transport 
embargo must have weighed heavily upon the army's already strained resources. An 
entry in the Digest of Service of the 2nd Border Regiment recorded how: 
During the month of November, much extra work and hardship 
was thrown on the battalion owing to the trains not running to 
Castlebar and through the railway employees declining to take 
W. D. property. This necessitated constant motor convoys being 
`'' Record of the Rebellion, pp. 15-16. 
25 Green Howards' Gazette, Dec. 1920, p. 1 16. 
26 The Times, 12 Oct. 1920, p. 11. 
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despatched to Athlone, under escort to fetch rations, supplies etc 
and a heavy strain on all ranks. 27 
In order to demonstrate the extent of the inconvenience caused by the railway 
strike, it is worth highlighting that in the 5th Divisional area the two main railway 
lines, namely the Great Southern and Western from Dublin to Cork via Newbridge, 
and the Midland Great Western from Dublin to Athlone, were supplemented by- 
branch lines which `brought every part of the area within 15 miles of a railway 
station. '28 The inconvenience would appear to be even greater if we accept Darrell 
Figgis' (rather controversial) claim that 'the Irish railways were built to link military 
barracks rather than commercial centres. '29 
Further to the logistical difficulties that the boycott entailed, the episode also 
gave a strong indication to the military that a long-standing campaign of 
disassociation was now being accompanied by a concerted campaign of industrial and 
commercial boycott, which, though rather uncoordinated, was held together by a 
unifying principle of civil resistance. 
Although such forms of hostility may have appeared ubiquitous to the soldier, 
there are strong reasons to suggest that civilians were not always willingly complicit 
in this form of action. Boycotts were sometimes the outcome of forced expressions of 
hostility on the part of the community. Active rebels were anxious to coerce 
communities into resisting the presence of the armed forces and, if the majority of 
civilians were unwilling to participate in military offensives, they could be more 
easily persuaded to disassociate themselves from, or actively boycott, soldiers and 
policemen. A Times article of November 1920 suggested that the insurgents' grip on 
the community was all-pervasive: 
... terrorized 
by the tyranny of Sinn Fein, by night raids in search 
of arms, by compulsion of the younger men, enforced by threats 
of death, to join the ranks of the Irish Republican Army... Grim 
letters of personal warning, notices of forthcoming vengeance on 
whole towns, and similar alarming threats are almost 
commonplaces of life. It is easy to find people who have been 
cruelly knocked about or who have had their houses burned 
27 Digest of Service of the Border Regiment, 9 July 1919. 
28 Hist. 5th Div., p. 14. 
29 D. Figgis, The Economic Case for Irish Independence, (Dublin, 1920) p. 37. 
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about their ears. Every night thousands of people sleep in fields, 
under hedges or haystacks, because they dare not sleep at 
home. 30 
Likewise, C. R. B. Knight of the Buffs Regiment, claimed that the Irish countryside 
was dominated by `armed men' intent on `terrifying the people into becoming active 
helpers, or at least into mute acquiescence of their deeds. '31 Indeed, Augusteijn cited 
(an unproven) case whereby a group of Volunteers arrested in Dublin on 21 
November 1920 claimed to have been `forced to join the I. R. A. against their own 
will. '32 
Certainly, the majority of soldiers attributed their growing estrangement from the 
community to Sinn Fein's influence on the Irish people. J. W. Rowarth, after being 
snubbed by his previous associates in Dublin, was informed by the parish priest that: 
`the rebels are very strong in the district now, and it is forbidden to talk to the 
enemy. . . the rebels are 
few in numbers but strong in persuasion. " 33 Douglas 
Wimberley sympathised with the growing reluctance of local families to entertain 
officers: `from a very natural fear of reprisals. '34 Very soon, any hint of commercial 
or social fraternisation between the military and civilians usually prompted a severe 
response. A fancy dress ball held in Rosslare (County Wexford) in August 1920 was 
interrupted by armed and masked men who ordered the women to go home on the 
grounds that they were improperly dressed'. On the same night, military and naval 
officers were `held up', searched, and told to leave `as social intercourse with the 
people was denied to the "army of occupation. "' 3' In most cases however, rebels 
targeted civilians for punishment rather than risk an engagement with the military. 
Sometimes civilians received similar treatment if their familial ties connected 
them to the Crown forces. A girl in Tuam was rendered `unconscious from shock and 
exposure' after being dragged from her home, and having her hair cropped with 
shears, under the repeated threat of her ears being cut off. This was claimed to be a 
30 The Times, Two Terrors in Ireland', 30 Nov. 1920, p. 16. 
31 Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs, p. 2. 
32 Augusteijn, From Public Defiance, p. 242. This was a common mitigation plea that was usual],, 
rejected by G. H. Q., although it would seem from the evidence presented in this chapter that, in a 
minority of cases, such repudiation of the I. R. A. may have more guileless than it seemed. 
33 Rowarth, `A Soldier's Tale', p. 27. 
34 Wimberley, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 154. 
35 The Times, 1 Sept. 1920, p. 11. 
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reprisal for her brother having recently joined the military. 36 This form of action 
mirrored a long-standing campaign against the R. I. C. and their associates.. series of 
telegrams from June 1921, sent by the Inspector General of the R. I. C., T. J. Smith to 
Bonar Law, detailed similar incidents whereby civilians were punished for assisting 
or supplying policemen. In June 1920, Miss M. A. Little of Enniskillen received a 
letter `warning her against letting her house to a sergeant of the R. I. C. ', during the 
same month Mr G. Mcphail J. P. of Portumna District, County Galway had his 'turf 
shed maliciously burned including its contents and a quantity of turf and farm cart' 
when he allowed the police to take turf after they had been refused elsewhere. 37 
General Staff's `Record of the Rebellion' is particularly useful for its exposure of 
incidents of community coercion on the part of the I. R. A. For the period from May, to 
July 1920, chapter notes provide a tally of the so-called `typical' methods employed 
by the rebels: `10th May - Newport (Co. Tipperary) a shopkeeper and his daughter 
each received a letter signed "Officer I. R. A. Commanding the District, " threatening 
them with bodily harm, if the daughter continued to talk to policemen's wives. '; ' 16th 
July - at Arklow (Co. Wicklow), bombs were placed in two shops which supplied 
troops. '; ` loth May - Broadford (Co. Limerick) an armed gang of 80-100 men entered 
the shop of a tailor who made police uniforms. Having assaulted the tailor and his son 
the gang made off with 400. The same gang having then proceeded to the house of an 
R. I. C. pensioner, having pulled his 16-year old son out of bed and into the street, 
stripped him naked and compelled him to swear never to speak to a policeman 
again. ' 38 
The experience of the 1 st Manchesters in North Cork provided a vivid picture of 
the means by which communities in North Cork became coerced into loyalty to the 
republican cause. In Millstreet the combined efforts of Sinn Fein activists and the 
local priest and demagogue, Father Brennan, appear to have cowed the population 
into a terrified submission. On 22 August 1920, a military detachment based 
in the 
town overheard a sermon delivered by Father Brennan in the local Catholic 
Church in 
which he urged parishioners that: 
... contact with the 
English people depraves the Irish mind. . . The 
soldiers are here to murder innocent civilians and to destroy your 
36 The Tunes, 5 May 1920, p. 16. 
37 N. A., C. O. 906/19, Ireland 1920-1: Disorders and Telegrams. 
38 Record of the Rebellion, pp. 19-20. 
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property.. . bind yourselves together for the overthrow of khaki 
and all that represents England. 39 
It later emerged that Father Brennan's activities were not confined to mere 
demagogy; his position and influence allowed him to browbeat the community into 
compliance with his wishes: 
... he has compulsorily enrolled all the young men in the district 
in the I. R. A. One method of enforcing enlistment was by 
prohibiting owners of threshing machines to hire their machines 
to farmers whose sons were not enrolled. 40 
Even more sinister were the activities of the local I. R. A. Both the Mid-Cork Brigade 
and the notoriously active North Cork Brigade (under the energetic leadership of 
Liam Lynch) operated within the area for which the 1st Manchesters was responsible. 
Besides the numerous, and often successful, attacks perpetrated against the regiment, 
service records also recalled numerous instances where civilians incurred the wrath of 
the I. R. A. An entry for 29 November 1920 recorded how two uniformed men near 
Ballincollig raped a young woman at gunpoint, after previously threatening her with 
"`bobbing" (hair cut short)'. Her alleged indiscretion against the I. R. A. is not 
revealed in the account. 41 
Local Loyalist Mrs Mary Lindsay of Coachford, who was known personally to 
Strickland, paid the ultimate price for reporting a planned ambush to the Crown 
forces, due to take place on 28 January 1921. Owing to her information, the action 
was thwarted, resulting in the death of one Volunteer and the later execution of three 
others. Subsequently, she was kidnapped together with her chauffeur James Clarke, 
by men of the 6th Battalion Cork I. R. A. who also burned her house and confiscated 
her land during her period of capture. The Manchesters' account recalls how Mary 
Lindsay and James Clarke were held hostage for several days `without adequate food 
or clothing' while `their lives were used to bargain against the execution of rebel 
prisoners'. When these executions were enacted, both hostages were similarly shot by 
the I. R. A., and it was claimed that during her execution `20 shots were fired into her. 
39 Speech delivered by Father Brennan at the Roman Catholic Church, Millstreet. County. Cork, 28 
Aug. 1920, quoted in Record of Service of the Ist Battalion Manchester Regiment. 
40 Ibid, 5 Oct. 1920. 
41 Ibid. 29 Nov. 1920. 
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detaching some of her limbs' . 
42 The severity of her treatment, and the exaggerated 
method of execution must have served as a stark warning to civilians to disassociate 
from the Crown forces. 
By 1 December 1920 the Manchester Regiment were able to report. with some 
satisfaction, that `all wanted persons in the area are "on the run"' due to a counter- 
offensive following the murder of their intelligence officer Captain J. Thompson. 4' 
This would appear to have had a curious effect on the civil population of Millstreet 
who were observed to be in a `highly nervous state.. . all the population leave their 
houses at night and sleep in the workhouse'. Service notes suggested, rather 
quizzically, that `this is done for extra warmth (? )', though it seems more likely that 
people were grouping for safety, fearing either the vengeance of the local I. R. A.. or 
the free hand of the military. 44 Civilians were very much in the crossfire between the 
two: the military usually regarded them as an adjunct of the I. R. A., who treated 
civilian loyalties with equal suspicion. Father Brennan's flight from Millstreet in 
December 1920 coupled with the continued absence of the majority of local I. R. A. 
leaders certainly had a liberating effect on the population. Local people, who had 
greeted a detachment of the Manchester Regiment in August 1920 with stone 
throwing, were described as `considerably quietened down'. Military proclamations 
in the town were no longer vandalised, and `a certain amount of uniform' was handed 
in. More significantly, service notes reported that, in the absence of prominent I. R. A. 
leaders from the locality `there appears to be no desire on the part of the rank and file 
to take their places. '45 
In some cases, the coercion of communities was such that civilians were not 
allowed to give any succour to the military, even when a humanitarian impulse would 
seem to compel it. Thus, Nurse McCrossan was ordered to leave her home. which 
was shortly afterwards showered with bullets, as a reprisal for assisting wounded 
soldiers during several nights of serious rioting in Derry in June 1920. Soldiers later 
escorted her, still under heavy fire, to Derry railway station. In the hail of bullets that 
46 accompanied her flight, a passer-by was shot by her side. 
,` Record of Service of the 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment, 28 Jan. 1921. 
'' Ibid, 28 Jan. 1921. 
4' Ibid, 1 Dec. 1920. 
°S Ibid, 6 Jan. 1921. 
46 The Times, 25 June 1920, p. 17. 
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On other occasions, rebels were anxious to ensure that opportunistic local traders 
were unable to undermine the commercial boycott. During a general strike in April 
1920, as a protest against the non-release of hunger strikers in Nlountjo-, prison, the 
Green Howards' Gazette observed that `any venturesome shopkeeper who did not 
comply was speedily convinced of the error of his ways and had his premises closed 
for him. '47 In addition to carrying out threats against the owners of businesses, the 
I. R. A. also issued stark warnings to the community to boycott those who did not 
comply (boycott or be boycotted). The following I. R. A. proclamation, posted in 
Killshandra, County Cavan, highlights the typical means by which communities were 
`warned off trading with non-compliant businesses: 
The following Merchants are boycotted. Any person found 
entering will do so at their own risk: 
William Johnson 
John Richardson 
George Eccleston 
Joseph Carson 
John Storey 
Samuel H. Gibson 
By Order 
I. R. A. 48 
Nonetheless, for many shopkeepers the loss of trade created by trade boycotts was too 
severe to encourage them to continue with any form of trade discrimination. The 
`Record of the Rebellion' claimed that the economic importance of the military to 
Irish communities (coupled with the military's preparedness to requisition goods that 
were refused) ensured that the boycott could never be sustained in the long term: 'an 
attempt to boycott the troops was... a failure, partly because trade with the troops 
formed the shopkeepers' chief source of income. ' 49 
Nonetheless, it would appear that the majority of ordinary civilians preferred to 
face the consequences of non-compliance with military directives, rather than risk a 
reprimand from local republicans. Numerous reports in The Times throughout 1920 
detailed how civilians were increasingly failing to report for jury service at military 
47 Green Howards' Gazette, April 1920, p. 6. 
48 N. A., W. O. 35/932, War Diary, 26th Brigade, June 1920 to Jan. 1922. This notice appeared in a 
Weekly Intelligence Summary for week ending Sept. 17,1921. 
49 Record of the Rebellion, p. 15. 
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courts and inquests. Of 14 jurors summoned, only five attended an inquest into the 
deaths of Sergeant Keane and Constable Norton after an attack on police barracks in 
Kilmallock, County Limerick in May 1920. This failure prompted an outraged 
District Inspector to condemn their non-appearance as a `contemptible piece of 
cowardice' and a `terrible indication of the terrorism to which the country \v as 
reduced' . 
50 A further inquest into the murder of Constable King near Bantry on 14 
June 1920 yielded only three jurors. 51 Following the murder of Lieutenant 
G. B. F. Smyth, the R. I. C. District Inspector for Munster (also attached to the K. O. S. B. ) 
at the County Club in Cork City, a subsequent inquest had to be abandoned when all 
the jurors failed to attend and could not be found. 52 Even when a jury could be 
summoned to its full complement it usually failed to return the expected verdict. One 
District Inspector was dismayed by the farcical verdicts' of local juries in County 
Limerick. 53 A famous example was the pronouncement of a coroner's jury, following 
the Fermoy ambush of September 1919, that the killing of British soldiers was a 
regular act of war and therefore not murder. The decision (whether influenced by 
terror or not) prompted a severe response from outraged soldiers who descended on 
the town and destroyed property belonging to the jurors (see Chapter 5). 
Civilians were also loath to incriminate rebels for their outrages, meaning that 
witnesses were usually at a premium in prosecution cases. As early as August 1919, 
The Times (commenting on crime reports from Dublin) detected 'a pernicious and 
insistent notion... amongst the people of the city.. . that 
it was a crime to help the 
police in the detection of criminals. ' 54 Furthermore, military sources and other reports 
suggest that the refusal to co-operate with the military and the police in criminal cases 
was only partly motivated by patriotism or belief. In the main, non-co-operation was 
enforced by the threats of republican activists. For this reason, Shaw consistently 
argued in favour of the deportation of suspects on the grounds that `... no witness can 
come forward and give evidence against any member of the Irish Volunteers without 
running grave risk of assassination. Nor is it possible to induce any Jury outside parts 
of Ulster to convict even on the clearest evidence. ' 
55 
50 The Times, 31 May 1920, p. 14. 
51 Ibid, 15 June 1920, p. 18. 
52 Lieutenant G. B. F. Smyth Papers, K. O. S. B. Regimental Archive, Berwick Upon Tweed 
53 The Times, 31 May 1920, p. 14. 
54 Ibid, 6 Aug. 1919, p. 14. 
ss N. A., W. O. 32'9519, Statement by Shaw on the present situation and state of affairs in Ireland. 27 
March 1920, 
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As the conflict progressed, rebel groups continued to inflict punishment on 
civilians who were seen to be working against them via the legal system. In Gakw-av 
on 19 September 1920, Miss Evelyn Baker, proprietor of Baker's Hotel, was seized 
by six masked men, who cut of her hair for giving evidence to a military inquiry into 
the death of Constable Krumm. 56 Such actions were backed by notices posted in 
villages and towns warning of dire consequences for anybody who was prepared to 
comply with `English courts'. Attendance at court was tantamount to 'informing' as 
the following notice, posted at Ballyjamesduff, County Cavan in September 1920, 
demonstrates: 
NOTICE 
Any persons attending English Courts as Plaintiffs, Defendants 
or Witnesses will be treated as spies and informers. 
By Order 
Competent Military Authority 
I. R. A. 57 
This situation posed serious difficulties for the military and the legal system who 
were keen to ensure that `due process' could be adhered to. Prior to the establishment 
of the R. O. I. A. in August 1920, the Oxford and Bucks Chronicle recalled how the 
intimidation of witnesses seriously hampered the process of courts-martial under 
D. R. R: 
They were difficult cases in law, and complicated by the 
reluctance of witnesses to give evidence. A man might be shot in 
the street in broad daylight. When the civil and military police 
arrived, a moment later, no one would admit having heard the 
shot, seen anything unusual, or even to have noticed the body 
lying at his feet. 58 
To resolve the difficulties, Greenwood had introduced a Bill to the Commons in 
August 1920 that aimed at substituting coroners inquests and (in certain areas) trial by 
jury, for military courts of enquiry and courts-martial. These regulations formed the 
56 The Times, 20 Sept. 1920, p. 12. 
57 N. A., W. O. 3 93'2, War Diary, 26th Brigade, June 1920 to Jan. 1922. This notice was posted in 
Ballyjamesduff (Ulster) and finally appeared in a Weekly Intelligence Summary for week ending Sept. 
17 1921. 
58 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 33. 
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pre-conditions for the introduction of the R. O. I. A., which finally established the 
jurisdiction of courts-martial for cases previously heard in civil courts. This tended to 
increase conviction rates and yet failed to resolve the problem of obtaining evidence. 
particularly in relation to capital offences. 59 The reticence of ci`-ilians in this respect 
seriously hampered the detection and prosecution of crime in Ireland. The breakdown 
of British law and authority, first driven by popular feeling, was being reinforced by 
Sinn Fein's increasing willingness to purge elements disloyal to it. Their growing 
confidence (if not paranoia) in this respect, often led to the belief that entire 
communities could be cleansed of their disloyalty. Numerous sources from the period 
reported people having been `driven out' of their communities. sometimes under 
threat of death. One Daniel Donoghue, of Leap, County Cork, was forced to 'abandon 
his home and go into hiding in 1921 after having a poster with the word 'Traitor" 
nailed to the gate. '60 More chillingly, a Times report of February 1921, detailed how: 
`Michael Ryan, a labourer was found shot about five miles from the town of 
Tipperary. He is said to have been warned to leave the district a short time ago. '61 
Insurgents also sought to eliminate political opposition to Sinn Fein, even in 
cases where their political opponents were seeking a democratic mandate from the 
electorate: during rural elections in the Laskey District of County Sligo in May 1920, 
a notice was found posted to the effect that `John Maloney farmer [sic] was to prepare 
for death. The motive is to deter Maloney from standing as an independent candidate 
in the forthcoming election for Rural district Councillorship [sic]. '62 On occasions 
attacks were even targeted against moderate Sinn Feiners: in July 1921, a rebel party 
entered the office of the Dundalk Examiner and destroyed type and printing machines 
to prevent any future publication. A telegram from Dublin Castle to the War Office 
described the paper as a `Sinn Fein paper of the "mild type. "' 63 
Traditional antipathies towards the British garrison became rapidly inflamed 
during the later period of conflict. Given that civilian non-combatants were subject to 
59 Historian Gerard Oram lists 20 death sentences as being passed by military courts in Ireland between 
October 1920 and May 1921, of which three were commuted to life imprisonment, these were: Dermot 
O'Sullivan (civilian), William James Gordon (civilian) and C. G. R. Helmore (Royal Marine). All 17 
executed persons were civilians charged with murder or treason. Death sentences passed by military 
courts of the British Army 1914-1924, (London, 1998) pp. 69-70. 
60 Hart, The IPU and Its Enemies, p. 295. 
61 The Times, 21 Feb. 1921, p. 10. 
62 N. A., C. O. 906/19. Inspector General R. I. C. to Lord Privy Seal, Ireland 1920-21 - Disorders and 
Telegrams, 4 July 1920. 
63 Ibid, G. H. Q. to the War Office, 22 June 1921. 
133 
coercive influences from both sides and that their actions were scrutinized and 
punishable, a social and commercial separation from the military was probably 
regarded by many as the most tactful way to respond to these pressures. A newspaper 
article of the time described how civilians were 'ground to powder' between the 
upper and nether millstones' of `two terrors' : 
... the innocent section of the people of Ireland... suffer for the 
excesses of both sides... they are, not unnaturally, so abjectly 
cowed by the rule of the revolver, and the assassins in their 
midst, that any other attitude than their present one of enforced 
submission is to be hardly expected of them. 64 
Take, for example, the role played by civilians in the trenching of roads. This 
laborious process sometimes involved the digging out of trenches up to ' 14 feet 
wide', which often depended upon the use of forced civilian labour. Howvcv'er, the 
equally labour-intensive task of refilling trenches also fell involuntarily upon the 
civilian population. The `History of the 5th Division' recalled how `armed strangers' 
would enter a district and compel the `local inhabitants to dig some road trenches 
during the night; the next day the troops would appear on the scene and make the 
same inhabitants fill in the trenches which they had dug the night before! '65 Percival 
recalled how this pattern could repeat itself over and over: `we also tried to fill them 
with civilian labour, but they would invariably be opened again within the next few 
days - probably with the same labour; in fact, the local inhabitants spent most of their 
time opening and filling in trenches during this period. '66 
Despite the note of sympathy in these accounts, most soldiers failed to recognise 
the involuntary aspect of actions designed to inflict injury or inconvenience on them. 
Naturally, many saw no essential distinction between civilians and active rebels. 
Some imagined that the I. R. A. were able to conceal themselves within a wholly 
compliant civil population. Many accounts were unable to decipher where the I. R. A. 
began and where it ended. The chronicler for the O. B. L. I., stationed in Dublin from 
1919 to 1922, reported that: 
6' The Times, Two Terrors in Ireland', 30 Nov. 1920, p. 16. 
65 Hist. 5th Div., p. 80. 
66 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (I), p. 27. 
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No one could be trusted, not even those concerned with matters 
of everyday life. The artisan working on one' s car - the girl who 
sold cigarettes - or the man sitting next to one on the bus - they 
were all a possible part of the vast underground Sinn Fein 
organization, which attacked without warning, and then as 
suddenly dissolved again until required for the next job. Nor was 
the hidden threat confined to any time or place. 67 
Descriptions of this kind were replete in military accounts. Most soldiers considered 
Sinn Fein to be an organisation that operated within a highly propitious climate. 
Douglas Wimberley was confident that Ireland was `largely a hostile country, and 
maybe 75% of all the local inhabitants, both men and women, viewed us with enmity, 
active and passive. '68 Working on the assumption of collective responsibility, his 
regiment (the Cameron Highlanders) rounded up 'several hundred men' in 
Queenstown and brought them to the barracks at Belmont where they were divided 
into `groups of five or six'. Each group was allotted a time during which they would 
be `on duty'. 69 This meant that should any incident occur in the town, whereby any, 
member of the regiment or the police were killed or wounded, the men detailed as 
being on duty at the time would be immediately arrested and incarcerated. 
To the detriment of the military campaign, the assumption of collective 
responsibility did not usually extend to the female population of Ireland who, as 
Hopkinson has stressed, `excelled and played a most crucial role' especially in the 
field of Intelligence and propaganda. '70 In the very early period, a `mistaken chivalry' 
often led to women being exempt from search during military operations. 
7' However, 
this oversight was given legislative authority under D. O. R. R. which stated that in the 
event of it becoming necessary to search a woman, female searchers were to be 
employed, and troops were forbidden to arrest a woman. '72 Women searchers were at 
a premium in the British army and this shortage enabled female rebels to exploit their 
67 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 28. 
68 Wimberley, Scottish Soldier', p. 146. Claims of this kind were often exaggerated in line v ith the 
claims made by republican propaganda. Many republicans were similarly given to overestimating the 
actual strength of the Volunteer movement, For example, Dan Breen claimed that in earl} 1920 'nine 
tenths of all able bodied Irishmen between the ages of 16 and 50 were Volunteers of some kind. ' 
Breen, , %1i" Fight, p. 3 1. 69 Wimberley, `Scottish Soldier', p. 148. 
70 Hopkinson, The Irish Ifar of Independence, p. 199. 
'1 Record of the Rebellion, p. 33. 
72 Ibid, p. 6. 
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apparent immunity to detection and prosecution. This allowed women to play a 
crucial role in concealing arms during the course of I. R. A. operations: The 'History of 
5th Division' recalled how the military (under orders to search railway carriages) 
encountered great difficulty in detecting rebels who had learnt to `conceal their arms 
by handing them over to women passengers. '73 The huge disparity between male and 
female internees in British prisons in April 1921 (respectively 4,000 and 26) gives a 
strong indication of the failure of the Crown forces to detect female insurgents, and a 
very weak indication of the relative involvement of men and women in the 
preparation (and realisation) of acts of rebellion. '' 
The assumption of collective responsibility (though not carried through during 
search and arrest operations) was prevalent in the memoirs of soldiers from this 
period. Captain J. B. Arnold, a pensions inspector for the British army, sensed an all- 
pervading antipathy throughout Ireland: `the whole tenor of the country was one of 
opposition to British rule. ' 75 In the same vein, the correspondent of the 1st East 
Yorkshire Regiment, Major K. A. Plimpton claimed that the Irish today blame the 
government for everything; blame everybody in fact'. 76 Clearly, some soldiers were 
prone to implicate the Irish as a homogenous and actively rebellious race, and many 
felt that the I. R. A. and Sinn Fein articulated and acted upon the wishes of the 
community. In other words, the actions of rebels were legitimised by the bulk of 
public opinion and they were an outcome of a more general antipathy. Even the 
`History of the 5th Division' offered very little insight, beyond the rather 
platitudinous claim that `the whole population supplied their information, either 
actively, or out of sympathy, or through terrorism. '77 Fitzpatrick has claimed that this 
quality was particularly relevant to `the forces of the 6th Division' who were `taught 
to treat the `natives' as enemies rather than citizens. '78 These attitudes reflected a 
similar lack of sophistication at the very top level of Irish Administration, which, 
according to Sir Warren Fisher (Head of the Civil Service), was 'almost woodenly 
stupid and quite devoid of imagination': 
'' Hist. 5th Div., p. 87. 
74 Hopkinson, The Irish 11 ar of Independence, p. 200. 
75 Arnold, 'Against the Stream', p. 128. 
76 Plimpton, "The Snapper", 1st Battalion `D' Company, Nov. 1920, p. 8. 
" Hist. 5th Div., p. 6. 
78 Fitzpatrick, 'Militarism in Ireland' in Jeffery and Bartlett, .4 
Military History of Ireland, p. 403. 
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It listens solely to the ascendancy party and (previous to General 
Macready's arrival) it never seemed to think of the utility of 
keeping in close touch with opinions of all kinds. The phrase 
Sinn Fein' is a shibboleth with which everyone not a 'loyalist' is 
denounced and from listening to the people with influence you 
would certainly gather that Sinn Fein and outrage were 
synonyms.... the ruling class reminds one of some people in 
England who spend their time in denunciation of the working 
classes as "socialists" without ever condescending to analyse 
what they mean. 79 
For the regular soldier, certain experiences lent justification to the impression of 
wholesale hostility which, at times, appeared to be almost overwhelming: on 11 April 
1920, a plain clothes officer attending Mountjoy prison to oversee the deportation of 
suspects, was manhandled by a gathered crowd of four to five hundred. Military 
sources described how `as soon as the car stopped a section of the crowd gathered 
round the car calling out "he is military" and proceeded to lay hands on the officer. ' 
The officer was fortunate to escape the situation relatively unharmed by claiming to 
be `a doctor paying a visit to the sick prisoners. ' 80 
In the later period, despite the daily experience of strong opposition in the 6th 
Division, Percival was able to achieve a more balanced view as to the real extent of 
popular support for the nationalist cause amongst the population. He asserted that the 
rebel campaign in Ireland was a national movement' and not one `conducted by a few 
hired assassins' and yet held firm to the belief that in combating Sinn Fein and the 
I. R. A. the military `must at all costs distinguish the sheep from the wolves. '8' 
Percival placed great emphasis on the necessity for battalion intelligence officers to 
gather information regarding the political loyalties of all civilians within their district 
and to consider how useful they might be for supplying relevant information. His own 
method of monitoring political allegiances in his brigade area involved a `large scale 
6" map' upon which 'every farm and detached house is marked' containing the name 
79 Letter from Fisher to Lloyd George, Chamberlain and Bonar Law, 15 May 1920. As Chief of the 
United Kingdom Civil Service and Secretary to the Treasury, Sir Warren Fisher (together with 
R. Harwood and A. Cope) was transferred to Dublin Castle in May 1920 to assist with the 
reorganization of departments and administrative reform. Lloyd George Papers, F'3 l 1/33. 
80 N. A., W. O. 3 5/91 /7. War Diary - General Staff Dublin District, Schedule "D", 
Report on the 
proceedings at Mountjoy prison during Sunday 11 April 1920. 
Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (I) pp. 5-6; Guerrilla Warfare (II) p. 7. 
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of the occupier. This was accompanied by a book containing notes on the 'perceived 
political sympathies of these occupiers, to be consulted prior to raids or other militar-- 
operations. ' 82 
Some soldiers were prone to view hostility as the product of an anti-English 
hysteria amongst the populace. Consequently, many imagined themselves as 
`whipping boys' for the long history of Anglo-Irish antagonism. Whilst seeking 
accommodation in Dublin, an officer's wife was confronted by a woman who 
described herself as: 
"England's bitterest enemy"... she told me a great deal about 
Ireland under Cromwell and Lord French, and of General Dyer's 
methods in India; she evidently classed them together, and spoke 
of all three in the same breath with equal bitterness. It was a 
novel experience to be hated and told so. I realised just a little of 
the intense hatred with which the English are regarded by a large 
majority of Irish men and women... They have not forgiven 
England yet for Cromwell's deeds. . . time 
does not soften things 
in this unhappy country. 83 
The sources generated by soldiers in Ireland also tended to reflect Fisher's 
derogatory assessment of the Irish as a `tragically long-memoried race. '84 L. A. Hawes, 
based in Cork between October 1919 and October 1920, recalled an impromptu 
history lesson in a Waterford hotel from a local man who claimed that: ' ... when 
King John came here to receive the allegiance of the Irish Kings, he made them kiss 
his foot and laughed at their clothes". "This" he said, "was an example of the 
behaviour of the hated English". In turn, Hawes described the incident as 'a small 
example of the mentality of the Southern Irishman. '85 
More extreme was the experience of an English officer in Tullamore, County 
Offally, who was confronted in a railway station by `an apparently decent and sober 
Irishwoman' and assailed with a battery of anti-English abuse, most of w hich he 
considered to be `unprintable', though `the majority of her sentences ended with the 
82 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (II), pp. 7-8. 
83 Anon, Experiences of an Officers Wife, pp. 7-13. 
84 Fisher to Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Chamberlain, letter dated 15 May 1920, Lloyd George 
Papers, F/31/1/33. 
85 Haww es. `Kwab-O-Ka\ al', p. 70. 
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exhortation: "shoot me if you like! Yes - trample on my dead body' ,, 86 Similarly, 
J. P. Swindlehurst describing his attempts to arrest persons during curfev patrols. 
recalled how our ancestors, ourselves and future generations were roundly cursed as 
only an Irishman can do. '87 
Even during the earlier period, when passions were less inflamed, many soldiers' 
accounts suggest that the structure of popular anti-Englishness was already well 
established. Private W. S. Matthews undergoing training in Derry in 1918 with the 3rd 
D. C. L. I., was shocked on his return via Dublin to be approached by an old woman 
who described him as an `English bastard! ' In this case, Matthews made light of the 
event by adding `I didn't take any notice because I wasn't a bastard anyhow'. 88 
Incidents of this kind were usually recounted in a decidedly light-hearted tone, 
except in cases where there was a perceived affront to national pride. These included 
the removal of the union flag from public buildings, or the omission of the national 
anthem from cinematic or theatrical performances. Officers were also incensed by the 
refusal of civilians to respect military ceremonials or to remove their hats for the 
playing of the national anthem during band displays. One officer, stationed in 
Tallaght, County Dublin, was so infuriated by the refusal of the villagers to remove 
their hats (while officers stood at the salute for the playing of the national anthem) 
that he forcibly removed their hats and trampled on them. 89 Similarly, soldiers of the 
2nd O. B. L. I. were so outraged by the failure of a Dublin theatre to play The King', 
which they regarded as `a deliberate insult', that a party of soldiers `introduced a 
cornet into the theatre ... and repaired the omission, also taking care 
to ensure that 
hats were removed in proper respect. ' This event provoked a night of serious rioting 
in the capital as soldiers attempted to return to their barracks through `large crowds, 
angry and determined'. 90 In both cases, the perceived affront to national pride, 
arguably, arose from the soldiers themselves. Nonetheless, these events were usually 
regarded as further proof of an inherently anti-English stance on the part of the civil 
population. 
If the majority of soldiers detected anti-English undercurrents, the sometimes- 
differential treatment of Scottish soldiers does give some credence to their claims. 
86 Ewart, in Rebel Hands: An English Officer's Impressions' The Times, 20 Mai 1921, p. 1-1. 
87 Swindlehurst, MS Diary, entry dated 20 Jan. 1920. 
88 Taped interview with private W. S. Matthews, Peter Liddle Collection, Brotherton Library, Leeds 
University. 
89 Penny, 'Memories of Flying ', p. 16. 
90 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, pp. 32-3. 
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Despite heavy Scottish associations with settlement in Ulster, there is ample evidence 
to suggest that soldiers in Scottish regiments could expect more leniencies from the 
I. R. A. and from the community, than their English colleagues. This was in spite of 
the notoriety gained by some Scottish regiments in Ireland: both Tom Barry and Dan 
Breen reserved especial distaste for the King's Own Scottish Borderers who were 
popularly dubbed `the King's Own Scottish Murderers' after opening fire on an 
unarmed crowd in Dublin 1914, following an arms landing at Hokvth harbour. 
Nevertheless, when Private R. Burns arrived in Limerick in April 1918 with the 
2nd Cameron Highlanders to `replace a regiment which, we were told by some of the 
inhabitants, had "to get out quick"', he later reported that `there was no longer a 
disturbed atmosphere in the city' due to `the fact that we were Highlanders. ' 91 On 
another occasion, he and a colleague took an excursion to the Lakes of Killarney, 
where they were held up by five individuals with guns and searched for arms. Having 
failed to find weapons, they were told to `scram - quick, and consider [themselves] 
lucky to be wearing kilts. '92 On the same outing, Burns was fortunate to be allowed to 
travel back to his barracks by a train-driver who had relations in Scotland, and 
agreed to help provided we sat among the coals. ' 93 In a diary entry, republican activist 
Edward Maclysaght recalled how a British officer by the name of Dick Forsyth 
regularly spent his time on leave in County Clare where as a 'Scottish Highlander' he 
was `tremendously popular'. 94 Furthermore, despite the infamous reputation of the 
Cameron Highlanders in County Cork, The 79`h News claimed that the departure of 
the battalion from Queenstown was `keenly regretted' by the townsfolk. This was in 
marked contrast to accounts of other departing regiments. 95 
These accounts suggest that a fraternal Celtic feeling was sometimes sufficient to 
overcome barriers to integration. Nevertheless, if Scottish soldiers enjoyed apparent 
popularity (or at the very least mild indifference) some accounts suggested that such 
gestures could also be used as a smokescreen for rebel or military activity. One 
Cameron officer recalled how a road patrol in South Cork was `surrounded in a 
village street by a number of young men supposedly playing a game of hurly on the 
village green, a game akin to our own Highland Shinty. ' In this case, the men 
91 Burns, 'Once a Cameron Highlander', p. 168. 
92 Ibid, p. 170. 
93 Ibid, p. 172. 
94 E. Maclvsaght, Changing Times (Gerrards Cross, 1978), diary entry dated 28 Jan. 1919, p. 92. 
95 The -()"'News. 2nd Battalion Notes, Jan. 1922, p. 82. 
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exchanged pleasantries and 'made friendly remarks and gestures' before seizing their 
ammunition and bicycles at gunpoint. 96 In a similar fashion, men of the Cameron 
Highlanders attempted to gather intelligence and infiltrate local Sinn Fein circles by 
sending their Gaelic speakers into public houses where Gaelic was spoken 'for 
reasons of secrecy'. However, their initiative was betrayed by the significant 
differences between Irish and Scottish Gaelic. 97 
Clearly, identities constructed with reference to nationality or nationhood are 
vital to understanding the soldiers' experience of hostility in Irish communities (see 
Chapter 6). However, the religious-sectarian divide between the bulk of the Irish 
population and the majority of the Crown forces does not appear to have contributed 
significantly to poor relations. Moreover, it would appear that sectarian differences 
were less central to the struggle for Irish independence than issues of nationalism and 
sovereignty. Alleged abuses of British rule in Ireland were the important factor, with 
religious differences only becoming significant when they were bound together with 
conceptions of nationality. Of the military sources consulted only one contained a 
sketchy reference to sectarianism as a source of hostility: R. Burns recalled how 
members of the Queen Mary Army Auxiliary Corps were employed at Birr barracks 
in the cookhouses and messes: `they seemed to be rather restrained and under a severe 
curfew. ' Burns hesitantly suggested that `religion was one factor'. 98 Likewise, Peter 
Hart noted that: 
British anger also occasionally expressed itself in sectarian 
terms. Anti-Catholic songs were heard sung during reprisals 
... and rioting soldiers sometimes 
declared themselves out to get 
`the Catholics'. This does not seem to have been a major factor 
in Crown forces' violence, however. 99 
Where soldiers did become involved in sectarian issues they were usually caught 
in the crossfire during street clashes between Catholic and Protestants in Ulster, 
sometimes bearing the brunt of hostilities from both sides. The 'History of the 5th 
Division' recalled how events in Munster triggered sectarian violence in Ulster 
between members of historically divided communities: `the main storm 
96 Wimberle\, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 146 
97 Ibid, p. 149. 
98 Burns, `Once a Cameron Highlander' p. 164. 
99 Hart, The I. R. A. and Its Enemies, p. 83. 
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centres. . . were Belfast and Londonderry, and it was in these toxins that the ripples 
created by the outbursts of lawlessness in the south started disturbances between the 
rival factions. "°° Soldiers became embroiled in these sectarian clashes, even though 
they were rarely targeted for religious hostility. Lady Day in August 1919, saw 
soldiers of the Dorset Regiment being forced to stand in the crossfire between the two 
communities who taunted each other with `the singing of The Soldiers' Song" and 
"The Boys of Wexford" on the one side, and the waving of Union Jacks and the 
singing of "God Save the King" on the other. '°' 
F. H. Vinden serving with the Suffolk Regiment in Belfast found himself in an 
uncomfortable barrier role between two irreconcilable communities: The centre of 
the troubles was the Falls Road area as it is today. and besides bullets, there was a 
good deal of bottle throwing between the two religious groups. " 02 During several 
nights of serious rioting in Belfast in late August and early September 1920, troops 
were even forced to open fire on Orangemen who were proceeding from the Shankill 
Road to attack a Sinn Fein Club near the Falls Road. Soldiers fired at the party 
despite the fact that they `displayed the Union Jack', an action that prompted a Times 
journalist to observe: `this is... the first time that the Union Jack has been fired upon 
by [British] troops. ' 103 
The apotheosis of sectarian conflict in Derry during this period (and the whole 
period stretching up until the late 1960s) was four consecutive nights of rioting in 
June 1920 that resulted in an estimated 17 deaths. 104 During the rioting, local 
magistrate Major R. G. Brett resolved that the situation could only be relieved by the 
sternest military methods available. In a telegram to Greenwood he urged that: 
... control of the situation 
be assumed by the competent 
military authority and martial law proclaimed forthwith. Trade 
and business of city are at a standstill. Citizens afraid to appear 
in streets. Much looting, burning and shooting still continuing. 
Grave situation anticipated tonight [sic]. '05 
100 Hist. 5th Div., p. 12-13. 
101 The Times, 18 Aug. 1919, p. 10. 
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103 The Times, I Sept. 1920, p. 11. 
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Sectarian violence was not confined to Ulster; Protestants in dunster also 
attracted the attention of the I. R. A. Of the 113 private homes burned by the I. R. A. in 
County Cork over the period, 85 per cent belonged to Protestants, and a further 24 
farms were seized from Protestant landowners. 106 By late 1920, dispossessed and 
sometimes under threat of death, many Cork Protestants were forced to seek refuse in 
Dublin, Belfast or England. One, Henry Bradfield of Killowen, was forced to flee his 
home after a spate of murders of loyalists in the district and remarks made to his 
family by local guerrillas that `they would soon have the English out of the 
country. ' 107 Many of those who chose to remain, like George Lysaght, a Protestant 
farmer from Cashel, County Tipperary, paid the ultimate price for their decision. 
Lysaght died in hospital in Dublin on 20 June 1921 from `wounds received on 7/3/21 
when working on his farm'. The details of his death featured in a telegram from 
Dublin Castle which concluded with the stark verdict: `Motive - loyalist. 
"08 
Many republicans imagined that the military and the Protestant community were 
inextricably linked. The persecution of Protestant minorities was usually based on the 
assumption that Protestants were also (by extension) loyalists, and therefore a fruitful 
source of local information for the Crown forces. In reality, there was far less contact 
or co-operation between the two than many active rebels imagined. 
In the early period, officers were often invited to attend soirees, garden parties 
and sporting events at the homes of prominent loyalists: Robin Salisbury recalled 
attending a `tennis fete ... 
in a great big house standing in its own grounds at a little 
place called Dundrum just outside Dublin. "09 However, despite this early promise, 
the progression of the conflict and the fear of I. R. A. reprisals caused many loyalists to 
disassociate from the military to avoid charges of fraternising with the enemy. To be 
regarded as an `informer' was a palpable threat to the lives of Protestants; Peter 
Hart's study of a list of `Enemy agents and other suspects' compiled by the I. R. A. 
West Cork Brigade in July 1921, revealed that 64 per cent of people shot as informers 
by this division were from the Protestant community. 
' 10 Naturally. many Protestants 
106 Report on Land Seizures to Ministry of Agriculture, 19 April 1923, reproduced in Hart, The I. R. A. 
and Its Enemies, p. 313. 
107 Ibid, Henry Bradfield statement, p. 276. 
108 N. A., C. O. 906/19, Dublin Castle to the War Office, Ireland 1920-21 - Disorders and Telegrams, 22 
June 1921. 
109 Salisbury, letter dated 3 June 1916. The description of Dundrum as a 'little place' N% ill be of some 
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sprawl of Dublin. 
110 Intelligence Officer, Cork 3 Report, July 1921, quoted in Hart, The I. R. A. and Its Enemies, p. 304. 
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were anxious to avoid visible contact with the military. One martial law area 
commander was unimpressed by the lack of 'any effort to actively help the 
government' on the part of Protestants. Another bemoaned the fact that 'practically 
none take any action and nearly all hide their sentiments. ' " Percival claimed that 
Protestant elements were `unanimously in favour of a continuation of English control 
in the South' but complained that only '... a few, but not many, were brave enough to 
assist the Crown forces with information. ' 112 There were suggestions in some 
quarters that loyalists and other law-abiding citizens could be formed into "Protection 
Committees", however the government's reluctance to issue arms to civilian militias 
meant that the concept never came to fruition. 113 The tone was set at a Dublin Castle 
conference held in July 1920, at which it was formally agreed that *It was impossible 
to afford protection to individual loyalists'. Thereafter, a number of vague initiatives 
were floated during the truce period aimed at concentrating armed loyalists together 
with troops in `certain centres' or `protected areas' should the conflict re-ignite. 114 
Macready's only stated policy in this area involved '`'showing the flag" in districts 
where there are a number of loyalists' in order to `encourage the waverers' and 
`hearten' the loyal population to take a more active role in supporting the military. 115 
However, Lord Desart was far less sanguine about the prospect of encouraging 
loyalists to assist the military and rightly observed that `while the vengeance of Sinn 
Fein is almost assured, it is demonstrated that the government afford no effective 
protection against such vengeance. ' 116 Startlingly, a number of instances were 
reported where loyalists who had been the victims of crime, finding `that no redress 
could be obtained from the ordinary courts' and no protection was forthcoming from 
the government, had `applied to the Sinn Mn Courts' where they were generally 
well treated. ' 117 
Given that any involvement in civilian affairs was a hazardous pursuit for 
members of the armed forces, some soldiers felt the need to distance themselves 
'.. Reports quoted in Macready to Miss Stevenson, 20 June 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F'36'2 19 
''2 Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (I), p. 23. 
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General Officer Commanding: (2) Great Britain: (estimated strength after imminent end of coal crisis), 
23 May 1921. 
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completely from the community. Many fell back upon the safety afforded by their 
barracks (explored in more detail in Chapter 3) Major B. L. Montgomery, stationed in 
County Clare in 1921, shunned community life for barrack isolation: `I think I 
regarded all civilians as "shinners" and never had any dealings with them. * 118 
F. A. S. Clarke remembered being invited to dinner at the house of `a local practitioner' 
who had been acting as the army doctor. He declined the offer, suspecting that the 
invitation was a `treacherous trick' on the part of local rebels: 'The superstitious mind 
came into play at once, as we had no social contact with any civilians of whatever 
political beliefs. ' 19 
Nonetheless, self-imposed barrack isolation not only resulted from suspicion and 
paranoia, nor the authorities' attempts to foster vigilance in the ranks, the web of 
rumour and distrust was also fuelled by almost daily reports of attacks on soldiers. In 
early May 1920, Major G. S. Drew, O. C. 25th Brigade, Dublin District, had reported to 
G. H. Q. that `information has been received that the Sinn Feiners will probably 
commence to molest officers and soldiers when the opportunity is favourable. ' This 
necessitated a number of precautionary measures aimed at distancing and protecting 
vulnerable soldiers from attacking parties, including orders that 'main thoroughfares 
are to be used... daily routes should be varied... officers should not move about alone 
[and] soldiers to move in parties consisting of at least four. ' However, these measures 
failed to anticipate the increasing involvement of ordinary civilians in anti-military 
violence. 120 Indeed, several newspaper reports from the time suggested that civilians 
(intimidated by the conduct of the military, and fully encouraged by Sinn Fein 
propaganda) could sometimes be driven to new heights of violence. On 23 November 
1919, the army attempted to proscribe an event held to commemorate the execution of 
the `Manchester Martyrs' in 1867, only to find themselves bombarded with stones 
and missiles from the gathered crowd. 
121 In July 1919, Victory Day was marred by 
street rioting in Dublin, Limerick and Cork, in the course of which several soldiers 
were openly assaulted by crowds of civilians consisting of 'both young men and 
women'. 122 
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Although some were willing to engage the military as part of a large crowd, 
civilians were usually manipulated to provide cover for armed rebels. The routine 
appearance of civilian life masked a subterranean threat to the lives of soldiers. 
Rebels were indistinguishable from civilians; the adoption of uniforms for I. R. A. 
gunmen only became a facet of the rebel campaign after August 1920, and even then 
they were worn only by `flying-columns' operating in isolated rural districts. The 
`History of the 5th Division' recalled how although the I. R. A. took to wearing khaki 
breaches and black leggings [brown after 11 July 1921] with trench coats, slouch hats 
and green ties' doubts remained as to whether this attire 'fulfil [led] the requirements 
of the Laws and Customs of War on Land regarding "uniform"'. However. 
regardless of whether these rural columns displayed 'distinguishing marks 
recognisable at a distance', in urban areas the military were reliant entirely upon 
accurate intelligence to separate civilian non-combatants from suspected rebels. 123 In 
the absence of this, they were forced to observe suspicious behaviour amongst the 
civil population in order to expose the threat. In reality however, the military could 
only make the distinction after the decisive moment: when the `hidden and plain 
clothes enemy' revealed itself by launching an attack. 124 Percival observed that `a 
favourite trick of the I. R. A. was to mix with the crowd in a busy thoroughfare and 
suddenly make an assault on any military patrol that might be passing. ' 125 
Insurgents made full use of the daily flow of civilians in urban districts: it 
allowed them to remain inconspicuous, to attack and then return to the 'role of a 
harmless worker in the fields' a `loafer at street corners' or 'assistant in a shoP ' 
126 
Brevet Major T. A. Lowe of the Essex Regiment recalled how, in the course of 
tracking rebels: 
Pursuit was kept up as long as possible, but the rebels had the 
advantage here because, having thrown away their arms and 
picked up ploughs and other agricultural implements. it was 
impossible to distinguish between them and the ordinary farm 
labourers. 127 
123 Hist. 5th Div., p. 78. 
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Civilian traffic provided a useful cover for escape and occasionally formed an 
effective human shield. On 20 February 1921, a military- and police patrol Na as fired 
upon by men in civilian clothes outside Phibsborough Church in Dublin. Soldiers and 
policemen were hampered in returning fire: `owing to the number of civilian adults 
and children in their line of fire ... one of the attacking parties was definitely seen to 
take cover and fire from behind the shelter of women and children. ' 128 On other 
occasions, having not seen their attackers, the military were less discriminate in 
returning fire: four civilians were wounded and a young boy killed when soldiers 
fired from a bombed military lorry travelling down Camden Street in Dublin on 6 
February 1921.129 Six civilians were shot dead in an exchange between soldiers and 
rebels that followed an attack upon two military lorries in Dungarven, only one of the 
attackers was killed. 130 Another soldier was shot dead during a military football 
match in Bandon, County Cork, by rebels who had immersed themselves amongst the 
ordinary spectators, a number of civilians were also wounded in the subsequent 
exchange of fire. 131 During the ambush perpetrated by Kevin Barry and his 
colleagues, a party of soldiers of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment were attacked, 
and two killed, whilst conveying bread from Monk's Bakery, North King Street to the 
North Dublin Union Workhouse. Their attackers were estimated to have numbered 
between '10 and 15', although they `aroused no suspicion' in the busy street, on 
account of the fact that they `walked in twos and threes, some of them reading 
newspapers. ' 132 In Cork city, one soldier was killed and three dangerously wounded 
when `civilians from a street corner' bombed a military lorry: the street was crowded 
at the time by men and women going to work and children going to school". 
133 
This `state of affairs' was recognised by Macready who feared its effects on 
military discipline: 
The very nature of duty necessitates guards and sentries being 
posted where civilians are apparently pursuing their ordinary 
avocations, but who suddenly turn and attack the soldiers. The 
128 The Times, 21 Feb. 1921, p. 10. 
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result of this is that the troops are getting - to use a slang 
expression - "fed up". 
134 
The ability of the I. R. A. to manipulate their position in the community must. 
undoubtedly, have contributed to the military's reluctance to become involved in 
civilian life. Even in cases where civilians approached the military for assistance, 
soldiers were naturally prone to caution: J. E. P. Brass remembered travelling with a 
military convoy along the road from Dublin to Kingstown: 
... when away ahead of us a figure ran out into the road waving 
its arms ... without a moments [sic] hesitation our gunner opened 
up with his Lewis gun. I've never seen a figure jump for cover as 
quickly as that one did. As we passed the spot there was a car 
drawn up at the side of the road. It might well have been a 
genuine breakdown; but we were taking no chances. People had 
been had that way before. 135 
All the evidence suggests that soldiers' attempts to segregate themselves from the 
Irish were, to a large extent, driven by the difficulty of distinguishing between 
insurgents and civilians. Another consequence of this outlook was that soldiers came 
to regard the community as homogenous and collectively responsible for the rebel 
campaign. Brass remembered that he blindly avoided any contact with civilians on 
the grounds that `one trusted nothing and nobody. ' 136 L. A. Hawes commented on the 
ability of rebels to manipulate their position as civilians to provide an effective 
camouflage for their military ambitions: `the soldiers despised the Sinn Feiners, they 
never came out into the open'. 137 Another soldier wrote of the rigours of urban 
warfare: `It was a game of hide and seek ... 
in pursuit of an enemy so elusive that, but 
for his trail of crimes, appeared almost mythical. 138 Towns and villages were a 
labyrinthine hunting ground for soldiers; enemy actions could arise instantaneously 
from apparently normal scenes of everyday life, and the enemy could just as easily 
disappear back into the civilian crowd. 
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The genuine threat of attack, combined with the parallel existence of social 
ostracism, ethnic hostility and commercial and infrastructural exclusion evoked a 
palpable climate of fear amongst the soldiery. By the spring of 1921 troops had 
became the regular target for rebel actions. At their peak, during the final two weeks 
of May 1921,91 Crown casualties resulted from enemy action. 139 Douglas 
Wimberley captured something of the adverse climate in which soldiers served in his 
dramatic description of a train journey across rebel Ireland in September 1920: 
I travelled with my 45 Colt automatic in one pocket and another 32 
automatic in the other. Not long before some British officers had 
been pulled from a train, in cold blood, and shot. Every time the 
train stopped I felt nervous and alone. Every time a ticket collector 
came to the compartment, while I showed him my ticket ýtiwith one 
hand, I kept the other in my pocket on the butt of one or other pistol. 
Indeed, upon his return to Britain, his experience of service in Ireland continued to 
inform his everyday practices: 
We were back at peacetime soldiering, but after Southern 
Ireland, I had got so used to sleeping with a loaded pistol under 
my pillow. I found it quite difficult to drop the habit for many a 
month to come. 140 
Few soldiers attempted serious or sober assessments of their enemies' strength, 
rather the I. R. A. were regarded as an omnipotent force embedded in the community 
and unfathomable from the civilian crowd. The correspondent of the Green Howards' 
Gazette drew attention to their enemies' claustrophobic presence outside the barracks, 
by making reference to the `eagle eye upon US,. 141 Other soldiers wrote of their 
compulsion to carry `an entrenching-tool' for self-protection outside barracks. 142 
Some soldiers received written warnings from Sinn Fein - allegedly written in blood: 
They ran somewhat as follows: The officer's name might. or 
might not be at the top and then "Your first warning: beware. " 
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Or Your third or last warning. " ... The chits might be signed by- 
an initial, a cabalistic sign, or a bloody thumbprint, or not signed 
atall. 143 
F. H. Vinden, based in Ballykinlar, County Down, receiving a chilling letter from an 
anonymous adversary `headed by a skull and crossbones with the words "There is not 
room for you and me in this world and one of us is going to leave it. "' '44 Similarl\, 
Captain N. Austin, serving in County Kerry at the height of the troubles in 1920, was 
the recipient of a startling letter, which read as follows: 
Captain Austin 
Intelligence Officer 
Sir, 
You are hereby given 48 hours notice in which to leave Tralee. If 
this order is not obeyed you will be shot on sight at such a time and 
place to suit our convenience 
Signed by me 
The Officer Commanding 
Tralee I. R. A. 14' 
Soldiers were made to feel uncomfortably aware of their status as an `army of 
occupation' in Ireland. The I. R. A. assumed belligerent rights to expel soldiers from 
the community, under threat of death if necessary. Letters of this kind were 
unequivocal in tone and intent and, at the same time, suitably vague in detail to 
heighten the soldiers' discomfort outside barracks, which must have contributed to his 
general distrust of the Irish population. 
This distrust, coupled with the failure to engage or to co-operate with the civil 
population, inevitably gave rise to wild rumour and speculation amongst the soldiery. 
Given the social and psychological gap between the military and the host community, 
the conflict became firmly rooted in abstract mythology. For the most part, the civil 
population and the military regarded one another through the medium of hearsay and 
propaganda (as opposed to familiarity arising from actual social contact). This 
hampered their ability to make a rational assessment of their enemies' strength, or 
143 Ibid, p. 233. 
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disentangle the loyalties of the general population from the united front presented by 
Sinn Fein propaganda. 
Misconceptions concerning the actual scale of the threat posed by insurgent 
groups had their roots very early in the period. Indeed, if we make a chronological 
leap back to the rising of Easter 1916 it is evident that rumour, mythology. fear. 
distrust and misconception were already exerting a heavy influence on soldiers' 
experiences of Irish service. These mediums undoubtedly contributed to the actions of 
the notorious Captain Bowen-Colthurst, an officer of the Royal Irish Rifles. On the 
evening of 25 April 1916, Colthurst, based upon his own loose definition of martial 
law, used (often falsely) arrested prisoners as human shields for his oxn protection 
outside barracks. He later shot three prisoners without trial at the barracks before 
being arrested, court-martialled and confined to Broadmoor Lunatic Asylum. His plea 
of mitigation read as follows: 
Sir, 
In accordance with instructions, I have the honour to forward for 
your information a more detailed account of the circumstances 
connected with the shooting of three rebels in Portobello Barracks. 
Dublin. 
On Tuesday evening, 25 th ultimo I was officially informed 
that martial law was declared in Dublin. There were three leaders 
of the rebels in the guard room in Portobello Barracks. The 
guard room was not safe for these desperate men to be confined 
in, their rescue from outside would be very easy. 
On Tuesday and up to Wednesday morning rumours of 
massacres of police and soldiers from all parts of Dublin were 
being sent to me from different sources. Among others the 
rumour reached me that 600 German prisoners at Oldcastle had 
been released and armed and were marching in Dublin. I also 
heard that the rebels in the city had opened up depots for the 
supply and issue of arms, and that a large force of rebels 
intended to attack Portobello Barracks, which was held only by a 
few troops, many of whom were recruits ignorant as to how to 
use their rifles, and a number of the others were soldiers and 
15 
sailors who had taken refuge in the barracks. We had also in the 
barracks a considerable number of officers and men who had 
been wounded by the rebels and whose protection was a great 
source of concern to me. I believed that it was known that these 
leaders were confined in the barracks and that possibly the 
proposed attack on the barracks was with a view to their release. 
Rumours of risings all over Ireland and of a large German- 
American and Irish-American landing in Galway were prevalent. 
I had no knowledge of any reinforcements arriving from 
England, and did not believe it possible for troops from England 
to arrive in time to prevent a general massacre. I knew of the 
sedition which had been preached in Ireland for years past and of 
the popular sympathy with rebellion. I knew also that men on 
leave home from the trenches, although unarmed had been shot 
down like dogs in the streets of their own city, simply because 
they were in khaki. On the Wednesday morning the 26`h April all 
this was in my mind. I was very much exhausted and unstrung 
after practically a sleepless night, and I took the gloomiest view 
of the situation and felt that only desperate measures would save 
the situation. I felt I must act quickly, and believing I had the 
power under martial law, I felt under the circumstances, that it 
was clearly my duty to have the three ring leaders shot. It was a 
terrible ordeal for me, but I nerved myself to carry out what was 
for me at the time a terrible duty. 146 
Though later certified insane, Captain Bowen Colthurst's plea highlights the ways in 
which many soldiers perceived the climate under which they served. It captures 
something of the mental and physical siege that many servicemen described at 
different times and in different places throughout the period. Military society in 
Ireland was a hotbed of rumour and speculation and this applied regardless of the 
actual level of the threat. The influences to which Colthurst was subject, made an 
unpopular and under-supported minority Rising take on the appearance of a general 
146 N. A., Records of the Home Office (hereafter H. O. ) 45/10824! 319 388. Report of the Royal 
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rebellion or even an Irish-German or Irish-American conspiracy. His false perception 
of the tenor of Irish society (though specific to events in Dublin 1916) could be said 
to be typical of many soldiers serving in the later period. Indeed, an anonymous 
military source dated June 1921 offered a similarly gloomy assessment of the military 
situation in the later period: 
The position is Gilbertian with the humour left out... The British 
Army in Ireland is besieged... responsible officials cannot move 
without strong escort; money cannot be drawn from the Bank 
without strong escort; despatch riders are being rapidly displaced 
by armoured cars, officers must move not only armed and in 
bodies, but with their revolvers very handy; in motor cars they 
carry them actually in their hand. Troops sleep in defended 
barracks - behind barbed wire... communication is so laboriously 
difficult that it is not unnatural that personal liason between army 
headquarters and the divisions is very much reduced, as also, I 
understand, it that between divisions and brigades and brigades 
and battalions. On the other hand the population move when, 
where and by whatever route it wishes. This is a curious situation 
for a force whose raison d'etre in the country is to maintain 
order. 147 
The soldiers' sense of insecurity was also heightened by the fact that their whole 
experience of Irish society consisted of confrontations and skirmishes with rebel 
groups. Sometimes this resulted from the intensive work regimes to which they v, ere 
subject, especially following the declaration of martial law in December 1920 (see 
Chapter 2). Ambushes, raids, searches, and patrols through rebel strongholds brought 
them face to face with the enemy on a regular basis. Even during patrols through 
isolated stretches of country, any human presence was likely to be rebel activity. On 
occasions, even barracks were attacked or raided by well-organised rebel soldiers (see 
Chapter 3). Furthermore, the military (alongside the R. I. C. ) were the main targets for 
I. R. A. activity, as the most accessible organs of state. They were actively sought out, 
"' N. A., W. O. 32/9572, Anon - 36 Hours in Dublin, (1) Discussions and references to the Cabinet on 
measures to restore law and order and the respective responsibilities of ministers and the General 
Officer Commanding; (2) Great Britain: (estimated strength after imminent end of coal crisis), 16 June 
1921. 
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in a game of -cat and mouse' in which, prior to 1919. (before the onset of a reciprocal 
war) they were very much the hunted. 
Given the variety of obstacles that prevented British soldiers from associating with 
Irish communities during their brief tenure, it is surprising then to discover accounts 
which evoke a very different picture of civil-military relations in Ireland. If we accept 
that the military and the I. R. A. were both dependent upon the community, for success, 
then it would appear that many of the same influences that led to distrust, could also 
encourage a tentative contact between the military and the general population. An 
intelligence report of 1922 concluded that `in guerrilla war the foundation of military 
intelligence is the battalion and detachment system and that the best information is 
that obtained by front line troops. ' 148 In addition to the tactical advantage of 
establishing close relations with the community, neither side could achieve autonomy 
from the general population: both required succour from civilians in terms of shelter, 
transport and consumer supply. 
Violent clashes between soldiers and rebels overshadowed a parallel struggle for 
the hearts and minds of the people. Of course, shared nationality, as well as kith and 
kin, gave Sinn Fein a decisive advantage in this pursuit, and yet several military 
accounts highlighted instances where soldiers were able to establish close contact 
with civilians. A deteriorating relationship between the military and civilians (like 
that between active rebels and civilians) tended to arise where the military displayed a 
growing resort to coercion. However, this was not an inevitability: many individual 
soldiers or whole battalions were able to forge tentative links with Irish communities 
that undoubtedly contributed towards their success or, at the very least, promoted 
their comfort and security. 
During the period stretching from the Easter Rising of 1916 to the summer of 
1919, accounts of military service in Ireland provide ample evidence of associations 
between soldiers and civilians. Initially, the warmth of the reception for arriving 
soldiers was a source of surprise. In a taped interview, W. S. Matthews remembered 
his arrival in Dublin in 1917 en route to Derry to be trained for war service: 
148 Record of the Rebellion (Intelligence) in Hart (ed. ) British Intelligence p. 57. 
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... we were received most cordially. At every station we stopped 
at on our troop train they would come up and give us potato 
cakes and things like that because we were always hungry being 
young boys of eighteen. 149 
Similarly, the anonymous author of the `The Whitest Band', (Journal of The Buffs) 
after previous warnings that `You will have a hot time... English soldiers are not safe 
in Ireland. . . take a knuckleduster and a revolver', arrived in Dublin in November 
1917 to find that 
... the 
inhabitants surrounded us and tried hard to kill us - with 
kindness. They assaulted us with cups of tea, and bombarded us 
with sandwiches, and had we allowed them to work all their will 
upon us we would never have reached Moore Park 
alive... [Consequently] we revised all our ideas about the 
relations between English and Irish. '50 
Similarly, on his return to Ireland in 1918, J. W. Rowarth remembered: 
Arriving in the Capital Dublin, with joy in my heart and 
appreciation for that gallant band of ladies who still dispensed 
tea and other goodies to the troops passing through Railway 
stations, they were a godsend to us... we had a wonderful time, 
all Irish people did not hate the British soldier, I met some very 
nice Dubliners some who invited me to their homes. 
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Upon arrival many soldiers recalled how they nestled comfortably into life in an 
Irish community. F. C. Penny remembered his station in Ireland with the RAF in 1919 
with great fondness, describing one occasion in June when the local population and 
the military co-operated to assist two British airmen who had crash-landed at Clifden, 
County Galway: 
Little damage had been done to the aircraft itself, so with the use 
of gear such as ropes, spades, shovels etc, which ý, e had brought 
149 Taped interview ww ith W. S. Matthews. 
150 "The Whitest Band", Journal of the Buffs Regiment, p. 4. 
151 Rowarth, 'A Soldier's Tale', p. 24. 
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along and with the very valuable assistance of dozens of Irish 
villagers, we were able to get the machine on an even keel. '52 
In a letter to his father in 1917 one soldier commented, with some amusement. on 
the `daily contest between women of the local village as to who wwNwould take care of 
the soldiers' laundry'. 153 In March 1918, E. M. Warmington of the K. O. Y. L. I. was 
transferred from Catterick Camp in North Yorkshire to a quieter station on Bere 
Island. He remembered being: 
... entertained 
in a lonely cottage at a table supplied simply with 
a pile of potatoes in the middle and a plate and a knife and 
plentiful butter for each person. Next to the camp were several 
little houses whose Irish inmates treated us as friends. I doubt 
whether at that time politics meant anything to them. 154 
In the autumn of 1918, the battalion moved to Kinsale: `a town of about 5000 
people', though again he experienced `... little or no resentment during our stay of 
some four months. . . we went about 
freely in town and country with no feeling of 
danger. ' Through his involvement in Church parades, he soon acquired `a new society 
of Irish friends' amongst whom he was to meet his future wife Mollie Robertson. ' '5 
Recalling a later period, E. J. A. H. Brush detailed how `there were a number of families 
who I will not mention by name, but in spite of the dangers incurred were very kind 
to us during our soldiering in Dublin. "56 Also with reference to the later period, 
Douglas Wimberley remembered that his fellow officers were able to establish 
relationships with local girls despite the complex considerations of religion and 
nationality: 
A well known local bank manager, belonging to an old Irish 
Roman Catholic family had several daughters, and very good 
looking and charming girls they were... at one point three of his 
daughters became engaged to no less than three of our Protestant 
152 Penny, `Memories of Flying', p. 16. The incident described was the crash landing of Alcock and 
Brown's famous flight, which has been recorded as the first non-stop aerial crossing of the Atlantic. 
153 Griffin, letter to his father dated 10 Nov. 1917. 
154 Warmington, 'Diaries' p. 29. 
Iss Ibid, p. 41. 
15" Brush, 'Rifle Green'Orange Flash' p. 19. 
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Cameron officers. Later two of these engagements ended in 
marriage' 
. 
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Indeed, relations between soldiers and local girls appear to have been 
commonplace throughout the period, despite the risks inherent to both parties. An 
English officer visiting Limerick as late as May 1921 was surprised by the presence 
of `soldiers and girls strolling arm-in-arm under the new flowering lilacs. ' 158 Earlier 
in his trip, when visiting Dublin he had similarly observed: ` ... groups of soldiers and 
young girls, standing about the north side of St Stephen's Green, exchanging- 
obviously-evening [sic] pleasantries. ' 159 Similarly, K. A. Plimpton, serving with the 
East Yorkshire Regiment in County Longford, noted that the people were on the 
whole friendly, some of the weaker sex being particularly so'. 160 
Beyond the apparent popularity of British soldiers with local girls. the memoirs 
of participants (both soldiers and republicans) suggest that the troops were far more 
acceptable to the civil population than their comrades in the R. I. C. Despite being an 
active republican, Darrell Figgis (who wrote at length of the deteriorating relationship 
between the Irish people and the R. I. C. ) added that British soldiers were regarded as 
men who were simply doing their duty'. 161 In the same vein, J. W. Rowarth, upon 
visiting a pub, was pleased to be accepted by the locals: `like someone said on the 
cross, we forgive you, ye know not what ye do [sic]'. 162 Likewise, an officer's wife 
stationed in Dublin in 1921 expressed her confidence with regard to the safety of her 
husband: `... he was a regimental officer, and had nothing to do with politics, secret 
service or police, and the regular soldiers were popular. ' 163 The Record of Service of 
the 1st Manchesters claimed that `the civil population at Inchigeelagh [County Cork] 
have more respect for the military than the R. I. C. ' and went on to detail the boycott of 
the R. I. C. by a local publican who continued to welcome the patronage of the 
military. 164 Therefore, although it is evident from the pattern of hostilities that active 
rebels turned their attention to the British soldiery as the conflict progressed, it is 
157 Wimberley, `Scottish Soldier', p. 154. 
158 Ewart, On the Road to Ulster: An English Officer's Impressions', The Times, 23 Ma\ 1921, p. 14. 
159 Ewart, 'Life in Dublin: An English Officer's Impressions', The Times. 17 May 1921, p. 9. 
160 Plimpton, "The Snapper", Ist Battalion, 'D' Company notes, Dec. 1920, p. 7_ 
161 D. Figgis, Recollections of the Irish fl Far (London, 1927), p. 262. 
162 Rowarth, 'A Soldier's Tale' p. 24. 
163 Anon, Experiences of an Officer's Wife, p. 47. 
164 Record of Service of the Ist Battalion Manchester Regiment, 27 July 1920. 
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reasonable to suggest that this applied in a more limited sense to the ordinary civilian 
population. 
Even in the later period, certain regiments were able to gain the trust and respect 
of local people, despite the intensification of hostilities. In May 1920, the East 
Yorkshire Regiment arrived in Longford to assist the local police in maintaining order 
in the district. K. A. Plimpton, recorded several incidents of kindness and solicitude on 
the part of the community: `... there were a lot of ex soldiers, and the people on the 
whole were friendly'. 165 This was consistent with experiences throughout the 
divisional area, as the `History of the 5th Division' recalled `even in May 1920 there 
was no real hostility shown to either officers or men of the Army in the 5th Division 
area. ' 166 Later, detachments of the East Yorkshire Regiment were sent to occupy the 
courthouse in Carrick-on-Shannon, where they became involved in a number of 
minor skirmishes with local rebels. Subsequent reports in "The Snapper " 
documented a growing estrangement from the local population. A detachment 
stationed in Mullingar, County Westmeath, was for the first time' refused transport 
on local train services and had their own transport facilities sabotaged. As a 
consequence, the correspondent noted that `... we all feel sorry that our quiet little 
town of Mullingar has contracted, or is contracting the fever prevalent in this 
country. ' However, the same author was able to note, with some satisfaction, that 'all 
ranks are on very friendly terms with the local inhabitants, and a feeling of 
resentment [towards the perpetrators of the aforementioned sabotage] was expressed 
by a large body of the community. ' 167 Another isolated incident occurred in February 
1921 when attempts were made by street vendors to 'sell poisoned cigarettes and 
chocolate to the troops. ' 168 However, reports of this kind failed to detract from the 
convivial relationship that developed between the regiment and the civil population of 
Leitrim and Westmeath. When a detachment based in Carrick-on-Shannon were 
relieved by the Suffolk Regiment, Plimpton noted that the incoming regiment ' %\ ere 
amazed at finding how well the troops were getting on with the people there' , 
169 
Furthermore, when a draft left Mullingar station on 15 March 1920 to return to 
England, "The Snapper" noted that `there was a fairly large assembly of people on 
º65 Plimpton, "The Snapper", 1st Battalion, 'D' Company notes, Dec. 1920, p. 7. 
166 Hist. 5th Div., p. 39. 
167 Plimpton, "The Snapper", 1st Battalion notes, July 1920, p. 106. 
168 Hist. 5th Div., p. 77. 
169 Plimpton, "The Snapper", 1st Battalion. 'D' Company notes, Dec. 1920, p. 8. 
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the platform seeing the boys off, and I'm afraid many a lass of \lullingar went home 
heavy hearted. 170 
The regiment's ability to forge friendly relations with the local population did, on 
at least one occasion, allow the soldiers to foil an enemy incursion. Two attackers 
entering the barracks at the courthouse, in an effort to procure arms and ammunition, 
were forced to leave when reinforcements failed to arrive. Their plans were foiled bý 
the efforts of a local woman who upon `noticing a collection of men and motor cars in 
the town' had immediately informed the police and the military. Despite being 
`stopped at the point of revolver and told to go back, she eventually got through and 
gave the alarm', giving policemen and soldiers time to disperse the would-be 
invaders. 171 The battalion finally left Ireland in March 1922. after three years service 
and, according to service records, even the local republican press were compelled to 
remark that `the conduct of the battalion had been exemplary throughout'. 1 72 
The East Yorkshire Regiment did undoubtedly benefit from the relative quietness 
of their station. Although Longford was an active county, Westmeath and Leitrim 
were notably less so, and all three were quieter than the flashpoints of Dublin and the 
South-Western Counties. 173 Consequently, the local population were less prone (or 
less compelled) to become embroiled in a reciprocal siege between the military and 
the I. R. A. Nonetheless, some regiments serving in the worst districts were able to 
maintain good relations with the local population, despite the co-existence of a 
concerted rebel campaign. For example, the Green Howards stationed in Tipperary 
between January and July 1920, were subject to attacks, arms raids and general acts 
of intimidation by an active and well organised local Sinn Fein movement. In July 
1920 the regiment transferred to West Limerick, another active area and yet, despite 
their experiences, the correspondent of the Green Howards' Gazette was able to 
conclude that: 
Everyone in Tipperary seems sorry that we have left, for we 
have made many friends, who for their part will not forget us. 
170 Ibid, April 1920, p. 12. 
171 Ibid, Dec. 1920, p. 7. 
172 Record of Service of the 1st Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment, 15 March 1922. The Prince of 
Wales' Own Regiment of Yorkshire Museum, York. 
13 According to Hopkinson, Westmeath and neighbouring Meath conformed 'to the pattern in the Irish 
Midlands of intermittent and extremely small-scale military action', while Leitrim was rumoured to be 
the most treacherous county in Ireland. ' The Irish War of Independence, p. 144. 
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Even on our bills is written: "How grieved we are that so many 
of your regiment are leaving Tipperary. - 174 
Another detachment arriving in Rathkeale, County Limerick, in July 1920, noted that 
local villagers: 
... were quite peaceful, and do not seem anxious to give us any 
trouble. Though at first we were somewhat boycotted by tradesmen 
etc, after three weeks' occupation of the village, the inhabitants are 
willing to do anything for us, except wash our clothes! 
This suggests that initial resistance was never vociferous enough to provide an 
obstacle to friendly relations with the community. 175 Similarly, `C' Company, 
stationed in Adare, were able to establish good relations with local people in order to 
fulfil their consumer wants: `Lieutenant Richardson is very successful in interviewing 
tradespeople [sic] in Adare, and has discovered where cigarettes can be bought 
cheaply. ' 176 Officers in the 5th Division also proved adept at establishing supply 
networks, sometimes as a means of obtaining illicit goods: `There were some 30 or so 
shops including a tobacconist who sold smuggled navy tobacco at a very cheap 
price. ' 177 
In February 1921, the correspondent of the Gazette observed that: `during the last 
few weeks, Sinn Fein activity has greatly diminished in our particular area' he also 
suggested that the decline in rebel activity had further promoted good relations with 
people `in the various villages occupied, so much so that, in many cases, great regret 
was expressed at our departure. ' 178 In September 1921 (following the truce) the same 
correspondent claimed that the regiment's experience in Ireland had convinced the 
soldiers that: 
Irish or English, whatever we be, we can all live peaceably 
together. The so-called fanatical hatred of the one for the other is 
neither fanatical nor is it hatred. It is merely a slight 
' Green Howards' Gazette, July 1920, p. 50. 
175 Ihid, "B" Company notes, July 1920, p. 51. 
176 Green Howards' Gazette, "C" Company notes, July 1920, p. 52. 
1" Vinden, 'By Chance a Soldier', pp. 14-15. 
178 Green Howards' Gazette, Feb. 1921, p. 147. 
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misunderstanding between two people who are burning to shake 
hands with each other. 179 
This may have been overstatement, arising from of an emotional conflict, and vet it 
was noted by General Staff in the 5th Division that in many brigade areas 'directly 
after the hour at which activities ceased on July 11th, the I. R. A. leaders, and others 
hitherto "on the run", came out into the open and even tried to enter into friendly 
conversation with soldiers. ' 180 
When the regiment finally withdrew in February 1922. the Gazette concluded 
that: 
It would be wrong were we to say that we leave entirely without 
regret. There are few, if any, among the ranks who have not 
made friends who have [sic] "played the game"' with the 
despised "English garrison". To them our hearts go out. ' 81 
It is worth noting that, during the regiment's period of service, one soldier was 
murderously assaulted with a pickaxe and a detachment was ambushed in Listowel, 
County Kerry. A further two soldiers received knife wounds after being assaulted in 
Rathkeale, and another soldier was shot and severely wounded in Limerick station. In 
addition, a road patrol was ambushed in Gallybally, and a ration party was attacked in 
Clonbeg. Most serious of all was the capture of three officers near Macroom who 
were subsequently shot by the I. R. A. after refusing to dig their own graves. '82 
Therefore, despite being on the receiving end of a number of I. R. A. actions, it would 
appear that soldiers of the regiment made the important distinction between active 
rebels and non-combatants. Although there is no evidence in their account to suggest 
that this contributed towards success in the gathering of military intelligence, it did, at 
the very least, provide opportunities for friendship, recreation and trade. It is also 
reasonable to assume that the nature of civil-military relations must have contributed 
towards the exemplary conduct of the Green Howards during their period of service 
in Ireland. 
At a further extreme, there were a number of cases where friendships or (at the 
very least) mutual respect developed between opposing combatants. The most famous 
179 Ibid, Sept. 1920, p. 97. 
180 Hist. 5th Div., p. 114. 
181 Green Howards' Gazette, Feb. 1922, pp. 178-9. 
182 Kenneth Robert Henderson, Officers (? /the Green Howards 1688-1931 (Richmond. 1935). p. 162. 
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example emerged following the kidnapping of Brigadier General Lucas (Commander 
of the 16th Infantry Brigade) on 26 June 1920. In his memoir, Michael Brennan, a 
prominent IRA leader in East Clare, recalled his role in guarding Lucas following his 
capture in Kilbarry, County Cork. Brennan highlighted the kinship that developed 
between Lucas and his captors, an affinity that even extended to a nights `stroke- 
hauling' or poaching for salmon on the Shannon. He also fondly recalled how Lucas' 
remained steadfast to his officers' lifestyle: insisting on 'drinking a bottle of whisky 
every day', maintaining regular exercise and playing 'bridge every night until about 2 
a. m. ' The relationship of trust that developed between the two men allowed Brennan 
to convey letters to and from Lucas and his family without the usual precaution of 
opening them. 183 
Affinities between opposing soldiers did not always result from such intimate 
proximity; Tom Barry recalled how Colonel Hudson, commanding a detachment of 
the King's Liverpool Regiment in Skibereen `was a very decent man and a 
professional' who recognised `that we had a right to fight for our freedom'. Barry 
also recalled how Colonel Hudson was instrumental in saving republican lives from 
the vengeance of the Black and Tans. To demonstrate his appreciation, Barry ensured 
that `whenever he wanted to go fishing he got a permit from us'. After the conflict, 
the friendship remained intact and Hudson continued to write to Barry from his new 
base in India. ' 84 
Fitzpatrick has drawn attention to the influence of `militarism' on Irish national 
consciousness during this period, suggesting that many Irish war or army veterans 
who chose to apply their learnt knowledge in aid of the republican cause maintained a 
level of respect for the institution and the soldiers of the regular army. This was 
certainly true in the case of Paddy Mulcahy, who, after training with the Royal 
Engineers, became the leader of an I. R. A. flying column in Tipperary where he used 
his telegraphy skills to gather intelligence. Despite his position, Mulcahy lacked the 
killer instinct when it came to waging war against the military, in fact he 'regarded 
the 10th Royal Hussars stationed in Ennis [County Clare] as `gentlemen' and 
discountenanced all attacks against soldiers. ' 185 
183 Brennan, The liar in Clare, 'Entertaining General Lucas', pp. 54-6. 
184 K. Griffith & T. O'Grady, Curious Journey: An Oral History of Ireland's Unfinished Revolution, 
(Dublin, 1998) p. 220. 
185 Fitzpatrick, 'Militarism in Ireland' in Bartlett & Jeffery, .4 
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The large majority of republican memoirs from this period failed to convey a 
similar level of respect between combatants. Nonetheless. the military were usually 
cast as the more respectable face of the Crown forces: Clare Volunteer and 
Genealogist Edward Maclysaght (who, post-conflict, was elected to the Senate of the 
Irish Free State and also served as the Chief Herald of Ireland between 1943 and 
1954) having never belonged to the regular army had no especial reason to exonerate 
the military from the worst excesses of Crown force brutality, and vet his descriptions 
of troops succeeded in being remarkably balanced. The main thrust of his book was 
concerned with the misdeeds of the Auxiliaries and Black and Tans. and vet he was 
emphatic that his `strictures [did] not apply nearly so strongly to the armN. ' 186 He 
went on to recall acts of kindness shown towards him by regular soldiers. even during 
the course of raids on his premises. Even his criticism of the Auxiliaries implied a 
tone of respect for the British army when he expressed surprise at the lack of 
discipline amongst men `... who were supposed to be ex-officers of the British 
Army. ' 187 This was a recurrent theme in republican memoirs; republican fighters 
often regarded the British officer rank as a benchmark of respectability. American 
newspaper correspondent Carl W. Ackerman reporting 'behind the lines' in Ireland, 
claimed that Macready as G. O. C-in-C. commanded great respect within Sinn Fein 
circles: `Sinn Feiners, I find have respect for General Macready. They invariably ask 
questions about him. They consider him human, kind and believe he tries to be 
fair. " 188 Many held to an idealized notion of the officer type, which (despite the image 
presented by actual military conduct during the conflict) they subsequently tried to 
imitate within I. R. A. battalions. 
The various permutations of civil-military relations in Ireland and their meaning for 
the British campaign can only be revealed through an examination of the complex 
social relationships that formed (or failed to form) between soldiers and civilians 
against the backdrop of a civil uprising. Where personal affinities could develop. even 
in the midst of an overwhelmingly antagonistic situation, civilians and soldiers were 
usually kept apart by the divisive influence of their respective authorities, namely the 
186 Mach saght, Changing Times, p. 96. 
19' Ihid, p. 102. 
18 Ackerman Report (undated) contained in Lloyd George Papers, F'19; 4 2. 
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military and the I. R. A., of whom, only the latter appeared to appreciate the 
importance of civilians to the outcome of the conflict. The military were also faced 
with the difficulty of an enemy that utilised civilian traffic as a cover for insurgency. 
This led many soldiers to view all civilians as a potential threat to security. Only in 
rare cases did they sufficiently penetrate civilian circles to be sure of the distinction 
between rebels and non-combatants. A greater willingness to do so would have aided 
military intelligence and allowed the army to dissect Irish communities into their 
constituent parts. Instead, most soldiers treated the civil population as one 
homogenized mass, and failed to recognise that most civilians found themselves in an 
indeterminate `middle-place' between the rebels and the Crown forces. 
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Part III 
Reactions 
5. Reprisals, Indiscipline and Provocation 
Following wildly inaccurate claims made by General Sir Nevil Macready that only 
four military reprisals occurred during the course of the whole conflict, incidents of 
military reprisals in Ireland remain almost entirely shrouded in mystery. 1 
Furthermore, this post-conflict admission appeared to be more than Macready was 
prepared to admit during the conflict itself: writing in May 1921 he claimed that 'in 
not one single instance has there been the least attempt at an outbreak or retaliation at 
any time. '2 Likewise, General Staff in the 5th Division promoted the conflict as an 
episode that reflected well on the discipline of the British army: It is to the undying 
credit of the British army in Ireland that its discipline was never strained to breaking 
point. '3 Therefore, besides a smattering of correspondence and policy debates relating 
to the strategy of `official' reprisals4, the issue remains conspicuously absent in 
available War Office records. Faced with a dearth of evidence, many commentators 
(including several prominent republican authors) have tended to exonerate the 
military from the worst excesses of the conflict instead concentrating on the notoriety 
of the Black and Tans and the Auxiliary cadets. These `soldiers of fortune' have been 
described as `the greatest blot on the record of the Coalition, perhaps upon Britain's 
name in the twentieth century. ' 5 Their misdeeds have monopolised reports of Crown 
Force violence to the extent that many scholars of the period have come to regard 
retaliation as being the overwhelming characteristic of policemen in Ireland. 
Consequently, the `lusty animals' of the new R. I. C. have too often been reproached 
for the combined sins of the Crown forces. 6 
This chapter will, for the first time, subject the issue of military reprisals to 
serious academic scrutiny. It will attempt to reach beyond the shallow surface of 
events by presenting soldiers' own accounts as a means by which to provide detail 
and viewpoint. These memoirs will be supplemented by newspaper reports and 
eyewitness accounts. In Particular, Hugh Martin's (surprisingly under-utilised) 
Macready, Annals, Volume II, p. 494. 
Z Memorandum by Macready to C. I. G. S., dated 23 May 1921 
Hist. 5th Div., p. 46. 
° See particularly N. A., CAB 627/108; CAB 24'2807; P. R. O. 30'67144: W. O. 32 9537; W. O. 32/9578. 
5 C. L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, (London, 1955) p. 65. 
6 This colourful description of the troops and Auxiliary cadets ýN ho guarded him during his 
imprisonment at Dublin Castle is to be found in O'Malley, On. Another Man's Wound, p. 241 
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account Ireland in Insurrection will provide a key source for many of the arguments 
developed in this chapter. An appropriate use of both primary and secondary sources 
should also help to identify the origins of military reprisals and establish precedents. 
In turn, this will lead to a consideration of the different forms of reprisals and how 
they became incorporated into the military routine. This (broadly narrative) aspect of 
the study will also lend more understanding to the abstract notion of `a dynamic of 
escalation' in military violence. The term `reprisal' will also be brought under the 
spotlight; incidents where military terrorism was an initiative, rather than a response, 
will also be highlighted. The chapter will further examine the actual composition of 
reprisal squads: paying particular attention to the pivotal role of officers in the 
prevention or the promotion of indiscipline. This, in turn, will yield insights into the 
ways and means by which reprisal parties organised their actions. The chapter will 
further consider the intended effect of reprisals on their victims in order to reveal the 
motives and strategies that underpinned reprisal campaigns. The relationship between 
`official' reprisals and their `unofficial' precedents will also be considered as a means 
by which to link official policy with experience on the ground. A further section will 
highlight the other forms of indiscipline and provocative behaviour to which the army 
were prone: paying particular attention to bullish displays of nationalism on the part 
of the military. A final section will draw together these strands, identifying the 
factors that triggered rebellious actions and considering their effect on the nature of 
the conflict at large. 
Few historians have been inclined to tackle the issue of reprisals via military sources, 
and fewer still have subjected allegations of military reprisals to any detailed 
scrutiny. Beyond surface events, very little is known about the extent of vigilantism 
in the army, nor even the prickly question of `official' punishments. The pioneering 
studies of a number of scholars, particularly Townshend, Hart and Fitzpatrick, have 
been instrumental in highlighting some of these incidents. Despite this, (and with the 
possible exception of Peter Hart's book The I. R. A. and its Enemies) most studies that 
have confronted military violence in Ireland have merely provided a dry tally of 
reprisal incidents, interspersed with the denials and deliberations of officials. 
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Therefore, historians, writers and even filmmakers7, have colourfully and viv'idlýy 
reconstructed the excesses of the Crown forces in Ireland with little inclination to 
categorize the forms of military reprisal, to rationalize them from the point of view- of 
the soldiery, to trace their origin, or to identify who was involved and wý-hy-. 8 
Therefore it would seem that the majority of previous studies have brought us little 
closer to understanding the phenomenon of reprisals than the republican accounts that 
have provided their source. 
In recent years, historians have been prone to explain military terrorism in 
Ireland within the context of a `tit for tat' cycle of violence. Where this has been 
useful in restoring the phenomenon of I. R. A. violence to the equation, the stress on 
base revenge mentality has provided a rather too simplistic explanation for the 
explosion of Crown force violence vis ä vis the republican campaign. Certainly, there 
can be no denying that the majority of reprisals were (at least on the surface) knee- 
jerk reactions to the excesses of the I. R. A. campaign. This form of reciprocal siege 
has been ably demonstrated by Peter Hart in his study of County Cork, in which the 
pattern of terror and counter-terror was promoted by a `dynamic of escalation' driven 
by an irreducibly simple logic: `hurt one and you hurt us all'; `if you didn't kill 
someone, someone was going to kill you. ' In this view, the nature of the conflict 
caused military strategy to give way to murderous self-reliance as the means by 
which to wage war. 9 
Following this `dynamic' it has been suggested that deliberation amongst 
politicians and military commanders concerning the need to pursue a sterner course 
of action, prompted the military to take matters into their own hands. Full martial law 
was not forthcoming until December 1920, by which time the problem of indiscipline 
was practically insuperable. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that imposing 
7 Notable film and television productions depicting Crown force brutality have included Rebel Heart, 
(John Strickland, BBC Northern Ireland, 2001) a four part BBC production written by novelist Ronan 
Bennet; the biopic Michael Collins (Neil Jordan, Warner Bros, 1996) and more recently the winner of 
the 2006 Palme d'Or - The Wind that Shakes the Barley (Ken Loach, Sixteen Films, 2006), in which 
(despite underdeveloped references to the legacy of the Western Front) a dehumanised military are 
portrayed as little more than a pack of slavering wolves stalking the Irish countryside. 
One notable exception to the dearth of historiography in this subject is Hugh Martin's investigative 
study, Ireland in Insurrection which was published at the height of the conflict. It is perhaps one of the 
most remarkable documents to emerge from the period, it succeeds in being both painstakingly 
researched and frankly and explicitly written. It was also openly defiant of government policy in 
Ireland, and yet remained, throughout, scrupulously fair to the Crown forces, in the sense that it 
highlighted both their excesses and examples of their gallantry and discipline. With the exception of 
D. G. Boý-ce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, (London, 1972) it has been largely ignored by historians 
of the period and remains curiously absent in studies of the military. 
9 Hart, The I. R. A. and Its Enemies, pp. 102,82,97. 
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martial law in active areas at an earlier stage might have reinforced the military's grip 
on the population as well as delivering the means by which to resolve the army's 
disciplinary problems. 1° Macready was convinced that all disciplinary issues could be 
resolved by placing the conflict on a war footing, claiming that `discipline would be 
enforced as in any theatre of war'. 11 However, in the absence of this form of 
acknowledgement the later period came to be defined by attack and reprisal, siege 
and counter-siege, marked at each stage by escalating violence. In this rather crude 
assessment, the conflict took on the form of a game of `cat and mouse' in which both 
sides swapped roles indeterminably. The lines of distinction between Crown force 
troops and Irish Volunteers became indefinite, both operated beyond the command of 
their relevant authorities. In a short space of time the conflict had degenerated into an 
interlocking series of brutal clashes between `renegades' and 'bravos' drawn (on both 
sides) from the disaffected male youth of the post-war generation. 
If we trace the issue chronologically, there is strong reason to suggest that the 
foundations upon which military violence was to flourish in the later period were 
established prior to the period dubbed the `Anglo-Irish War'. 12 As early as October 
1918, a government report on the special Military Areas in Clare and Tralee warned 
that a reaction to community hostility combined with a lack of support from 
government was conspiring to produce `a bitter feeling amongst the soldiers for the 
Irish. Many of them are being taunted by young Irishmen and are getting in such a 
state that they may take the law into their own hands. ' The report further warned that 
the situation could only be remedied by a clear unambiguous government policy, 
rather than one that `changes like a weather cock with every breath of air' fluctuating 
between hard-line repression and official permissiveness. 13 In a similar vein, the 
Daily News journalist Hugh Martin visited Ireland in the summer of 1919 to find that 
mutual hatred and open retaliation had already soured the relationship between police 
and public: `over thousands of square miles of country there is active hatred... Each 
10 Charles Townshend's study of The British Campaign related the failure of the military campaign, 
and some of the excesses that it produced, to the government's reluctance to settle a course of military 
policy that involved martial law. 
N. A., W. O. 32/9537, Macready to the Secretary of the War Office, Reprisals by troops in Ireland 
and their effects on discipline, I Sept. 1920. 
'` Although there is no defined consensus, the period stretching from the Soloheadbeg ambush of 
January 1919 to the truce in July 1921 has often been taken by historians to constitute the 'Anglo-Irish 
War', or the 'Irish War of Independence. ' 
1; Lieutenant Colonel G. S, Report on Special Military Areas in Clare and Tralee, . dug. 1918, quoted 
in 
Hart. The I. R. A. and Its Enemies, p. 63. 
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side "gets it own back" at every opportunity. Blood feuds persist and multiply. 
Martin also claimed that at this early stage it was `only the presence of the army' that 
prevented police actions from `degenerating into massacre. ' 14 
Conversely, the few remaining soldiers" accounts from this period tended to 
recall incidents of retaliation in a very different tone. For example, J. B. Amold 
described his arrival in Limerick in 1918 where he found that the British garrison, 
particularly the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, were `very much cock-a-hoop in the town'. It 
later emerged that local men had attacked a party of soldiers returning from a pub, 
and the event had prompted a much larger body of troops to return the following 
night armed with entrenching tools. Arnold recalled, rather light-heartedly. how the 
battering was very much on the other skulls'. However, in this instance, the military 
authorities deemed the incident to be serious enough to warrant the removal of the 
regiment `to another cantonment where they would not be obliged to carry their 
entrenching tools at night. ' 15 
Similarly, on 5 September 1919, following considerable `friction between 
soldiers and some of the inhabitants in Inchicore [County Dublin]', The Times 
recalled that `a number of soldiers had gathered in Ring Street and discharged as 
many as 20 revolver shots' during the course of which three youths were injured: one 
received a thigh wound, another was shot in the ankle, and a third was grazed by a 
bullet across his hand. The event prompted a police investigation which (rather 
nonchalantly) concluded that `the incident had been exaggerated' and explained it in 
terms of drunken high spirits, consequent upon the soldiers having received a£ 10 
bonus to their pay that night. However, the investigators also recognised that the 
soldiers were responding to a long-standing campaign of intimidation and 
provocation in the district and `thought that by firing revolvers, they could frighten 
those who had been annoying them. ' 16 
This pattern of casual violence had become well established by the autumn of 
1919. However, the involvement of the military (relative to the police) was still 
minimal at this stage. Subsequent events at Fermoy were to mark a new stage in 
escalating violence amongst soldiers, policemen, and their republican counterparts. 
On 7 September 1919, a party of men of the Shropshire Light Infantry entering a 
1' Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, pp. 43-44. 
15 Arnold, 'Against the Stream', p. 132. 
16 The Times, 8 Sept. 1919, p. 11. 
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Methodist church were surrounded by 'three large motor cars, full of armed men' 
who indiscriminately `fired revolvers point blank into the ranks of 18 soldiers. ' This 
action, by rebels of the I. R. A. North Cork Brigade under the command of Liam 
Lynch, resulted in the death of one soldier, who died instantly after being shot 
through the heart. Four other soldiers received bullet wounds, and several others were 
badly injured when the attacking party overpowered the military using 'bludgeons' 
and `wheel spokes' as weapons in their attempt to procure rifles. '7 
I. R. A. arms raids and ambushes of this kind were not unusual in 1919: previous 
incidents had occurred at Soloheadbeg where two police escorts guarding a cartload 
of gelignite were shot dead, and at Knocklong where a further two policemen died 
whilst escorting their prisoner, Sean Hogan. In both instances however, the killing of 
policemen was the tragic outcome of a bungled attempt to capture arms, or to rescue 
I. R. A. prisoners. A more deliberate murder had occurred on 23 June 1920 in broad 
daylight in the village of Thurles, County Tipperary when an R. I. C. District Inspector 
was assassinated by persons unknown. However, the incident at Fermoy represented a 
departure because it fused together elements of cold-killing and armed raiding. 
Fermoy was a stronghold for the British army; its position as the most important 
military station in the South of Ireland' was sealed by the presence of two large 
barracks, and a sprawling military camp at nearby Kilworth. '8 It was also the 
headquarters of 16th Brigade (6th Division), Irish Command, and hosted four 
battalions. Therefore, the attack at Fermoy struck at the army's `inner sanctum', and 
the soldiery were further roused when a coroner's jury at the inquest into Fermoy held 
that the attack had been an effort to procure arms, and therefore not murder but a 
legitimate act of war. Impervious to the legal position, the local soldiery descended 
on Fermoy in numbers and wrecked 50 to 60 shops and houses as well as other 
property owned by members of the jury, causing damage estimated to total over 
£3,000.19 The Urban District Council of Fermoy demanded £20,000 compensation for 
the destruction of property which they claimed was of `so violent a character that 
business has actually been wiped out, and it is more probable that the affected parties 
' The Times, 8 Sept, 1919, p. 11; 9 Sept. 1919, p. 12. 
18 Ibid, quote from Thom 's Official Directory, Sept. 9,1919, p. 12. 
191bid, Sept. 10,1919, p. 10. 
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will never again be on the same financial standing as they were previous to the night 
of the attack. 520 
The early months of 1920 saw minor skirmishes between the military and the 
civil population escalate to an altogether more dangerous level. There was a further 
acceleration in the frequency and the scope of reprisal actions, and soldiers' 
involvement in rioting, vandalism and acts of deliberately provocative behaviour 
tended to proliferate. Lieutenant Gilbert of the Royal Berkshire Regiment recalled 
how on 22 March 1920, soldiers of the regiment had marched towards Portobello 
Bridge singing patriotic songs, after attending a performance at Dublin's Theatre 
Royal. Their inflammatory display attracted the attention of a crowd who followed 
and hissed at them. The party were then subject to stone throwing from the crowd, 
and several soldiers alleged that shots were fired against them. The military party 
were joined by an armed cycle patrol under the command of Lieutenant Dawson, who 
had been sent to provide safe passage for the soldiers. Dawson was heard to order the 
patrol to charge at the crowd, and (though accounts of the subsequent events are 
contradictory) it would appear that the officer in charge ordered "Rapid Fire'', 
following which, 30 rounds were discharged above the heads of the assembled crowd. 
The patrol then followed the fleeing crowd around Kelly's Corner where they 
unleashed another volley of 21 rounds in 15 seconds. During the course of events two 
2 civilians were shot dead (Michael Cullen and Ellen Hendrick). 1 
Equally alarming were events in Arklow (County Wicklow) on 25 April 1920, 
where a number of soldiers were bruised or injured when a patrol of the Lancashire 
Fusiliers were confronted by an enthusiastic crowd, gathered to welcome home a 
released hunger-striker. When the patrol returned to barracks a number of men were 
conspicuously absent at the roll call. It later emerged that a party of armed soldiers 
had `broken out of the camp through the barbed wire fence taking their rifles' and 
descended on the town. Having reached Arklow via a bridge, one or two shots' were 
fired at them `from the civilian population' and one soldier was wounded. The illicit 
party responded by opening fire 'without any orders' killing one civilian and 
wounding four others. 22 
20 N. A., CAB 24/1708. Correspondence from W. Theeham, Clerk of the Council to Macready, 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War - Fermoy disturbances, undated. 21 The Times, 7 April 1920, p. 11. 
22 N. A., W. O. 35/90/1. Report by Captain A. H. Peacock, Commanding 'Minden Coy. Ist Battalion 
Lancashire Fusiliers. to H. Q. Dublin District in Schedule "D" General Staff, Dublin District War 
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In both cases, detailed facts were difficult to ascertain; important issues such as 
who began the provocation, and who fired the first shot, were obscured by conflicting 
accounts. However, the two events suggested an increasing ambition on the part of 
civilians and rebels to engage the military, and (more importantly for our study) they 
point towards a corresponding slackening of army discipline in early 1920. 
If the events in Dublin and Arklow can be interpreted in a numbers of .v ays, an 
incident in Limerick on 20 May 1920 was far less equivocal. During the early 
afternoon, two police officers were shot dead by armed rebels. necessitating the use 
of troops to buttress the force. At 11 o'clock on the same day, both soldiers and 
policemen discharged shots, resulting in the death of James Saunders, a dock 
labourer. Another man named Joseph Egglestone was shot in the thigh and two others 
persons were wounded. The next morning at 3am bombs were thrown through the 
windows of a local drapery and a flour shop causing fires in both buildings. 23 
These events contained all the elements of a classic reprisal action: death 
resulting from death, the escalation of violence, and indiscriminate revenge against 
civilians and their property. Furthermore, the attack was given extra significance by 
the joint involvement of both policemen and soldiers. Previous violent acts had 
tended to be factional. The incidents in Limerick in 1918, Inchicore in 1919, and 
Dublin and Arklow in early 1920 probably arose from problems between specific 
regiments and local people. 24 Furthermore, these incidents tended to have developed 
from minor skirmishes into small-scale battles in a matter of hours. The later events 
in Limerick heralded the development of co-operative action between members of the 
Crown forces, thereafter policeman and soldiers who were billeted together often 
made common their pursuit of revenge. Douglas Wimberley observed that the new 
R. I. C. cadets, stationed with his own regiment the Cameron Highlanders, 'seemed to 
make a habit of breaking out of their barracks at night, illicitly killing men they 
thought were suspect rebels. ' He also observed that, in this way, `the habit spread 
surreptitiously to army officers and men. 25 This assessment reflected Macready's 
Diary, 4 Schedules "A", "B", "C" & "D" to accompany G. S. Dublin District War Diary, 26 April, 
1920. 
Z' The Times, 21 May 1921, p. 16. 
24 The Ist Essex Regiment in West Cork were a typical case. Unlike many other regiments in the 6th 
Division, notably the 1st King's and 2nd Green Howards' Regiments, they engaged in relentless 
rounds of attack and reprisal with local people until their eventual removal in late 192 1. 
25 W imberley, `Scottish Soldier', p. 153 (that is not to suggest that the initiative was always \\ ith 
policemen; following the murder of a civilian, the same officer had earlier recalled how 'a certain 
Cameron... had been out on his own secretly by night. ') 
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stated opinion of the means by which indiscipline wý as fostered in the regular army. 
To Macready reprisals were a form of learnt behaviour arising from the military's 
obligation to work in tandem with the R. I. C. In September 1920 (still stoppin`i short 
of implicating the military) he had warned: 
Every detachment of troops employed in carrying out arrests or 
preserving order is accompanied by one or more men of the 
R. I. C... Lately the R. I. C. has been reinforced by recruits from 
England... known by the soubriquet of `Black and Tans"... It is 
not for me to criticise the methods employed by the Police for 
keeping order, but in certain parts of the country this is attained 
by promiscuous firing [and] retaliatory measures are often 
indulged in... I mention these facts merely to illustrate the 
atmosphere in which the young soldiers who compose the Army 
today are called upon to serve. 26 
Much has been written, not least by soldiers themselves, concerning the problems of 
co-operation between soldiers and policemen on joint-operations and yet it would 
appear that the pursuit of clandestine revenge was certainly a binding factor. Inter- 
regimental reprisals also became commonplace, and later Auxiliaries and Black and 
Tans (drafted into the R. I. C. ) were to join the melee. During his travels through 
Limerick in August 1920, Hugh Martin recalled how scattered military detachments 
were prepared to form reprisal networks: `All this region was held by small outposts 
of the Machine Gun Corps, and one post was no doubt ready to help to avenge the 
wrongs of another. '27 Significantly, the action at Limerick (like that at Fermoy) was 
also marked by an intervening gap between the initial event and the counter-attack, 
during which time soldiers and policemen were likely to have fed one another's 
appetite for revenge. This lag between action and reaction also accounted for the 
more planned and systematic nature of the reprisal. The shooting incidents reported in 
the evening were probably indiscriminate, however, the bombing of two shops in the 
early hours of the morning in order to cause fire is suggestive of a more considered 
approach. Indeed, E. S. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India and a keen observer 
of Irish affairs, claimed in a memorandum to the Cabinet that the majority of reprisals 
26 N. A. W. O. 32/9537, Report by Macready to the Secretary of the War Office, Reprisals by troops in 
Ireland and their effects on discipline. 1 Sept. 1920. 
27 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, p. 78. 
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were not the result of 'vengeance in hot blood, but of deliberate outage, carefully 
planned and throughout without authoritative and definite permission by uniformed 
men as an answer to outrage. '28 Furthermore, the action at Limerick represented a 
marriage of several of the threads established in previous reprisals: it combined arson 
and vandalism with the killing or injury of civilians. Many future reprisals were to 
follow this lead and aim toward destruction of both people and property. 
Illicit action against the I. R. A. and the general population on the part of British 
soldiers shifted a gear in the spring and summer of 1920 when the very basis of 
agricultural life in Counties Tipperary and Limerick was shattered by the wholesale 
destruction of co-operative creameries. The campaign began in April 1920 at 
Laccamore, County Tipperary following the shooting of two police constables in the 
village. The creameries at both Laccamore and nearby Killoscully were both %%Tecked 
in the initial stage. On 10 April, soldiers destroyed another creamery at Kilcommon in 
broad daylight. Other smaller units at Rear Cross and Knockfune were also burnt 
down during the same week. These attacks would have been unremarkable (and 
might have been regarded as wanton and random destruction of property) had they 
not occurred in such a short space of time within a confined locality. Moreover, given 
these factors, the actions point towards a thoroughgoing campaign on the part of 
elements of the British army against the Irish Agricultural Organization Society 
(I. A. O. S. ) The logic of this vendetta was revealed by the fact that all the sites attacked 
were co-operative creameries; it was no coincidence that the most active rebels 
tended to be the sons of farmers and, according to Martin, `enthusiastic co-operators'. 
Often their livelihoods, and their welfare, were dependent upon the success of the 
creameries. Furthermore `the prosperity of a neighbourhood [was] in fact, more 
closely bound with the prosperity of its creamery than with that of any other 
institution. Hit the creamery and you hit the community. 
29 
Through the creameries campaign, soldiers and policemen had found a means to 
punish the whole community in one `fell swoop", whilst also taking care to ensure 
that their most dangerous enemies were hit the hardest. In addition. soldiers were also 
responding to allegations that creameries were being used as `recognized meeting 
2' N. A., CAB 242084. Memo - Present situation in Ireland - Circulated 
by the Secretary of State for 
India (E. S. Montagu), 10 Nov. 1920. 
29 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, pp. 67-9. 
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places, and distributing centres for the I. R. A. 30 Thus, given their suitability as a focus 
for attack, the military came to pursue a relentless campaign against co-operative 
creameries and dairies. Naturally, the Cabinet always demurred from the notion that 
any `campaign' or `practice of reprisals' was being pursued (in any context) by forces 
of the Crown, to have made such an admission might have implied that they had 
`received the sanction or condonation of the Government. '31 Nonetheless, the 
evidence for an unofficial campaign appears to be almost irrefutable: according to a 
report compiled by George Russell ("AE"), a stalwart of Irish co-operatives, 42 such 
attacks occurred between April and November 1920 of which, at least 31 were 
directly attributed to the military (with or without police co-operation). 3` Hugh 
Martin, writing in August 1920, claimed that in the counties of Tipperary and 
Limerick alone: 
At least fifteen dairies had been wiped out during the preceding 
few months at a loss to the community of £50,000. The progress 
of the co-operative movement - Ireland's `one bright spot' - had 
been stopped with a jolt. 33 
Sir Horace Plunkett, a doyen of the co-operative movement in Ireland, claimed 
that police and troops had inflicted over £150,000 worth of damage to co-operative 
creameries by October 1920.34 After the truce in July 1921, a delegation of the 
American Committee for Relief in Ireland estimated that 15,000 farmers had suffered 
severe loss `from the crippling of the co-operative creameries. ' 35 
George Russell claimed that the sabotage of creameries was a systematic policy 
of retaliation on the part of the Crown forces that followed on directly from the 
destruction of police barracks in the early part of 1920. He saw the dairies campaign 
as having a simple logic: `for every barracks a creamery. '36 However, it is difficult to 
make the destruction of barracks correspond with attacks on creameries and, as we 
30 Record of the Rebellion, p. 38. 
3` Letter drafted by Greenwood on behalf of Lloyd George in response to concerns raised by the Lord 
Bishop of Chelmsford regarding the discipline of Crown troops, dated 8 April 1921, Lloyd George 
Papers, F/19/3/10. 
32 Figures complied from entries contained in G. W. Russell ("AE"), A Plea for Justice, (Dublin, 
undated), pp. 7-24. 
33 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, p. 66. 
Detailed in a letter from E. S. Agnew (Hon. Secretary, London Branch, Irish Dominion League) to 
The 
Times, 2 Oct. 1920, p. 11. 
s O'Malley, On Another Man's Wound, p. 289. 
36 G. W. Russell (`A. E. ') The Irish Homestead (no publishing details given) quoted in Martin, Ireland in 
Insurrection, p. 66. 
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have demonstrated, such attacks, however unbridled. did contain a strong, element of 
forethought. Furthermore, the savage destruction of creameries often followed from 
the most minor infringements to military pride. In July 1920, a young girl attending to 
cattle at her father's holding in County Tipperary was approached by a group of 
young men who proceeded cut her hair with shears and bound her arms and legs. Her 
alleged crime was the familiar accusation of `walking out' with English soldiers. 
When she complained to the local soldiery, troops were reported to have been 
incensed by what they regarded as a cowardly attack on a helpless young woman. 37 
Within a matter of hours a creamery at Newport was burnt to the ground, followed a 
few days later by establishments at Reeska, and the previously damaged units at 
Laccamore and Knockfune. The attack at Newport was particularly telling because it 
led to the ruin of an I. A. O. S. flagship dairy containing valuable machinery and a 
cheese house stocked with £2000 worth of goods. According to a witness, 'twenty or 
more soldiers were present. . . they marched up 
four abreast and the leader, apparently 
a sergeant, gave the order, "Now, lads, over the top! " when they reached the locked 
gates of the creamery yard. ' Other witnesses remembered that shots were fired by 
troops, and the place was set alight at a number of points. After the creamery had 
been razed, the sergeant in charge was heard to say "Now we'll burn the cheese- 
house", further instructing his men to prevent any stock from being salvaged by local 
people while the incendiaries carried out their order. Similarly, in a later incident at 
Upperchurch, policemen and soldiers patrolled the village and surrounding roads in 
lorries, in order to prevent civilians from interfering, while their comrades destroyed 
the creamery. Interestingly (in the case of the Newport Creamery) when the I. A. O. S. 
took their claim for compensation to Nenagh County Court no rebutting evidence 
was offered by the military authorities. '38 This was despite Macready's assertion that 
claims regarding the conduct of soldiers been `untrue and exaggerated' and further 
unsubstantiated allegations that the military were `fired at from the creamery 
premises. '39 
Such disproportionate responses suggest that the creameries campaign «as 
intended as a defiant statement to the community. who must have become aware that 
a clutch of creameries would be destroyed for every outrage perpetrated against the 
'' Russell "AE", .4 Plea 
for Justice, pp. 9-10. 
38 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, pp. 65-73. 
39 Russell, A Plea for Justice, p. 10. 
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Crown forces. However, the campaign, once inaugurated, became entirely self- 
sustaining; the destruction of creameries continued regardless of whether or not 
soldiers were the victims of outrages. As the causal links disappeared, the actions 
could be seen more plainly as an independent and illicit military campaign operating 
far beyond anything prescribed by the military authorities. Unusually, given the 
overall pattern of the conflict, the campaign forced the I. R. A. to adopt a number of 
militarily conventional operations involving the defence of fixed points. Sean Moylan 
recalled how `all creameries in the district [Kanturk, County Cork] were covered by 
the strongest forces we could muster - the British seemed to make a special point of 
destroying creameries. ' 40 
Alongside the creameries campaign, the army participated in other notable 
reprisal actions calculated to hurt Irish society as a whole. As D. G. Boyce has noted it 
was `in September 1920 that the word `reprisals' began to appear with alarming 
regularity in the headlines of the British press. ' Newspaper reports suggested that 
many of the actions at this time were similarly designed as a deliberate affront to Irish 
nationalists in particular. Planning, precision and forethought were discernible in the 
burning of a private house in Killorglin, County Kerry in October 1920, known to 
hold a library containing an important collection of Gaelic manuscripts relating to 
Irish folklore. 41 A similar blow to Irish pride occurred on 30 January 1921, following 
the ambush of a party of soldiers at Teranure, a suburb of Dublin during which, two 
men, including an officer, were seriously injured. In this case the reprisal was carried 
out against Cullinswood House, which was partially wrecked by soldiers yielding 
crowbars, picks and saws. Cullinswood House was formerly St Enda's College, the 
school founded by Patrick Pearse, hero and martyr of the 1916 uprising. The 
institution had been a training ground for the militants of 1916, and was considered 
by Irish nationalists to be a monument to republican tradition. 
42 
Martin provided further strong evidence that the military were devising their own 
lawless approach to controlling unrest in Ireland during his visit to the previously 
quiet village of Hospital in County Limerick. Here he discovered that the creamery 
had been partially wrecked, and an estimated £720 worth of damage inflicted. As an 
investigative journalist, Martin became exasperated at the lack of a sufficient 
40 Moylan, In His Own Words, p. 69. 
41 Copy of a newspaper report included in Colonel R. H. G. Wilson Papers, October 1920. 
42 The Times, Jan. 31,1921 p. 10. 
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explanation for the event: 'certainly no policeman or soldier had been murdered or 
assaulted in the immediate neighbourhood. ' That this incident (lacking any 
discernible background in provocation) could be seen as a new departure in the 
campaign was confirmed by Martin's visit to Roscommon in October 19.0 where he 
discerned another initiative involving `the methodical burning of selected farmsteads 
and large quantities of stacked hay. ' Again, the destruction of property- could not be 
linked to any known attack on the Crown forces in the immediate vicinity: 
The excuse of uncontrollable fury caused by some dastardly 
outrage was altogether absent. In this sense the affair was not so 
much a reprisal for something done as a deliberate piece of 
terrorization to prevent something else from being done in the 
future. 
Pre-emptive reprisals or `disciplinary measures' were to become increasingly 
common amongst the soldiery. Where the government and the military authorities 
could be accused of inconsistency or reacting to events in their approach to military 
policy, elements of the British forces were devising their own provocative and 
consistent methods to combat the uprising. Martin recalled incidents of riflemen joy- 
shooting' after dark in the streets of Abbeyfeale, County Kerry, and the case of two 
young men who were shot dead for simply failing to say `good evening' to a sentry. 
Particularly distasteful was his description of a military lorry driving through 
Limerick `while a soldier fingered the trigger of a heavy swivel gun and swung the 
barrel from side to side. ' This incident prompted him to write `... this sort of thing 
may be expedient, but if so, why pretend that we are acting merely on the 
defensive? '43 
It would appear then that many of the incidents previously filed under the 
heading of `reprisals' were, in fact, examples of the military going on the offensive. 
There can be little doubt that soldiers were becoming increasingly prone to displays 
of power, which can only be regarded as 'disciplinary measures'. Speaking in 
Leicester in October 1920, Herbert Asquith drew attention to the false representation 
of military and police outrages as reprisals, highlighting the systematic nature of such 
actions to suggest that they were rarely a simple reflex response: 
43 Martin, IrdLurl in Insurrection, pp. 75,107,129-131. 
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We have heard a great deal about the police and the military actin- 
in self defence. But outrages have been committed in the name of. or 
at any rate by the officers of the law in the uniforms of soldiers and 
policemen - not in hot blood, but calculated, planned and organized. 
and of which the victims have been innocent, inoffensive civilians. 
He also asserted that his case: 
... rested upon the evidence of perfectly independent, honest, and 
responsible correspondents, not only of the English but of the 
American and European press [He concluded that there was] an 
overwhelming and irrefutable case of systematic and calculated 
outrage on the part of the officers of the Crown. 44 
Ultimately, there is strong reason to believe that a campaign of 'disciplinary 
measures' on the part of the armed forces was entirely counter-productive. Certainly, 
the evidence of outrages in Ireland committed by the I. R. A. against the Crown forces 
and civilians suggests that the simplistic `strike first' logic of the soldiery and the 
police was deeply flawed. Illustrating the peak of the conflict, Irish Office statistics 
suggest that the three months from the end of September to the end of December 
1920 saw 1098 outrages committed by the I. R. A. The following three months saw 
another 2033, with a disproportionately greater incidence of killing or wounding of 
soldiers and policemen. 45 The fallacy of the supposed quietening effect of 
`disciplinary measures' was also exposed by Martin who claimed that: 'neither in 
Clare nor Galway had the number of shootings, kidnappings, and other rebel outrages 
diminished, but rather the reverse. '46 Following a particularly distasteful military 
reprisal in Templemore, County Tipperary, Martin warned that `such 
experiences... manufacture `physical force men' wholesale out of peaceable 
citizens. '47 
Following this, a considerable part of the I. R. A. 's campaign became focused on 
simultaneously limiting the excesses of the Crown forces, whilst maintaining their 
own violent offensive. Marie Coleman uncovered a useful example of how the I. R. A. 
attempted to break the chain of interlocking reprisals via a series of counter-reprisal 
4' The Times, Oct. 30,1920, p. 12. 
45 Townshend, The British Campaign, Appendix V, p. 214. 
46 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, pp. 1 13-4. 
4 Ibid, p. 105. 
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actions. The death of the Lord Mayor of Cork. Terence Macsýxiney, On 25 October 
1920, whilst on hunger strike in Brixton prison, provided the trigger for the killing of 
District Inspector Kelleher on the 31 S` and Constable Cooney of the R. I. C. on 1 
November. On 2 November, combined parties of policemen and troops (by «-aý of 
reprisal) attempted to burn the town of Granard in which Kelleher and Cooney had 
been shot. On this occasion, their attempts were thwarted by a flying column of the 
Longford I. R. A. Still seeking revenge, the British forces headed for Ballinalee (the 
base from which the counter-attack was launched) only to 'fall into an I. R. A. trap by 
driving all their lorries into the centre of the village and thus allowing the five 
sections of the column which were arrayed around the village to attack them from an 
encircling position. '48 
In some cases, I. R. A. units even `factored-in' anticipated reprisals and made 
adequate defensive provisions before launching their own attacks. Such was the case 
in Tubercurry, County Sligo, on 30 September 1920 following the ambush of an 
R. I. C lorry which resulted in the death of Detective Inspector Brady. Frank Carty of 
Sligo I. R. A. claimed that `in anticipation of reprisals he sent a group of men under the 
charge of Charles Gidea to take up position in the vicinity of Rathscanlon creamery, 
near Tubercurry. ' Further parties took up position in the town square at Tubercurry 
suspecting that reprisals would be directed towards local republican businesses. 
However, on this occasion the party of police and military proved to be too strong for 
the counter-reprisal squad who were forced to retreat. 49 
Only rarely did incidents of this kind seriously interrupt the cycle of terror and 
counter-terror. For the most part, preventative measures only prompted the side 
seeking revenge to return in greater numbers thereby sparking off new rounds of 
reprisals, which (following the dynamic) became more savage and ambitious in 
character. The developing situation was adequately summarised by Dr Cohalan. the 
Bishop of Cork, in a pastoral address on 19 December 1920.50 Bishop Cohalan 
referred to the killing of Constable Murthagh of the R. I. C. in March 1920, as the 
event that prompted `the terrible reprisal murder of Lord, Mayor MacCurtain' which 
48 Coleman, County Longford, pp. 123-24. 
49 Farry, Sligo 1914-2?. pp. 245-6 
so This address was focused on the shooting of Constable Murtagh on Pope's Quay on 19 March 1920 
which was a rebel response to a series of police raids on Sinn Fein clubs in Cork. Likewise these raids 
were a response to the killing of Inspector McDonagh who lost his life whilst guarding ballot bo\cs in 
a municipal election. It is also likely that this particular series of interlocking assassinations ultimately 
led to the death of the Lord Mayor of Cork, Tomas MacCurtain, in the early hours of 20 %larch 1920. 
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thereby sparked 'a devils' competition in feats of murder and arson between members 
of the Volunteer organization and agents of the Crown. '5' 
Very soon regular military operations such as raids, patrols and round-ups -were 
quickly degenerating into reprisals, and violent acts were being committed under the 
pretence of duty. Take, for example, Sean Moylan's description of a militar-Y, raid on 
Noonan's farm near Liscarroll: 
The father and one son, Paddy, were in the house ... Mr Noonan 
and his son were questioned and beaten. Finally, the son, a boy 
of nineteen, was brought out placed against the wall and riddled 
with bullets. As he lay on the ground, the officer in charge put a 
bullet through his face, smashing his jaw and teeth and almost 
severing his tongue. 52 
Sometimes routine military operations became converted into reprisal actions or 
grossly indisciplined operations when raiding parties were stirred by breaking news. 
In an exceptionally explicit account, Colonel J. M. Hulton remembered being asked to 
plan a joint police and military raid on a Sinn Fein meeting being held under the 
guise of a dance at Cahirguillamore House (County Limerick. ) The raid was intended 
to be a regular military operation, aimed at making arrests and procuring arms, 
consequently Hulton took great pains concerning the precision planning of the event. 
He remembered how, given that the operation was to take place shortly after 
Christmas Day, officers, men and policemen had little appetite for the job. Hoy,, ever, 
their enthusiasm was awakened when `news came in that a policeman, walking with a 
girl in the city [Limerick] had been fired upon, and the girl had been killed. This 
episode rather increased the general interest in the operation. ' 
Passions were further inflamed by the news that the meeting was being attended by 
men involved in an earlier ambush against the police at Grange, County Limerick. 
The strength of feeling was such that when D. I. Regan of the R. I. C. requested 40 
policemen for the raid 'about sixty men paraded' including a number of `R. I. C. motor 
mechanics' yielding `large, useful looking spanners in their hands. ' The mood was 
51 The Times, Dec. 20 1920, p. 10. 
`z Moylan, In His Own ! Fords. Miraculously . 
Moylan claimed that Paddy Noonan survived the attack 
despite receiving 10 bullets at point blank range. It is also claimed that he went on to father 10 
children, a fact which prompted Moylan to jibe that 'England's problem in Ireland cannot be solved 
in 
her munitions factories. ' p. 64. 
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such that Hulton (whilst being conveyed to Cahirguillamore House in a Crossley van) 
remembered stopping at a nearby cottage where he promptly smashed the window 
with the butt of his revolver demanding that the inmates give him directions, an 
action that prompted their children to `wild... sickening... dreadful screams. ' When 
the military and two police parties finally arrived, five suspected rebels were shot 
outside the entrance to the house (in spite of an earlier "No shooting" order issued by 
District Inspector Regan. ) Another man, shot and wounded in the attack, managed to 
escape but was later spotted by a police patrol 'who fired and brought him down . with 
a lucky bullet through the top of his head. ' With the Crown forces in total control, the 
remaining attendees were rounded up and packed tightly against the side wall. 
Despite their `frantic, monkey-like screams' the troops held them in the hall for over 
two hours and forced them to listen to soldiers and policemen singing a' fervent 
chorus of "God save the King" and "Rule Britannia. "' Hulton regarded the operation 
(the very first under martial law) as being `entirely successful [and] the only 
operation in the Brigade area which produced direct and lasting results over a whole 
area right up to the truce. '53 Indeed, the operation did secure the arrest of 138 rebels, 
many of whom were subsequently court-martialled and sentenced to a combined total 
of `600 years imprisonment. ' 54 Hulton's account demonstrates the belief amongst 
troops that they could gain the upper hand in the conflict through the sheer weight of 
military violence. However, his belief was perhaps slightly overstated; attacks on the 
Crown forces did continue unabated in Limerick, most notably at Drumkeen, where a 
police patrol were crushed by a rebel ambush on 3 February 1921. 
Raiding parties were also prone to petty theft. Considering the period as a whole, 
over 2,000 claims of theft arose in connection with military search and raid 
operations. This was in spite of attempts in some areas to discourage such actions: 
G. J. Ball, still investigating allegations of theft against the military as late as March 
1924, claimed that in some areas: 
The military party was.. . under an officer and 
before starting out 
the men were searched and their ammunition counted. On their 
53 Colonel J. M. Hulton, The Operation at Cahirguillamore House' TS memoir. p. 2, Peter Liddle 
Collection, Brotherton Library. Leeds Uni' ersitY. 
`' Rebellion. 6th Div., p. 65. 
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return to barracks they were searched again and their rifles 
examined and their ammunition checked. " 
However it would appear that this form of protection was not always rigorously 
enforced. Martin witnessed disturbing aspects of raid conduct (« hich effectively 
amounted to armed robbery) during his investigation into a raid on the premises of 
Mr. O'Rorke, a schoolmaster from Tarmon, County Roscommon. In this case the 
raiders attempted, unsuccessfully, to bum down the premises and: ' ... 
it was owing to 
this fact that Mrs O'Rorke knew that when the raiders left they took with them all the 
spoons, forks and knives, a quantity of china, a silver watch and all the towels in the 
house. ' 56 
Predictably, evidence that raids were being used for the purpose of theft is harder 
to discern amongst sources generated by soldiers. However, F. A. S Clarke suggested 
that stealing during the course of raids was commonplace, and a likelihood that was 
sometimes anticipated by householders. During the search of a farm near Kinsale, 
Clarke remembered how `a spinster with a nasty sneer produced a bottle of whisky 
from a drawer and handed it towards me so as to show that in,,, sergeant had forgotten 
to pick it up. '57 
Besides the opportunities for minor theft, there is also a suggestion that soldiers 
in some districts appropriated goods from local farmers and shopkeepers (usually in 
response to their refusal to trade with the military). Martin suggested that this 
behaviour was another feature in the general bullying of civilians by the military. 
During his visit to the village of Hospital, Martin discovered that the local soldiery 
were indiscriminately firing rounds in the village streets in order to frighten the 
villagers into submission. The indiscipline of these young soldiers was so notorious 
that the military authorities were forced to change the command of the garrison. 
Martin recalled how the villagers were `pathetically grateful' to the new officer ' for 
ss N. A., W. O. 32/9577, Memorandum by G. J. Ball on the Procedure of Crown Forces in Connection 
with Raids and Services in Ireland, (1) Discussions and references to the Cabinet on measures to 
restore law and order and the respective responsibilities of ministers and the General Officer 
Commanding; (2) Great Britain: (estimated strength after imminent end of coal crisis). Ball urged a 
note of caution regarding the figure of 2000 claims, indicating that where misconduct was alleged, in 
most cases `the claimant was himself arrested or incriminating matter found as the result of the search. ' 
March 1924. 
sb Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, p. 112. 
57 Clarke, 'Memoirs of a Professional Soldier', Chapter 6, p. 4. 
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having at once put a stop to the theft of eggs, the trick of refusing to pay for drink 
consumed, and the bullying habits of the young soldiery. 58 
Indeed, the problem of theft (as well as other forms of gross indiscipline) was so 
widespread that it was publicly recognised by the military authorities, albeit rather 
belatedly. In a remarkable admission, possibly designed to promote the case for 
regularizing reprisals, Churchill, the Secretary of State for War, confessed that 'the 
troops are getting out of control, taking the law into their own hands. and that besides 
clumsy and indiscriminate destruction, actual thieving and looting... are taking 
place. ' 59 
The reprisal that followed the Fermoy ambush provided copy for this admission. 
Following the wrecking of 50-60 shops in the town, troops were reported to have 
been seen `marching to the barracks, swinging boots and shoes in their hands. ' 
Furthermore, `a jewellery shop received particular attention' and later, when military 
pickets turned out for duty in the town, `most of the stock in the windows was carried 
off. ' The military (with the help of a band of opportunist civilian followers) were 
estimated to have looted goods to the value of £2,000, besides causing £ 1,000 worth 
of damage by the breaking of windows. 60 In addition, the military were also found 
guilty of inciting or, at the very least, failing to discourage civilians from harvesting 
the loot. During a night of serious incendiarism in Cork on 11 December 1920, a 
civilian witness recalled how a soldier `dressed in ordinary "Tommy" uniform' 
seemingly `engrossed with his own loot... did not interfere' when 'four or five women 
and a civilian came and looted many pairs of boots. ' Other looters followed, however 
nobody was `interfered with by the soldiers who could see all that was going on. ' 61 
Sometimes thefts were carried out with a clear purpose. Martin remembered his 
first visit to Templemore, County Tipperary, in August 1920, where he discovered 
that police and soldiers had stolen a large quantity of petrol from a neighbouring 
garage, and had used their loot to burn down the market hall as a reprisal for the 
recent killing of D. I. Wilson in the town. 62 For the most part, purposeless looting and 
theft were simply `part and parcel' of reprisal actions. In some cases, illicit actions 
against property were accompanied by the beating and intimidation of civilians, 
58 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, pp. 76-7. 
59 Memo by Churchill. 3 November 1920, quoted in Townshend. The British Campaign, p. 122. 
60 The Times, Sept. 10,1919, p. 10. 
61 The Irish Labour Partm, and Trade Union Congress, The Burning o( Cork City by British Forces, 
December 1920, (Cork, 1978), Part I- Who Burnt Cork City? ' p. 48. 
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especially in cases where reprisal parties were known to have indulged in heavy and 
sustained alcohol use. As the major part of Patrick Street. Cork burned on the night of 
11 December, one witness claimed that a young soldier 'very drunk and showing his 
rifle to a youngster' turned the rifle on him as he approached, forcing him to grapple 
with him in order to turn the `rifle to one side'. This defensive action resulted in the 
witness being shot in the arm, as opposed to the 'left breast' as the soldier had 
intended. 63 On a return visit to Templemore in December 1920, Martin witnessed 
another reprisal in the town (which is worth quoting at length) that followed the 
ambushing of a party of the 1 st Northamptonshire Regiment. His description evokes 
an almost carnival-like atmosphere, in which drunkenness and larceny were very 
much part of the festivities: 
They broke first into Morkin's, a spirit grocer's premises, and 
looted a quantity of whisky, which they drank in the 
street... . 
Then they attacked Michael Kelly's public house and 
after taking a great deal more to drink burnt it down in the most 
determined fashion 
.... 
The window smashing began next. 
Fogarty's, a large drapery house, was easily looted by breaking 
its plate-glass windows. Much of the stock was thrown into the 
river, but the men dressed themselves also in what they fancied, 
dancing up and down the street attired in ladies' blouses and 
autumn millinery. Many of the men seemed to be riotously 
drunk. Having set fire to a bicycle shop.. . they 
looted a jewellers 
by the light of the flames.. . one soldier proved 
himself to be an 
expert performer on a stolen mandoline. Another, having with 
some comrades broken into a private house where a sick woman 
happened to be lying, played ragtime tunes on a piano. 
64 
Martin's account also exposed the soldiers' appetite for arson. By the summer of 
1920, vandalism (involving the breaking of windows and the defacing of monuments) 
gradually gave way to a more persistent campaign of burning property and contents. 
Following rebel attacks on soldiers, houses or business premises belonging to 
republican families were often destroyed in lieu of the military being able to punish 
63 The Irish Labour Party and T. U. C., The Burning of Cork City, p. 49. 
6-' Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, pp. 102-4. 
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those responsible. As the conflict progressed, incendiaries became even less 
discriminate, and the homes of civilians, as well as civic buildings, were reduced to 
ashes. In addition, burnings prompted an equally indiscriminate riposte on the part of 
the I. R. A. against the homes of Protestants. In two parallel campaigns, the Crown 
forces assumed homogeneity amongst the populace to justify their actions and the 
I. R. A. took the pre-supposition of `loyalty' to direct their operations. Soon 
combatants on both sides became `locked into an arson competition which became 
part of the cycle of reprisals. ' In County Cork alone, the seven months from January 
to July 1921 saw the destruction of 93 buildings by the I. R. A., and a further 67 by the 
Crown forces, bringing the respective totals between Januare 1920 and July 1921 to 
209 and 216.65 Lady Gregory recalled how, upon hearing lorries full of Crown force 
troops `firing and shouting' as they descended on the town of Gort, County Galway, 
local people had became accustomed to putting their furniture out in the streets 
`expecting the burnings to begin. ' 66 
The origin of military reprisals involving arson is difficult to discern, but it was 
probably the next logical step in a campaign of vandalism, looting and intimidation. 
The Times, under the editorship of Wickham Steed who `placed no restrictions on his 
"leader writers"' played a key role in exposing military reprisals involving arson: 67 
after the devastating reprisal at Fermoy in September 1919, which involved large- 
scale vandalism, May 1920 saw a joint police and military reprisal in Limerick that 
resulted in the bombing of a flour shop and a drapery establishment. In this case the 
resulting fires were easily extinguished before extensive damage was caused. 68 The 
spring of 1920 also saw the beginning of the creameries campaign which, as we have 
demonstrated, relied on burning as its most effective weapon. 
Besides attacks on creameries (which tended to be methodical and efficient), the 
first significant arson attack against public buildings occurred in July 1920 in the 
small town of Tuam, County Galway. The build-up to the reprisal contained all the 
elements necessary for a large-scale revenge attack. On the night of 19 July 1920, two 
policemen were killed in an ambush whilst returning by motor wagon to Tuam from 
Galway Assizes. Parties of police and 'Dragoon Guards' were detailed to track down 
those responsible for murdering their colleagues but having failed to do so returned to 
65 Hart, the I. R. A. and Its Enemies, p. 101. 
66 L. Robinson (ed), Lady Gregory's Journals (Dublin, 1973) p. 136. 
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Tuam at 3am the next morning. Other policemen and troops stationed in the town 
were engaged in a "wake" for their colleagues, which lasted until 5am and, following 
the tradition, involved a heavy use of alcohol. The scene was set for a devastating 
reprisal: the patrolling party's desire for revenge had not yet been sated, and 
remaining troops were intoxicated with alcohol and thoughts of revenge. Matters 
worsened when the returning party allegedly threatened to shoot a young Sinn Feiner 
in his lodgings. Fortunately their actions were thwarted by the Valiant efforts of a 
senior policeman who removed the target to a local bridewell for his own safety. Not 
yet satisfied, the Crown forces finally opened fire in the town, and their shots were 
mixed with the sound of grenades exploding. When the barrage had ceased, the 
smoke cleared to reveal that a number of buildings had been bombed or set alight, 
among them a large drapery warehouse, containing 120,000 worth of stock and 
fittings' and the Town Hall which had been set alight by the blast from a hand- 
grenade. Furthermore `the progress of the fire was aided by the application of 
paraffin. ' The fire spread rapidly to other `business establishments' owing to `the 
flames being swept by the wind across a narrow street. ' 69 
Similar scenes were to become alarmingly familiar in Irish towns. Commander of 
the 1st Lincolnshire Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel R. H. G. Wilson kept a personal 
record of notable reprisal actions in Ireland which point towards a catalogue of 
sustained arson attacks between August and December 1920. In August, a party of 
troops set fire to a lodging house in James Street, Tipperary after cutting the `urban 
council's hose' in order to ensure that the fire remained `beyond control'. Previously 
burnt out houses, in the process of repair, were `again bombed and set on fire, and 
only the walls now remain. ' Similar precautions were taken at Tralee in October 
1920, when armed men `kept up rifle firing throughout Sunday night' in order to 
deter any would be rescuers; in the absence of any opposition their colleagues burned 
several buildings including the County Hall. In October, at Ballyduff `a creamery and 
some of the chief business houses in the village were burned down', bridges enabling 
access to the village were also bombed. Killorglin also witnessed the destruction of 
several dwelling houses in October. In December, a cinema hall in Tullamore was 
bombed and burned, whilst other troops set about burning and demolishing the local 
69 The Times, July 21 1920, p. 14. 
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transport workers hall, finally turning their attention to the offices of a local Sinn 
Fein club, and the houses of several Sinn Feiners. - 70 
In an evocative account, Ernie O'Malley described (with a touch of hyperbole) 
how, at the height of the arson campaign, Irish towns stood like jagged stumps of 
broken teeth where the fires had spread. '71 F. H. Vinden even recorded a (rather 
tasteless) doggerel poem concerning a fictitious military operation that aimed at the 
wholesale destruction of a town as an effective means by which to root-out 
extremists: 
And just to show them that 'twas no more play, we burnt the 
parish church and C. P. A., 
This didn't yield us the desired effect, not even with the Manse 
completely wrecked, 
So as they held their ground at half-past nine, we blew the 
Gospel Hall up with a mine. 72 
Further to attacks against creameries and religious or public buildings, new 
avenues also emerged in the arson campaign. Arriving in Roscommon in October 
1920, Martin found that `in the place of the usual destruction of shops and cottages in 
some small country town, we had here the methodical burning of selected farmsteads 
and large quantities of stacked hay. ' He further observed that incendiaries drove from 
place to place, carrying their petrol with them... instead of indulging in an orgy at one 
spot. From his investigations he discovered that a lorry carrying policemen and 
soldiers had set out from the small town of Castlerea, County Roscommon, on 5 
October 1920. After `shooting up' windows in the town, they drove to the village of 
Ballinagare, where the `shop and house' of Patrick Martin `was sprinkled with petrol 
and set alight' whilst his family were held at gunpoint. Shortly after, an explosion on 
the first floor caused the whole premises to collapse. The raiders repeated their 
actions in a neighbouring premises belonging to `Mr Kelly, farmer and general 
merchant' also destroying `a large quantity of hay, nearly eight tons' which was 
carefully lit in several places and totally destroyed. ' Descending on a farm in Dereen 
belonging to Thomas Hanly: `aged eighty seven years', some of the party set fire to a 
70 These accounts are drawn from various newspaper reports that appear in scrapbook form in the 
Colonel R. H. G. Wilson Papers. 
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30ft haystack, whilst other raiders doused the farmhouse in petrol and 'burnt the place 
to the ground: `as they watched the flames rise the men shouted, 'That's the stuff to 
give `em. ' The shouts mingled with the shrieks of a sow and ten young pi-L's which 
were being burned to death. ' The same party were also found to be responsible for the 
destruction of a farm at Tarmon on the same night. In this case, the family were given 
`five minutes to live' while their house was burned, along with 'three stacks of oats' 
stored in the barn. The incendiaries concluded their tour de force in Roscommon, by 
attempting to destroy the house of the schoolmaster Mr O'Rorke. The flames were 
eventually extinguished leaving the house seriously damaged. Martin later recalled, 
rather ominously, that the same raiders returned six weeks later and 'Mr O'Rorke's 
house was again set alight, and this time completely destroyed. ' ^' 
In this case, the actions of Crown force terrorists were reminiscent of the earlier 
creameries campaign: they were distinguished by clarity of purpose, organisation and, 
more worryingly, resounding success. Interestingly, Martin's account offered an 
unwitting explanation for the methodical nature of the reprisal. His interviews with 
scores of witnesses drew attention to several crucial distinctions of rank between 
those who participated in the nights violence. In particular, Mrs Martin, the wife of 
Patrick Martin whose corner shop was destroyed that night, remembered being held at 
gunpoint against the wall while the burning was in progress. Interestingly, she 
remembered that her captor was a man wearing a trench coat who described himself 
as `an officer'. Similarly, Patrick Flynn, the son of Frank Flynn whose farm was 
destroyed at Dereen, remembered being held at gunpoint under repeated threat of 
death by a man similarly dressed in a trench coat. He also remembered that the same 
man `placed over him as guard a man dressed in the uniform of a sergeant of the 
British Army. This man obeyed the orders of the man in the trench coat as though he 
were an officer. ' Furthermore, the uniformed soldier seemed `much distressed at his 
position' and was keen to help Flynn bind a wound he had sustained during the 
attack. Mrs O'Rorke, also recalled that the man in the trench coat was responsible for 
'supervising the smashing of all the looking glasses and windows within reach and 
the drenching of the stairs and other wood-work. ' The mysterious individual also 
73 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, pp. 108-12. 
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made repeated death threats against her absent husband, in spite of the apologies of 
other soldiers `who seemed much upset' at the action that was taking place. 74 
These eyewitness accounts are significant because they point towards several 
unexplored features of reprisal actions. In particular, they suggest that reprisals or 
disciplinary measures could be characterized by a chain of command. The account 
also incriminates officers as well as men and suggests that colleagues (particularly 
superiors) may have coerced one another to participate. Previous studies have 
suggested that reprisals were the independent actions of small knots of young 
policemen or soldiers typically drawn from the lower ranks, representing the 
equivalent of I. R. A. `murder gangs'. However (excepting the case of `official 
reprisals') the relative involvement of officers and men in punitive actions has never 
been fully explored. Certainly, the evidence of soldiers, investigators and journalists 
suggests that these actions involved the full spectrum of military personnel. They also 
suggest that the success of illicit actions was dependent upon a definite command 
structure. Eyewitnesses to the aforementioned attack on the Newport creamery were 
surprised by the formality with which soldiers carried out their actions. James Parker, 
the courthouse caretaker, recalled how soldiers marched to the scene in full militar\ 
formation. Patrick Bourke, another witness, confirmed that the officer in charge 
dispensed orders as though it were a regular military operation. Denis Ryan, the 
manager of the creamery, provided further strong evidence that an officer was 
supervising and spearheading the action. He recalled that the soldier in charge 
detailed some of his men to prevent stock being salvaged whilst others set about 
burning the creamery. Therefore, the testimonies of three independent witnesses 
suggested that reprisals or disciplinary measures had qualities akin to official military 
operations; both depended upon the exercise of authority and a clear division of 
labour. 75 
Similarly, during a night of reprisals in Cork on the night of 11 December 1920, 
eye witnesses observed a unit of `fourteen to sixteen' soldiers under the `charge of an 
officer in uniform' formed 'into two files ... 
[with] the leading man in each file 
carrying what appeared to be an iron bar'. They continued to `go through movements 
of a military nature' before marching to Marlboro' Street in order to 'smash ', indo-Vw-s 
on both sides of the street. ' Again, the action appears to undermine the familiar image 
'a Ibid, pp. 106-12. 
75 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, pp. 65-73. 
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of reprisals as a highly secretive and illicit activity, perpetrated by, gangs who had 
`broken ranks'. Far from losing their discipline, those involved in this incident were 
drilled and instructed at all stages in order to maximise their destructive potential. '6 
Similar qualities were evident during Martin's visit to Granard. County 
Longford, in early November 1920 to ascertain the facts surrounding the partial 
destruction of the town in an arson attack. During his visit, further reprisal acts were 
committed against the town. One such act was distinguished by the fact that it was 
directed from first to last by a `tall fellow in khaki officer's uniform, with leggings, 
riding breeches and a cane. ' This individual was said to have 'kept excellent order 
throughout. There was no shouting, no drunkenness, only a little music on mouth 
organs. ' After a night of relentless attacks, the dust settled to reveal that ' Granard "as 
a ruin. It had been coolly, scientifically, methodically. gutted by men who from first 
to last remained under some sort of discipline. Planned vengeance had had its ordered 
result. ' 77 
On other occasions, officers were implicated in the chaos and the disorder that 
accompanied reprisals or regular operations. In the midst of desperate actions, 
officers' seniority still held considerable weight. Darrel Figgis, an active republican 
and a prominent member of the Däil's Commission of Enquiry, recalled how a 
meeting of the Leitrim and Roscommon County Councils was interrupted when the 
door of the Council Chamber was flung open and a body of military entered, with 
bayonets fixed, led by two officers, a captain and a lieutenant, each with large 
revolvers in their hands. ' Figgis was ordered to give his name and, being a wanted 
man: 
... the effect on the 
Captain was startling. It is hard for me not to 
appear to exaggerate that effect, for indeed he behaved like a 
villain in a melodrama -a dangerous villain, with almost 
unlimited power in his hand. He levelled his revolver at me and 
ordered my instant arrest. 
Figgis also revealed how the captain (acting beyond his authority) 'announced 
his 
intention to try us instantly by drum-head court martial... it was clear to us all that 
he 
76 The Irish Labour Party and T. U. C., The Burning of Cork City, p. 57- 
77 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, pp. 151-6. 
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meant to execute his sentence. -78 He also noted that the soldiers under the officer's 
command `were terrified, but when I protested to them in his absence they replied 
that they did not want him to turn upon them'. Figgis was later liberated b\ the timely 
intervention of the Clerk of the Crown of Peace, and recalled: 
I wondered how it came about that an officer; so clearly mad 
should continue in authority. It was not till afterwards that I 
learned that he had but a few days been liberated from hospital 
after a drinking bout followed by delirium tremens. 79 
Figgis' account suggests that there may have been some distrust of the system of 
court martial, given that some officers were attempting to punish their enemies by 
subverting legal means. Certainly, in pursuit of summary justice many officers did 
display a cavalier disregard for human life. Lieutenant Colonel M. B. Savage 
remembered the events of 28 February 1921 - the day that six republicans were 
executed in the Cork city barracks - an event that prompted the local I. R. A. to shoot 
12 unarmed soldiers in the streets. The assassins were traced to a nearby barn 
whereupon: 
... the officer who 
found them, told them that he would give them 
a sporting chance, there was a hedge on the side of the hill and he 
told them that his men would open fire when they got there. Four 
of them were killed, the fifth got away, but ran into another of 
our pickets and they shot him' 80 
In this case, the officer used the letter of military law to punish his assailants by death 
(in the sense that he ordered their escape before firing a shot). 
A. M. Jameson, based in Gough Barracks at the Curragh, wrote to a letter home to 
his mother in May 1916 in which he recounted the actions of his corporal 
during 
street fighting in Dublin. With misplaced humour Jameson recalled 
host : 
The corporal saw a civilian walking where a whole lot of Sinn 
Feiners were, he said he didn't know whether he was a Sinn 
18 According to Percival, a Drum-head Court-Martial was only permissible 
in cases where rebels %kere 
caught with arms in their hands. ' Guerrilla Warfare (I), p. 20. 
79 Figgis, Recollections of the Irish {i"ar, p. 305. 
80 Lieutenant Colonel M. B. Savage, MS memoir, Looking Back; The stor - of my 1i1L'. p. 
126 quoted in 
Hart, The LR.. -i. and Its Enemies, p. 99. 
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Feiner or not, but anyhow he oughtn't to be there, so he'd "just 
shoot him the foot. " [sic] So he aimed with his rifle and fired, 
and the man hopped all down the street on one leg! 
Jameson (an officer himself) also commented that it was `one of the best shots I saw. ' 
Even more disturbing was his description of the Dublin skyline ablaze during the 
1916 rebellion. A sight repellent to most, Jameson regarded the fires as 'the most 
gorgeous thing I've ever seen. ' 81 
In most cases it could be argued that, whilst not taking an active role in reprisals 
themselves, some officers were guilty of failing to prevent them and this ability to 
`turn a blind eye' could be seen as a tacit encouragement by lower ranks. On other 
occasions, the decisions made by officers could be said to have promoted the 
likelihood of reprisals: F. A. S. Clarke remembered attending a football match between 
the Essex Regiment and the local R. I. C. The game was suddenly interrupted when 
`fire was opened on both players and spectators from the edge of a nearby -wood. ' The 
shooting resulted in the death of a soldier. Following the incident, Clarke recalled 
being `ordered to take a patrol out'. In so doing, he `chose the dead fellow's platoon' 
being fully aware that they were `anxious' for revenge. 82 
Despite a general acceptance of the logic of reprisals amongst some officers, the 
most serious outrages such as killings or counter-murders were usually remarked 
upon with due seriousness. Wimberley recalled the murder of a civilian by a British 
soldier: `he had been out on his own secretly by night. I think the madman concerned 
was the same individual who was soon after removed from our regiment and the 
army. ' 83 
Nonetheless, despite being aware of assassins in their midst, most officers and 
other ranks were prone to absolve the military from wrongdoing and consign 
disciplinary problems to their colleagues in the R. I. C, particularly to the ne« recruits. 
J. P. Swindlehurst described Black and Tan and Auxiliary troops as 'miniature 
arsenals' roaming the country committing `bloodthirsty deeds' armed with 'a 
brace of 
revolvers on each hip. bandoleers of ammunition slung around, and a short musket to 
finish off the ensemble. '84 In a similarly critical tone, J. E. P. Brass recalled a startling 
81 Jameson, letter to his mother, 2 May 1916. 
82 Clarke, 'Memoirs of a Professional Soldier', Chapter 6, p. 6. 
g' Wimberley, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 152. 
84 Swindlehurst, MS diary, 8-9 Jan. 1921. 
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conversation with a Black and Tan on a ferry crossing to Ireland in which the young 
cadet: `... told [him] with some glee that he had thirty seven 'kills' to his credit. '8 
Another general was equally disdainful of his colleagues in the R. I. C., describing 
Black and Tans as veterans of the Great War `... of the type who would not or could 
not settle down in civil life ... some were undoubtedly no more or less than real 
"thugs". On joint patrols with the R. I. C. the same general felt the need to observe the 
policemen as closely as his surroundings: `to see that they did not commit an-- 
atrocities when they were acting under my command'. 86 This need to 'police the 
police' was echoed by E. M. Ransford who claimed that: `it was to say the least 
difficult for disciplined troops to co-operate with the Black and Tans'. 87 Therefore, in 
the perceptions of soldiers and the general public alike, Black and Tans monopolized 
the violence perpetrated by the Crown forces. Likewise, government advisors and 
other officials also impressed this image upon the Cabinet. The notion that counter- 
terror was spearheaded by the R. I. C. without military collusion was evident in 
W. E. Wylie's declaration at a Cabinet conference that an 'Irish policeman either sav. 
white or saw red; if he saw white he resigned from the force through terrorism, and if 
he saw red he committed a counter-outrage'. This was tantamount to declaring that all 
88 existing serving policemen were involved in committing outrages. Most soldiers 
also failed to connect reprisals to the military, instead confining their whole 
discussion of the subject to outrages committed by Black and Tans or Auxiliaries. 
Even the army's official account claimed that while `several cases of retaliation had 
occurred amongst the R. I. C. ' the `army was practically free from this taint. ' 
89 
An officer's wife was aware of the notoriety which Auxiliary troops had 
achieved in Dublin. In her description of her husband's role in military raids in 
Dublin, she revealed that `the occupants of the house were generally terribly 
frightened but when they realised the raiders were soldiers and not the much feared 
Auxiliaries they became much calmer. '90 Clearly, many soldiers felt that the Black 
and Tans and the Auxiliary cadets with their `bullying' habits, their appetite for 'hard- 
R` Brass, `Diary of a War Cadet', p. 234. 
86 Wimberley, `Scottish Soldier' p. 153. 
87 Ransford, One Man's Tide', p. 19. 
88 N. A., CAB 2411693, W. E. Wylie (Law Advisor) to conference. Notes of conference - Officers of the 
Irish Government - 10 Downing Street, Friday 23`d July, 1920. 89 Record of the Rebellion, p. 22. 
90 Anon, Experiences of an Officer's j1'ijc, p. 63. 
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living' and their 'exotic habits', had found their true calling in Ireland. 91 One soldier 
even remarked that `one would think that this trouble was made specially to amuse 
them and they alone. ' 92 
Despite Macready's confident (post-conflict) assertion that 'unauthorized 
reprisals on the part of the Army [had been] effectually checked by the autumn of 
1920' there was, nonetheless, a remarkable growth in the scale, ambition and 
regularity of reprisals in the latter half of 1920.93 This brought a belated recognition 
from the government that stemming the tide was well beyond the capacity of military 
commanders under the current system of court martial. With this recognition came 
the notion of incorporating reprisals into a broader military strategy aimed at 
diverting troops' energies into more productive channels. The official line on reprisals 
reflected a characteristic ambiguity in policy direction. Despite the insistence of 
Macready, Lloyd George felt unable to commit the government to such a 
responsibility, although he was aware of commentators' suggestions that unofficial 
reprisals were contributing to the quieting of hostile districts. Indeed, Sturgis (at least 
privately) advocated the view that illicit reprisals were the only effective counter- 
insurgency method left open to the Crown forces: 
There is no doubt that we have benefited by them. Yet we have 
been driven into repudiating them and saying they will be 
stopped. If they stop S. F. [Sinn Fein]stock will rise higher than if 
they had never been, unless the Big Wigs in London find a 
substitute that will satisfy the "armed forces" and have an 
equally discouraging effect on the gunmen. 
94 
The Prime Minister differed in his public and private attitude towards reprisals in 
such a way that Crown force troops could easily be forgiven for drawing some 
encouragement from his behaviour: 
91 Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, p. 23. British veteran officers were recruited to 
form an Auxiliar} 
Division of the R. I. C. (A. D. R. I. C. ) Over the period, 2214 such veterans were recruited 
into a force that 
remained virtually independent from both military or police authorities. 
The creation of the force was 
based on the assumption that officers who had distinguished themselves 
in the Great War would 
similarly adapt to the demands of guerrilla warfare. 
92 Swindlehurst, MS diary, 31 Jan. 1921. 
93 Macready, Annals, Volume II, p. 502. 
94 Strugis Diaries, 1 Oct. 1920. 
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Lloyd George privately urged restraint on the Crown forces, but 
in public he defended them against all criticism... the professed 
champion of the rights of small nations allow[ed] himself to be 
tied to repression in Ireland, and condone[d] methods similar to 
those he had condemned in South Africa twenty years before. 9, 
Certainly, his reluctance to prevent troops from entering into a `competition in crime 
with the rebels' and his failure to express his concerns to his colleagues regarding 
Crown discipline until as late as February 1921, suggest that he was not the 'prisoner 
of his Cabinet' in this respect. 96 
It would appear, however, that Macready was more torn between the need to 
maintain army discipline and troops' fragile morale: 
He sees clearly that to wink at organised reprisals is the end of 
discipline. On the other hand he said frankly that a regiment that 
did not try to break out when a story.. . was told them. . . that one 
of their comrades had been chucked in the Liffey and shot in the 
water, was not worth a damn, and he had to be careful not to 
make them sullen and take the heart out of them. 97 
E. S. Montagu even suggested that the government felt a misplaced sense of obligation 
to the military and allowed them to exact their own punishments in the absence of 
their being able to effectively punish those who were provoking them by legal means. 
To Montagu, this form of acquiescence `in unlawful and often vicarious punishment' 
gave troops `every reason to believe that the government [had] encouraged them in 
the action that they [felt] justified in taking. '98 Indeed, Fitzpatrick went further than 
most in claiming: 
Though never a declared policy of Lloyd George's government, 
the campaign of violent reprisals was applauded by Churchill at 
the War Office and condoned at every level of administration. 
95 Boyce, `How to Settle the Irish Question' in Taylor (ed) - Lloyd George: Twelve Essays, p. 149. 
96 Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State, p. 39; Lloyd George to Greenwood, letter dated 2i 
February 1921, in which the Prime Minister declared himself to be not at all satisfied ww ith the state of 
discipline of the Royal Irish Constabulary and its Auxiliary force' Lloyd George Papers, F/l9 3 4, 
Hopkinson, 'Negotiation' in Augusteijn, The Irish Revolution 1913-23, p. 126. 
97 Sturgis Diaries, 19 Aug. 1920. 
98 N. A., CAB 24'2084. Memo - Present situation in Ireland - Circulated by the 
Secretary of State for 
India (E. S. Montagu). 10 Nov. 19-'0. 
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notwithstanding mild expressions of regret for the 
understandable excesses of men under intolerable pressure. 99 
Indeed, a number of official sources give a clear impression that illicit reprisals 
were tolerated for their purpose as an effective counter-insurgency weapon. The 
authors of the `Record of the Rebellion' were adamant that retaliation had 'produced 
such a quelling effect upon the lawless, and such a corresponding peaceableness in 
the district concerned' that its suppression would, in the absence of 'some 
compensating Government policy, lead to a more vigorous campaign of murder and 
outrage on the part of the rebels and renewed incitement to retaliation. ' 100 
Aware that the logic of reprisals was gaining support amongst the people who 
mattered, Macready put forward a proposal in September 1920 that the houses of 
known rebels should be destroyed `as a military operation. ' This was to be done on 
the condition that the occupants were given an hour to remove any `valuable 
foodstuffs' from the building, following which the house would be destroyed using 
explosives (arson was to be one element of reprisals carried over from the unofficial 
campaign). The proposals fell way short of (C. I. G. S. ) Field-Marshall Sir Henry 
Wilson's remarkably candid remark to the Prime Minister (also in September 1920) 
that `if some men should be murdered, the government should murder them. ' 
Therefore, perhaps due in part to their relative moderation, they gained cautious 
approval in military and Cabinet circles. '0' By December 1920, military governors in 
the martial law area had already adopted the practice of authorised punishments 
against known rebels. The first of these actions occurred on 29 December 1920 when 
six houses were destroyed in Midleton near Cork, following the murder of three 
policemen in the district. The frequency with which these operations occurred 
remains unclear (and probably understated): Townshend estimated that around 150 
took place between December 1920 and June 1921, although evidence from the 6th 
Division suggests that 278 official punishments occurred in a single brigade area, of 
99 Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands, 1912-39 (Oxford, 1998) p. 91. 
100 Record of the Rebellion, pp. 23-4. 
101 Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State, p. 38. Dangerfield also cited this remark 
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which 182 involved the destruction of houses, twenty aimed at the destruction of 
property and 76 involved the closure of Post Offices and creameries. '02 
There is strong evidence to suggest that the new policy was based on strategies 
devised by officers in certain districts, which had sought to sanction limited reprisals 
as a means of preventing more serious outrages. Prior to the onset of official reprisals 
(in an illuminating and unpublished passage) Colonel R. H. G. Wilson. Commanding 
the 1st Lincolnshire Regiment in County Tipperary, claimed special dispensation for 
a military reprisal at a farm near Goldengarden `as a military, operation and as 
punishment, not as mere blind reprisal. ' Wilson's letter to G. H. Q. in October 1920 is 
illuminating because it highlights the depth of soldiers' appetite for revenge, as -VNwell 
suggesting that reprisals had a quality of inevitability that Wilson could not ignore. 
Following the shooting of Lieutenant Morley-Turner in Goldengarden, he claimed: 
From the moment the battalion heard of this outrage, feeling ran 
high. 
. . this event seemed 
likely to prove too much for their self 
restraint. The officers company were giving voice to their 
feelings (which were running high) and uttering certain 
threats... Nothing could be shown to them to show that the 
outrages on previous officers had been adjusted and even in the 
case of the would be murderer being arrested, the term of 
imprisonment he was likely to get from a court martial did not 
seem adequate to them. I therefore sized up the situation as 
follows. If I was unable to show them that something would be 
done and done promptly, and allowed to be done by them. I 
would be prepared for a reprisal of their own... but such an affair 
would have been deplorable in the extreme and added one more 
instance of troops getting out of control and causing senseless 
and ill-directed damage against the innocent people and another 
black spot on the map. The situation admitted of no delay 
for 
advice or report to higher authority, it had clearly gone too 
far 
that ... 
I therefore chose a picked party of men who could be 
trusted not to go to excess and detailed one of their officers to 
102 Townshend, The British Campaign, p. 149, these estimates were based on instances 
in R. I. C. 
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command it. His orders were to remove the inhabitants and 
destroy the farm. The occupant is a bitter and well-known Sinn 
Feiner. Two of his sons are wanted for murder. 
In an appeal for special consideration, he added: 
Was it to be one farm, known to shelter scoundrels and the scene 
of a treacherous attempt at murder, or was it to be a town 
wrecked and tens of thousands of pounds worth of property 
destroyed. 103 
Wilson's plea indicates that officers recognized the need for punitive measures as a 
means of preventing acts of gross indiscipline. Similarly. Hugh Martin following 
interviews with a number of officers, detected a large amount of sympathy for the 
idea of official reprisals. It was anticipated by many that legalized punishments would 
have a disciplinary effect on troops, whilst (of course) absolving their own 
responsibilities: 
The average officer detests the unofficial reprisal, because it 
means indiscipline and the overthrow of his personal power. but 
he can see little objection under present circumstances to the 
official reprisal, which would take the form of the punitive 
expedition. He bases his argument upon British experience and 
practice in certain parts of Africa, where the custom has been to 
destroy a certain number of villages as a punishment for acts of 
aggression on the part of natives. In the meantime he is willing to 
turn a blind eye to the excesses of his men, well knowing that he 
will not be called to account by those at the head of affairs. 
'04 
Punitive measures had long been a component of British counterinsurgency 
methods. The popular presentation of military reprisals has tended to concentrate on 
the renegade actions of individuals (the most obvious example being those of 
General 
Dyer at Amritsar). These examples of individual cruelty. misjudgement, even 
insanity, have tended to mask some of the brutalities that were permitted 
bý, official 
military policy. British methods in South Africa during the Boer War of 
1899-1902 
103 Colonel R. H. G. Wilson Papers, letter to G. H. Q., 4 Oct. 1920. 
104 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, p. 191. 
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aimed at the `devastation' of Boer farms in order to `strip away the logistic base' of 
the Boer Commandos. The policy of burning Boer farms (begun under Lord Roberts) 
was inherited by Lord Kitchener who, realising `that there would be no clean military 
success in the conflict', drove military units into the countryside to `lay- ww aste' to 
their surroundings. A further solution involved 'rounding up' persons displaced by 
this strategy into concentration camps. '°5 Likewise, in other areas and other conflicts. 
punitive expeditions were a component of military strategy. Whilst the 1 st East 
Yorkshire Regiment were pursuing rebels in Counties Westmeath and Leitrim. their 
colleagues in the 2nd Battalion were `engaged on punitive measures near the middle 
Euphrates from Shamiya to Kufa [Mesopotamia]. ' 106 
Even in cases where punishments were not implicit in military policy. it could be 
argued that the British army of the early twentieth century was prepared to give rogue 
officers their `heads. ' Collective punishments (inspired by officers) formed part of the 
British army's campaign against Egyptian insurgents during the unrest of 1919-23 (in 
what was, for the most part, an efficient and disciplined campaign). 107 After the Irish 
conflict and the Amritsar massacre (when the barbarity of reprisal measures was 
brought to public attention) similar actions were even employed in Palestine as late as 
1947 as a means by which to discourage Jewish guerrillas who had risen against 
British rule of the protectorate. 108 
In Ireland, an official policy of reprisals was touted by many officers as an 
expediency; not only would it limit indiscipline in the ranks, it would also act as an 
effective military weapon: 
I think the only solution to the problem is to institute a system of 
official reprisals and impress on troops that by taking the law 
into their own hands they damage the cause instead of furthering 
it. If there is a definite scheme of reprisals in force, made known 
beforehand, it should be easy to get the troops to restrain their 
105 Townshend, Britain's Civil lVars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (London, 1986) pp. 
179-181. 
106 Plimpton, "The Snapper", 2nd Battalion notes, Nov. 1920, p. 8. 
107 Townshend, Britain's Civil il"ars, p. 193. One staff officer involved in punitive expeditions in 
I0Egypt 
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T. R.. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919-60 (London, 1990), p. 110. 
201 
unofficial efforts, while the deterrent effect on Sinn Fein cannot 
fail to be considerable. 109 
Despite the willingness of many officers to voice public approval for the scheme. 
detailed descriptions of official reprisals are almost entirely lacking in military 
sources. Historians of the period are confronted with a surplus of detail about the 
policy and a dearth of information about the practice. It is therefore difficult to 
discern how Wilson's `disciplined' example became translated into policy. 
A rather sketchy reference contained in the Record of Service of the 1 st Battalion 
Manchesters highlighted an incident that could be said to resemble the perfect model 
of the official reprisal. On 28 May 1921, a party consisting of two officers and 30 
other ranks `proceeded to Waterfall [County Cork] and burnt William Murphy's 
furniture'. The failure to burn the property wholesale probably fell in line with 
Macready's directive that, in the case of terrace houses, the furniture ýv as to be 
removed from the building and burnt separately in the street to avoid a house fire 
spreading to other properties. William Murphy's house was targeted because his son 
Walter Leo Murphy (who also resided there) was believed to be commander of the 
3rd Battalion I. R. A. He was also implicated as the head of a `murder gang' 
responsible for the killing of Captain Thompson (the intelligence officer of I st 
Manchesters). That the incident can be regarded as an official reprisal is revealed by 
the fact that it was a disciplined raid, followed by an exacting punishment that 
followed martial law directives, against a man with obvious rebel credentials. 
l 10 
However, legalized punishments were rarely so well organized: on 7 March 1921 
in Kilmallock, County Limerick, the military, following erroneous information as to 
the ownership of the property, destroyed a house occupied by Mr J. Houlihan not 
realising that the property was owned by local loyalist Mr J. Fraser. Furthermore. 
`during the destruction of the house occupied by Houlihan, Mr Fraser's private 
residence and business premises were also badly damaged. ' On 15 April 1921 at 
Shanballymore, County Cork, troops destroyed a private house 'held in trust for the 
children of Mr O'Keaffe (deceased)' believing it to be occupied by, a Mr David Daly . 
109 N. A., W. O. 32-9536, Major-General Radcliffe, (D. M. O. ) to Wilson, Ireland: Proclamation of 
Martial Law, 23 Sept. 1920. 
110 This version of events and the background to the reprisal has been compiled 
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it was in fact occupied by Mrs R. Daly who had no connection to the intended target. 
On this occasion, a recommendation was made for compensation of £604: 12: 6.. ßt 
Tralee, County Kerry on 22 May 1921, the house of loyalist Denis McCarthy caught 
fire and sustained significant water damage during the rescue effort. after the 
adjoining property belonging to William Knightly was destroyed in an authorized 
reprisal. ' 11 Even Lord Midleton (Leader of the Irish Unionists in the House of Lords) 
found that a portion of his estate was badly damaged during the course of the first 
official reprisal in December 1920: 
The whole of the town of Midleton belongs to me. Three 
hundred of the houses are in my hands.. . one which was 
destroyed reverts to me in three years time by the termination of 
a lease made eighty years ago. Further damage has been done to 
another house. 112 
Speaking in April 1921, the Lord Birkenhead claimed that the effect of authorised 
reprisals was a matter of `conjecture' further pointing out that `the houses destroyed 
usually turn out to be the property of respectable absentee landlords. ' 113 Indeed, 
mistakes of this kind were so common that the policy of burning property was 
gradually phased out in favour of a system of fines `except in very serious cases. ' 114 
There was also a danger that escalating violence and proliferating murder might 
arise from the new official measures. This was recognised by Macready at the outset 
of the martial law period. He was acutely aware that `public opinion insisted that the 
beginning of official reprisals must mean the end of irregular acts of revenge or 
punishment by the Crown forces. ' In fact, his reputation depended on it. He was 
further aware that `the co-existence of the two systems, would diminish the punitive 
value of the official measures and would encourage rather than discourage 
unauthorized attacks on life and property. ' 115 To this end, he issued a circular in 
December 1920 warning troops that under martial law, acts of indiscipline by forces 
111 N. A., W. O. 32/9578, Macready to the Secretary of the War Office, Policy regarding compensation 
claims arising out of action by the military in Ireland (undated). 
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of the Crown might incur the death penalty. ' 16 However, few soldiers seemed 
concerned with the consequences given the authorities past failure to clamp down on 
reprisals. For the period 1 January to 11 July, J. A. G. Registers indicate that 236 
soldiers were court-martialled for 'absence and breaking out of barracks', a further 38 
were charged with `offences against the property of an inhabitant' and 16 were found 
guilty of `offences against the person of an inhabitant'. None of those found guilty, 
received the death sentence. l 17 
Undoubtedly, some Crown force troops recognised that bringing punishment 
under legal control was an attempt to appease their frustrations and to limit their 
excesses. Others assumed carte blanche to pursue their own reckless campaigns. 
Townshend highlighted the case of an R. I. C. District Commander in Galway, who. 
following the inauguration of official reprisals, unleashed a series of reprisals in the 
county, despite the fact that his area was not even covered by martial law (making 
official punishments illegal without the permission of higher authorities). '' 8 The 
author of The History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers suggested that official reprisals 
were no more discriminate than most of the troops previous unofficial efforts: 
On New Year's Day 1921 "authorised'' reprisals had begun. The 
inhabitants of districts where outrages had occurred were held 
collectively responsible, on the assumption that the outrages 
could not have taken place without connivance. The punishments 
were burning and the demolition of property. Fortunately the 
Scots Fusiliers were not involved in this repugnant role. 
119 
In tandem with the new military measures, cold-blooded unofficial reprisals 
continued unabated throughout the period, despite the strictures of martial law. Hart's 
study of the conflict in County Cork suggests that martial law aided `secretive squads 
- often operating undercover and often at night. . . to organize official or unofficial 
`raids' and `stunts" due to an increased flow of intelligence. Hart also suggested that 
116 Ibid, 20 Dec. 1920. 
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119 Anon, Histon" of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, p. 4. 
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these 'hunters' were increasingly adopting a policy of 'shoot to kill' 120 or otherwise 
allowing their prisoners to escape in order to shoot them and avoid the need for a 
court martial. 121 To Hart, the introduction of martial law to County Cork in 
December 1921 promoted the conflict from being `primarily an affair of ambushes 
and round ups' to a campaign of `terror and counter-terror' characterized by 'murder 
after murder' and `death squad against death squad'. 122 
Therefore the legalization of arson as a `military' measure may have had the 
adverse effect of pushing military vigilantes towards the taking of life, as opposed to 
attacks on property. In turn, this suggests that the illicit aspect of reprisals was 
important to some soldiers; this was their campaign and they would pursue their own 
agenda by their own methods. By legalising reprisals within strict limits, the 
authorities may, unwittingly, have pushed the `bravos' in their ranks to new extremes 
of indiscipline. 
Certainly, the early months of 1921 point towards a distinct lowering of the 
moral threshold of British soldiers. In the flashpoint of Carrigtwohill, County Cork, 
soldiers were even implicated in such nefarious activities as kidnappings and drive by 
shootings. Furthermore, despite the unequivocal tone of martial law directives, many 
soldiers were prone to a loose interpretation of their new powers. On 20 December 
1920, Brigadier General Cumming, Commander of the Kerry Infantry Brigade, issued 
a proclamation stating that `Irish Republican Army officers or leaders in military 
custody will be sent as hostages with all transport moving armed forces of the Crown 
in areas under military law. ' 123 This policy of using `hostages for convoys' was 
intended as a practical scheme to prevent attacks by armed civilians on military and 
police transport (see also Chapter 2). However, as O'Malley recalled, many convoy s 
were abusing the scheme in order to pursue inhumane practices: 
Hostages from amongst the prisoners were being used by the 
British, The prisoner had his hands stretched over his head; they 
120 This development is evidenced by the earlier description of `The Operation at Cahirguillamore 
House' by J. M. Hulton, the first operation under martial law. Five men fleeing the house ýNere shot 
dead, prior to any attempts at arrests being made. A sixth was later shot by a patrol 
121 Peter Hart also noted that four Volunteers and three civilians were shot by the Crown forces 
in 
Macroom, County Cork between Sept. 1920 and July 1921, on the grounds that they had 'attempted to 
escape' or 'failed to halt' before a patrol, The I. R. A. and its Enemies, p. 9 
12' Ibid. p. 96. 
123 The Times, 20 Dec. 1920. 
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were then tied to a steel bar that ran from front to rear of the 
lorry. "Bomb now" was painted on a card near the prisoner. 12' 
Macready, who only rated the policy as a 'slight deterrent to outrages' considered that 
the practice was worthwhile because it 'amused the light hearted soldier. -, though 
possibly not their involuntary passengers. ' 125 
Other examples of deliberately provocative behaviour on the part of the military 
were alluded to in soldiers' accounts. The chronicler of the O. B. L. I. remembered an 
incident in a Dublin theatre: 
The theatre was not in the habit of playing `The King' ... one 
night someone introduced a comet into the theatre, and in the 
presence of a considerable number of his friends - between two 
and three hundred - repaired the omission. The friends also took 
care to ensure that hats were removed in proper respect ... a 
large-scale riot ensued as the soldiers attempted to return to 
barracks. 126 
Provocation often assumed this form; affronts to national pride were a typical form of 
aggravation. R. H. G. Wilson recalled an incident in Tipperary when a Sinn Fein flag 
was replaced with a Union Jack. Likewise, journalist Henry Nevinson (who was 
generally kind to the soldiery, often defending their role in the conflict) found himself 
amongst civilians who had gathered to watch the coffins of the victims of the 'Bloody 
Sunday' massacre being conveyed to the North Wall to be removed to England. 
Nevinson recalled being shocked by the sight of `British Officers going about them, 
knocking off their caps with foul oaths as though to provoke trouble. ' 127 F. C. Penny, 
an R. A. F. officer recalled a military procession in the small village of Tallaght 
outside Dublin: 
... we marched to the accompaniment of patriotic airs along 
the 
half mile of road leading to the centre of the village, "here we 
formed up in a circle with a band in the centre. The band began 
well-known tunes such as `Rule Britannia' and `There'll always 
124 O'Mallev, On Another Man's Wound, p. 269. 
125 Macready,. -annals, Volume II, p. 503. 126 Anon, OxI Qrd and Bucks Chronicle, pp. 32-33. 
127 Nevinson, Last Changes, Last Chances, p. 186. 
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be an England'. We rounded off with the band playing the 
national anthem ... civilians who had not removed their hats 
soon had them removed by the C/O [commanding officer] who 
pulled them off and stood on them. '28 
Similarly, the wife of an officer recalled how: 
Four or five of the older soldiers, who knew how to use their 
fists, would go into a public house on the quays of the Liffey, 
and order drinks. Then, standing up, they would sing `God save 
the King' insisting that everyone else should stand up too. '29 
Often the military pursued its regular routine of ceremonials and displays. 
oblivious to the offence that they caused. F. C. Penny (an Australian by birth) did sense 
something of the offensive nature of his ceremonial duties when he remembered a 
close formation flight `at almost roof-top level' over Dublin on Empire Day in 1920, 
he added quizzically `just what these displays were intended to prove, I know not'. 130 
The Green Howards' Gazette remarked bitterly upon the refusal of the Civil 
Population to observe Armistice Day ceremonials, which the correspondent 
considered to be an `an entirely unpolitical and unsectarian custom [sic]' without 
realising the potential offence caused by exposing a hostile population to military 
displays. 131 
Clearly many regiments in Ireland were either unwilling to make allowances for 
the political and national tensions which surrounded them, or were largely ignorant of 
public opinion. Many soldiers were genuinely surprised at the hostile reception that 
greeted patriotic or institutionalised military displays, and it would appear that many 
officers arrived in Ireland in full expectation of carrying on the trappings of 
regimental life as usual, and this (albeit, at times unconsciously) could be seen as a 
form of provocation in itself. 
Despite a general dearth of official or military sources concerning the particulars of 
military reprisals or provocation, a close scrutiny of the records generated by British 
soldiers is able to offer limited insights into the motives, purposes and general 
128 Penny, 'Memories of Flying', p. 17. 
129 Anon. Experiences of an Officer's Wife, p. 70. 
130 Penny, `Memories of Flying', p. 18. 
131 Green Howards' Gazette, Dec. 1920, p. 1 16. 
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contexts of reprisals and other Crown force violence. Given the frequency of acts of 
indiscipline in the later period, any study of this kind is forced to consider the issues 
that prompted soldiers towards counter-terrorism. Broadly speaking, the frustrations 
arising from the monotony of the work routine, tedium and barrack isolation, 
undoubtedly contributed to the soldiers' desire to break free from the shackles of 
military discipline. Furthermore, the artificial separation of the military from the 
community helped to create the necessary atmosphere of suspicion. distrust and 
hatred. Nonetheless, it would be far too convenient to draw easy equations between 
the difficulties and privations of the soldiery and their appetite for revenge. Therefore, 
to avoid idle speculation, perhaps the best way to rationalize reprisals is to consider 
their intended effect. A detailed consideration of the purpose of reprisals will hay e 
backwards implications to the base issues that troubled the soldiery, and forwards to 
the wider political context that made these actions appear necessary. A consideration 
of these issues will also allow for a much clearer understanding of the character of 
reprisals, ranging from the `spontaneous' to the 'systematic. ' 
Descriptions of reprisal actions only skim the surface of events and, as Hugh 
Martin pointed out, examples of Crown Force violence could easily `be multiplied to 
the point of tedium'. 132 Furthermore, previous studies of the period have failed to 
fully explore the issue of reprisals, eschewing any attempt to rationalize these actions 
from the point of view of the soldiery. Given that many studies have limited 
themselves to a dry tally of events, incidents of counter-terrorism appear to be lacking 
in any real motivation beyond a `tit for tat' logic - driven by an instinctive want for 
revenge or a `mob mentality. ' This aspect of reprisals certainly cannot be ignored: 
based on the available evidence it would appear that the majority of reprisals did 
occur in the immediate aftermath of attacks on the Crown forces and were therefore 
committed in `hot blood'. The memoir of an officer's wife provided a snapshot of the 
raw emotionalism that affected soldiers in the aftermath of an attack. Her account 
provided a frank and earnest description of the tenor of soldiers on patrol in Dublin, 
following the outrages of `Bloody Sunday' in November 1920: 
The men were longing to shoot. They were mad with passion. 
One car did not stop when challenged. and they fired at it at 
once. Fortunately they missed it, as it was an R. I. C. car, going 
132 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, p. 59. 
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from one hotel to another, collecting luggage belonging to the 
survivors of the morning's massacre. 
The same author also recalled being able to share the revenge mentality- of the troops. 
Following the massacre of 12 British officers, during which her husband was 
seriously wounded, she was conveyed by armoured lorry, for her ovm safety. to 
Portobello barracks. 133 In her description the desire for revenge ý, as palpable: 
Our armoured lorry made a terrific noise on the paved roads, and 
as we passed, people fell on their knees on the pavements. Nearly 
everyone had their hands up, and ran distractedly about. I could 
feel no pity for them. I hated them. I know nothing about 
reprisals. I believe nothing in Ireland that I do not actually see 
myself; but I do know that night I should have understood, and 
forgiven any act of reprisal by our men. ' 34 
Similarly, Ernie O'Malley recalled how, on the same day, the troops had blood in 
their eyes'. '35 Indeed, the events of `Bloody Sunday' were so monumental to the Irish 
garrison that, as one soldier stated `In Dublin, time is now reckoned as since or before 
"Bloody Sunday". 136 
After the murder of D. I. Brady in October 1920, near Tubbercurry, County Sligo. 
Hugh Martin recalled how a party of 16 police and 10 soldiers had broken into a shop 
in the town and attempted to set it on fire. The District Inspector in charge of the 
party recalled his difficulties in restoring order amongst his troops on account of the 
fact that `they were simply mad with passion, and all restraints of discipline were 
thrown to the winds. ' 137 Sean Moylan recalled how, following a successful ambush of 
British troops near Drominarigle, County Cork, he could hear `the rattle of a Lewis 
gun from the Kanturk direction' and suspected that the aimless shooting resulted from 
the wild and uncontrolled anger of the troops who had just learned of their colleagues 
fate: `since there could be no possible target, all our men having retreated, it seemed 
to me that the mental outlook of the British troops was rather 
disturbed. ' 138 
133 The Record of the Rebellion stated that 'The murder of an officer 
in his house was a recognized 
form of guerrilla warfare known as "cutting off stragglers. 
"' p. 14. 
134 Anon, Experiences of an Of cer 's Wife, pp. 100-101. 
135 O'Malley, On Another Man's Wound, p. 214. 
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Douglas Wimberley was well aware that his soldiers demanded immediate 
reparations following attacks upon their colleagues. In order to quell their passions. 
he devised a strategy for exhausting their appetite for revenge: 
Whenever what was called an "Incident" [occurred] we at once 
worked the troops off their legs for the next 48 hours.. . until all 
our soldiers wanted was a chance to sleep; and by this time 
tempers had cooled. 139 
In seeking to confine troops to barracks following any incident, officers of the 
Lancashire Fusiliers employed a quite different tactic. As J. P. Swindlehurst recalled. 
barrack confinement resulted from concerns about discipline rather than their 
personal safety: `all pass outs have been cancelled to prevent the rougher element 
taking reprisals. ' 140 
Other accounts suggest that reprisals were commonly a reaction to the perceived 
brutality of their enemies' campaign. Reprisals seldom followed on from what the 
military would regard as `battles', that is - confrontations or gun fights between 
groups of armed or unarmed men, but rather from attacks on individual soldiers or 
small detachments. Professional soldiers naturally resented these actions because they 
failed to offer the victims `a fighting chance' of survival. To this end, soldiers' 
accounts were replete with negative references to their enemies' tactics. L. A. Haý, wes 
complained bitterly that: 
All shooting was in the back from behind walls.. . they would 
extol as a feat of arms, the murder of an unarmed policeman 
pulled off a bus, and shot by a gang of thugs and left lying in the 
road. [sic] 141 
Any attack on the Crown forces was perceived as `murder'. very few soldiers 
accepted the death of their comrades as casualties of war. To J. E. P. Brass. the rebel 
campaign was defined by `brutal, cold blooded murders, and ambushes. ' 
lag 
J. M. Hulton regarded all republicans as 'thorough paced murderers' also claiming that 
"-murder" is a household word in Ireland. . . that 
is probably the best explanation of 
139 Wimberlev, 'Scottish Soldier' p. 148. 
140 Swindlehurst, MS diary, 20 Jan. 1921 
"" Hawes, 'Kwwwab-O-Kayal', p. 68. 
142 Brass, 'Diary of a War Cadet' p. 233. 
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the events of the last few years. ' 143 C. R. B. Knight highlighted 'the murder of isolated 
soldiers' as the most significant 'feature of the rebel campaign. ' 144 Colonel 
B. R. Mullaly of the 1st South Lancashire Regiment saw the murder of defenceless 
soldiers as a form of `treachery', which served to 'envenom' the soldiery. '45 The 
correspondent of the 2nd Green Howards, regarded the growth of Sinn Fein as 'a 
despicable tale of murder... intimidation, anarchy [and] highway robbery. "46 Writing 
in December 1920, more than a year after the regiment's arrival, the same author 
expressed seeming relief when "A" Company became involved in an open gun battle 
with ambushing rebels. He also suggested that the soldiers involved were 'to be 
congratulated on being the first company to have a taste of open warfare in 
Ireland. ' 147 Similarly, Hugh Martin detailed how, after the death of Inspector Brady. 
the frustrations of soldiers and policemen at the method of execution caused them to 
take to the streets. A county inspector recalled how `there was a great deal of rifle 
firing and throwing of bombs. The men stood in the middle of the street shouting to 
the Irish Volunteers to come out and fight them clean. ' las 
Clearly, many soldiers were frustrated by the reluctance of their enemies to meet 
the military `head-on'. Likewise, the military never accepted republican tactics within 
the context of a war, seeing only `cowardice' and `brutality' in the assaults upon their 
colleagues. 149Lord Birkenhead provided one of the best summaries of the soldiers' 
predicament in a speech to the House of Lords on 4 April 1921: 
No war, guerrilla war or otherwise, in the history of the world as 
far as I am aware, has ever been carried out under circumstances 
which are claimed to be legitimate by those who are determining 
the policy of the Irish army at the moment. They claim that they 
are entitled, wherever they see a man in uniform, be he soldier or 
be he policeman, to shoot him. They claim, if it meets their 
convenience, that the persons so carrying out these assassinations 
may wear uniform and may not wear uniform. and they expect 
143 Hulton, `Cahirguillamore House', pp. 1-3. 
'44 Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs, chapter 1, p. 2. 
145 Mullaly, The South Lancashire Regiment, p. 350. 
146 Green Howards' Gazette, Nov. 1920, p. 99. 
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that every assassination carried out under circumstances of the 
kind I have indicated should be treated as a legitimate act of 
war. 150 
Given these unorthodox methods, it seems plausible to suggest that many troops 
regarded reprisals as a means of recapturing some of the military potential that was 
absent in the initial confrontation. 
Beyond the base instinct for revenge, and the soldiers' notion of `fairness in wwar', 
military memoirs also suggest that reprisals had another significant underlying 
purpose. Troop morale was dependent upon tangible success. In Ireland, the difficulty 
of achieving it created a serious test of discipline. Furthermore, if the military were 
successful in capturing and arresting republican activists their efforts were sometimes 
left unreciprocated by their authorities. Both the government and the judicial system 
often failed to enforce the heavy penalties that they threatened, or otherwise 
capitulated to public opinion in Ireland and released republican prisoners. Their 
leniency was usually a response to the tactics employed by imprisoned rebels in using 
the weapon of the hunger strike to galvanise public sympathy and pressurise the 
authorities. As a result, military success, however hard gained, rarely became tangible 
where permissive policies existed alongside coercive measures. There was a clear 
conflict between military and judicial policy, and the latter frequently nullified the 
former. As early as 1917, of 148 people tried by court martial, 24 per cent were 
released following hunger strikes and a further 61 per cent had their sentences 
withdrawn. 151 In January 1920 when I. R. A. command authorised open attacks on 
Crown soldiers (with a consequent proliferation of republican violence) the 
government responded with a counter-insurgency policy that aimed at the internment 
and deportation of republican militants. However, following an extremely successful 
round up of Sinn Fein leaders and activists in early 1920, Dublin Castle insisted on 
following cumbrous legal procedures that held back deportation warrants. 
Consequently, many prisoners were held for long periods of time without trial. In 
addition, those who were deported were granted the right to claim status as 'political 
prisoners'. This contributed to another large-scale amnesty on 14 April, following a 
mass hunger strike. Untried prisoners were released along with all hunger strikers 
150 N. A., CAB 24/2807. Lord Chancellor to the House of Lords, Irish Situation - deputation to the 
Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords, 4 April 1921. 
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regardless of whether they had been convicted or not. To make matters worse, it soon 
emerged that many of those who had been convicted had been granted "parole" as a 
result of a misunderstanding of instructions on the part of the civil authorities: 
It was originally intended that the only men to be released should 
be such of the untried prisoners, as the doctors certified to be in 
danger owing to the hunger strike.. . In the end, however. owing 
to a misunderstanding... all the hunger strikers... were released. '52 
Therefore military gains were often lost in a spiral of judicial and penal 
maladministration. Douglas Wimberley's account documented the growing 
disillusion amongst soldiers in his regiment at the government's continual failure to 
settle upon a consistent and thoroughgoing military strategy. Furthermore, his account 
suggests that the indecision and leniency of bureaucrats increasingly forced his 
regiment back on their own initiative. Following their strained arrival in May 1920, 
the regiment found the country to be in a disturbed condition, and were subject to a 
number of successful arms raids by rebels. However, after these initial setbacks, 
Wimberley was able to report that his regiment had quickly become conditioned to 
the demands of service life in Ireland: `We were now learning our lesson.. . and soon 
we began to capture arms and to inflict casualties on our hidden and plain-clothes 
enemy. ' 153 However, he was anxious to credit this military success to the local 
initiatives of officers and men, as opposed to any guidance on the part of his 
superiors. In fact, at this point his account began to reveal a growing estrangement 
from higher political and military authorities: 
It was most frustrating and unpleasant work for us all, and 
certainly we felt that we were not being given a free enough hand 
by Parliament to deal with the situation with which we were 
faced... Our N. C. O. s and men felt that we should be allowed to 
take much sterner action with the rebels [sic]. Many cases had 
arisen of obvious Sinn Feiners having been arrested or tried, but 
if they managed to hide or dispose of their arms and automatics, 
they were as often as not acquitted and released. 
152 Record of the Rebellion, p. 10-1 1. 
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Even at this early stage, Wimberley was insightful enough to realize that an ugly 
guerrilla war combined with the government's half-hearted and ambiguous approach 
to military policy was a severe test of discipline for the professional soldier: *`tatters 
came more and more to a head, and the troops became more and more restive. and 
chafed at the restraints they were invariably subjected to. ' 1'4 Finally, in July 1920, 
while dining with fellow officers, Wimberley received a report that a group of 
soldiers under his command were loose in Queenstown. In his capacity as Assistant 
Adjutant he was sent out to investigate, only to find a party of some fifty officers and 
men under the reserve sergeant major had armed themselves with entrenching tools 
and were destroying shop windows and vandalising property in the town. Though his 
initial reaction was one of shock and outrage, he did nevertheless make a concerted 
attempt to rationalize the behaviour of his men: 
The Jocks [Cameron Highlanders] had felt that they were not 
being allowed to deal properly with their enemies, and they had 
therefore decided they would retaliate... They had let off steam, 
and in point of fact their undisciplined action really did a lot of 
good, for the military authorities were forced to realise that the 
troops were not prepared to stand anymore a policy of never 
being supported, whatever politicians in London might be 
advocating.... The British government would not or dare not 
properly support the army in the impossible task they had given 
us to do, tied as we were always tied by restrictions on our legal 
actions. 155 
This was to be Wimberley's first taste of what was to become a grim pattern of 
retaliation on the part of the Crown forces, a pattern that was marked by an expanding 
threshold of violence. His account (like Colonel R. H. G. Wilson's plea) suggests that 
the phenomenon of military reprisals cannot simply be dismissed as evidence of a 'tit- 
for-tat' logic amongst soldiers. Moreover, he suggests that the actions had both a 
clear motive and a definite purpose. To Wimberley, there were clear linkages 
between 
the escalation of military violence in Ireland and the failure of the British government 
154 Ibid, p. 147. 
155 Wimberle-,, 'Scottish Soldier', pp. 147-8. 
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to encourage or to capitalise on military successes. His opinion coincided with that 
expressed in the `Record of the Rebellion': 
Anything in the nature of an offensive against the I. R. A., or 
wholesale arrest of rebels, militant or political, formed no part of 
the Government policy. Indeed, neither at this time nor any other 
did the Government ever give to the military authorities any 
enunciated policy. The Commander-in-Chief was left to devise 
the best means he could for quelling lawlessness and crime with 
whatever powers, or handicaps he derived from the Act of 
Parliament for the moment in force. 156 
Rather than struggle amiably within the confines of emergency legislation, it 
became clear that the government's `lack of a coherent policy had simply unleashed 
forces it could not control'. 157 However, the display of such force Evas as much a 
demonstration and a show of strength to the government, as it was to the I. R. A., Sinn 
Mn or civilians. Reprisals tended to plug the contradiction between soldiers' 
ambitions for a thoroughgoing military campaign and the actual legal reciprocation of 
military success. For their part, the Cabinet became increasingly aware that a 
consideration for the discipline and the morale of the armed forces was vital to the 
formation of government policy. This came to be reflected in the government's 
attitude towards the continued detention of Terence Macswiney, the Lord Mayor of 
Cork during a sustained hunger-strike between September and October 1920. Lloyd 
George wrote to Bonar Law in September: 
I have received no communication during the last few days 
indicating what the view of the Irish Government is of the 
detention of the Lord Mayor of Cork to the point of death. When I 
sent my wire I had been definitely informed that if we let him go 
it would completely disintegrate and dishearten the police force 
in 
Ireland - and the Military. Apart from that 
it struck me that if we 
release him we might as well give up again attempting to 
maintain law and order in Ireland. 1'8 
156 Record of the Rebellion, p. 25. 
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From the sources generated by soldiers during the period it would appear that the 
threat to 'law and order' envisaged by the Prime Minister as arising from the lack of a 
sufficiently hard-line policy, came from both the military and the civil population. 
The phrase `dishearten' in this context can be read as political shorthand for the 
promotion of indiscipline in the Crown forces, with all the violence and rapine that 
this implied. 
From the evidence presented in this chapter it is would seem that the inadequacy of a 
simple `reciprocal siege' explanation is demonstrated by the sources generated by 
soldiers and other participant observers. In particular, the explicit accounts provided 
by journalists, based on their own tireless investigations, suggest that reprisals were 
not always instantaneous, nor blind; they could be systematic and calculated. 
Sometimes these actions were planned to cause maximum distress to the community 
at large, and, in their pursuit of revenge, soldiers could be extremely discerning in 
their choice of targets. Conversely, many troops regarded reprisals as a form of 
demonstration to the government of what the military were capable of given adequate 
support or legislation. They were a kind of `proof of worth' : displays of potential 
power in order to highlight the shortcomings of actual power. Therefore, beyond the 
simplicity of a `tit for tat' mentality, we can see the foundations of a crude, but 
consistent rationale. 
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6. Politics, Ethnicity and Nationhood 
The British "Tommy, " as usual, forgot the bitterness of the 
"campaign" with remarkable suddenness and was quite prepared 
to mix with the very men he had been chasing and to exchange 
cigarettes and gossip with them. But he is built that way and 
being a "nature's gentlemen" by disposition, his outlook is 
wonderfully serene. ' 
If the pressures of an intense campaign, coupled with the frustrations of isolation and 
weak government promoted indiscipline amongst a minority of the Crown forces, the 
majority, more rationally, confronted the political and military issues of the day in 
their writings. The strain of service sharpened the troops' appetite to question the role 
of their superiors in handling the conflict and this often led them led them to 
comment on wider political issues such as Irish sovereignty, or the future of the 
loyalist minority in Ireland. Significantly, this new political consciousness did lead 
some to consider the wider pattern of Anglo-Irish relations, ultimately leading to a 
consideration of the `Irish question' itself. 
This final chapter will present and contrast soldiers' views on the political and 
military issues that surrounded the conflict. It will consider the full spectrum of 
political opinion that emerges from soldiers' accounts: vieý, ýs ranging from pro- 
republican bias at one extreme, to dogged British colonial attitudes at the other. 
Within this broad range, this chapter will attempt to draw out the main strands of 
opinion, paying particular attention to considerations of the British authorities' 
handling of conflict, and British attitudes towards the aims and aspirations of Irish 
republicanism. It will further examine soldiers' views of the methods used by their 
opponents to further their ends. 
As well as providing the first study of political opinion in the Irish garrison, the 
chapter will break new ground by investigating the possibility that financial 
1 Lowe, Some Reflections of a Junior Commander', p. 58. 
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incentives and a pro-republican attitude amongst some troops led to a limited 
fraternisation between soldiers and rebels in aid of the nationalist cause. 
At another extreme, this chapter will consider the means by which soldiers came 
to regard the campaign as a `racial' or `ethnic' conflict between the English and the 
Irish. This section will further downplay the notion of a religiously sectarian conflict. 
placing the struggle firmly within the arena of nationalism. Accordingly-. it 
uncover the myriad associations of nationalism, including soldiers' perceptions of' the 
`Irish' and the `English' as two distinct `ethnic' groups. This aspect of the stud\ will 
highlight the tendency of soldiers to regard the Irish within the confines of 'received' 
stereotypes. Additionally, it will consider soldiers' ideals of 'Englishness' or 
`Britishness' and explore the tendency of troops to stereotype themselves within this 
image. 
By examining the scope and the variety of troops' political concerns, this study 
will highlight how the truce of July 1921 was received by troops. This should provide 
a leading indicator of their views towards the campaign as a whole. A further 
consideration of soldiers' reactions to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921 
should also yield insights into the relationship between soldiers' experience of service 
and the manner in which it reached its conclusion. This chapter will also incorporate a 
number of accounts written long after the period in order to determine the means bý, 
which soldiers' political attitudes were formed during the course of the conflict. A 
consideration of the process by which soldiers became politicised should explain ho ,N 
their final assessment came to differ from their initial or 'working' view of the 
conflict. 
In order to analyse soldiers' attitudes towards the conflict, it is first important to 
realise that increased political awareness was, by no means, common to all. 
In fact, it 
would appear that very few accounts were brimming with overt political comment. 
Percival's own account, delivered orally in the course of two lectures 
dealt mainly 
with `tactical problems' and as far as possible. avoid[ed] all political and religious 
questions. '2 Likewise. our sample of soldiers' records from the period 
indicates that 
the majority were apolitical (at least in their written accounts). 
There were very solid 
Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (I), p 1. 
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reasons for this apparent absence of political motivation: in particular it should be 
understood that military culture promoted subservience and the suppression of 
independent thought. 3 This form of deference. coupled with the government's 
continual failure to settle a course of policy may have discouraged many from 
forming coherent political opinions. In addition, the shape-shifting and incompetence 
of political and military authorities in Ireland tended to promote an indifference to 
political issues. Therefore, Ireland's demands for self-determination usually fell 
beyond the pale of interest or concern for British soldiers. Few (certainly amongst the 
ranks) defined their commitment to service in terms of their own deeply held hostility 
to republican ideals, suggesting that they were less 'imbued with an ideological zeal' 
than their rebel counterparts. 4 That is not to suggest that they made patent statements 
of a lack of concern for Irish political affairs, but rather that most detailed accounts of 
service failed to mention anything pertaining to the political situation. An expressed 
lack of concern was evident in some accounts: the correspondent of the 2nd Green 
Howards, still stationed in Ireland in February 1922, wrote that `the majority of the 
Crown forces are quite uninterested in Ireland's future and are quite prepared to let 
her `stew in her own juice'. 5 Further apathetic comment followed the ratification of 
the Treaty in December 1921: in June 1922. R. H. G. Wilson was approached by a 
reporter from the Daily Chronicle who asked him about the likely duration of military 
outposts in Ireland to which Wilson replied: `I can't say... our job is done here. The 
rest is political. '6 His reply was indicative of the usual tendency of soldiers to 
separate the realms of politics and the military and a further indication of the lack of 
interest in a future political resolution. In this view, the military remained very firml\ 
the passive puppet of political decision makers. This quality was reflected in almost 
every leaving address given to outgoing regiments during this period: 
Our energies and our sufferings in Ireland had not been in vain. We 
were soldiers, not politicians. We were the servants of the state and 
3 Interesting debates surrounding the political ramifications of soldiers' criticisms of prevailing policy 
have emerged following (the head of the army) Sir Richard Dannatt's damning assessment of 
government policy in Iraq on 12 October 2006. Jonathan Freedland, writing in the Guardian 
has 
claimed that Dannatt's actions 'violated a principle central to democracy: that the military sta` well 
clear of politics... soldiers are meant to be servants of the elected leadership: they follow political 
decisions they don't make them. ' See 'Homeward Christian Soldiers' Guardian, 13 Oct. 2006. or ': 
A 
man prepared to speak his mind' Times, 13 Oct. 2006. 
4 Augusteijn, From Public Defiance, p. 227. 
` Green How ards ' Gazette, Feb. 1922. p. 179. 
6 Colonel R. H. G. Wilson Papers. 
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not of any particular government. If the state was satisfied, then Xti e 
were satisfied. We naturally resented how much had happened and 
was happening even now in Ireland; but whatever happened. we 
might rest assured we had done our duty. ' 
In June 1921, an observer visiting soldiers in Dublin district. «as surprised to realise 
that those involved in a conflict that had preoccupied public opinion in Britain had 
very little appetite for the political and military issues that it raised. He recalled that. 
although `very few were pessimistic' the `bulk were just fatalists' with little or no 
interest in broader political or military affairs. 8 
Despite a general lack of concern for political affairs amongst the majority of 
soldiers, a significant minority (especially amongst those who recorded their memoirs 
after the conflict) wrote with a free hand about the political and military issues of the 
period, sometimes with great insight. In particular, the breakdown of British 
administration and authority in Southern Ireland became a real focus for discontent: 
J. B. Arnold recalling his first trip to Ireland in June 1919 recalled how the sands of 
British administration in Southern Ireland, now "The Republic"', were running loýý 
and soon we saw them disappear in blood and misrule. '9 
The author of the Oxford and Bucks Chronicle highlighted the demise of British 
authority in Ireland resulting from Sinn Fein's ability to galvanise public sympathy 
and duplicate the Irish Executive: 
After their success in the 1918 elections, its members, under de 
Valera, claimed the right of government. To this end they set up a 
legislative assembly, called the Dail; appointed their own ministers; 
and unequivocally declared Ireland independent. 
'0 
However, the author never entirely absolved the British government of blame, 
suggesting that their loss of prestige was masterminded by Sinn Fein, but ultimatel" 
guaranteed by their own actions. Sinn Fein was an illegal body. bent on attaining 
Description of the general sentiments expressed by Colonel Cameron, 
Commander of the 16th 
Infantry Brigade to the departing regiment, Green Howards' Ga_ette, March 1922, p. 
19 3. 
N. A., W. O. 32'9572, Anon, 36 Hours in Dublin, (1) Discussions and references to the 
Cabinet on 
measures to restore law and order and the respective responsibilities of ministers and 
the General 
Officer Commanding; (2) Great Britain: (estimated strength after imminent end of coal crisis). 
16 June 
1921. 
9 Arnold, 'Against the Stream', p. 132. 
10 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 28. 
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their ends by subversive action' but these 'ends' were realized by them 'having 
received sufficient recognition by Westminster to give them the status of a 
negotiating party. " 11 Taken to its conclusion, this argument suggested that the 
government had promoted Sinn Fein from being a marginal separatist group to 
becoming the nexus of militant republicanism. Furthermore, this promotion. first 
arising from a false perception of Sinn Fein's part in the 1916 Rising, was finally 
sealed by their summons to the negotiations that led to the signing of the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty in December 1921. 
Arnold also recognised that Sinn Fein's ability to undermine the British 
authorities was based on its ability to imitate the authorities that it aimed to 
supersede: 
By 1921... all departments of government had gone so far as 
effective work was concerned. The Courts ceased to function, the 
King's writ did not run and a government within a government, set 
up and sponsored by the Sinn Fein party, was the only la,. ý that held 
sway. 12 
Sinn Fein's total control of certain districts by means of duplicate administration had 
been acknowledged by the Irish Situation Committee in their report of July 1920 
concerning the town of Westport, County Mayo: 
... 
flour is issued only on a permit from the head of the Sinn Fein 
organization. . . the 
Sinn Fein Arbitration Court was held on Friday 
every week at the Town Hall ... a 
Sinn Fein Urban Council had 
been formed which had struck a rate, which was being levied by 
the official rate collector. 13 
Arnold recognised that Sinn Fein had assumed authority in order that the I. R. A. could 
pursue `outrage and assassination' in the knowledge that they had weakened the 
judicial system beyond its ability to retaliate. '4 Likewise, many soldiers were 
11 Anon, Oxford and Bucks Chronicle, p. 28. 
``' Arnold, `Against the Stream', p. 161. 
N. A., CAB 241636. Report of the Irish Situation Committee, note by Walter Long dated 16 Juli 
1920. 
14 Arnold, 'Against the Stream', p. 161. N. A., CAB 24'1693, Notes of conference - Officers of the 
Irish 
Government - 10 Downing Street on Friday 23`d July, 1920. W. E. Wylie, 
LaNk Advisor to the Cabinet. 
reported to the conference that the entire administration of the Imperial government had ceased. 
In 
one town out of 45 appeals down for hearing only two came on. ' 
ýýl 
extremely forthcoming regarding the aims, methods, organization and moralit\ of 
their opponents' campaign. A 'free hand' hand in this respect was \ cry much evident 
amongst Brigade Commanders and lower officer ranks. In October 1921. General 
N. G. Cameron, then Commander of the 16th Infantry Brigade, claimed that 
`cowardice and brutality have characterized the doings of rebels throughout this so- 
called war. ' 15 K. A. Plimpton questioned the misguided patriotism of his opponents 
after witnessing the sabotage of the regiment's vehicles in July 1920: 'a heavy day's 
work had to be put in to clear away the result of what, perhaps, might seem to a 
certain sect, an act of patriotism... We don't think so! ' 16 Similarly, Hulton recalled his 
vendetta against the Irish rebel Martin Conway. culminating in Conway being shot 
dead during a raid at Cahirguillamore House, County Limerick, in December 1920. 
Hulton summarised his opponent as either `a simple Irish patriot - or a thorough- 
paced murderer, according to one's point of view. ' Where Sean Niov-lan regarded his 
colleagues as `determined, earnest men', there was little concealing Ilulton's view of 
the I. R. A. as a `murder gang' whose principal feature was cowardice: 'an enemy that 
sprints better than it fights. ' 17 To F. H. Vinden they were no more militarily proficient 
than `a sabotage force' and even the `History of the 5th Division' dismissed the 
I. R. A. as an `ill trained, ill armed and badly disciplined force. ' 18 In June 1921, The 
Green Howards' Gazette highlighted the murder of Mrs Blake (the vife of D. I. Blake 
of the R. I. C. ) as the most craven act of the conflict: `If these so-called "Irish" imagine 
that by the murder of women (Miss Barrington of Limerick was also shot dead this 
weekend) they will further their cause for self-determination they are sadly 
mistaken. ' 
19 
Some military commentators went even further in suggesting that the brutalities 
of the I. R. A. 's campaign were a direct threat to Ireland"s reputation in international 
circles. In alarmingly familiar language, `the murder gang' were urged to 'hand over 
their weapons of destruction to safe-keeping, come out into the open and save 
Ireland's good name from further stigma and total bankruptcy. '20 Certainly, the 
development of the rebel campaign (ranging from the social and commercial boycott 
15 Commander N. G. Cameron, Letter to Colonel R. H. G. Wilson dated 23 Nov. 1921, Colonel %\ ilson 
Papers. 
16 Plimpton, "The Snapper ", 1st Battalion notes, July 1920, p. 106. 
1' Hulton, 'Cahirguillamore House', p. 2; Moylan. In His Own Words, p. 109. 
18 Vinden, By Chance a Soldier', p. 29; Hist. 5th Div.. p. 4. 
19 Green Howards ' Gazette, June 1921, p. 156. 
20 Ihid, March 1921, pp. 5-6. 
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of the Crown forces to the cold-blooded assassination of Crown soldiers) ýt as a 
constant test of moderate opinion amongst officers: 
During my earlier trips the officers' distaste for the job appeared to 
me to rest on the ground of being sorry for the Irish. But later. after a 
string of particularly brutal, cold blooded murders. and ambushes, in 
the early part of 1921, their distaste changed to pure hatred, and all 
they asked for was the chance to take part in a full blooded round 
up 
21 
The majority of commentators lacked sufficient insight to relate changing 
attitudes amongst the soldiery to the development of the Sinn Fein movement. Some 
demonstrated very little sophistication in their political assessments. In a letter to a 
friend dated 30 April 1916, E. F. Chapman. provided the following naive summary of 
the republican cause: `The Sinn Feiners are silly people who hate England and want 
to be quite free from her. '22 Similarly, A. M. Jameson \tirote to his mother following 
the Easter Rising dismissing republicans as `all fanatics and very cracked. ', ' Even 
K. A. Plimpton struck a similar note in claiming that his enemies' grievances were 
entirely misdirected: `... they blame everybody but those most to blame - themselves. 
`Not a bit' do the majority of them do to help matters. ' 24 
Others were prone to regard their enemies as being representatives of a low 
criminal mentality emanating from Ireland's poorer classes. Sometimes this false 
perception was utilised by Volunteers to avoid capture or to limit their ill treatment at 
the hands of the military. During his imprisonment at City Hall, Dublin, C. S. Andrews 
of the Rathfarnum Company of Volunteers, felt that his non-compliance with the 
classic stereotype of the I. R. A. soldier `wearing leggings, trench coat and cap with 
neither collar or tie who was also illiterate' confused his captors, who were surprised 
that he was `respectably dressed and spoke coherently and grammatically'. 
These 
qualities allowed him to avoid the worst excesses of an interrogation at Dublin 
Castle. 25 
21 Brass, 'Diary of a War Cadet', p. 233. 
22 Chapman, letter to a friend, dated 30 April 1916. 
`' Jameson, letter to his father, undated. 
`'' Plimpton, "The Snapper" Nov. 1920, p. 8. 
25 Andreww s, Dublin Made AL'. p. 169. 
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The class diversity of the I. R. A. was little appreciated by soldiers. Peter Hart's 
statistics from a sample of 878 Volunteers in County Cork suggested that 49 per cent 
were sons of farmers or skilled workers, whilst a further 17 per cent were students. 
professionals, merchants or clerks, with 31 per cent being farm labourers or unskilled 
workers. 26 These statistics only partially correspond with Percival's derogatory 
summary of his enemies as '"farmers sons and corner boys" who had no stake in the 
country [who]... preferred earning a living by plunder and murder than by doing an 
honest day's work. '27 Dan Breen also noted the military's weak analysis of their 
enemies and their tendency to project the vagaries of the British class s\ stem on Irish 
society. Recalling a car journey through an army convoy, he observed how 'in those 
days British officers regarded an Irishman who could travel by motor as a person of 
considerable importance. ' Given that his means of transport did not correspond with 
the military's expectations Breen was able to pass through the convoy unnoticed. 28 
Where most soldiers held derogatory views concerning the class composition and 
political aims of their opponents, most were keen to emphasise the ingenuity of their 
enemies' tactics. Of these, the majority focused on the organizational exactitude that 
underpinned their opponents' operations. Soldiers' descriptions of rebels ýý crc often 
couched in a tone of soldierly respect, the average column man became `the wily Sinn 
Feiner'; or the `elusive' and `invisible' enemy, who displayed awareness, perception 
and `cool pluck. '29 This suggests that the frustrations of service in an unorthodox 
conflict (commonly regarded as `dirty', `ugly-' or `ungentlemanly') were usually 
insufficient to prevent soldiers from applying some form of context to enemy actions. 
Some even managed to hold two competing views of their opponents: who became 
both `callous murderers' and `freedom fighters'. The Green Howards in Limerick 
were painfully aware of the elaborate research, intelligence and operations networks 
that fed their opponents' campaign: 
To give them their due the rebels' columns were clever and 
extraordinarily well commanded. Their leaders were acquainted 
26 Hart, The I. R.. J. and Its Enemies, p. 155. 
'' Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (I), p. 5. 
'R Breen, : Ih" Fight, p. 52. 29 Plimpton, The Snapper" Nov. 1920, p. 7, Carter. MS War Diar\. 1; April 1919, "The Snapper", 
Ihid, p. 8. 
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with all the tricks and a great many more that made the Boers 
famous in the South African War. 30 
The wife of an officer wasted few opportunities to remark on Sinn Fein's 
organizational superiority to the Crown forces: 
No one who has not been in Ireland lately could possibly realise the 
marvellous organization of the Sinn Feiners. and the enormous sums 
of money they have at their command for Intelligence work. Their 
information was wonderfully rapid and accurate, and they do not 
disdain the humblest instrument. The paperboys, the woman who 
sold flowers and was allowed to sit in the hall of the flats with her 
baskets, were all part of the Intelligence system [sic]. Ever since 
1916 when [Prime Minister] Asquith released the rebel leaders who 
were then in prison, they have been busy, while wti e ,N ere Fighting l'or 
our lives, perfecting this system, collecting money and organizing 
the guerrilla warfare which they are now waging so successfully. 31 
Shaw was unsparing in his praise for the military achievements of the I. R. A., 
claiming that they were `organized and commanded in a manner ýý hich ww ould be 
creditable to highly trained military experts. '32 Others were startled by the audacity 
and bravery of rebels and equally aware of their resourcefulness: `... don't imagine 
that the Irish Volunteer is a fool, he is anything but; he has a versatile brain, and is up 
to all sorts of dodges in his efforts to steal arms and ammunition. ' 33 Career soldier. 
Douglas Wimberley recalled his game of `cat and mouse' with a local republican for 
whom he began to develop a grudging respect. By using R. I. C. constables concealed 
in the barrack's guard room whilst prisoners were paraded in the adjacent courtyard. 
Wimberley was finally able to identify one of the prisoners as: 
a man named Henry O'Mahony, the local "Robin Hood", who had. 
on capture, given us a false name. He was a colourful character, and 
the local Sinn Fein leader in our area. We had him imprisoned in a 
fort on Spike Island, a small island in the Cork Harbour, but he soon 
30 Green Howards' Gazette, `Fighting the Gunmen', Feb. 1922, p. 179. 
Anon, Experiences of an Officer 's Wife, p. 61. 
N. A., W. O. 329519. Statement by Shaw on the present situation and state of affairs 
in Ireland. 27 
March 1920. 
13 Plimpton, "The Snapper", Nov. 1920, p. 8. 
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escaped by means of a disused passage into the fort's moat. I think 
we had a sneaking admiration for him. 34 
Wimberley was also insightful enough to recognise rebellion as an act of patriotism 
for those involved and not an indication of murderous or violent tendencies: 
`... though very ruthless, these rebels were certainly brave, and, accordin-, to their 
beliefs, patriotic men'. 35 
Some British soldiers (in common with the British and Irish public) were 
susceptible to creating martyrs of imprisoned or executed rebels: Private C. Farrar of 
the Duke of Wellington's Regiment stationed in Dublin between 1919 and 1921, 
recorded a collection of republican songs in his training diary during his service in 
Ireland. One song, the ballad `Kevin Barry', was a particularly controversial choice 
given that Farrar belonged to the regiment that had lost two soldiers when Barr% and 
his accomplices attacked an escorting party. The event is best remembered for its 
aftermath during which Barry (a young medical student) became the first rebel to be 
executed by the British in the later period. Partly due to his tender years, he became a 
dual symbol of the Irish nationalist spirit and of British tyranny. Despite these 
connotations, the ballad was to become extremely popular amongst men of the Duke 
of Wellington's Regiment for many years to come36 although Farrar added a note to 
his diary as a cautious reminder: 'not to be sung in public. ' 37 Similarly 
J. P. Swindlehurst, despite being involved in operations aimed at securing his arrest, 
was far more exited by the mythical status of Michael Collins than the actual prospect 
of capturing him. In a diary entry he wrote: `... the population of Dublin are too loyal 
to give him away. I was going to say that I hope he keeps free. but someone might 
see this before I get it home so that it is better left unwritten. ' 
38 
Friendships were also prone to develop in military internment camps between 
republican inmates and their captors. Often these relationships were based on a 
shared appetite for political discussion, as well as a sense of mutual respect. 
F. H. Vinden recalled how: 
34 Wimberley, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 149. 
35 \\ imberley, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 149. 
36 Personal correspondence with the curator of the Duke of Wellington's Regimental \luseum and 
Archive (a former soldier of the Regiment). 
37 C. Farrar 'Training Diary 1920-1' MS, p. 149, Duke Of Wellington's Regiment Archive`. Bankfield 
Museum, Halifax. 
'" SAN indlehurst, NIS diary, 28 Feb. 1921. 
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The internment camp was soon filled with to capacity and 
amongst the internees were Desmond Fitzgerald, who became 
the Eire Minister of Foreign Affairs when Southern Ireland 
became independent, and Sean Lemass, who later became Prime 
Minister. I liked Fitzgerald and spent many an hour in e\-enin, s 
walking around the cage with him. He poured out the woes of 
Ireland going back to the days of Cromwell and the Battle of the 
Boyne in 1690 when William III defeated the local Chieftain. 
The extent to which soldierly respect translated into genuine republican 
convictions amongst the soldiery has never been previously explored in any 
concerted way. In a political sense, the fight for Irish independence and its 
consequences for the wider British Empire tended to be of little concern to soldiers 
when their service began. Those entering service were often a 'political void' into 
which radical ideas could be fed. Thus, political views were usually formed by the 
experience of conflict. Therefore, officers of the East Yorkshire Regiment flirted with 
the improbable notion that they were all `deep and sincere Sinn Feiners' because they 
shared republican ideals: `We are all strongly in favour of the Irish people looking 
after Ireland themselves. '39 More convincing were E. M. Warmington's criticisms of 
British rule in Southern Ireland. Warmington was a man of moderate opinion and his 
delightfully balanced account of service with the K. O. Y. L. I. between March 1918 
and June 1921 suggests that his sympathies were with the 'moral force' section of the 
republican movement. In his role as an officer, following the establishment of 
Tipperary as a Special Military Area, Warmington recalled being asked to enforce a 
curfew order and to prohibit markets in the town of Tipperary following a serious 
outrage elsewhere in the county. Initially he was given the duty of picketing the main 
road leading into the town, but was later transferred to picketing the market for 
having `let some pleasant county people through who claimed to have other business 
in the town. ' These concessions reflected Warmington's deep 'unease' about 
Britain's policy towards Ireland: `further British control over Southern Ireland did 
not square with my conception of freedom. '4° Warmington was also insightful 
enough to realise that restricting freedom would encourage many (even moderately 
19 Record of Service of the East Yorkshire Regiment, Sergeants' Mess Notes, p. 40. 
40 Warmington, ' Diaries', p. 44. 
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minded) civilians into support for the "freedom fighters' of republican propaganda. 
As O'Halpin has claimed, it was assumed that civilians: 
... irked by the restrictions on economic activity imposed by the 
military - prohibition of fairs and markets, and of the movement 
of goods in and out of the area - would turn against the 
wrongdoers, what in fact happened was that they grew 
progressively more hostile to the government which was 
punishing everyone for the activities of a few. 41 
In very rare cases, republican sympathies could lead to a greater or a lesser 
degree of military-rebel fraternisation. A. C. Hannant of the Royal Fusiliers recalled 
one such incident prior to the Easter Rising of 1916. In early April of that same year 
he had been invited by a colleague, an Englishman by the name of 'Smith' (a 
`trooper [sic]' in the same regiment) to attend `a party in a house in St Stephens 
Green. ' Upon reaching the venue his friend introduced him to a smart young man in 
uniform' whom Hannant observed was asking `discreet questions' to other soldiers 
`about their regiments etc. ' Later, whilst returning to barracks. Hannant recalled: 
I asked Smith who the officer was, and he replied, "Don't tell 
anyone! he was Lieutenant de Valera of the I. R. A.... The next 
morning I reported the matter to my Squadron Commander, He 
assured me the matter would be looked into, and thanked me for 
reporting it, and after a few days Smith disappeared, and I never saw 
him again. 42 
For the later period, when the Crown forces and the nationalist Irish became even 
more polarized, it is much more difficult to discern a similar example. although 
Percival revealed that he was aware of the presence of I. R. A. spies and informers 
within the ranks of the Essex Regiment. Owing to this, he `found from personal 
experience' that: 
it was fatal to issue orders for any operation more than an hour or 
two before the troops were due to start, and then the plan should 
41 O'Halpin, The Decline of the Union, p. 186. 
42 Hannant, untitled TS memoir, pp. 4-5. 
228 
be known only to one or two necessary officers before the troops 
actually paraded. 03 
The Digest of Service of the Manchester Regiment between August 1920 and 
May 1921, contained a series of references numerous enough to suggest that soldiers 
and local rebels were linked outside their 'combatant' relationship. The first hint of a 
possible fraternisation appears in service notes for 6 August 1920 when two attempts 
were made at Inchigeelagh [County Cork] to buy arms or ammunition from the 
soldiers, £5 reward being offered for a revolver or rifle. One civilian has been 
identified as being concerned with this. '44 This type of event wwas not remarkable in 
itself, but its importance became apparent shortly afterwards when army equipment 
and rifles began to appear in the houses of known rebels. An entry for 2 September 
1920 reveals that a search of the house of J. O'Keefe near Macroom found 
`ammunition and a pair of army boots belonging to an absentee of the battalion' x\ ho 
was believed to have deserted his post. `' Suspicion was further aroused in November 
1920 when a planned operation secured the arrest of William Eager (a known rebel) 
at Bishopstown Railway Station `for being concerned in an organization to help 
soldiers to desert. ' On this occasion: 
Two private soldiers were used as decoys, while the remainder of 
the party took cover, the prisoner ran into the trap, firmly believing 
that the decoys were would-be deserters. He was eventually 
sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard labour. 
46 
Eager's apparent willingness to trust two unknown soldiers claiming to be potential 
deserters suggests some previous involvement with soldiers of the regiment. 
In 
addition, the entry suggests that soldiers were approaching rebels (or vice versa) with 
a view to undermining or escaping the military. 
Desertion was certainly feature of the Irish campaign. although overall rates 
in 
the military lagged well behind resignations from the police 
force. Nonetheless, 
J. A. G. Registers indicate that between March 1919 and November 1921.514 soldiers 
on Irish service were court-martialled for desertion. Of these, 
283 were convicted 
between January and the truce of July 11, a weekly rate of 10. 
These figures are 
4' Percival, Guerrilla Warfare (I), p. 9. 
4' Record of Service of the Ist Battalion Manchester Regiment, 
6 Au, _. I920. 
15 Ibid. Sep. 2.1920. 
46 Ihid, Nov. 22.1920. 
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perhaps a better indicator of overall convictions than overall rates of desertion and 
give no indication whatsoever of the actual number who secretly defected to the 
republican cause. 47 
In the case of the Manchesters, another entry dated 20 November 1920 revealed 
that insurgents were continuing to approach the regiment to buy arms and 
ammunition: `John O'Brien arrested and identified for attempting to buy arms from a 
soldier. " 8 Other entries suggested an increasing frequency of army equipment. arms 
and clothing being found in rebel hands. During a `shoot-out' between 15 men of the 
1st Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Evans. and a band of 50 
rebels near Macroom on 28 January 1921, at least two of the rebels' were observed 
to be `dressed in British uniform with "Sam Browne belts. "' 49 Sometimes these 
disguises were used to good effect to draw Crown force troops to ambush sites, such 
was the case in Macroom in November 1920, when `two lorries containing 16 
Auxiliary police. . . were stopped 
by a rebel dressed as a British soldier and wearing a 
steel helmet. ' The man claimed to belong to a military patrol that had broken down 
and requested the assistance of the Auxiliaries, who, not sensing anything untoward 
`were led straight to an ambush' in which 15 of their number were killed. 50 The 
misuse of military uniform was so widespread and considered so serious that it was 
specifically covered by a Martial Law Proclamation: 
Any unauthorised person wearing the uniform or equipment of 
His Majesty's Naval, Military, Air, or Police Forces, or wearing 
similar clothing likely to deceive, will be liable on conviction to 
suffer DEATH, and any person in possession of such uniform, 
clothing or equipment will be liable on conviction to suffer penal 
s servitude 1 
Despite the dire warnings, it would appear that military equipment, uniforms, arms 
and ammunition continued to be made readily available to the I. R. A. Suppl% 
networks, often involving members of Cumann na mBan to aid with the acquisition 
4' N. A., W. O. 92; 4; W. O. 213/32, Judge Advocate Generals Office: General Courts-Martial: Register, 
1917-1945; Field General Courts-Martial (In field and Ireland): Registers, 21 July 1920 to 19 No. 
1921,; Fitzpatrick established a figure of 12 per ýýeek over the same period although 
he gave no source 
for the data. Politics and Irish Life, p. 36. 
48 Record of Service of the Ist Battalion Manchester Regiment, 20 Nov. 1920. 
19 Ibid. 20 Nov. 1920,28 Jan. 1921. 
50 Record of the Rebellion, p. 27. 
51 N. A.. W. O. 2 9536, Ireland: Proclamation of Martial Law, Appendix IV. 11 No. 1920. 
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and carrying of weapons appear to have been commonplace. Marie Coleman 
identified Bridget McGuinness as being particularly prominent in this form of 
activity in County Longford where she purchased revolvers from soldiers and 
conveyed them to Brigade Headquarters `strapped round' her body and those of her 
sisters. 
52 
While these examples point towards some form of contact between soldiers and 
rebels, it is less clear whether any shared ideology developed between the tw` o. 
Certainly, Sean Moylan's account suggested that the main motivations for British 
soldiers to desert to the I. R. A. were financial. Whilst being attended by a group of 
soldiers prior to his imprisonment in Kanturk he recalled how 'these men wti ere 
tremendously interested in their prisoner but my memory... of their main concern was 
their anxiety to know what the pay of the I. R. A. was. ' 53 Financial rather than 
ideological motives also drove a working party of the Royal Engineers to assist the 
escape of prisoners from the Curragh camp. These form of break-outs ýt ere a regular 
occurrence at the Curragh but it took some inspired sleuthing on the part of Brigadier 
F. H. Vinden to establish a link between the escapees and itinerant working parties of 
troops. His (unpublished) account is worth quoting at length for the extra dimension 
that it reveals concerning the relationship between soldiers and rebel prisoners: 
We had a series of disappearances of one internee at a time. I 
gave much thought to the method. One afternoon, I went to the 
guard room at the main gate to see the officer on duty for an idle 
chat. I was looking out of the window of the guard room still half 
thinking about the escapes and saw a working party of Royal 
Engineers marching out. There were about 20 soldiers under a 
sergeant. Working parties were almost permanently in the camp 
patching roofs of the huts which leaked or other maintenance 
jobs. I went out to the gate as the party was passing through and 
ordered the sergeant to march them into an empty hut on the 
opposite side of the road. I followed and was then at a loss to 
know why on earth I had given such an order. Howtwev-er. 
inspiration made me tell the sergeant to grounds tools and when 
`' Coleman, County Longford, p. 186. 
`' Moylan, In His Own Words, p. 132. 
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this was done, I said: I am going to search ou". This I did, 
making each man turn out all his pockets. From the pockets of 
the sergeant and four men I found letters from internees 
addressed locally telling the recipient to give the bearer five 
pounds for which he would bring into the cage a uniform in 
which the internee would dress and march out with the working 
party. 
It is not altogether clear whether the relationship between fraternising soldiers on 
both sides was always one of such rudimentary supply and demand. Gig en a lack of 
sufficient evidence, it is difficult to establish whether these relationships were formed 
on mutual opportunity or shared aspirations. What is clear in any case is that the 
relationship was, in many respects, far less binary than any previously imagined. 
Loyalties aside, the majority of political comment concerned soldiers' desire for 
a resolution of the conflict. Some looked forward to the end of hostilities regardless 
of whether or not the outcome was favourable to the British. Most troops had two 
main priorities which they hoped a political resolution would procure: the First was a 
speedy end to the conflict, and the second was a prompt return to an English station. 
These wants could be best satisfied by Britain's imminent withdrawal from Ireland 
and a hasty transfer of sovereignty. The correspondent of the 2nd Green Howards 
typified this attitude: writing after the truce of July 1921 he applauded the Anglo- 
Irish Treaty as a stepping stone to the end of British military involvement in Southern 
Ireland: `good luck to the Irish Free State if it functions, and may it soon be farewell 
to the miseries, the horrors and the wasted energies which the poor unfortunate 
Crown forces have endured for so long. ' 54 
Prior to the truce the tone had been markedly different. As early as July 1920. the 
Green Howards' Gazette had already succumbed to a pessimistic view: We are 
afraid that we have long since given up all hopes of a settlement of anything 
appertaining to Ireland. '" Even in the weeks preceding the truce of July 1921 the 
Gazette remained rooted to its familiar gloomy position: we are almost entirely in 
the dark as far as the Irish riddle is concerned. All we can say, is that the toll of 
' 56 murder and the inevitable consequences of rebellion wax greater day by day. 
54 Green Howards' Gay ette, Dec. 1921, p. 145. 
ss Ibid, JulN 1920, p. 49. 
50 lhid, May 1921, p. 25. 
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Likewise, in November 1920 The "Snapper" described the Irish question as -a 
hopeless business' and denounced the regiment's -efforts to produce peace and order 
in this distressful country' as futile. This tended to reflect opinions long held by 
Macready that `the state of affairs in the country [had] been allowed to drift into such 
an impasse that no amount of coercion [could] possibly remedy it. ' 57 
The desire to escape Irish service was palpable in soldiers' accounts. which made 
the majority reaction to the truce of 1921 all the more surprising. Rather than being 
gratefully received, the end of hostilities was roundly condemned as a premature 
capitulation to Sinn Fein. The timing of the truce and the terms of the subsequent 
Treaty drew a greater volume of political comment from soldiers than any other 
single issue in the conflict. This reflected an undercurrent of feeling that had been 
present throughout that soldiers were serving `under difficult and distressing 
circumstances' but could not leave Ireland until they had put an 'end to Sinn Fein and 
its despicable tale of murder. '58 The full weight of this opinion could only be 
liberated by the cessation of hostilities, to soldiers the tragedy of the July truce ýv as 
that it delivered a last minute reprieve to an enemy believed to be 'on the ropes' at 
this point of the conflict. 
Regardless of the I. R. A. 's strength (real or imagined) at the time of the truce, it is 
certainly true that Irish Command had heavily reinforced the British garrison from 
early June. In fact military strength increased dramatically by 'about one third in less 
than a month'. 59 This was in marked contrast to the fate of the I. R. A., which had been 
decimated by the imprisonment and internment of the core of its battalion leaving a 
remnant of just 2,000 men, with roughly 5,500 men either convicted or interned being 
held in detention. 60 In addition, the reinforced garrison was immediately successful in 
a number of counter-insurgency operations. Between December and June 1920, the 
Crown forces captured 1,585 firearms and 45,593 rounds of ammunition, a 
significant haul against a force whose greatest restraining factor had always been a 
lack of sufficient arms. 61 
Despite these inroads, the picture was far from one-dimensional. the I. R. A. had 
inflicted 48 deaths and 116 injuries on the military between January and April 1921. 
57 Macready to Greenwood, letter dated 17 Jul\ 1920. Lloyd George Papers, F119 2/12. 
58 Green Howards' Gazette, Oct. 1920, p. 85. 
51' Townshend, The British Campaign, p. 196. 
60 M. Hopkinson, Green Against Green: The Irish Civil {far (Dublin. 2004) p. 9. 
61 Townshend, The British Campaign, p. 195. 
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and this death toll was more than matched in the final two months of the conflict 
when the British army suffered its worst casualty figures of the conflict. 62 
Furthermore, the I. R. A. continued to wreak havoc against Crown force patrols e en 
after the truce. It is difficult to imagine then how the Crown forces could have been 
poised on the brink of victory. Nevertheless, increased mortality rates failed to detract 
soldiers from the belief that victory was in their grasp. L. A. Hawes' military 
assessment of June 1921 was unequivocal: 
More and more troops were poured into Southern Ireland until there 
were some 100,000 of them. Techniques for quelling the rebellion 
were perfected and the rebellion was being subdued. H. M. 
government [sic] chose this moment to give in. All the casualties we 
had suffered were wasted. While it might have been v ise to give 
Southern Ireland independence. I feel this might well have been kept 
until we had made it quite clear that we were acting from a position 
of strength. 63 
In a more dispassionate tone, the `History of the 5th Division' claimed that the first of 
a scheduled seven extra battalions to arrive at the Curragh in June 1920 had restored 
the military advantage: `from that date onwards the military outlook appeared more 
favourable. '64 Similarly, men of the Green Howards believed that an injection of 
troops together with improved tactics had already defeated their rebel counterparts 
when hostilities ceased. In a retrospective account, a correspondent recalled: 
By degrees, an absolute military ascendancy was established in 
certain of the worst areas, and several rebel flying columns were 
dispersed and broken up while others were compelled to take to the 
mountains. 65 
Consequently the truce was bitterly received by contributors to the Green Howards' 
Gazette, even more so when it became clear that the cessation of hostilities had 
allowed their opponents to regroup and continue their attack: 
62 Greenwood to Lloyd George, letter dated May 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F'19 -3 6; Hopkinson, 
The Irish Ii -ar of Independence, p. 96. 
63 Hawes, 'Kwab-O-Kayal', p. 68. 
6' Hist. 5th Div., p. 86. 
65 Green Howards 'Gazette, 'Fighting the Gunmen'. Feb. 1922, p. 179. 
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Attacks have been made on our detachments at Clonbeg and 
Gallybally, without any material success to the rebels. And ýt c are 
bidden to forget the hideous past and to keep a truce from what was 
66 virtually war. 
Indeed, on the day of the truce, it was claimed that in the 6th Division alone: 
A Private of the Machine Gun Corps was murdered: a water party 
of the Green Howards was attacked at Mitchelstown luckil\ 
without fatal results [and] that night four unarmed soldiers were 
kidnapped and murdered in Cork, and a patrol at Castleisland was 
ambushed. 67 
It was also claimed that "liason" officers appointed to co-ordinate the truce (usually 
recruited directly by de Valera from amongst officers of the I. R. A. ) were guilty of 
ignoring `offences claimed of and took no steps to redress just grievances, or were 
totally unable to control their followers. '68 By November 1921, the Green Howards 
were concerned that `British prestige.. . was endangered' 
by the rebels continued 
violation of the truce: `Never has such provocation been shown to a force as is being 
shown to us. '69 As late as December 1921 (five months into the ceasefire) the% still 
found themselves targeted by rebels: We could fill volumes if we liked in recording 
very serious breaches of the truce in our area alone. ' 70 
J. E. P. Brass expressed particular frustration at the timing of the truce. His account 
points towards an upturn in both the morale and the capability of the armed forces in 
the final days of conflict: 
... the round up was 
fully organized, the net carefully laid. and the 
strings just about to be pulled to close it up, when there was an 
epidemic of handshaking amongst certain of our politicians, and the 
gunmen were left to murder Irishmen instead of Englishmen. 
" 
Evidently, many saw the truce as a contradiction to the increased military activity that 
preceded it. C. R. B. Knight achieved more balance through his recognition of the 
66 Green Howards' Gazette, no 329, Aug. 19-' 1, p. 43. 
67 Rebellion. 6th Div., p. 129. 
68 Hist. 5th Div., p. 112. 
69 Green Howards' Gazette, no 332. Nov. 1921, p. 78. 
'" Ibid, no 333. Dec. 1921. p. 145. 
71 Brass, 'Diary of a War Cadet', pp. 233-4. 
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continued threat of an I. R. A. offensive: he remained convinced. hoNveN er. that the 
British forces had finally outflanked their opponents by July 1921: 
At Fermoy, no trains had run for a «eek due to the lines being cut 
and the roads for miles around were blocked. Yet everywhere British 
columns were passing, harassing the rebels who were e% cry where 
"on the run" as the saying was, when, with a complete volte /ice. the 
government ordained a truce, and there began the talks that resulted 
in the establishment of the Free State of Eire. 72 
F. A. S. Clarke was less confident of the wholesale destruction of his opponents and yet 
remained certain that the I. R. A. could never have physically evicted the British forces 
from Ireland. In a poignant passage, he recalled the Essex Regiment's final 
withdrawal from Fort Charles: 
Every officer and other rank felt angry and ashamed as ww e marched 
out into the dark from the Fort which had been held by British troops 
for about 350 years. We did not see the rebels waiting somewhere 
nearby to take over the Fort which they could never have captured 
but which our politicians had given to them. 73 
In their outlook on the military campaign, it would appear that the military v ere 
continually at odds with the Cabinet in terms of the balance of optimism. In 
November 1920, Greenwood expressed his confidence that the work of restoring 
order is making satisfactory progress', likewise, in January 1921 he reinforced his 
opinion that that `the tide had turned' against Sinn Fein and the I. R. A.. '4 This 
contrasted with a less encouraging (if not fatalistic) report issued by Macready- on 25 
December claiming that: `The general military situation is developing as was 
anticipated... rebel flying columns still carry out enterprises in out-lying districts 
against small forces of troops and police. ' 75 Further to this, in the latter part of 1920 
Macready had begun to express his underlying concerns regarding the weakness of 
the British counter-propaganda effort, and the frequency of retaliatory acts on the part 
of the R. I. C. Indeed, Lawlor has suggested that Macready displayed increasing 
72 Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs, chapter 1, p. 3. 
73 Clarke, 'Memoirs of a Professional Soldier', chapter 6, p. 14. 
'4 N. A., CAB 27/108, Weekly Survey of the State of Ireland for the Irish Situation Committee. 9 Nov. 
1920, Greenwood to Lloyd George, 26 Jan. 1921, Lloyd George Papers, F 193,2- 
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irritation at Greenwood's unbridled optimism fearing that it *encouraged the 
extremists to keep up their pressure' in order to continue to discredit the 
government. 76 In his reports to the Irish Situation Committee. Macready tended to 
convey an impression of inertia rather than advance during the early part of 1921. 
This tended to be reflected in the rather sullen accounts generated by soldiers' during 
this period. However, despite this, military initiatives did begin to meet with 
considerable success by the spring of 1921. A series of arms raids in Niountjoy 
Square, Harcourt Street, and Baggot Lane in Dublin during March and April were 
accompanied by a raid on 31 March on the Däil's Ministry of Home Affairs in 
Molesworth Street resulting in the seizure of a number of important documents. A 
further raid on Blackball Place on 29 April resulted in the arrest of 40 men of the 
Dublin Brigade I. R. A. Certainly, the evidence of serving soldiers suggests that an 
enervated military was revitalised by the more favourable military outlook in April. 
In a reversal of roles, the increasing optimism of the soldiery (if not %lacready) 
failed to synchronise with a burgeoning realism at Cabinet level that gestures towards 
a constitutional settlement were the key to restoring order in Ireland. The divergence 
of opinion between the soldiery and the government was voiced by Midleton, who 
contrasted military optimism with the general public perception: 'whatever any 
soldier has said to the contrary, no civilian that I have met will admit that we have 
gained in the last six months. '77 Indeed, there were belated signs of a Cabinet 
recognition that coercive policies had failed to sufficiently advance the British 
position. In December 1920, the government had already committed itself to 
resolving a new constitution for Ireland through the introduction of the Government 
of Ireland Act. This established two Irish Parliaments: a Northern Parliament for the 
six counties of Ulster, and a Southern Parliament for the remainder. The elections 
held on 25 May revealed that the Unionists had gained a majority in the Northern 
Parliament, and Sinn Fein had secured 124 of 128 seats in the Southern Parliament. of 
whom only the four Unionist M. P. s of Trinity College were prepared to assemble. 
Sinn Fein were aware that the terms of the Government of Ireland Act stipulated that 
the failure to assemble would result in Crown Colony government 
being imposed in 
Southern Ireland. This eventuality strengthened the government's resolN c to reach a 
settlement with Sinn Fein. Given the delicate balance of public opinion and 
the lack 
76 S. Lawlor, Britain and Ireland 191-1-23 (Dublin, 1983) p. 86. 
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of military and financial resources to implement it. the government were particularly 
anxious to avoid such drastic emergency measures. 
Certainly by March 1921 it would appear that all hopes of a speedy militan- 
resolution to the conflict had been abandoned and the Cabinet had reached a 
recognition that `the military methods adopted by the government had not kept pace 
with or overcome, those adopted by their opponents. -78 The change of emphasis .N as 
also reflected in Greenwood's recognition in April 1921 that 'attacks upon the police 
and military forces continue with no signs of diminishing activity. ' 79 It would appear. 
therefore, that the government had belatedly accepted the reality that `Britain had 
neither the coercive capacity nor the political will to carry the campaign through to 
finality. '80 Despite this, officers' statements suggest that such 'finality' was required 
to satisfy the garrison. Furthermore, their assuredness regarding the prospect of a 
military victory can be taken as an indication of a general lack of political nous 
amongst officers in Ireland. As Hopkinson has observed `politics and shifting 
perspectives, both nationally and internationally. came to matter more than the state 
of the fighting and the strengths of the two sides. '81 For the soldiery, it would appear 
that `defeat' or `victory' could only be understood in a purely military sense. 
Amongst officers, the most insightful view of the eventual settlement of 1921 
was offered by Douglas Wimberley. He was perceptive enough to realise that ýý here 
an enlarged army might have overpowered Sinn Fein in the short term, time and 
convalescence would have re-ignited an armed republican campaign. To Wimberley' 
the settlement went well beyond expediency because it was shaped by moral 
considerations: 
To my mind this was the only sensible course left open to them ... an 
official policy of ruthlessness could easily have quelled the active 
Sinn Fein revolt... but I feel certain the discontent would have 
merely smouldered underground, it would have again burst 
into 
flames as soon as we withdrew. The really brutal measures which 
Cumberland and his army took in Scotland in 1745, finally to crush 
78 Speech of Lord Chancellor, 21 June 1921, quoted in D. G. Boyce, 
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the rising there, would never have been tolerated by public opinion 
in Britain in 1921.82 
Macready was similarily convinced that there was no definitive military solution to 
Anglo-Irish antagonism, asserting that the the great Irish question «-ill never be 
solved by force. ' 83 
The eventual settlement of the Irish War of Independence in the form of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty, drew a heavy volume of comment from the soldiery. Although 
some (like Wimberley) saw it for its pragmatic qualities, others felt that it \ý as too 
generous to republican demands, at the expense of loyalists: 
We do not see in any of these terms any guarantee that no more 
murders are to take place, no intimidation of loyalists, or even no 
coercion of Ulster, but we hope that those upon whom the whole 
responsibility of this somewhat dangerous Treaty lies. have taken 
our only friends in this country into consideration. 84 
For some, the Treaty was `a betrayal of the rights and the honour' of the loyalist 
Irish. 85 Others, less biased in their assessment, saw the portents of sectarian conflict 
in the Treaty. By maintaining the partition of Ulster (previously established by the 
Government of Ireland Act in December 1920) J. B. Arnold claimed that 'differences 
of religion' which had previously been tempered by an 'artificial link' in the form of 
`a common government' were likely to become more marked and more prominent 
when the link [was] broken. '86 Similarly, E. M. Ransford argued that the separation of 
Ulster was undesirable to all participants in the conflict be they loyalists, nationalists, 
soldiers or policemen. To Ransford 'partition' was a 'crude arbitary solution výith no 
clear basis on geographical, religious or ethnological grounds. ' He also added, rather 
sardonically, that it had some more merit in being unsatisfactory to all sides! An 
"Irish" virtue? ' 87 
Clearly, the handling of the final period of the conflict from the truce to the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty was very much at the forefront of the minds of those who served 
82 Wimberley, 'Scottish Soldier', p. 155. 
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in Ireland during these months, enough to cast significant doubt on claims made in 
the 'History of the 5th Division' that: 
The British soldier, where his feelings had not been stirred by the 
murder of some of his officers and comrades. probably did not 
think very much about the subject; he hoped for a quick release 
from the arduous round of duties in Ireland and looked forward 
to more leisure and to more "nights in bed. "88 
Prior to the Truce of July 1921 a number of soldiers had focused their discontent 
on the lack of leadership shown by the government. Many were angered by the 
`extreme reluctance' of the Cabinet to opt for either of the dire alternatives of 
conciliation or full scale coercion in the post-war rears of economic recession and 
labour crises. ' 89 Some expressed views that reflected Anderson's indication that 
military strategy (be it conciliatory or coercive) should be 'accompanied b\ a 
declaration of policy". 90 Certainly, this would have established ý\hether the 
government, in quelling disorder, intended to maintain the union of Britain and 
Ireland or create the pre-conditions that they felt were necessary for conciliatory 
measures. Certainly, an enunciated policy establishing conciliation as the ultimate 
purpose of the campaign may have attracted the support of moderate opinion in 
Ireland. From what we can ascertain from soldiers' memoirs, troops ý\ ere certainly 
prepared to be led in either direction. The failure to carry policy through to an 
ultimate conclusion only led to greater anger and frustration and may have pushed 
some towards the `consistent' application of violent force. 
With regard to the sectarian issues raised by the Ulster question and the 
persecution of Protestant minorities in the south, it would appear that soldiers were 
more preoccupied by notions of `ethnicity" and `nationalism. ' Although present in all 
conflicts (and often overlooked for this very reason) sentiments and examples of 
ethnic hostility and aggressive nationalism seemed especially to the fore in accounts 
of Irish service. Many soldiers regarded themselves as being engaged in a racial Lar 
with the Irish and saw this attitude as being reflected back by the Irish people. 
The 
Digest of Service of the Manchester Regiment recorded a speech delivered 
by Father 
Brennan in Millstreet, County Cork in which he warned against the cultural and 
88 Hist. 5th Div., p. 110. 
89 Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence, p. 66. 
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19 2 14. 
240 
linguistic colonialism of the English: `The English language must be expelled from 
Ireland, like the hated English themselves... only read Irish books in the Gaelic 
language. ' 91 In turn, many soldiers conceptualised the conflict in terms of a binary 
clash between `Celts' and `Saxons'. 92 This could create significant problems for Irish 
soldiers in British regiments: E. J. A. H. Brush, an Ulsterman, recalled how relations 
between English and Irish soldiers in the 3rd Rifle Brigade awaiting transfer to 
Ireland, were destabilized by news of the conflict: `At that time one of the periodical 
wars waged by the I. R. A. was in progress and the impact was not lost on an English 
Regiment. ' Brush recalled how suspicion fell on himself and two other Irish Second 
Lieutenants `Denis Purdon from the rich Midlands [and] Edda Perceval-Max« ell 
from the deep South... However, they decided that we were unlikely to have been 
planted on them. '93 Recalling an earlier period, Cecil Plumb revealed how traditional 
rivalries between (London) English and Irish soldiers serving in English regiments 
could often led to infighting or, in his words, a clash between 'Irish blood and 
Cockney swagger. '94 
In addition, many soldiers sought to emphasise the most favourable aspects of 
the British stereotype in order to highlight the most menacing aspects of the Irish 
character. This form of presentation usually failed to discriminate bemeen the Irish 
people and active rebels. Most saw no special distinction between the two, and 
`rebellion' came to be regarded as inherent to the Irish character. As the Green 
Howards' Gazette claimed `Those of our readers who have studied Erin's gloomy 
history will realise the class of people with whom we have to deal. '95 The wife of an 
officer also invoked the past to demonstrate aspects of the Irish temperament: 
`History tells us that Ireland has always been indifferent to murder. ' 
96 Lieutenant 
R. D. Jeune, an Intelligence officer, ascribed the conflict (and the wider problem of the 
Irish question) to `climatic laziness' combined with the rebellious Irish 
temperament. ' 97 The Gazette even compared the Irish to the `wildest savages of 
Central Africa. ' 98 
91 Speech delivered by Father Brennan at the Roman Catholic Church, Millstreet, County Cork. 28 
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Ethnic hostility amongst the soldiery was fostered by the experience of the 
conflict although, as O'Malley observed, it was built upon strong foundations: 
We [the Irish people] were an unknown quantity save judged in 
their hereditary contempt and their current interpretation of the 
papers they read... These men believed their own propaganda. 
We saw them as part of their government machine which ww ished 
through them to produce a certain effect. 99 
Soldiers' `hereditary' views usually reflected anti-Irish prejudices that had developed 
in Britain during the course of the nineteenth century. The dramatic increase in Irish 
immigration to Britain from the 1840's onwards tended to create antagonism across 
all levels of British society. This, in turn, led to a rigidly defined ethnic stereotype 
based around the perceived stupidity, intemperance and violence of the Irish. The 
Irish immigrant (in contemporary opinion) was akin to a menace or a contagion 
threatening Anglo-Saxon culture. This `Irish Conspiracy' loomed large amongst the 
middle classes who regarded it as a significant factor in the increased criminality 
associated with British urban life. It applied equally to dispossessed workers who 
claimed that the immigrant Irish had flooded the ranks of their declining trades. In 
addition, the Victorian intelligentsia were also prone to articulate anti-Irish prejudices 
and, according to historian R. Swift, they can even be discerned in the works of such 
diverse figures as Carlyle, Engels and Disraeli. '00 
Amongst all sections of the populace, contemporary comment on the immigrant 
Irish tended to be couched in distinctly `racial' terminology. Victorian attitudes 
towards the Irish were often based on the assumption that they were inferior in 
culture and separate in race to the Anglo-Saxons. To this end, some sections of the 
Victorian press lampooned the Irish, and these presentations allowed the Irish 
stereotype to become firmly entrenched in contemporary opinion. Historian, Perry 
Curtis drew attention to the `simianized' representation of the Irish in Punch 
101 
magazine: 
A creature manifestly between the gorilla and the negro is to be met 
with in some of the lowest districts of London and Liverpool... 
It 
99 O'Malley, On Another Man's Wound, p. 242. 
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belongs to a tribe of Irish savages... When con` ersing with its kind it 
talks a sort of gibberish. 102 
The evidence of British soldiers serving in Ireland suggests that they "ere prone to 
similarly lurid presentations of the Irish stereotype. This implies that the Victorian 
stereotype of the Irish was still very much intact in the earl% years of the t« entieth 
century. However, as R. F. Foster pointed out for an earlier period, 'class and religion' 
often informed the caricature, as did `resentment against Irish resentment of the 
Union. ' Therefore, presentations that were manifestly `racial in their tone sometimes 
reflected a brand of `colonial' attitude towards the Irish. '03 In any case, Irish 
stereotypes were manifest in the ranks of the military (despite a significant Irish 
contingent in the British army). In particular, the concept of the `drunken' or 
`intemperate' Irishman was extremely popular: even the 'History of the 5th Division' 
drew attention to `the natural loquacity of the Irishman when drunk' as a fruitful 
source of intelligence. 104 The Manchester Regiment Gazette regularly published anti- 
Irish jokes to sustain the 1st Battalion whilst they were on Irish service: 
Scene in Hospital... 
(Irish recruit with no apparent disability being interrogated by a 
Medical Officer) 
M. O: "What's the matter with you? " 
RECRUIT: "I am `wake' and can't do any work. " 
M. O: "What did you work at before you enlisted? " 
RECRUIT (with emphasis): "Work is it? I never did any. " 
M. O: "What supported you then? " 
RECRUIT: ``Sure, my friends paid me 10/- a week to keep sober! " 
[sic]. '° 
Charges of intemperance were usually interspersed with references to casual violence 
and criminality: J. P. Swindlehurst claimed that men of the Lancashire Fusiliers 
awaiting transfer to Ireland were convinced that the "favourite joke of the Irishman 
is 
102 Punch, 18 Oct. 1862. 
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104 Hist. 5th Div., p. 43. 
105 
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to get you to stand a bottle of Guinness, drink your health. and then crash you on the 
head with the empty bottle. 1°6 
Soldiers were also prone to portray the Irish as stupid'. 'ignorant' or 'half 
witted'. The correspondent of the Green Hoirards' Gazette suggested. patronizin, 1, y. 
that the Irish people were unable to recognise that the British campaign was being 
fought on their behalf to protect them from the tyranny of Sinn Fein. In his 
assessment he described them as the poor ignorant creatures on whose account the 
Battalion is serving in Ireland. ' 107 Similarly, an officer's wife considered it to be a 
failing on the part of the general public not to appreciate the role of the army as their 
protectors: `it was an undoubted fact that the British stood between them [the Irish 
people] and ruin. ' 108 Indeed, anti-Irish sentiments and stereotypes even extended to 
the ranks of Irish government and the Cabinet particularly with regard to the 
rebelliousness of the perceived Irish temperament. Despite his Irish background, Lord 
French typified this attitude in his claim that the Irish were an 'impulsive' people 
who lacked the capacity for `deep thinking. ' Hopkinson has similarly discerned 
`contempt for the Irish' in the comments and correspondence of. amongst others, 
Walter Long, Lloyd George, Churchill and particularly Bonar Law who declared the 
Irish to be an inferior race. ' 109 
Many soldiers regarded the Irish as dour in both appearance and demeanour. One 
made reference to the look of `depression' on the faces of Irishmen and suggested 
that they had a stem, humourless nature: it is rare you see any civilian with a smiling 
face'. ' io Equally, some regarded the Irish claim to independence as evidence of 
egotism and self-centredness; one soldier even regarded the demand for an Irish 
Republic (and the methods used to obtain it) as further proof of the `ghoulish Irish 
altar of selfishness. ' " The authors of the `History of the 5th Division' even 
reproached the Irish population for their `natural moral cowardice' in failing to assert 
public opinion against the methods employed by the rebels. 
12 
Some soldiers even went to the extreme of relating ethnic stereotypes to physical 
characteristics, J. M. Hulton's (almost eugenic) description of the rebels 
in his custody 
106 Swindlehurst, MS diary, 7 Jan. 1921. 
107 Green Howards' Gazette, Nov. 1921, p. 79. 
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following an ambush at a Sinn Fein ball was typical of this approach: 'they «ere fox- 
trotted into a small room, six at a time, where we cross-examined them. They «ere all 
of the right type; long black hair, brushed back; furtive close set eyes; lean 
degenerate faces. ' 113 Though less inflammatory in his choice of words. PerciN al was 
similarly confident that he could identify the rebellious 'type' by appearance alone: 
`picture 50 or 60 civilians lined up in front of you, out of which you have to pick any 
of the I. R. A. leaders. At first sight it seems almost impossible. but after a little 
practice one becomes able to select a few likely types. " 114 
Whilst most accounts focused on negative stereotypes, others remarked on the 
more amiable aspects of the perceived Irish character. This quality was recognised by 
S. Gilley in his study of English attitudes towards the Irish in Victorian Britain, in 
which he pointed out that the Irish were perceived to have a benign as well as a 
menacing face. According to this argument, `Irishness' not only entailed negative 
11' connotations, it also conjured images of kindliness, generosity. hospitality and wit. 
Certainly there were some amongst the soldiery who were keen to credit what they 
considered to be the best qualities of the Irish. These accounts may still have invoked 
familiar stereotypes, but they did also reveal a fondness and a warmth towards the 
Irish people. In particular, J. B. Arnold noted a high level of illiteracy amongst the 
civilian population, but paid tribute to their fluency of speech: the Irishman ho" C\ er 
unlettered, is eloquent, he believes that words are a power in themselves and not 
merely an imperfect medium for conveying thoughts. ' 
116 Jp Swindlehurst was 
similarly touched by the `pathos that Irish eloquence could command after hearing 
an Irish barrister plead on behalf of one of the perpetrators of the "Bloody Sunday- 
killings. ' 17 
If soldiers were liable to draw caricatures of the Irish, they were equally prone to 
self-stereotyping. In contrast to the `impulsive', `intemperate' and 'irrational' nature 
of their opponents, soldiers regarded themselves as representatives of the 'English' or 
`British' virtues of `rationality', `sobriety', `stoicism" and 'discipline. 
' K. A. Plimpton 
saw evidence of these qualities in the aftermath of a rebel attack against 
his 
battalion's stock of vehicles: 
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East Yorkshiremen, like the good Englishmen they are. are not 
easily upset, but there are limitations to everyone's patience. The 
reign of "fear and terror" as we sometimes see it described, will not 
shake the faith that has been pledged before God and Country of the 
East Yorkshire Regiment. 118 
During his imprisonment in Kanturk, Sean Movlan observed that the soldiers who 
guarded him exhibited a form of self-perception based on what they regarded as 
inherent British virtues. During his first night in prison he was attended by an orderl\ 
officer who arranged for his handcuffs to be removed and replaced with a pair that 
allowed him more comfort and freedom of movement: 
I thanked him and expressed some surprise at his kindness, to 
which he stated "I am British". The term did not in my 
experience connote any form of chivalry or fair play and at that 
time I could not realise that it could mean those things to 
anybody. However, there are some British who do play the 
game. 119 
References to national characteristics were often interspersed with expressions of 
English or British patriotism, as though the traits were reflective of the 'greatness' or 
the `majesty' of Britain. In such cases they were usually assumed to be innate 
qualities: 
It is only the fact that the men have the inborn instinct of every 
Britisher that it is his job to "carry on" that keeps them going, and 
we shall all be glad for our own sakes, as well as for Ireland's , -hen 
peace is restored. 120 
The qualities that soldiers attributed to themselves were usually diametrically 
opposed to those displayed by their enemies. Thus. the wife of an officer Evas able to 
make a virtue of `obedience' and 'subservience' in sharp contrast to 'rebellion': 
I only know from hearsay of the deeds. chivalry, self sacrifice and 
devotion to duty of our men in France. But what I did see v ith my 
1 18 Plimpton, "The Snapper", 1st Battalion notes, Jul\ 1920, p. 106. 
119 Moylan, In His Own lFords. p. 132. 
120 Plimpton, "The Snapper", 1st Battalion notes, July 1920. p. 106. 
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own eyes in Ireland was the same devotion to duty, discipline, and 
cheerful obedience to orders under the most hateful and disagreeable 
circumstances. 
121 
Wilfred Ewart, visiting Victoria Barracks in Cork, found himself engaged in a 
conversation with staff officers of the 2nd South Staffordshire Regiment concerning 
the general picture of Anglo-Irish relations. His hosts attempted to summarise the 
essential differences between British soldiers and Irish insurgents by claiming that 
... we English are 
incapable of hating.. . 
You see our men actually 
offering cigarettes to these swine who shoot 'em in the back 
whenever they get an opportunity. That's your English Tommy 
all over. 
This view echoed sentiments expressed by other soldiers emphasising passivity and 
generosity as national characteristics. J. B. Arnold, as an army pensions inspector. 
emphasised `trustworthiness' as an English virtue. To Arnold, this quality ww as 
contrasted with the `treachery' of Irish nationalists. In his discussion of Britain's 
commitment to honouring army pensions for ex-servicemen in Ireland, (in which he 
played a role) he claimed that the English had the quality of being steadfast, 
regardless of changes in the political sphere: `Whatever party came out top in the 
country, the promises of England would always be redeemed. ' 
122 Again, in this 
respect, Irish officials were similarly prone to colonial attitudes that promoted the 
virtues of English democracy, respect for the individual and human rights. Some 
regarded themselves as duty bound to impose these qualities on a reluctant people. 
Sir Warren Fisher, in his condemnation of conciliatory policies in Ireland, looked 
forward to the `restoration to the community at large of elementary human rights as 
understood by Anglo Saxendom. ' 123 
Besides promoting vigilantism and indiscipline in the Irish garrison, the general aura 
of discontent arising from isolation, over-work, and frustration came to 
be reflected in 
soldiers' attitudes towards the handling of the conflict by their competent authority. 
'2' Anon, Experiences of an Officer's Wife. p. 24. 
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This was especially relevant to the timing of the truce. which many felt betrayed their 
`struggle' at the precise time when an ascendant military could have delivered the 
decisive blow. A difficult campaign also promoted a hardening attitude against the 
methods employed by their opponents. The perceived brutality of the rebel campaign 
could also have the effect of converting traditional stereotypes into genuine 'ethnic' 
and `racially' defined antagonisms that came to be defined by binary ethnic identities 
relating to `British' and `Irish' or `Saxon' and `Celtic' categories. On the other hand, 
a minority of soldiers straddled these identities, to reach an appreciation or a 
`soldierly respect' for the ingenuity of their enemies' tactics that was not necessarily 
indicative of their loyalties. In limited cases, loyalties could be surmounted by the 
financial incentives involved in fraternising with the enemy. An occurrence which has 
been demonstrated to have taken place on a larger scale than has been previously 
claimed. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to examine the social and cultural experience of British soldiers 
who served in Ireland between 1916 and 1921. In so doing it has provided the first 
analysis of the period in which soldiers of the British army have formed the primary 
focus. This represents a unique contribution to the historiography of the subject. and 
one that that has sought to apply the categories of analysis exemplified in recent 
regional studies of the conflict in order to appreciate the `dynamics', 'political 
identities' and `relationships' that linked the regular army to other participants in the 
conflict. ' Applying these categories to the soldier's experience has also allowed for 
further insights into the effects of capricious military and colonial policies on those 
who served at the `sharp end of the conflict. Therefore, this study can claim to have 
promoted the efficacy of reading the period through a concentration on social and 
cultural experience. To this end, this thesis has established six key areas which, it is 
argued, formed the social and cultural framework for military service in Ireland. 
Retrenchment 
The campaign in Ireland, which has been described as Britain's `rude introduction to 
insurgency' was continually dogged by organizational, tactical and material 
deficiencies for which regular soldiers paid the price with their labour and their lives. 
2 
Post-war retrenchment and army reform had a profound effect on the remaining 
garrison in Ireland: the crusade for economy in all aspects of government spending 
tended to have a disproportionately negative effect on the lives of servicemen. As 
budgets dwindled, so too did the number of troops available for security w ork: and as 
the size of the garrison dwindled, the insurgency gathered pace. This was the central 
problem facing the British soldier in Ireland. He attempted to continue 
his regular 
service life. fully aware of the contradiction between capability and expectation. 
Those unfortunate enough not to be transferred, seconded. drafted. posted or 
otherwise demobilized from Irish service, endured a rise in militant republicanism 
1 Hart, The L RA. at War, p. 9. 
2 Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, p. 149. 
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with a corresponding decline in their ability to combat the disorder. Furthermore. 
retrenchment not only affected the numerical strength of battalions but also stripped 
them of the necessary materials to wage modem warfare. Wireless technology, 
clerical aids, armour-plating and motor transport were lacking in the Irish army. That 
this situation did not spell disaster for the British campaign is testament to the 
energies of those who remained. A small garrison was required to make itself large, 
and it did so at the expense of adequate training and physical and mental exhaustion. 
The negative impact of economy in the British army was never counteracted by a 
corresponding drive for efficiency, which could have incorporated ne« methods and 
appropriate training. Even basic military training could have allowed reduced mobile 
units to benefit from the multiplied effect of superior marksmanship, movement and, 
above all, discipline. 
Operational Experiences 
Soldiers could be said to have been the victims of the frugality of the period, ýti hich, 
together with the war-weariness of the British public, established the contours of their 
operational routine. A culture of distrust and suspicion was later to result as a 
corollary of barrack isolation and community exclusion; soldiers' discontent, fatigue 
and professional frustration tended to develop during the course of military 
operations. This study has attempted to provide detailed accounts of these operations 
and reach beyond dry descriptions of familiar military terms such as `raid', `sweep', 
`drive', `patrol', `escort' and `guard' to discover their peculiar meaning within the 
context of Irish conditions. In so doing, it has highlighted the clash between classical 
and irregular patterns of warfare in Ireland and, for the first time, this study has, on an 
inter-personal level, examined soldiers' strained relationships with their comrades in 
the R. I. C. Here it was demonstrated that the government was never certain of its 
emphasis in combating disorder, and never fully resolved the balance between `civil' 
and `military' methods in its approach. Soldiers' accounts have revealed that 
successful co-operation in this field resulted from the enthusiasm and initiative of 
individual soldiers and policemen and could never be credited to any strategic plan 
for civil-military policing. 
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It was demonstrated that military strategy relied upon traditional and predictable 
military norms in order to define the army's operations and movements. Consequent 
inability to adapt operations to meet the demands of guerrilla warfare allowed the 
insurgents to plan and co-ordinate their attacks around conspicuous and ill-conceived 
military routines. Slow moving military patrols became the fa\ oured target for rebels. 
and even in the absence of confrontation, it was easy to disrupt their passage through 
the use of tree felling or `road cutting. ' Sometimes these tactics heralded a planned 
ambush. That military convoys could fall victim to these, was an indication of a lack 
of dynamism and imagination on the part of military commanders in Ireland. 
This part of the thesis also included a case study of the experience of military 
intelligence officers in Ireland. This strand brought together several of the threads 
established in Part I, including the problem of material and personnel shortages. the 
lack of adequate training, the vacillations of government policy and the inability to 
establish a unity of command in the Crown forces. 
Living Conditions 
The origins of military isolation during the conflict were to be found in the culture of 
barrack life: the standard and the location of barrack accommodation created both a 
physical and a mental barrier between the British soldiers and other participants in the 
conflict. This contributed towards a skewed vision of Irish society on the part the 
British soldier that usually preceded any form of confrontation. Typically, large 
barracks afforded ample protection to troops, but the old stone fortresses that the 
military relied on, fostered a siege mentality amongst their occupants. This feeling 
was reinforced by the heavy fortifications deemed necessary to secure barracks. 
Heavily armoured bases such as those at Moore Park or Portobello increased the 
soldiers' perception of being engaged in conflict, regardless of ho« combative the 
hostilities actually were. Lines of defence were bolstered despite the absence of an,, 
concerted rebel campaign against military bases. Added to this, a blind conspiracy of 
rebel action and republican and military propaganda tended to immure soldiers within 
their camps by exaggerating the separatist loyalties of the general public. Given all 
these influences, troops developed a consciousness of being adrift amidst a uniformly 
hostile population. Their knowledge of conditions outside barracks ,, N as gained during 
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counter-insurgency operations that, inevitably, brought them into direct contact with 
their enemies. As a result, the average British soldier experienced Irish service at both 
ends of the binary extremes of isolation and conflict. A 'curious mixture of peace and 
war' shaped the soldier's predicament in Ireland. 3 He was either hemmed in fortress- 
like barracks, and thus physically and psychologically separated from the community. 
or otherwise detached from the main battalion and exposed to the full wrath of his 
enemies. 
Barrack isolation combined with hostile operations also produced other extremes 
of experience arising from a sharp contrast between hard work and inactivity. Where. 
during peacetime, the gap between action and inaction was bridged by a great amount 
of leisure time and social or sporting activities, the contours of military leisure and 
social lives were continually eroded by the risks posed by the rebellion. Where this 
could promote an innovative approach to barrack-based entertainments, many soldiers 
were prone to fill the void with heavy drinking, leading to quarrels and infighting. For 
those not overcome by liquor and thoughts of revenge, the safety afforded by larger 
barracks sometimes allowed soldiers to pursue the usual rounds of guest nights, reel 
dances and amateur dramatics. However, as the conflict progressed, a change in the 
direction of military strategy, combined with a shortage of troops required for 
military operations, resulted in larger battalions being broken up into smaller 
detachments and dispersed throughout their brigade area. This necessitated the use of 
makeshift barracks ranging from old cottages and courthouses to gaols and lunatic 
asylums and even tents and hutment camps. This militated against the soldiers' ability 
to seek respite and leisure and effectively removed any `back area' in the conflict into 
which they could withdraw. ` 
Civilian Life 
Developing on the strands established through an examination of barrack life. a 
thorough study of relations between soldiers and civilians in Ireland suggests that 
despite the paralysing effect of barrack confinement there were strong elements of 
3 Hist. 5th Div., p. 65. 
4 N. A., W. O. 32 9572, Memorandum - Ireland and the General Military 
Situation. issued by Sir 
Laming Worthington Evans. (1) Discussions and references to the Cabinet on measures to restore law 
and order and the respective responsibilities of ministers and the General Officer 
Commanding. (2) 
Great Britain: (estimated strength after imminent end of coal crisis), 16 June 1921. 
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both integration and segregation. In fact, ambivalence is the key to understanding 
civil-military relations in Ireland - it would be easy to attribute the variety of 
experiences to independent factors such as differences of location and time period. 
The contrasting experiences of the East Yorkshire Regiment, stationed in the 
Midlands, and the Manchester Regiment. based in North Cork, bear witness to the 
importance of locality. Similarly, the experience of E. M. \Varmington stationed in 
County Cork between 1918 and 1919, contrasted heavily with the later experience of 
Douglas Wimberley stationed in the same county. Nonetheless, the mixed fortunes of 
other soldiers and regiments suggest that any division in terms of area or period may 
only have limited value as a general rule. In any case, it fails fully to explain why 
some individuals or regiments were able to enjoy good relations with local people 
even in the worst districts, and at the very height of the conflict. This simple analysis 
also fails to separate the non-engaged crowd from active republicans, thereby failing 
to credit civilians with a mind of their own. As demonstrated, civilians were subject 
to the coercive influences of combatants on both sides of the conflict. It would, 
however, be wrong to imply that their actions were always simply a fearful and 
submissive reaction to initiatives from the protagonists. Some military accounts 
suggest that despite I. R. A. attempts to coerce communities into a rejection of the 
military presence, ultimately communities were able to reach their own conclusion. In 
his memoir Changing Times, Edward Maclysaght, a member of the Däil's Industrial 
Resources Commission, remembered how a British officer on leave spent his time in 
County Clare where he was `tremendously popular' adding that `... the real 
explanation is that we have no antagonism to individuals whatsoever ... we actually 
welcome individual foreign soldiers; what we resist is an army of occupation. ' 
5 To 
take Maclysaght's observation a stage further: individuals could gain acceptance in 
the community by virtue of their disciplined conduct and geniality: similarly whole 
battalions, regiments, companies and detachments could be integrated, provided that 
they did not display the arrogance of an `army of occupation'. Therefore the nature of 
civil-military relations cannot be attributed solely to the strength of local Sinn Fein 
influence: the conduct of the armed forces must also be brought under the 
microscope. If (hypothetically) we were to remove issues of politics and nationalism 
from the equation, the military can be seen as no more than a temporary adjunct to the 
5 Maclysaght, Changing Times, diary entry dated 28 Jan. 1919, p. 92 
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community. The British soldier in an Irish community becomes, like a tourist, a 
potential source of trade, a focus for hatred and suspicion. a source of friendship and 
entertainment, an exotic point of interest, or an unwelcome outsider. However. given 
that the soldier was a representative of British rule in Ireland, his verb presence did in 
fact raise issues of sovereignty, ethnicity and nationalism, and these fundamentally- 
precluded his actual social contact with local people. Nonetheless, this chapter also 
suggested that such barriers could be overcome through individual or collective effort 
on the part of soldiers, and furthermore that such acceptance was possible in the worst 
districts and at the worst times. The variegated nature of civil-military relations 
allowed personal affinities to be formed in the midst of an overwhelmingly 
antagonistic situation. 
Unfortunately, as the weight of evidence provided in this chapter demonstrates. 
civil-military relations in Ireland only rarely took this form. For the most part, 
civilians and the military were separated by mutual antagonism, distrust and pre- 
conceived ideas with regard to each other's loyalties. There is a huge sense of lost 
potential in the fact that the barriers that separated the military from the communit\ 
too often proved to be insurmountable. Only in rare and exceptional cases were the 
military able to establish close relationships with local people. and there seemed to be 
little or no thrust on the part of commanding officers to attempt to infiltrate 
community life. 
The social and psychological gap between soldiers and civilians, which was 
usually present at the outset, tended to widen as the conflict progressed. Many 
amongst the soldiery were prone to fill this void with their own assumptions. Some 
soldiers experienced Irish society only through a series of confrontations with active 
rebels. This tended to have a teleological impact on soldiers' perceptions of the Irish 
as a whole; Sinn Fein came to represent everyone and everything outside the confines 
of the barracks, the colloquialism "shinner" became almost a generic term to describe 
any member of the population. In most cases, integrative potential (as seen in a 
number of accounts) was lost in a web of rumour and speculation concerning the 
loyalties of the general population. As a result, many soldiers found themselves in the 
curious position of living `within' and `without' Irish communities. The soldier's role 
in assisting civil policing (and later imposing military law) gave them a pivotal role in 
Irish towns and villages; the combined efforts of Sinn Fein, the I. R. A.. local people. 
and their own misconceptions, still isolated them from the social and commercial life 
254 
of the community. Those who failed to penetrate civilian circles usually became 
incurious bystanders to Irish life, whilst others increasingly viewed Irish communities 
as a softer target for revenge attacks than the hardened and elusive fighters of the 
I. R. A. 
Violence 
In the historiography of the Anglo-Irish War, the phenomenon of military reprisals 
and indiscipline occupies an indeterminate place between the horrors of police 
violence, and the ruthlessness of the rebel campaign. Both of these factors have been 
evidenced and theorised in great detail, and yet the excesses of the military remain 
insufficiently covered by either approach. Military violence emerges as the 'grey 
area' between abuses of the civil power and nationalist revolt. 
By breaking down events into their component parts, this study has identified the 
diversities and peculiarities of the reprisal campaign and, in doing so, it has also 
highlighted both the `untamed' and the `regimental' character of reprisals. This led to 
a consideration of the composition of those involved, and a more thorough 
examination of the character and the motivations of raiding parties. 
Without fully dispensing with the claim that reprisals could be an irrational 
'knee-jerk' response to the pressures of the conflict, it has been shown that such 
actions were rarely immediate or spontaneous. Hugh Martin's account of the attack 
on the Newport Dairy, and eyewitness reports of reprisals in Cork on the night of 11 
December, demonstrate that reprisals could resemble regular military operations - in 
the sense that they had a clear target, a definite strategic purpose, a chain of 
command, and a division of labour. 6 Furthermore, as notable events in Roscommon 
and Hospital demonstrate, many ostensible reprisal actions often lacked any real 
background in provocation and were less the product of a revenge mentality than a 
`warning shot'. In addition, military sources suggest that these statements of intent 
were aimed at both the military authorities and the civilian population. Beneath the 
main focus of the conflict (namely Ireland's struggle for independence) we see a 
parallel struggle on the part of the soldiery for independence from the restrictions of 
an over-cautious military policy. Many soldiers were of the mindset that they could 
6 Martin, Ireland in Insurrection, p. 67. 
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recapture, by violent means, the ground that had been lost in the sands of 
governmental maladministration. As a result, many professional soldiers regarded the 
leniency and indecision of the British government as the main obstacle to their 
success, rather then the strength of their enemy. Sturgis' private assertion: `I cling, 
like a parrot to Make peace or Make war, and if it is to be the latter it's the soldiers' 
job and should be the soldiers' responsibility' would. undoubtedly, have raised cheers 
in the barrack rooms of the Irish garrison. 7 Echoing sentiments expressed by a 
number of soldiers, Douglas Wimberley claimed that an official policy of 
ruthlessness could easily have quelled the active Sinn Fein revolt. '8 However justified 
his claim, the absence of a hard line military policy led many soldiers to resolve upon 
an unofficial solution. 
Behind the scattered trail of destruction we can discern a series of campaigns, 
such as the ones that methodically targeted creameries, farmsteads or civic buildings. 
These actions can be seen as part of an unofficial military policy. Of course, the 
various battalion officers never met to settle on this course, but most individual 
regiments, or even small detachments did pursue similar independent reprisal 
campaigns. These small campaigns tended to converge into an effective whole, often 
with synchronistic effect. The initiatives of one illicit squad were quickly emulated by 
another; habits spread furtively between battalions, regiments, companies and 
detachments. Thus, the precedent for the creameries campaign was established at 
Laccamore, County Tipperary, in the spring of 1920 and, within a very short space of 
time, the burning of creameries had become a feature throughout the South Western 
counties. Similarly, the well-publicised vandalism and looting of Fermoy 
in 
September 1919 (though not a precedent) prompted a rash of similar incidents from 
disgruntled soldiers in stations throughout Ireland. 
Faced with a seemingly relentless onslaught from the I. R. A. (and the consequent 
proliferation of military violence) came the belated recognition 
by the government 
that civil authority in Ireland had ceased to function effectively. 
The government's 
commitment to the restoration of power by civil means created ambiguity 
for the role 
of the military, which became effectively `lifted above 
its own law'. 9 Conversely, this 
kind of commitment (which had sought to avoid a drastic military solution) 
forced the 
Sturgis Diaries, entry dated, 23 November 1920. 
8 Wimberley, `Scottish Soldier', p. 155. 
9 Figgis, Recollections of the Irish War, p. 307. 
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military to go on the defensive, as guerrilla fighters increasinLly- targeted soldiers. By 
the time the government had recognised the need to buttress the military, both in 
terms of manpower and rights within the law, the pattern of reprisals had become 
firmly entrenched. Necessarily, martial law had to incorporate the soldiers' 
increasingly flexible notion of justice. Therefore. military policy broadened to 
assimilate the very forms of indiscipline that its past failures had conspired to 
produce. Reprisals prompted an official response that could never substantially alter 
the course that had already been established. The growth in the scale and ambition of 
rebel attacks had forced the authorities towards a military resolution. but the 
particulars of future military policy turned upon the earlier independent actions of 
soldiers. These actions were not usually driven by evil intent. indiscipline, or base 
revenge mentality, but by raw fear and anxiety. The lack of an enunciated top-down 
policy combined with social exclusion and barrack isolation had fostered a dangerous 
self-reliance. Therefore, any consideration of the role of the British army in Ireland is 
forced to consider two parallel military campaigns: one aimed at aiding the civil 
power, another at transcending it. 
In terms of motivation, it was demonstrated that there were three main 'triggers' 
for revenge attacks. In the first instance, reprisals were driven by an instinct for 
revenge that followed a simple `tit for tat" mentality. Secondly. the brutal methods of 
the republican campaign tended to make troops more vengeful; many soldiers were 
not prepared to tolerate the killing of their colleagues by means that they considered 
to be `unprofessional' or `unmilitary. ' Therefore, the reprisal was an attempt to regain 
the `military' potential denied to their `murdered' colleagues. Finally, the authorities' 
irresolute approach to the punishment of insurgents created another vacuum of 
potential that soldiers filled with their brand of punitive measures. 
Political and Ethnic Identities 
The co-existence of moderate republican sympathies and Victorian -origin 'racial' 
attitudes towards the Irish could barely conceal a broad consensus of opinion 
amongst soldiers of the British army that was fiercely critical of government policy. 
This general discontent with the authorities' handling of the conflict was manifest 
in 
soldiers' memoirs. to such an extent that even republican initiatives 
(such as the 
?7 
formation of the Dail) were seen (at least partly) as a result of the government's 
tolerance of Sinn Fein. That is not to suggest that soldiers failed to recognise the 
tactical and organizational intelligence of their opponents, but rather that this 
recognition brought the shortcomings of military command into sharper relief. This 
view was further promoted by the Däil's willingness to duplicate the roles normally 
reserved for the state. To many soldiers this further undermined British colonial 
prestige. Given these drawbacks, many soldiers looked forward to a resolution of the 
conflict in favour of Sinn Fein as the best prospect for a prompt return home. and this 
attitude derived from the continual failure of the British government to promote 
military ascendancy. 
If a desire for conflict resolution (at whatever cost) produced low morale of the 
British forces during this period, the government's commitment to reinforcing the 
garrison in early June 1921 brought a spectacular reversal of opinion. For the first 
time, a change in military policy had opened up the possibility of a swift and 
favourable military resolution. Nonetheless the optimism was short-lived - in July 
1921, the government offered Sinn Fein a truce as a prelude to the peace talks. Many 
soldiers felt that the government had failed to support them throughout the conflict 
and were further insulted by the `volte face' of July 1921 because it frustrated their 
first sustained period of success. 
Besides recognising the I. R. A. 's organizational strengths, some soldiers could 
also accommodate republican ideals. There is even a suggestion that a minority may 
have sometimes lent material (or manpower) support to the republican cause either 
for self-serving financial reasons or through conviction, though the claim requires 
further research. The obstacle for most soldiers, even for the sympathetic, was usuall\ 
the methods employed by their opponents to further their cause. In this respect. the 
soldiers' stance was often contradictory, in the sense that they urged that recognition 
be given to the conflict as a state of war, but continually baulked at accepting their 
opponents' tactics as being of 'acts of war. ' The actions of insurgents exposed them 
as being `murderous" and `treacherous' and this had implications for the ýý ay soldiers 
viewed the Irish as a whole. Many entertained firm stereotypes of the Irish. and the 
worst aspects of the perceived Irish character were reinforced during the course of the 
conflict. Negative stereotyping of the Irish (juxtaposed with a positiN e British 
stereotype) reinforced the soldiers' view of the conflict as a racial var. Issues of 
ethnicity and nationalism are central to any understanding of the soldiers' experience 
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in Ireland; nationalism rather than sectarianism defined the antagonistic relationship 
between soldiers and rebels. If some republican activists saw the struegle in sectarian 
terms, to British troops the issue was determinedly racial. Though it was never 
explicitly stated in soldiers' accounts, it seems plausible that in a civil conflict, the 
reduction of enemy combatants and civilians to 'ethnic' or `racial' types made 
individuals sufficiently anonymous (and homogenous) so as to make revenge attacks 
against them seem less morally reprehensible. Consequently, claims regarding the 
innateness of the British sense of 'fair play' and 'rationality' were probably invoked 
to provide further moral justification for unfair and frequently irrational punitive 
measures. 
This study has provided a vivid portrait of service life in Ireland. It has examined the 
rigours of military service, and the culture that developed by way of response to 
antagonistic and alienating circumstances, also demonstrating how this culture 
established alternatives to effective judicial processes. penal procedures, intelligence 
flows and operational efficiency. This has allowed for a greater understanding of the 
British campaign in Ireland. By considering the minutiae of everyday experiences it 
has also expanded our knowledge of the period as a whole, particularly with respect 
to the dynamics of violence and the interplay between civilians, combatants, 
colleagues and comrades. By examining soldiers' personal records, it has afforded 
individuality to a much-overlooked participant group. Human agency is the defining 
force in any given conflict: individual acts of violence or gross indiscipline usually 
emerge as the most salient features of a period of conflict. The conduct of regular 
armies has a profound effect in galvanising public opinion and strengthening 
opposition (or even forming the future course of international relations). The 
constancy of a culture of obedience amongst soldiers is sometimes taken for granted 
by political historians keen to emphasise the downward causal links between policies 
and events. This study has demonstrated that soldiers on Irish service were reluctant 
to be the passive recipients of brigade orders when faced with a conflict that exposed 
their frailties and tested the limits of their obedience. 
259 
Bibliography and Sources 
London 
(Please note that all descriptions are presented as they appear in the files and may not 
necessarily reflect the methods of punctuation, grammar or abbreviation used in the 
main text of this thesis) 
1. National Archives, Kew 
A. Cabinet Papers 
CAB 23 Cabinet Minutes and Conclusions 
CAB 23/21 - Minute Sheet on Ireland, 30 April 1920. 
CAB 23/037 - Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers held at 10 Downing Street on 
Monday 3 1St May 1920 - General Policy in Ireland. 
CAB 24 War Cabinet & Cabinet Memoranda 
CAB 24/1636 - Report of the Irish Situation Committee - note by Walter Long 
(16/7/20). 
CAB 24/1693 - Notes of conference - Officers of the Irish Government - 10 Downing 
Street on Friday 23rd July, 1920. 
CAB 24/1708 - Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War - Fermoy 
disturbances. 
CAB 24/2084 - Memo - Present situation in Ireland - Circulated 
by the Secretary of 
State for India (E. S. Montagu). 
CAB 24/2804 - Survey of the State of Ireland for Weekended April 4`h 1921 
(circulated by the Chief Secretary for Ireland). 
CAB 24/2807 - Irish Situation - deputation to the Lord 
Chancellor in the House of 
Lords (4/4/21). 
CAB 24/2983 - Report by the Chairman of the Irish 
Situation Committee - The 
extension of Martial Law in Ireland and the consequent Naval and Military Measures 
- 24/5/21. 
CAB 27 Miscellaneous Committees 1915-39 
CAB 27/107 - Macready to Irish Situation Committee, 25 
Dec. 1920. 
260 
CAB 27/108 - Weekly Survey of the State of Ireland for the Irish Situation Committee, 9 Nov. 1920. 
B. Domestic Records of the Public Record Office 
P. R. O. 30/59 - 1/2/3 - Mark Sturgis Diaries. 
P. R. O. 30/67/42 - Earl of Midleton Papers. 
C. Records of the Colonial Office 
C. O. 905/15 - Ireland - Criminal Injuries to Private Persons - 1920-22 
C. O. 906/19 - Ireland 1920-21 - Disorders and Telegrams. 
D. Records of the Home Office 
H. O. 45/10824/319388 - Report of the Royal Commission on the Arrest of 25`h : \pril. 1916, and subsequent treatment of Mr Francis Sheehy -Skeffington, Mr Thomas Dickson and Mr Patrick James McIntyre. 
E. Records of the War Office 
W. O. 32/18919 - Ireland: Military Aid to Civil Power. 
W. O. 32/3006 - Guards of Honour to be furnished for HM judges proceeding on 
official duties - request for covering approval. 
W. O. 32/4309 - Whether officers in Ireland are on "Active Service" 
W. O. 32/4815 - Sir Nevil Macready - appt as C in C in Ireland. 
W. O. 32/9516 - Difficulties of transport of stores and troops to, from and in Ireland. 
W. O. 32/9517 - Formation of a special force for service in Ireland (19/5/20). 
W. O. 32/9519 - Statement by G. O. C. -in-C. as to the present situation and state of 
affairs in Ireland (27/3/20). 
W. O. 32/9520 - Memorandum on present military situation and general proposals in 
regard to troops during coming winter. 
W. O. 32/9521 - Ireland. Reinforcements in certain contingencies. 
W. O. 32/9522 - Proposed Garrison in Ireland: Branch Memorandum (25; 2/20) 
regarding the Deficiency in personnel (Infantry) in Ireland. 
W. O. 32/9533 - Military Situation in Ireland in October 1921: Secret Report: The 
Military Situation in Ireland at the end of September 1921 '. 
261 
W. O. 32/9534 - (1) Situation Report - December 1920 (2) Steps to meet the 
requirements of the Irish command in regard to armoured cars. 
W. O. 32/9535 - Military Guards protecting prisons where Sinn Fein prisoners are interned: Whether allowed to use weapons in emergency. 
W. O. 32/9536 - Ireland: Proclamation of Martial Law. 
W. O. 32/9537 - Reprisals by troops in Ireland and their effects on discipline. 
W. O. 32/9539 - Supply of Motor Transport. 
W. O. 32/9572 - (1) Discussions and references to the Cabinet on measures to restore law and order and the respective responsibilities of ministers and the General Officer 
Commanding; (2) Great Britain: (estimated strength after imminent end of coal 
crisis). 
W. O. 32/9578 - Policy regarding compensation claims arising out of action by the 
military in Ireland. 
W. O. 35/50/3 - Barracks: Reappropriations and Misappropriations. 
W. O. 35/50/6 - Reports [barrack inspections] by Inspector of Quartermaster General's 
Services, Irish Command. 
W. O. 35/50/7 - Winter Accommodation. 
W. O. 35/56B/3 - Courts Martial - Private Joseph Smith R. A. S. C. (Royal Army 
Service Corps). 
W. O. 35/90 - (1) War Diary - General Staff H. Q. Dublin District - December 1920: 
(2) War Diary - General Staff H. Q. Dublin District - January 1921. 
W. O. 35/90/1 -4 Schedules "A", "B". "C" & "D" to accompany G. S. Dublin District 
War Diary. 
W. O. 35/91/7 - War Diary - General Staff HQ Dublin District, June 1921. 
W. O. 35/93/2 - (1) War Diary - 5th Division General Staff for the period 25 
November 1920 to 31St December 1920; (2) War Diary - 3rd Cavalry Brigade (5th 
Division) - May - July 1921; (3) War Diary -G (operations) from l st December 
1920 to 31St December 1921: (4) War Diary - 26th Brigade - June 1920 to January 
1922; (5) War Diary - 1st Battalion Prince of Wales" Volunteers - December 1920 - 
March 1922. 
W. O. 92/4 - Judge Advocate Generals Office: General Courts-Martial: register 1917- 
1945. 
W. O. 213/32 - Field General Courts-Martial (In field and Ireland) Register 21 July 
1920 to 19 November 1921. 
262 
Imperial War Office, London 
" J. E. P. Brass -'Diary of a War Cadet 1914-21', TS memoir. 
0 Major R. G. Brett - Letters and Telegrams 1914-1922. 
0 Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. A. H. Brush - `Rifle Green/Orange Flash'. TS memoir. 
0 E. Craig Brown letters. 
0 Captain E. F. Chapman letters. 
" 2nd Lieutenant C. Carter - MS War Diary. 
" J. M. Cordy -My Memories of the First World War'. TS memoir. 
0 Commander Be De L Faunce - TS Memoir. 
" Adrian Clements Gore - This Was the Way it Was, TS memoir. Compiled 
by Enid A. Gore. 
0 D. E. Griffin letters. 
" Major General L. A. Hawes - `Kwab-O-Kayal: The Memories and Dreams of 
an Ordinary Soldier'. TS memoir. 
" 2nd Lieutenant A. M. Jameson letters. 
" Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Jarvis - Diary 1920. 
Sir Hugh Jeudwine Papers - General Staff, 5th Division, `History of the 5th 
Division in Ireland: November 1919 - March 1922'; General Staff Irish 
Command `A Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-1. and the part 
played by the Army in Dealing with it. 
0 Lieutenant R. D. Jeune -Ireland 1920-1', TS memoir. 
" A. E. Percival Papers - TS Lectures: Guerrilla Warfare (I) - Ireland 1920-21. 
1920 to Spring 1921; Guerrilla Warfare (II) - Ireland 1920-1. April - July 
1921. 
0 Cecil Plumb - Field Message Book, MS diary. 
" Brigadier E. M. Ransford -'One Man's Tide", TS memoir. 
" Private J. `V. Rowarth - 'A Soldier's Tale'. TS memoir. 
'63 
" Sir Peter Strickland Papers - General Staff. 6th Division, The Irish Rebellion 
in the 6th Divisional Area: From After the 1916 Rebellion to December 
1921'. 
0 Private J. P. Swindlehurst - MS Diary, 7 Jan 1921 to 28 Feb 1922. 
0 Brigadier F. H. Vinden -'By Chance a Soldier', TS memoir. 
0 Major General Douglas Wimberley - 'Scottish Soldier', TS memoir. 
National Army Museum, Chelsea 
0 Article -'The Great Withdrawal' from An Cosantoir. (December, 1979). 
Liddell-Hart Centre for Military Studies, Kings College 
" Brigadier F. A. S. Clarke - The Memoirs of a Professional Soldier in Peace and 
War', TS memoir. 
House of Lords Record Office, Westminster 
" Lloyd George Papers 
Leeds 
Peter Liddle Collection, Leeds University 
0 Captain J. B. Arnold - `Against the Stream in Ireland'. TS memoir. 
0 Malcolm Bickle - Diary. 
0 R. Burns -'Once a Cameron Highlander'. TS memoir. 
" N. M. Hughes-Hallett -With 2/KSLI in Ireland 1919-22', TS memoir. 
0 Colonel J. M. Hulton - The Operation at Cahirguillamore House'. TS memoir. 
0 Private W. S. Matthews interview (audio cassette). 
0 F. C. Penny - `Memories of Flying 1915-20', TS memoir. 
0 Robin Salisbury letters. 
" G. J. Smith - TS war diary. 
E. M. Warmington -'Diaries of War Service 1914-19' NIS memoir. 
264 
Hull 
Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull 
" The Times - March 1916- December 1921 (microfiche). 
" The Times - Digital Archive 1785-1985. 
Regimental Archives 
Border Regiment Archives, Carlisle Castle 
0 2nd Battalion - Digest of Service. 1919-21. 
Cameron Highlanders' Regimental Archives: Fort George, Ardersier, Inverness 
" The 79 `h News - Journal of the Cameron Highlanders. 
Duke Of Wellington Regiment Archives, Bankfield Museum, Halifax 
0 2nd Battallion - Digest of Service. 
9 C. J. Farrar - MS Training Diary 1920-1. 
East Yorkshire Regiment Archives, The Prince of Wales Own Regiment of 
Yorkshire Museum, York 
01 St Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment - Record of Service. 
0 "The Snapper "- Journal of the East Yorkshire Regiment. 
Green Howards' Regimental Archives, Trinity Church, Richmond 
0 2nd Battalion - Digest of Service. 
0 Green Howard's Gazette. 
Kings Own Scottish Borderers (K. O. S. B) Regimental Archive, Ben ick upon 
Tweed 
0 Lieutenant Colonel G. B. F. Smyth papers. 
Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (K. O. Y. L. I) Regimental Archive, 
Doncaster 
265 
01 St Battalion - Record of Service, 1919-21. 
01 St Battalion - Digest of Service. 1910-40. 
King's Liverpool Regiment Collection, Regional History Department, National 
Museums and Galleries on Merseyside 
" 1" Battalion - Digest of Service. 
Lincolnshire Regiment Archives, Museum of Lincolnshire Life, Old Barracks, 
Lincoln 
01 St Battalion - Digest of Service. 
" Colonel R. H. G. Wilson Papers. 
0 The Imp's Magazine - Journal of the Lincolnshire Regiment. 
Manchester Regiment Archives, Tameside Local Studies Library, Stalvbridae 
0 Lieutenant Colonel Dorling Papers. 
"1 St Battalion - Record of Service, 1919-22. 
0 Record of Arrests: 1St Battalion Manchester Regiment, Ireland 1921. 
0 Manchester Regimental Gazette. 
Royal Scots Fusiliers' Regimental Archives, Sauciehall Street 
01 St Battalion - Digest of Service 1918-21. 
Published Books, Pamphlets and Articles (Primary and 
Secondary Sources) 
0 Ainsworth, J. `British Security Policy in Ireland, 1920-1921: A Desperate 
Attempt by the Crown to Maintain Anglo-Irish Unity by Force' Australian 
Journal of Irish Studies (2001) 
" Andrews, C. S., Dublin Made Me (Dublin, 1977) 
" Anon, Experiences of an Officers Wife in Ireland (Edinburgh, 1921) 
" Anon, History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers (Glasgow, 1954) 
" Anon, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle, 
1919-1920 
(London, 1921) 
266 
0 Anon, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle. 1921 
(London, 1922) 
0 Anon, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle. 1922 
(London, 1923 ) 
0 Aubane Historical Society.. An Answer to Revisionists - Eamon 
6 Cuiv. T. D. 
and others launch Sean Moylan's Memoir (Aubane, 2004) 
0 Augusteijn, J. (ed. ), The Irish Revolution 1913-23 (London, 2002) 
0 Augusteijn, J., From Public Defiance to Guerrilla ITarfare - The Experiences 
of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish liar of Independence (Dublin, 1996) 
0 Barry, T., Guerrilla Days in Ireland (Tralee, 1971) 
0 Bennett, R., The Black and Tans (London, 1959) 
0 Bowden, T., The Breakdown of Public Seciiritl : The Case of Ireland 1916-21 
and Palestine 1936-39 (London, 1977) 
0 Bowyer R., Dictionary of Military Terms (London, 2004) 
0 Boyce D. G. and O'Day. A. (eds. ), The Making of . lIocIE'rn Irish 
History: 
Revisionism and the Revisionist Controversy (London, 1996). 
0 Boyce, D. G., Englishmen and Irish Troubles (London, 1972) 
" Boyce, D. G., The Irish Question and British Politics 1868-1996 (London, 
1996) 
0 Bradley, D., Farm Labourers and the Irish Struggle 1900-19'6 (Belfast, 
1988) 
0 Breen, D., My Fight for Irish Freedom (Tralee, 1964) 
0 Brennan, M., The War in Clare 1911-1921: Personal Memoirs of the War of 
Independence (Dublin, 1980) 
0 Buckland, P., The Anglo-Irish and the ýVew Ireland 1885-1922 (Dublin, 1972) 
0 Burrows, John William, Essex Units in the War 1914-1919 (Southend on Sea, 
1920) 
" Clearly, J. and Connolly, C. (eds. ), The Cambridge Companion to Modern 
Irish Culture (Cambridge, 2005) 
0 Coates, T. (ed. ) The Irish Uprising 191-4-21: Papers from the British 
Parliamentary Archives (London, 2000) 
. Coleman, M., County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1919-19_'3 (Dublin. 
2003) 
267 
0 Collins, M., The Path to Freedom (Dublin, 1996) 
" Conlan, L., Cumann na mban and the iVomen of Ireland 1913- (Kilkenny. 
1969) 
0 Coogan, T. P., Michael Collins: A Biography (London, 1990) 
0 Costello, C., A Most Delightful Station, The British Army on the Curragh of 
Kildare, Ireland, 1855-1922 (Cork, 1999) 
0 Cottrell, P. The Anglo-Irish War: The Troubles of 1913-22 (Oxford. 2006) 
0 Curran, J. M., The Birth of the Irish Free State 1911-'3 (Alabama, 1980) 
0 Curtis, L. P., Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricatures (Neww 
York, 1971) 
0 Dangerfield, G., The Damnable Question. A Study in Anglo-Irish Relations 
(London, 1977) 
0 Driver, F., & Martins. L. (eds. ), Tropical Visions in an. -lge of Empire 
(Chicago, 2005) 
" English, R., Armed Struggle: The History of the I. R. A. (London, 2003) 
" English, R., Ernie O'Malley, I. R. A. Intellectual (Oxford, 1998) 
" Ewart, W., A Journey in Ireland, 1921 (London, 1922) 
" Farry, M., Sligo 191.1-1921: A Chronicle of Conflict (Trim, 1992) 
" Farry, M., The Aftermath of Revolution: Sligo 1921-23 (Dublin, 2000) 
" Figgis, D., Recollections of the Irish War (London, 1927) 
" Figgis, D., The Economic Case for Irish Independence (Dublin, 1920) 
" Fitzpatrick, D. (ed. ), Revolution? Ireland 1917-23 (Dublin, 1999) 
" Fitzpatrick, D. The Two Irelands, 1912-39 (Oxford, 1998) 
0 Fitzpatrick, D., `The Geography of Irish Nationalism 1910-21'. Past and 
Present (February 1978) 
0 Fitzpatrick, D., `The Logic of Collective Self Sacrifice: Ireland and the British 
Army 1914-18', Historical Journal (1995) 
" Fitzpatrick, D., Harry Boland 's Irish Revolution (Cork, 2003) 
" Fitzpatrick, D., Politics and Irish Life 1913-1921: Provincial Experience of 
War and Revolution (Dublin, 1977) 
0 Foster, R. F. (ed. ) The Oxford History of Ireland (Oxford. 1989) 
Foster. R. F., Modern Ireland (London. 1988) 
268 
0 Foster, R. F., Paddy and Air Punch: Connections in Irish and English History 
(London, 1995) 
" Gardiner, J. (ed. ), What is History Today? (London, 1998) 
" Griffith, K. & OGrady, T., Curious Journey: An Oral History of Ireland's 
Unfinished Revolution (Dublin, 1998) 
" Hart, P. (ed. ), British Intelligence in Ireland 1920-1: The Final Reports (Cork. 
2002) 
" Hart, P., `The Thompson Sub-Machine Gun in Ireland. Revisited'. Irish 
Sword (Summer 1995) 
" Hart, P., The I. R. A. and its enemies: Violence and Community in Cork 1916- 
23 (Oxford, 1998) 
" Hart, P., The I. R. A. at War (Oxford, 2003) 
0 Harvey, A. D., `Who Were the Auxiliaries? ' Historical Journal (1992) 
0 Heffron, Colonel M., `Collins Barracks, Dublin' An C'osantoir. The Irish 
Defence Journal (May, 1968) 
0 Henderson, K. R., Officers of the Green Howards 1688-1931 (Richmond, 
1935) 
0 Holmes, C. (ed. ), Immigrants and Minorities in British Society (London, 
1978) 
" Holt, E., Protest in Arms: The Irish Troubles 1916-23 (New York, 1961) 
" Hopkinson, M. (ed. ), The Last Days of Dublin Castle: The Diaries of A lark 
Sturgis (Dublin, 1999) 
" Hopkinson, M., Green Against Green: The Irish 001 liar (Dublin. 2004) 
" Hopkinson, M., The Irish War of Independence (Dublin, 2004) 
" Hoppen, K. T., Ireland Since 1800: Conflict and Conformity (London. 1999) 
" Irish Labour Party and Trade Union Congress, The Burning of Cork City by 
British Forces, December 1920 (Cork, 1978) 
0 Jeffery, K. and Bartlett, T. (eds. ), A Military History of Ireland (Cambridge. 
1996) 
0 Jones, T.. Lloyd George (London, 1951) 
0 Jordan, K. (ed. ), Kilworth and Moore Park British Army Camps_f "om I S96- 
1922 (Fermoy, 2004) 
269 
" Knight, C. R. B., Historical Records of the Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment) 
3rd Foot 1919-1948 (London, 195 1) 
Knight, Colonel C. R. B, Historical Records of the Bzift. S (Royal East Kent 
Regiment) 3rd Foot 1919-1948 (London, 1951) 
0 Labour Party., Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Present 
Conditions in Ireland (London, 1920) 
" Labour Party., Report of the Labour Commission to Ireland (London. 121) 
" Laffan, M., The Partition of Ireland 1911-25 (Dublin. 1983) 
" Lawlor, S., Britain and Ireland 1914-23 (Dublin, 1983) 
" Lowe, Brevet Major T. A. Some Reflections of a Junior Commander upon 
"The Campaign" in Ireland 1920 and 1921. ' Armv Quarterly (Oct., 1922) 
0 Lyons, F. S. L., Culture and Anarchy in Ireland 1890-1939 (Oxford. 1979) 
0 Macardle, D., The Irish Republic. A Documented Chronicle of the. -1 nglo-Irish 
Conflict and the Partitioning of Ireland, U"ith a Detailed . Account of the 
Period 1916-23 (London, 193 8) 
" Maclysaght, E., Changing Times (Gerrards Cross, 1978) 
" Macready, N., Annals of an Active Life. 2 Volumes (London, 1924) 
" Martin, H., Ireland in Insurrection (London, 1921) 
" Matless, D., Landscape and Englishness (London, 1998) 
" McCartney, H., Citizen Soldiers, The Liverpool Territorials in the First 1 World 
War (Cambridge, 2005) 
0 McColgan, J., British Policy and the Irish Administration 1920-22 (London, 
1983) 
" McDermott, J., Northern Divisions: The Old I. R. A. and the Belfast Pogroms, 
1920-22 (Belfast, 2001) 
0 Mockaitis, T. R., British Counterinsurgency 1919-60 (London, 1990) 
0 Mowat, C. L., Britain Between the Wars (London, 1955) 
0 Moylan, S., In His Own Words: His Memoir of the Irish War of Independence. 
(Aubane, 2004) 
0 Mullaly, Colonel B. R, The South Lancashire Regiment, the 
Prince of It ales' 
r olunteers (Bristol, 1955) 
. Nevinson, H. W.. Last Changes, Last Chances (Plymouth, 1928) 
270 
" O'Halpin, E., The Decline of the Union: British Government in Ireland 189 2- 
1920 (Dublin, 1987) 
" O'Malley, E., On Another 
. tIan 's [Found (Dublin, 1979) 
" Oram, G., Death sentences passed by military courts of the British . 4rni1. 
1914-1924 (London, 1998) 
0 Putkowski, J., British Army Mutineers 1914-22 (London, 1998) 
" Robbins, F., Under the Starry Plough (Dublin, 1977) 
" Robertson, K. G (ed. ), British and American Approaches to Intelligence' 
(London, 1987) 
0 Robinson, L. (ed. ), Lady Gregory's Journals (Dublin, 1973) 
" Russell G. W. ("AE"), A Plea for Justice (Dublin, undated) 
0 Ryle Dwyer, T., Big Fellow, Long Fellow: A Joint Biography of Collins and 
de Valera (Dublin, 1999) 
" Ryle Dwyer, T., Tan, Terror and Troubles: Kerry's Real Fighting Store 
(Cork, 2001) 
" Sheehy Skeffington, H., British Militarism As I Have Knoit'n It (Tralee, 1946) 
" Stephens, J., The Insurrection in Dublin (Dublin, 1916) 
" Street, C. J. C. (`I. 0. '), The Administration of Ireland 1920 (London, 1921) 
" Swift, R., The Irish in Britain 1815-1914 (London, 1990) 
" Taber, R., The War of the Flea. A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and 
Practice (New York, 1965) 
0 Taylor, A. J. P., (ed. ), Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (London, 1971) 
0 Thompson, W. I.. The Imagination of an Insurrection, Dublin, Easter 1916 
(New York, 1967) 
0 Townshend, C., `The Irish Republican Army and the Development of 
Guerrilla Warfare 1916-1921' English Historical Review (Apr. 1979) 
0 Townshend, C., Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth 
Century (London, 1986) 
0 Townshend, C., The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-1921 (Oxford, 1975) 
0 Valiulis, M. G., Portrait of a Revolutionary: General Sir Richard. tlulcahy and 
the Founding of the Irish Free State (Dublin, 1992) 
" Warren, J.. History and the Historians (London, 1999) 
0 Williams, D. (ed. ), The Irish Struggle 1916-26 (London, 1966) 
271 
Zimmerman, G. D., Songs of Irish Rebellion (Dublin, 1967) 
272 
